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Crackdown On Counterfeit Networking Gear
angry tapir writes "US agencies targeting the sale of counterfeit networking hardware have gotten 30 felony convictions, including a man attempting to sell fake networking equipment to the US Marine Corps, and seized $143 million worth of fake Cisco hardware. The agencies have conducted Operation Network Raider, which has made 700 separate seizures of networking equipment since 2005, the DOJ said. In addition to the convictions and seizures, nine people are facing trial and another eight defendants are awaiting sentencing."
If people want to clone Cisco gear that's fine, just as long as they don't try to sell it to me as if it were the real thing
I suppose this is a good thing. Honestly though, I'm not entirely sure why this is considered news - the government has long been opposed to knock-offs of most things. It's a nice buff to the security community, but is so hard to detect that the over all effect is likely to negligible. I'll take a stand and say, "meh."
Still, it's better they target actual criminals than wasting our tax dollars supporting the likes of the RIAA.
The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
Daaumn. To feign to be unimpressed on slashdot. Balls of steel, man... balls of steel.
Is the fact that they were trying to sell the knock-offs to the DOD for use with Marine Corp forces. My cousin is out there right now, and to know that operation critical hardware could fail because it's a knock-off and poorly manufactured - is the worst crime. These are our troops, brothers, sisters, friends, and family members. I would hate to think my cousin died because somewhere in someplace a network card failed to relay operational data.
Of all the things I've lost; I miss my mind the most. - Mark Twain
From my understanding, Cisco uses Finisar GBICs but burns a custom serial number that IOS looks for before bringing up the port. I've made the mistake of putting a Finisar SFP in a Cisco switch and not realizing it until the port doesn't come up.
Of course, you can put a Cisco SFP in just about anything and it will work.
Not saying it makes what this guy did right, but still, if you're that sort of person who'd try to counterfeit, it would be pretty tempting.
"Well, good luck finding a judge that doesn't run a bestiality site."
Still, it's better they target actual criminals than wasting our tax dollars supporting the likes of the RIAA.
Actually, this is not too far off. The devices in question are GBICs, which are available from various sources and are as close to a commodity items as it gets in this area of networking. However, the big network equipment suppliers (such as Cisco, but they aren't the only ones doing this) order modified GBICs (with device IDs) and restrict their hardware to run only with those, and not the much, much cheaper commodity ones. It turns out that some of these manufactures produce a surplus of those special GBICs and sell them through other channels, as compatible GBICs. It's still fraud if you sell them as originals (especially if you attach stickers with logos of the relevant router maker), but it's hard to see any national security implications. More often than not, these devices are the real thing, just not rubber-stamped by the respective router vendor.
And "counterfeit networking gear" makes it sound rather dramatic. It's more like fake ink cartridges.
The only reason I'm *not* surprised that there was an actual U.S. Goverment/Military faction mentioned ITFA is the government's flame war over fair compete in regards to their many contracts that they bid out and most of the time going to the lowest bidder.
I'm a federal government IT contractor and we're going through the same heartache in the sense that we put requirements together for Enterprise XYZ switch/router/server with good justifications why we want this XYZ brand, but we may never get that item. The government people in charge of procurements will just 'internet-window' purchase something off-brand or knock-off because it was 'like' requirements we asked for, or they will go with some reseller who we've NEVER heard of before, barely has a website and their phone number is disconnected because it was cheaper than the reputable reseller we were going through by 10-fold. I'm just really not all surprised. I'd really be leery of hacked or altered firmware that make some sort of port-knocking backdoor into your network.
I work for an agency under Department of Defense. We just received about $300k worth of fake Cisco stuff. Fortunately the problem was discovered before my podmate certified the vendor's invoice.
Vendor didn't get paid and contracting is still working the issue.
we see things not as as they are, but as we are.
-- anais nin
...attempting to sell fake networking equipment to the US Marine Corps...
After all the polemic about cyber-attacks from Russia & China, this could be more sneaky. Mass-produce some Cisco knock-offs, with a backdoor, and sell 'em cheap...I can see it now:
NetAdmin1: "So, no worried about $latest_attack, then?
NetAdmin2: "Nah, just installed the latest Cisco gear. Got a good price too!!!
I've seen the counterfeit hardware first hand. Modules for 2600 and 3600 series routers, mostly. That was a few years ago. It was cheap, and nobody at the *cisco partnered CCIE training company* which I will not mention cared. They worked, thats all that mattered.
Its like spam. If people continue to buy from spam adverts, we'll continue to see more spam. If people quit buying, the spammers will eventually move to something else.
They keep selling because it keeps on working.
Nobodies Prefect
Tidbits for Techs Technology Blog
I have really mixed feelings about this. Much of this hardware is not truly counterfeit. It's actually unofficial production from the same components in the same factories as the legit gear. The only way anyone (including Cisco) can tell it from the real thing is the serial numbers.
On one hand, this is fraud an I'm all for stopping fraud. On the other, it only happens because Cisco chose to go with the dirt-cheapest labor out there knowing very well this was a likely result. The use of law enforcement resources is just externalizing the cost. Meanwhile, part of the reason U.S. domestic labor is more costly in the first place is because it exists under a regulatory framework that mostly prevents exactly this sort of fraud.
So they offshore the production and then to add insult to injury, underemployed Americans get to foot the bill for fixing the INEVITABLE fraud, and so are forced to help make the offshoring possible and profitable for Cisco. It's almost like having your employer charge you a fee to process the paperwork for your involuntary layoff.
Perhaps Cisco should bring it back onshore so this sort of fraud doesn't happen in the first place. If the DoD is really concerned about the security of the networking gear (and they really SHOULD be), they should INSIST that Cisco at least make their gear domestically.