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Stuxnet Virus Now Biggest Threat To Industry
digitaldc writes "A malicious computer attack that appears to target Iran's nuclear plants can be modified to wreak havoc on industrial control systems around the world, and represents the most dire cyberthreat known to industry, government officials and experts said Wednesday. They warned that industries are becoming increasingly vulnerable to the so-called Stuxnet worm as they merge networks and computer systems to increase efficiency. The growing danger, said lawmakers, makes it imperative that Congress move on legislation that would expand government controls and set requirements to make systems safer."
This is a wake-up call to a new vulnerability. There are a helluva lot worse ways to have found out about it than this relatively innocuous version. It also exposes stupid weaknesses like the fact that all Siemens PLC's (programmable logic controllers) have a hard-coded password that was never meant to be changed, and that all the obscure proprietary software in the world on PLC's doesn't mean jack for security--because they all still have to take their orders from a machine running it software on regular old Windows.
We could have realized these vulnerabilities only after a bunch of stuff started exploding.
SJW: Someone who has run out of real oppression, and has to fake it.
Don't use Windows for important industrial systems.
There's no reason why these machines should be connected to the internet. Maybe some of the top-level communication computers to coordinate between plants, but certainly not the local-area computers/machines.
"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." - historian Evelyn Beatrice Hall
I would think that the risk of prolonged downtime in a factory that plows through millions of dollars a day would be enough of an incentive for any manager to tighten their security.
A fair number of people have labeled me a socialist, and even I can see that this is nothing more than a blatent attempt at a power grab by the federal government, and profiteering by Symantec.
Dean Turner, director of the Global Intelligence Network at Symantec Corp., told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee that the "real-world implications of Stuxnet are beyond any threat we have seen in the past."
So we're having people who stand to gain more power over their country men making a decision about taking that power, receiving testimony about the threat from the company that stands to profit the most by their decision to take the power. Yeah, that's not a recipe for a horrendous outcome.
-Rick
"Most people in the U.S. wouldn't know they live in a tyrannical state if it walked up and grabbed their junk." - MyFirs
When the last time the government solved the problem that it told you it was trying to solve?
For the love of god! You cannot create another Chernobyl, it had ZERO core containment. US reactors have 12 feet thick concrete surrounding the core! It *may* melt down, but then it's entombed in tons of concrete, so there isn't much to worry about! Equating a meltdown to Chernobyl is naive.
As an AC this post will never see the light of day, but I really wish people would stop being so afraid of nuclear power, it's really our only hope to get off fossil fuels any time soon.
Many of the comments here seem to be unaware of what Stuxnet actually is or how it works. Symantec has a great whitepaper on it that is updated as they learn more. 50 pages of technical detail. Of course you can read the executive summary and at least avoid making the kinds of uniformed comments I'm seeing here.
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf
Just a Few:
1. "People are so stupid to connect their industrial control system to the internet!"
Stuxnet does not require internet access. It delivers its payload in various ways, and in particular, if an infected USB stick is inserted into a susceptible machine, it will find a machine on that network with the Siemens PLC development environment and infect it in such a way to insert hidden malicious code into the PLC.
2. "Just don't run Windows"
There is some validity to this idea. But the payload was not delievered to a Windows machine, just via one. How many embedded controller development environments require a Windows machine? Try coding a Xilinx FPGA without a Windows box, or just about anything out there without one.
3. "We could have seen this coming"
Most people did see this coming. But they didn't think it was actually plausible to defend against. The Stuxnet worm required a huge amount of resources and detailed knowledge to pull off. Everything from the payload to the infection method. Someone really thought this through. It is a proof of concept of what people generally believed to be only possible in theory.
The fact that government is getting involved here is a bit worrisome. I hope they at least pay attention to the existing specifications already out there to help mitigate some of these threats. NIST 800-82 is a decent read that is free (final public draft) and there are other pay ones out there as well.
The reason why I am kindof annoyed about people's ignorance about Stuxnet is because the biggest lesson learned from it is largely being ignored. 1. That "air gap" protection you think you have is not as good as you think it is. 2. The "insider threat" is worth thinking about, even if you trust your insiders. They may not know they are a threat.