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Thumbprints Used To Check Books Out of School Library
krou writes "Junior students at Higher Lane Primary in Whitefield, Greater Manchester, are in a trial of a system that uses their thumbprints to check out and return books from a library. The thumbprints are 'digitally transformed into electronic codes, which can then be recognized by a computer program.' The system was developed by Microsoft, and is being trialled elsewhere in the country. NO2ID condemned the system, saying it was appalling, and that 'It conditions children to hand over sensitive personal information.' The headmaster has defended the scheme, saying, 'We have researched this scheme thoroughly. It is a biometric recognition system and no image of a fingerprint is ever stored. It is a voluntary system. The thumbprint creates a mathematical template. All parents have been written to and we have told them what the system is all about. From the responses we have had there has been overwhelming support. We hold a lot of information about children because we are a school. This is no different.'"
School bans gummi bears
Big deal schools in the UK and NZ have been using this method for checking out books for ages. You try to get a six year old to remember a pin number or library card. Many also use public barcode lists of users instead due to the cost of fingerprint scanners and in some rare cases privacy concerns.
I'm fairly certain there's a hidden agenda here. They say it is a voluntary system, but what they mean is that privacy conscious students won't have access to the library. Libraries hold books. Books hold information. Information leads to knowledge. Knowledge is power.
They're taking the power away from the privacy conscious people. It's a conspiracy, I tells ya!
And no, I'm not paranoid. It's not paranoia if they really ARE out to get you.
*looks over his shoulder*
I'd rather you rationally disagree than irrationally agree.
'If Christ had tweeted the sermon on the mount, it might have lasted until nightfall.' - John Perry Barlow
The risk that someone will cut off a junior schoolchild's thumb in order to check out a library book seems to lie within acceptable bounds.
"You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
"All pupils' details are erased when they leave school."
They promise...this time is true! For real!
I briefly worked at a company which used a hand scanner in lieu of a badge. It was unwisely put between your desk and the restroom. It's no secret not everyone washes their hands after relieving themselves, so I avoided eating lunch at my desk unless I had a bottle of hand sanitizer with me.
Now imagine 4 year olds, touching everything and sucking their thumb, and then checking out a book.
Technologically, scanners work well enough. Implementation, however, is done by the foolish.
If I were a kid at that school, I'd start signing out a lot of books under a teacher's fingerprint. I'm sure a lot of them have seen the mythbusters episode where they do that sort of thing. It's not difficult.
I know a couple of schools that use the system, and unfortunately a large number of thumbs are "unscannable". This means they are singled out to carry cards or something else, which (like almost anything else that makes kids stand out from the crowd) embarrass them.
what the hell is wrong with a library CARD. hasnt this been working for years. if you cant keep up with a library card you might have problems later on in life. further than that why not just use the NAME of the student who has the book. IDIOTS!
How can we be sure there isn't some perv getting off to our children's mathematical templates?
UTF-8: There and Back Again
Personally, I'm less worried about the 'privacy' of my thumbprint, and more worried that, generally, it's too *easy* to get my thumbprint.
While this probably isn't much of a worry with a school library checkout system, I'm worried that with something like a thumbprint, which never changes, eventually it gets too easy for someone to get access to your thumbprint and 'forge' authentication/authorization.
It's the same problem I have with the use of Social Security No.s - you start out life, and your SS # is basically secret - your parents know it, and it's in the SS Admin.'s computers. Right there, though, because it is in government computers, potentially thousands of people have access to it. Now, your parents sign you up for school, and they enter your SS # info into the local school district database. Then you get a savings account at the bank, and they ask for your SS #. You apply for jobs, and they ask for your social security number. You sign up for a credit card, or a checking account, an IRA, or an application for an apartment, and they ask for your Social Security number. You apply to college, and each college wants your SS#.
By the time your 25 or 30, your Social Security number is in dozens of different databases and millions of employees have access to those databases, and your SS # is basically worthless as a 'secret' which identifies you - it's no longer secret.
You could have the same problem with biometric identification (although at first glance, that might seem impossible), because, fundamentally, biometric information such as a fingerprint, retina scan, or DNA sequence, is reproducible data - ultimately, no system can guarantee that the actual finger or eye or DNA was scanned - all that the 'server' can verify is that the correct 'data' corresponding to previously recorded data, was transmitted over the network to the server. So, compromise a terminal (or setup a computer which masquerades as a valid 'terminal'), then send the correct 'data' from that terminal, and the server will assume that the user's thumb or retina was scanned.
I'm really can't offer any advice on a better alternative, but mark my words - if biometric identification becomes widespread, the identity thieves will not have too much difficulty adapting - as the biometric id becomes widespread, it will get harder and harder to keep the identification 'data' secret, and fraudsters will steal that data like any other bit of data, and misuse it.
The *real* security threat is that people will start to get a stronger and stronger belief in the 'infallibility' of such biometric identification, and so people will lose the ability to repudiate false authorizations. Juries and judges, if they have too strong of an assurance on the evidence provided by biometric identification, may produce verdicts/rulings which unjustly penalize innocent people.
"My gummy bear owns the membership, but he's disabled and I'm his method of transport.".
which is totally what she said
Honestly, I don't get the almost pathological paranoia people have surrounding the concept of privacy, without regard to the reality of it. Your fingerprints are not private, you leave thousands of them unsecured around you every day without a second thought...exactly why they should NOT be used as a security key, but that's a different discussion. People should be worried about the improper use and implementation of "security" methodologies, not acting like tinfoil hat wearing nutjobs because someone wants to store the fingerprints they leave on every doorknob in the city.
Same goes for Social Security number paranoia. News flash people, your SSN is NOT private, it is not a secret, it is an identification number...nothing more. No different from the street address on your house, just more permanent. The problem comes from institutions USING it like it was secret, instead of a password or PIN. The solution is not to try to belatedly make SSN something it isn't and won't ever be, the solution is to refuse to accept companies using public information (your SSN number) as if it were secret.