TEPCO Unveils Plan To Deal With Fukushima Crisis
RedEaredSlider writes "Tokyo Electric Power Co. unveiled its plan for dealing with the crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl. TEPCO said the radiation levels should drop over the next three months. It will take about six months for the reactors to achieve 'cold shutdown' in which the temperature of the water inside the reactor is less than 100 degrees Celsius (212 F). The current plan for cooling the reactors will mean injecting nitrogen into the reactor pressure vessel. All four damaged reactors experienced hydrogen explosions when water, heated by nuclear fuel, turned to steam and reacted with the zirconium alloy cladding of the fuel rods. Hydrogen, when exposed to oxygen, combusts. Nitrogen is an inert gas, so TEPCO hopes that it will prevent further explosions."
Your assertion then is that they have done and are doing nothing?
Pack your bags, smart ass, we are sending you over there to run into the plant and turn on the cooling pumps.
Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
Well, that and prepare for unforeseen consequences...
It's above 100C. The coolant is constantly flowing, and under pressure; or, if the pressure vessel is breached, it's just flowing and there's steam being generated constantly.
When the temperature stays below 100C, presumably when the water is standing and not flowing, then the reactor is considered cold.
That's in six months, when the low-level reactions in the fuel have run through their half-lives enough that they don't generate heat faster than non-boiling water can pull it away.
I wonder WTF their contingency plan is if a big tsunami hits now ...
I strongly believe we know how to set up technical systems for safe nuclear power. However I'm extremely sceptical of the idea that we know how to set up social / administrative systems for safe nuclear power. It's too easy to hide systemic weakness behind secrecy, or too embarrassing to identify and fix present failings, or the debate gets too polarised and ideological so people, politicians and regulatory systems lose sight of the actual safety issues because of the headline effect etc.
I wouldn't be quick to blame money or corruption or unscrupulous people, either. The key problem is secrecy -- even without malice, familiarity makes you blind to system flaws -- we software people know this very well. Only total transparency can ensure that flaws do not get hidden. On the other hand I don't know how this can be reconciled with security against sabotage.
There's a need for a sober, measured debate about all this and it's a pity that a few fundamentalists (on both sides) are making this impossible.
perl -e 'fork||print for split//,"hahahaha"'
You would hope. But given that they don't seem to have been prepared for foreseen circumstances*, I'm not betting on their team until I see management make some trades.
* - the 10-meter tsunami was the unforeseen circumstance. Everything after it was foreseeable, and there were design choices that guaranteed a destructive cascade once the power went out. Allowing the buildings to explode and damage the systems used to keep the buildings from exploding more is a pretty major fuckup in the realm of reliability engineering. The use of zinc cladding, the lack of effective venting for the hydrogen, the proximity of the explosion to components that could be damaged in a hydrogen explosion, blockage of access by debris from the explosion... Someone 40 years ago said that having backup generators would prevent these things from happening, and didn't consider what if the generators simply broke and couldn't be replaced. Even though they may have known what could be done.
Oh, and there's the part about how they did get generators rushed to the site, but the electrical connections didn't match up so they couldn't use them. I'm still not sure that's been reported right, because what the fuck?
Normally, cold shutdown takes a few days. At Three Mile Island, it took two weeks. Six months is worrisome. Too many more things can go wrong during that period.
They still have so little information about what's going on inside the reactors. Check the latest JAIF status report. Pressure is unknown. Temperature is unknown. Water level is unknown. "Fuel rods exposed partially or fully". Reactors 1 and 3 are buried under piles of rubble. And they have to fix the plumbing under that debris.
Iodine-131 has a half-life of eight days but Cesium-137 has a much longer half-life of 30 years.
30 years of maintaining a leaking plant that is in shambles and too hot to enter.
This says nothing about the plutonium in the other reactor.
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3906/fepc-info-sheet-414#more-1429
Sig Battery depleted. Reverting to safe mode.
Sigh.
N2 is inert, unless they're planning on planting peanuts in the reactor room...
The boiling temp of water rises with pressure. So under pressure, water can be above 100 C and still liquid (ignoring partial pressure of course). The submersible Alvin had a close encounter with this when they discovered the first deep water thermal vents. They were trying to move in for a closer look, when someone glanced at the temperature gauge and realized the water temperature at the manipulator arm (>400 F) was hotter than the melting point of the Plexiglas windows (320 F).
What's magic about 100 C is that even if a pipe bursts and you lose pressure, the system is guaranteed to remain stable. With a rapid depressurization, the temperature will drop (think of a can of compressed air getting colder as you use it). So if your initial temp is 100 C under pressure, the final temp after depressurization will be below 100 C. If it were above 100 C, some or all of the water would flash into steam if a pipe burst.
When Hydrogen U. played Oxygen Tech,
The game had just begun,
When Hydrogen racked up two quick points,
And Oxygen still had none.
Then, Oxygen scored a single goal,
And, thus, it did remain,
Hydrogen 2, Oxygen 1,
Called because of rain.
Johnny Hart - "BC"
Why, without your clothes, you're naked, Miss Dudley!
...the problem with this entire situation is that Japan let commercial companies run their entire nuclear infrastructure. I'm not sure about you folks, but all commercial companies do exactly what is required within the letter of the law, but not an ounce more if it would cost more money. Sure, it's a 40 year old facility, sure it was built within the specs for the time. But it was still operational in 2011.
Question is, would a public-run utility design and build nuclear infrastructure to within the letter of the law or would they 'overbuild' for safety? Is this entire situation the cause of capitalism running into its core fault - its lack of concern for the expensive 'doing the right thing' vs the cheaper 'doing things right.'? I don't really know, but it smacks of the reality of letting a company totally focused on making and saving money vs making decisions to protect the people of Japan.
Management is doing things right; leadership is doing the right things. - Peter F. Drucker
They didn't say they're waiting for it to be safe enough to hug.
They're just waiting for it to be cool enough to dismantle.
It's still going to be a radioactive nightmare when they have to do that.
You would hope. But given that they don't seem to have been prepared for foreseen circumstances*, I'm not betting on their team until I see management make some trades.
* - the 10-meter tsunami was the unforeseen circumstance. Everything after it was foreseeable, and there were design choices that guaranteed a destructive cascade once the power went out. Allowing the buildings to explode and damage the systems used to keep the buildings from exploding more is a pretty major fuckup in the realm of reliability engineering. The use of zinc cladding, the lack of effective venting for the hydrogen, the proximity of the explosion to components that could be damaged in a hydrogen explosion, blockage of access by debris from the explosion... Someone 40 years ago said that having backup generators would prevent these things from happening, and didn't consider what if the generators simply broke and couldn't be replaced. Even though they may have known what could be done.
Oh, and there's the part about how they did get generators rushed to the site, but the electrical connections didn't match up so they couldn't use them. I'm still not sure that's been reported right, because what the fuck?
You would hope. But given that they don't seem to have been prepared for foreseen circumstances*, I'm not betting on their team until I see management make some trades.
* - the 10-meter tsunami was the unforeseen circumstance. Everything after it was foreseeable, and there were design choices that guaranteed a destructive cascade once the power went out. Allowing the buildings to explode and damage the systems used to keep the buildings from exploding more is a pretty major fuckup in the realm of reliability engineering. The use of zinc cladding, the lack of effective venting for the hydrogen, the proximity of the explosion to components that could be damaged in a hydrogen explosion, blockage of access by debris from the explosion... Someone 40 years ago said that having backup generators would prevent these things from happening, and didn't consider what if the generators simply broke and couldn't be replaced. Even though they may have known what could be done.
Oh, and there's the part about how they did get generators rushed to the site, but the electrical connections didn't match up so they couldn't use them. I'm still not sure that's been reported right, because what the fuck?
I heard about the back up generators delivered on day two of this incident. Unfortunately I don't have time to track sources right now (I am at work and my initial Google search turned up nothing).
The fact that the generator did not match up goes back to the 1800s
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/24/134828205/a-country-divided-japans-electric-bottleneck.
"That's partly an accident of history. Eastern Japan followed the German model and has a 50-cycle electrical power grid. The western part of Japan used the American model and has a 60-cycle grid. Transferring power from one grid to another requires a very expensive facility. And there are only three connections between eastern and western Japan. That bottleneck means the power transfer is just a trickle, even during this national emergency. Creating more capacity would take years."
Liquid nitrogen is less effective than water at extracting heat. I ran through the calcs a few weeks ago:
http://news.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=2039038&cid=35501128
N2 is as close to inert as you're going to get, in that kind of quantity, for the nickel Tepco has left to its name.
It takes some interesting lock-picking to pry those two N's apart and fix them to hydrogen. Mere banging won't do it.
I'm saying they don't really have to do anything else, and basically aren't, besides keeping stasis until the thing cools off.
Uh no. They can't just keep doing what they're doing and wait. It's more urgent than that. With the rupture in unit 2 (believed to be in the suppression tank), that water they have to keep pumping in keeps coming out bringing highly radioactive particles from the damaged fuels rods along. They pumped over 100 tons of it out of one tunnel only to have it fill back up within two days. They may have briefly interrupted what's getting into the ocean, but it is piling up and needs to be dealt with soon.
They're injecting nitrogen into unit 1 hoping to reduce the chance of a hydrogen explosion, but the pressure not rising indicates a leak. They've said it may be venting contaminated gases. (but don't be too surprised if it turns out they are unintentionally pushing more contaminated water out somewhere)
For some pretty good articles check out what the media over there are saying.
Here's a six part series on how Tepco and the government have complicated matters.
It has many details no covered by most U.S. media.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110416002672.htm
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110415004983.htm
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110414006040.htm
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110413004031.htm
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110412006319.htm
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110411004567.htm
It's no noble gas; but N2 is pretty mild mannered. Nitrogen fixation generally requires either really clever enzymes(as with nitrogen fixing bacteria) or fairly abusive temperature and pressure along with a catalyst(as with the Haber Process). It is commonly used as a shield gas for welding of many of the less zesty metals; because it is probably the best-placed material on the cost/inertness curve. Nitrogen, liquid or compressed gas, is dirt cheap compared to any genuinely inert gas, and is inert enough for quite a few applications.
Compounds with a high proportion of nitrogen atoms, on the other hand, are to be considered guilty until someone who loves their fingers less than you do has finished proving them innocent...
People have argued the roads were out. But It's only a couple of hours by boat from Tokyo harbor, where there are ships and floating cranes and probably ten thousand spare generators, or even some non-spare ones that could be ripped out and moved because someone thinks stopping a nuclear meltdown is more important than flashing the Hitachi sign on the Ginza.
Instead they spent weeks unspooling cable from another grid. Retarded.
To hug nuclear waste, you need nuclear arms!
Or perhaps they could have fixed the generators?
Too many nuclear scientists and not enough diesel mechanics.
Godaddy is a scam and a ripoff.
TEPCO will not use liquid nitrogen to cool the reactor (other than incidentally). TEPCO will use liquid nitrogen because that is the form in which one manufactures and ships large quantities of nitrogen gas. They will still use water for primary cooling, and use nitrogen to dilute any hydrogen that is accumulating inside the containment.
Hydrogen has a wide explosive range of 4%-75% at STP in an otherwise normal atmospheric mix. By introducing appropriate amounts of nitrogen into an enclosed space, TEPCO can dilute the hydrogen in the escaping gas to a point where it cannot explode
Very simplified example: Escaping gas is 4% H2 and 96% N2. Air is about 20% O2. Now consider a mix of: 4 parts H2, 96 parts N2, 25 parts O2. Merely adding the oxygen necessary to bring levels up to those found in air creates mixture that is about 3.2% H2, 76.8% N2, and 20% O2. The hydrogen drops below its LEL. There's more flexibility in real life since the atmosphere is a 78/21/other mixture, but then there's safety factors and other complications as well.
This misconception has been going around quite a bit, so let me correct again.
Reactors were not designed to only last 40 years. 40 years is just the number the license period the original Atomic Energy Commission decided on based on the reactors being designed to last [i]at least[/i] 40 years, and to be re-evaluated periodically thereafter. This was because there was no prior knowledge or experience in this type of engineering. 40 and 60 year old reactors are not clunkers waiting to fall apart, they are just as safe (actually safer, due to upgrades) as the day they were built.
Yes, but in various contexts. What you have to understand here is that the nuclear apologists, having exhausted their initial denial options: it's overblown (er, yes it blew)! it's not chernobyl (nope, and it might get worse than chernobyl due to all that used fuel stored onsite)! the release is mostly iodine (so was chernobyl)! the containment vessels held (nope)! it was a black swan (sorry, but that wasn't the biggest tsunami to his japan in the past two centuries)! the radionuclide are mostly diluted into the ocean (where they will bioaccumulate into the predator species we like to eat)!
So now they're moving on to blaming the plant operators, becuase, you know, nuclear power is pure and beautiful and the technology itself cannot have systemic flaws. Next they'll seize on some tangent and argue that to death amongst themselves in order to avoid occupying their minds with the fact that the business of running nuclear plants is as corrupt, short-cut ridden, and plagued with short-term outlook as any other business.
way more people than are gonna die from this event.
Yep. The hideously deformed babies born from pregnancies affected by radioisotopes, the ocean fish stock die-offs, and the early cancers hidden in the statistical noise, don't count as actual "deaths", so it's all good.
You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
Because it doesn't have a dock? It's not meant to be a port. In fact they built a 20 ft high wall to keep out the sea :)
Shame they needed a 35 foot wall...
People in cars cause accidents....accidents in cars cause people
I remember hearing that the generators they needed were way too heavy to be lifted even by the largest helicopter.
We don't see the world as it is, we see it as we are.
-- Anais Nin