Microsoft Eyes PC Isolation Ward To Thwart Botnets
CWmike writes "In a paper published Wednesday (PDF), Scott Charney, who heads Microsoft's trustworthy computing group, spelled out a concept of 'collective defense' that he said was modeled after public health measures like vaccinations and quarantines. The aim: To block botnet-infected computers from connecting to the Internet. Under the proposal, PCs would be issued a 'health certificate' that showed whether the system was fully patched, that it was running security software and a firewall, and that it was malware-free. Machines with deficiencies would require patching or an antivirus update, while bot-infected PCs might be barred from the Internet."
I have a simpler pc health idea, stop installing the disease that is windows.
And who exactly is going to pay for this? If your system is not infected can you be exempted from a "monthly fee" or is it punishing everyone when Windows is the majority of infections? Maybe Microsoft should pay for it all?
Shh.
If you want to model how our body recognises and deals with disease, you need to concentrate on whitelists, rather than blacklists. Vaccinations are similar to a community blacklist, but for most pathogens our own immune system can work out what things are appropriate to reject.
Ask me about repetitive DNA
This is a not-at-all-terrible idea that will ensure people are up to date with such security patches as WGA. Bravo, Microsoft, bravo.
RUN NORTON OR NO INTERNET
If those are my only two choices, I'll take NO INTERNET please.
RIP America
July 4, 1776 - September 11, 2001
Can you imagine the hysterics if the government had proposed this! But it's a company, so I'm sure it's all OK.
There is no cure for stupid.
M$ should be bared from the Internet.
Why do you make me think of naked Ballmer? What did I ever do to you?
If Microsoft or anyone else were capable of certifying a computer to be malware free, and being right about it, malware wouldn't be much of a problem, now would it?
File under "Dumb Ideas"
You can't see ANYTHING from a car, You've got to get out of the goddamned contraption and walk...Edward Abbey
They just want to lock out Open-Source OSes, which won't have such a procedure due to the fact that it doesn't use binary-only distros with checksums built into the low-level OS.
Where is the USDOJ when you need them to remind Microsoft about their recent trip down anti-trust lane? Not to mention a nasty little thing called "collusion" - whichever AV and PKI vendors are selected naturally benefit, and I imagine all the ISPs will have to agree to enforce this as well or suffer some consequence.
A framework like this makes two assumptions that spell doom for future innovation by free thinkers: Microsoft Windows on every consumer device that connects to the Internet and every device using "Microsoft approved/recognized security software." Not a bad approach at first blush since that describes a large part of the marketplace and at least 100% of the problem, but honestly - there are better ways to solve this than trying to fit the future Internet ecosystem into Ballmer's limited imagination.
Read the paper. Please. And look for it soon as a key exhibit at the next anti-trust action against Microsoft.
Being anti-virus protected and updated sounds like a great idea until you ask questions like "which vendors of antivirus are excluded?" and "which updates will Microsoft push as critical that are just another piece of crapware or something that would break compatibility with something important to the user?"
Microsoft should be responsible. They should push out adblockers and javascript blockers. It makes browsing a lot safer. Oh no... commercial interests would be pissed and we know those interests are of more importance/significance than the end users are... remember Vista and all that DRM encumbered crap? We all know they had the consumer in mind when they did that.
It seems like most everybody doesn't understand (or notice footnote 14 on page 5) that, in order for this to work, all the subject devices must have trusted processing capability. That means "TPM" chips, signed OS kernels / hypervisors, and the inability to run untrusted root-level code. Take a second to laugh at the idea that anyone will be able to introduce a bug-free hypervisor / TPM environment that can't run unsigned and untrusted code. After you're done laughing at that I'd recommend being angered at the notion of such a thing, since it will effectively eliminate control of the devices owned by consumers.. turning every device with a "clean bill of health" into a walled-garden appliance. As long as consumers own and control their general purpose devices there will never be a way to do what this paper describes. Frankly, I'm alright with that. We'd do a lot better to just assume that every device is untrusted and act accordingly.
The Attitude Adjuster, I hate me, you can too.
I'm sure Linux and other systems will just spoof the certificate.
Which brings up the bigger question of "how do you supply a health certificate?" You can't expect the computer to respond properly, because any virus would just spoof the right answer. You *might* be able to have the local machine certified by a remote machine, but IP addresses change constantly, and then it's just a question of spoofing to the certifying machine.
On a practical scale, how can this even work?
The ______ Agenda
Sorry, but Microsoft lost my trust more than a decade ago. Microsoft is like an abusive boyfriend who says "Trust me - I've changed, this time is really different ..."
The only right response to both is "Drop dead!"
-- Barbie