HTTPS Everywhere Gets Firesheep Protection
coondoggie writes "The Electronic Frontier Foundation today said it rolled out a version of HTTPS Everywhere that
offers protection against 'Firesheep' and other tools that seek to exploit webpage security flaws. Hitting the streets in October, Firesheep caused a storm of controversy over its tactics, ethics and Web security in general. Firesheep sniffs unencrypted cookies sent across open WiFi networks for unsuspecting visitors to Web sites such as Facebook and Twitter, and lets the user take on those visitors' log-in credentials."
There's no substitute for end-to-end encryption.
Wait, unencrypted signals sent over the air with your password and login is bad? If only someone had told me... /snark
Seriously though: Unencrypted. Open. Network. Come'on guys.
#fuckbeta #iamslashdot #dicemustdie
Stated simply, many web sites just can't handle https.
Does it parse the webpage you are on and rewrite every link to use HTTPS or, better, does it intercept every request Firefox makes and rewrite that before it is sent?
The reason I'm interested is that I want to create an extension that does rewrites in the latter way described, but don't know how to do it.
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A self signed certificate would be fine for most of what HTTPS Everywhere does.
End to end encryption is for stuff that really matters, not facebook and other crap that's public to the internet anyway.
The 0.9.0 release of HTTPS Everywhere is a new beta version designed to offer improved protection against Firesheep. Most notably, it can provide much better protection for Facebook, Twitter and Hotmail accounts, as well as completely new protection for bit.ly, Dropbox, Amazon AWS, Evernote, Cisco and Github. Unfortunately, in order to obtain maximum Firesheep protection, especially on Facebook, you must take two extra steps:
'The tyrant will always find pretext for his tyranny.' - Aesop's Fables
If you are using an open wireless you have the same http/https issues everyone else has, regardless of the device you are using.
It's actually pretty common, and possibly even the norm.
You can't just use a pre-shared key, so you have to use WPA enterprise. (a PSK is only slightly better than open, for privacy, if everyone knows it, and not terribly useful for regulating access to the network if you only want school affiliates to use the wireless resources).
Often times you can't use the more common EAP types because the authentication data isn't stored in a way that's friendly to your radius servers.
So now you have to write all sorts of documentation like "download this application that will take over your laptop's wireless card and you'll lose all your old network configs" or "Look for how your wireless card's supplicant configures EAP, and chose EAP-TLS, and then if it asks, select from the list of trusted certificate authorities verisign." Now get this information to all the users without standing around with out hiring a town crier, and hope that users actually read *and understand* the information when they don't even know if they've got a 32 of 64 bit system...
So, while it is simple for you to configure your linksys wireless network at home, it isn't nearly as easy in the real world.
It's not as simple as that. The traffic is encrypted only during one part of the way from your computer to the server, so cookies can be sniffed anywhere from the wireless router to the server. But it is as simple as using HTTPS. Then all traffic is encrypted all the way from your computer to the server, and you also have the stronger guarantee that your computer is talking to the server you think it is, so you cookies cannot be sniffed by third parties. StartSSL offers free SSL certificates to allow any site to encrypt all of its traffic.
What a fool believes, he sees, no wise man has the power to reason away.
It can be done, but it's not being done - that's why this happens.
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Enterprise or Pre-shared key WPA? Pre-shared keys are only marginally better than open, if everyone knows the key. If I know the PSK, I can force you to rekey your session then your traffic is unencrypted to me and I can use firesheep on you.
And the fact that they use "mac-filter" leads me to think it is just PSK.
That isn't to say these mechanisms are completely worthless, but they're not super-valuable.
And I stand by my initial statement -- enterprise WPA in a university setting where you don't manage the end stations is hard.
Here's a way of handling certs which doesn't rely on those organizations: Perspectives
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~perspectives/