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Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness?

astroengine writes "Quantum theory is often seen as the root cause of unrelated, mysterious phenomena. Take consciousness for example. British physicist Roger Penrose recently argued 'that we will need to invoke 'new physics and exotic biological structures': rewriting quantum theory to make sense of consciousness.' But why do this, especially as there is no apparent causal link between quantum mechanics and the conscious mind? There appears to be a very basic logical fallacy here that even the most prominent physicists seem to be making."

73 of 729 comments (clear)

  1. What fallacy? by Threni · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Care to state it?

    1. Re:What fallacy? by SanityInAnarchy · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Is randomness really more satisfying than determinism? Is there really more "free will", by any useful definition?

      No, I think the appeal is that it appears random, and that we don't (yet) understand a mechanism by which the waveform collapses into one state or another, other than that it collapses with more frequency in some places than others. It's essentially a god-of-the-gaps argument, only this time for "consciousness" or "free will"...

      It is, of course, pure speculation. Worse, we are learning more and more about how the brain actually works, and I suspect at some point we will come to terms with the fact that what we call "consciousness" is an emergent phenomenon of the brain, and that it is no more free than a glider in Conway's Game of Life.

      Now, is it actually a fallacy? I suspect there's an informal one in there somewhere -- it certainly feels ad-hoc.

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    2. Re:What fallacy? by monoqlith · · Score: 2

      Here's a shot:

      The people who think quantum mechanics is going to explain consciousness are making a category error. Epistemologically speaking, it may very well be that quantum mechanics explains certain aspects of our cognition. But these aspects - i.e. its features of memory, attention, selectivity, planning - are often referred to, particularly by Jeffrey Chalmers, the "easy" problem of consciousness. This is because, as cognitive science has already shown, cognition can usefully be broken down into modules and explained as information processing subsystems which themselves are explained by the structure of the neural tissue they reside in.

      The hard problem of mind is another story altogether. This is the problem of phenomenal consciousness, the quality of "what is it like?" It is the problem of how experience arises at all. The problem is with saying that "Certain theories are insufficient for explaining consciousness, but if we just go *smaller*, i.e., add more detail to our theory, the mystery of how experience arises will be solved." I'm afraid this is not so, beecause we are trying to bridge the fundamental gap between two epistemological kinds: subject and object. Both subject and object may very well emerge from the same neural substrate, but exactly how they do so might also be empirically unverifiable. I cannot compare your subjective experience. I cannot connect our two brains together and examine your experience - as soon as it is in my brains it is my experience. And most importantly of all, I cannot ask a computer whether it feels certain things and be able to verify that its response is the truth. No matter how much physical detail is in our theory, I am afraid that a physical theory will always be in the realm of the objective, and the question we're asking is about subjective experience. And so this is a philosophical question, and I'm not even sure philosophy will ever have a suitable response.

    3. Re:What fallacy? by gilleain · · Score: 2

      To be fair, there are cases where quantum effects have surprising macro-level effects. Superfluidity of liquid Helium, and Hawking radiation are good examples. Not that I disagree with you in principle (the fallacy being the presupposition of consciousness as being anything other than a low-entropy state that requires constant energy input to maintain itself), but it is perfectly reasonable to think it's possible that quantum chemistry could cause unexpected physiological phenomena (olfaction is one known example of this).

      Well sure, there are tons of biological examples of quantum chemistry triggering larger effects. Light absorbed by the eye can involve a single photon, which triggers a conformation change in retinal, which alters the conformation of the protein that binds it, which in turn effects a phosphorylation cascade leading to membrane depolarization, which leads - through some neurotransmitters and such - to events in the brain.

      I'm sure I've mis-remembered many of the details, but you get the point? :)

      Anyway, this is quite different from consciousness requiring quantum-level stuff for it to work all the time. Where are the evolutionary intermediates for this process? Did the brain suddenly discover quantum mechanics when it reached a certain level of complexity? It seems improbable

    4. Re:What fallacy? by Dogtanian · · Score: 2

      I believe what he was talking about was the implied reasoning that "quantum physics is weird, mysterious and counterintuitive... and consciousness is also weird, mysterious and counterintuitive. Therefore the former might explain the latter."

      I don't know which particular fallacy this would fall under, but I'm pretty sure that there must be one it fits.

      BTW, I never understood why it was believed that quantum physics would explain consciousness. I'm not saying that it doesn't, I just haven't seen an explanation of why so many suspect that this might be the case. I'd assumed it was more than the above flawed reasoning. That's aside from the fact that the issue of consciousness- ever since I first considered it- always seemed to be to me to be a profoundly philosophical riddle that I wasn't convinced science could answer. How can you "prove" to yourself that anything else is "conscious", to reliably differentiate it from something that merely *appears* conscious to your *own* satisfaction... and is the question meaningful anyway?

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    5. Re:What fallacy? by Dogtanian · · Score: 2

      It's essentially a god-of-the-gaps argument, only this time for "consciousness" or "free will"...

      Yes, assuming you've represented their position fairly, I'd say that I agree with you there.

      BTW, I think you're making the mistake of tying together the issues of consciousness and free will. They seem to me to be two distinct phenomena.

      The fact that my brain working somehow creates a conscious "me" and what and how that "me" comes to be or exists (if it does!) is- regardless of whether or not I have "free will"- an issue in its own right.

      As for "free will", my gut attitude is that the only answer is that it's a philosophical matter whose (non-)answer essentially comes down to perspective and viewpoint because the issue is essentially circular. "Free" from what? The way fate put our brains together? But the brain itself is the thing which would be "free" to exercise (or not) this "free will" anyway so if something "has" free will... what is exercising it? IMHO the question only has meaning from our own perspective, not as something "absolute".

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    6. Re:What fallacy? by Zaphod+The+42nd · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I suspect at some point we will come to terms with the fact that what we call "consciousness" is an emergent phenomenon of the brain, and that it is no more free than a glider in Conway's Game of Life.

      Bingo.

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    7. Re:What fallacy? by ScrewMaster · · Score: 2

      Conflating the unfounded conjecture (AKA WAG) that QM has something to do with consciousness with a claim that QM "explains" consciousness.

      Yes, but it sounds very impressive to those without a background in philosophy.

      Or biology, or neuroscience, or any of a hundred other disciplines requiring a basic grounding in scientific method. This is yet another "the nature of consciousness is unknowable" argument, which just leads to the idea that only a supreme being could possibly impart it to inanimate matter. Wait until the first true AI of significant power makes its appearance. Assuming it doesn't start out like Skynet and wipe us off the face of the planet, it's going to make for a lot of very red faces.

      I was rather smugly informed by a gentleman a few years ago that "there can be no spontaneous rise to intelligence." I told him to look in the mirror.

      --
      The higher the technology, the sharper that two-edged sword.
    8. Re:What fallacy? by Boronx · · Score: 2

      Can free will be distinguished from randomness?

      A brain is extremely sensitive to tiny changes in input. If such changes are truly random then in no way are we like a glider. And what goes on in side a brain when a decision rests on a knife's edge?

    9. Re:What fallacy? by Black+Parrot · · Score: 2

      No. In ENM, Penrose was saying that there is something we don't understand in physics that is needed to explain consciousness. This is because all of physics that we understand can be simulated on a turing machine

      The notion that the universe has the same limitations is not an established fact; it's merely one of several competing conjectures.

      and the first part of his book contained a proof that the human brain could do something a turing machine cannot.

      How widely accepted is his proof? I know he has made contributions to our knowledge of the universe, but he tends toward the whack-a-doodle. And even sane people tend to get carried away when arguing about what the brain can do.

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    10. Re:What fallacy? by narcc · · Score: 2

      As for "free will", my gut attitude is that the only answer is that it's a philosophical matter whose (non-)answer essentially comes down to perspective and viewpoint because the issue is essentially circular. "Free" from what? The way fate put our brains together?

      It's not "Free from ...", it's "Free to ...". Let's break it down.

      The "will" part is easy. To will is to commit to a course of action. The ability to carry out your will is irrelevant. Will is in the choosing, not in the doing. (A lot of people seem to confuse "free will" with "freedom to act" and say absurd things like 'my will isn't free because I can't fly'. Putting physical limits aside for clarity, belief is also not subject to the will for the same reason.)

      The "free" part is harder. For your will to be free, means that you had the capacity to choose otherwise. This does not just mean that there were other possibilities, but that you had the ability to choose.

      If your will is determined, then there is no element of choice; thus no free will. If there is a random element then, similarly, you lack the capability to choose, as choice is different that merely the potential for difference randomness provides. Suffice it to say that randomness doesn't gain you any freedom.

      Moving on, I don't see anything "circular". From the GP, I don't see any "god-of-the-gaps"-type argument either.

      I'll define consciousness simply as 'subjective experience'. It should be obvious by now that classical physics can not supply an answer to the problem. (To say that consciousness is an emergent phenomenon is not an answer. It's as unsatisfying, and oddly less explanatory, as saying it happens by magic!) The last real hope there was computationalism, and no one save William Rapaport really takes that idea seriously anymore.

      There is hope, some think, in the especially weird bits of quantum mechanics where the observer seems to play a leading role. An observer capable of ... observation (having subjective experience) seems inescapably necessary. If you believe that consciousness can be explained in physical terms, that seem to be the obvious place to start looking. Now, Penrose isn't saying "here's a gap, that's where it must be", he's saying this is a good place to look if the physics works out a particular way. In "shadows of the mind" he offers his Orch-OR theory, and a number of tests.

      Penrose could very easily be wrong, but he's far too accomplished to dismiss out-of-hand -- he isn't positing anything mystical, after all. If we can take anything away from his three books on the subject, it's that if science is to explain consciousness, we need new physics. On that point, it's difficult to disagree.

  2. As the saying goes... by camperdave · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Quantum Mechanics: The dreams stuff is made from...

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  3. Recently? by roguegramma · · Score: 3, Informative

    By "recently" you mean "in the previous century"? He's been arguing this since his book "The Emperor's New Mind" in 1989. Maybe he has some new ideas, but your summary doesn't tell..

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    1. Re:Recently? by Angostura · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Indeed, I waded though The Emperors New Mind when it was first published and was very disappointed. As far as I could tell, the argument was something along the lines of "consciousness is mysterious and complex and hopefully non-deterministic. Quantum effects are mysterious and complex and non deterministic. Consciousness is probably a quantum-based phenomenon then".

      So I went back to reading Dennett and Hoftstadter.

    2. Re:Recently? by djl4570 · · Score: 2

      I read both The Emperor's New Mind and Gödel Escher Bach, An Eternal Golden Braid when they first came out and thought the GEB offered a lot more insight into consciousness, thought, self awareness, and self referential structures. At the physical level quantum mechanics explains the chemical reactions and electrical potentials in the wetware. Going beyond the physical layer and looking for quantum mechanics in consciousness sounds a lot like Sheldrake's morphogenetic field.

    3. Re:Recently? by mellon · · Score: 2

      A much better book for this is Anathem, by Neal Stephenson. Because it's fiction, and he never actually says what his theory of consciousness is, you just get to try to figure out what he thinks it might be, and he drops enough hints to let you construct a pretty interesting theory. I enjoyed it a lot.

      We don't actually have a clue how consciousness arises, despite lots of research into the field, so speculation is pretty much all we have. Although there are plenty of neurologists who think their speculation is fact...

    4. Re:Recently? by Burnhard · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Which goes to show how people prefer reading material that confirms their already strongly held opinions.

      I also read both Hoftstadter and Dennett. The former made a similar mistake to the one you accuse Penrose of making: attaching almost mystical properties to the concept of recursion and the emergence of complexity. Dennett has similar problems, but more than that he has mistaken a model of cognition for a model of conscious experience. He side steps the explanatory gap by simply denying it exists, just as Hoftstadter denies it by promoting the idea that it is simply an emergent property, without being about to explain exactly what the nature of that property actually is.

    5. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 4, Informative

      Indeed, I waded though The Emperors New Mind when it was first published and was very disappointed. As far as I could tell, the argument was something along the lines of "consciousness is mysterious and complex and hopefully non-deterministic. Quantum effects are mysterious and complex and non deterministic. Consciousness is probably a quantum-based phenomenon then".

      So I went back to reading Dennett and Hoftstadter.

      Then you didn't understand it. His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation". It has nothing to do with the non-deterministic nature of quantum mechanics because even non-deterministic outcomes are computable. His speculation about consciousness and quantum mechanics is based on an analogy between the "collapse of the waveform" and thought. Even though the analogy is suggestive, according to Penrose, quantum mechanics cannot fully explain consciousness (because of consciousness's supposed non-computability) and to the extent that it cannot quantum mechanics is incomplete. It's still a crap argument but it's a hell of a lot better than your caricature. Dennett and Hoftstadter are even worse in many ways. They, like Penrose, are stuck on artifacts of theory. Stick with people that know how the brain actually works, like Edelman.

    6. Re:Recently? by aaronszy · · Score: 3, Insightful

      "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation"

      This isn't really right. humans are capable of recognizing when SOME algorithms will halt. That isn't very spectacular, computers can do the same. Solving the halting problem would mean being able to recognize whether ANY algorithm will halt without resorting to dumb brute force methods. Humans are limited just as much as computers in this respect.

    7. Re:Recently? by Prune · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Penrose's argument from Emperor's New Mind and the updated version in Shadows of the Mind has been formally refuted: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.36.260&rep=rep1&type=pdf

      Beyond this, Penrose is refuted by physics. The holographic principle and its near-corollary, the Bekensten bound, guarantees that one cannot build a physical artifact more powerful than a Turin machine (finite number of distinguishable quantum states in a region of finite surface area => there are no arbitrary-precision real numbers in physics in a finite space => no super-Turing machines possible). Indeed, restricting ourselves to artifacts with finite spatial extent, any physical object can at best have the power of a mere linarly bounded automata (though non-deterministic one, due to QM, which is more powerful than its deterministic counterpart, but still less powerful than a Turing machine). Unfortunately, our brain happens to be a physical artifact. The mind is a collection of thought patterns and these directly map to physics by their neural correlates. Penrose's case is just a sad example of wishful thinking, the inability to admit that our minds are too subject to (likely unknowable) limitations, our own analogues of the halting problem.

      --
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    8. Re:Recently? by divisionbyzero · · Score: 2

      His argument was more like: "Human are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt (or not); computers are not; therefore thought cannot be reduced to computation".

      That is patent nonsense, though, and if it is better than the caricature of your parent, it is only very barely so. There is no proof, nor even the shadow of a supporting argument, to the idea that humans are capable of recognizing when an algorithm will halt, for all possible algorithms.

      First, only an astonishingly small subset of all algorithms is even intelligible to a human - if a computer was to solve the halting problem for "intelligible" programs, but was not itself "intelligible", how would you go about proving that such a program can't exist? All the proofs I know of imply applying the algorithm to a derivative of itself, but you can't do that if the algorithm does not belong to its own domain. And I see no reason - much to the contrary - to think that the brain is intelligible to itself (maybe the big picture is, but you don't solve the halting problem with an overview of the code).

      Second, if you say an algorithm will not halt, how do you think you can be sure, without resorting to formal proofs... which are isomorphic to programs via the Curry–Howard correspondence?

      Third, humans often miss rare or fringe cases, leading them to be overconfident in their answers for as long as these cases do not occur. I mean, if humans truly can solve the halting problem, they are not doing a very good job.

      And then there is the fact that the halting problem is vastly overstated: by waiting long enough, a Turing machine can come arbitrarily close to solving it. Furthermore, there is a very large number of algorithms that pretty obviously halt/do not halt, for reasons that can be codified. There is nothing at all controversial with the idea that a computer could figure out whether the vast majority of programs halt or not. It just can't work for *everything*, but the idea that humans do is nothing short of laughable.

      Ignore my other response it's obviously confused. I think what I was getting at is that Penrose thinks that the very fact we are able to understand the halting problem means thinking cannot be reduced to computation. In any case I don't want to be in the position of trying to defend a position I do not hold so I am going to stop digging myself into a hole now.

  4. Penrose is a mystic by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    He wants the brain to be non-computable, non-simulatable. In short, he wants it to be magic. He has no real justification for his position.

    1. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Hatta · · Score: 2

      This is surprisingly common among physicists. Schrodinger for instance believed in vitalism. Which is essentially the same thing, but about 'life' instead of 'consciousness'.

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    2. Re:Penrose is a mystic by Suiggy · · Score: 2

      Agreed. Penrose is getting long in the tooth, and his last few theories to be debunked are evident of this. He's seeing things that aren't there. However, in a sense, he's right, but there's no magic or new physics behind it. After all, everything in this universe is, to some degree, emergent from quantum phenomena--everything in our macroscopic world, from dogs and cats, your car, your house, the tax man, and your brain is nothing more than the result of quantum amplitude flows and configuration states on the microscopic scale. But I don't think higher-level cognition will be directly explainable through quantum mechanics.

    3. Re:Penrose is a mystic by im_thatoneguy · · Score: 2

      Anything less than a full duplicate wouldn't function as a simulation, and a full duplicate wouldn't function as a model (because it would give you no more insight than the identical original.

      Yes and no. It does offer something though that we can't do to a real human brain: Kill it. Over and Over and Over again.

      You certainly start getting into philosophical problems but imagine if you took a slice of your brain and ran a simulation for 10 minutes in a perfectly realized virtual world (or a world that explicitly told your brain to accept as perfect). You could subtly change a person's responses to you to see how you react based on different stimuli. Then wipe it. Reset it to the exact same state and do it again.

      Now you can start doing really exciting things with this exact duplicate. Since this simulation is a total simulation of all the atomic and sub-atomic interactions on a computer you can do things like insert break points. Freeze time and know the exact state of every atom. You can run difference splits between two moments of a conversation.

      This is the sort of insight that would lead to accurate modeling.

      A big part of learning how a system works it to strip it down to its core essentials. Usually 95% of something is just superfluous support framework. With a virtual brain you could start gutting the systems without concern since killing it can be 'undone'. Imagine a computer algorithm which ran a conversation but completely randomly eliminated 1,000 neurons every time. Just put a condition on the test that any time the conditions fail --say maybe stammering -- then you do another random test with only 500 removed. And so on and so forth until the test succeeds. Without actually understanding *why* the simulation works you can randomly dramatically narrow your focus.

      Is it ethical? Well it'll be an interesting conversation we'll have when we start. Or at least I hope we do. I'm actually pretty concerned we'll create a conscious entity and not realize it. We might end up committing genocide on new sentient life forms.

    4. Re:Penrose is a mystic by macshit · · Score: 3, Informative

      Indeed. I put it down to basic fear. Some people (like Penrose, apparently, and Searle, etc) want there to be something special about human sapience, and find the concept that it's "mere" computation repulsive and scary. It's their gut speaking, really, not their mind.

      Combine that fear with the conceit that "because I'm a world-renowned expert in my field, I must have amazing insight into every field I care to dabble in!" (which is depressingly common in academia) and you get cringe-inducing (but lengthy!) pap like "The Emperor's New Mind."

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  5. Consciousness is weird by Hatta · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

    That's essentially the argument here, and it's pretty easily seen as fallacious. There's no actual evidence that consciousness requires quantum mechanics, besides the trivial fact that our brains are chemical computers and chemistry requires quantum mechanics.

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    1. Re:Consciousness is weird by ShakaUVM · · Score: 4, Insightful

      >>Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      Quantum Theory is the new "magic" for all sorts of New Age thinkers.

      Penrose at least proposes a mechanism of action (quantum tube thingies), which has the benefit of at least giving his theory something more than hand-waving to base his theory on, but has the downside of having absolutely no evidence to support it from studies of the structure of the brain.

      Penrose is a smart guy (black holes and tiling and all that) but he does like to propose some rather outlandish things in his free time. Might be a correlation between the two, who knows.

    2. Re:Consciousness is weird by shess · · Score: 2

      Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      Or, more likely, consciousness explains quantum theory.

    3. Re:Consciousness is weird by bcrowell · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Consciousness is weird. Quantum theory is weird. Therefore quantum theory must explain consciousness.

      That's essentially the argument here, and it's pretty easily seen as fallacious.

      Well, the slashdot link, and the New Statesman story linked to from it, don't really do justice to Penrose's idea, so it's not surprising that you've gotten the impression that there's absolutely nothing there. Actually there's something to it, and although as a physicist I don't buy it, it's not completely stupid.

      The basic idea is that there are various ways to interpret quantum mechanics. The most popular interpretations are the Copenhagen interpretation and the many-worlds interpretation (MWI).

      My own take on it is that Copenhagen and MWI are just different words for talking about the theory, so the distinction isn't empirically testable. Copenhagen does a good job of depicting the psychological experience of doing experiments with quantum-mechanical systems, but Copenhagen is illogical because it gives a special role to measurement, which is actually a physical process like any other.

      Penrose's idiosyncratic idea is that he takes Copenhagen seriously, so he says that measurement is somehow *different* from other physical processes. That suggests that consciousness is somehow different from other physical processes. He also claims that his idea is at least in principle empirically testable, that we should be able to see this process happen by studying neurons. He thinks there is something special going on in microtubules.

      Slashdot's readers would have been a lot better off just reading the WP article on Penrose's theory.

    4. Re:Consciousness is weird by Burnhard · · Score: 3

      This argument is a fallacy, because it's not one that Penrose has ever actually made. His argument has a great deal more subtlety about it than the absurd reduction you present.

  6. Meh by Pharmboy · · Score: 2

    Not that interesting of an article, by someone I've not heard of, explaining why Penrose is wrong yet again, as well as others. No real substance. The concept that physics might explain consciousness is much more interesting than this short (in length and in content) article.

    It simply debunks the idea but offers no alternative or reason why. It was like reading a movie review from a small town movie reviewer....who didn't really see the movie but a friend told them about it.

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  7. Huh? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    This is the most vague, hand-wavy summary I have ever read (didn't read the article...maybe just as vague?). I am a physicist, but even for the non-physicist, this is vague.

  8. It's all about free will by spun · · Score: 3, Insightful

    People want to be an uncaused cause. That's what the concept of free will boils down to. The will can cause things, but itself is not caused by anything. If it were caused, it wouldn't be free. Of course, this would make any learning impossible. Either the will is a part of the chain of cause and effect, and therefore not free, or the soul (or whatever you believe to be the seat of consciousness) can never learn.

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  9. This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Nefarious+Wheel · · Score: 5, Interesting

    This place is full of Quantum; it's everywhere you look

    It's in the halls of Physicists, and pages of a book.

    "There has to be a fallacy!" the comment summarised,

    And if we care to challenge that, we aren't very wise?

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    1. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by grcumb · · Score: 4, Insightful

      This place is full of Quantum; it's everywhere you look
      It's in the halls of Physicists, and pages of a book.
      "There has to be a fallacy!" the comment summarised,
      And if we care to challenge that, we aren't very wise?

      But 'consciousness is quantum' is facile, don't you think?
      One hell of a non sequitur; he's right to raise a stink.
      Without supporting data, the statement is absurd,
      I'm with OP, this is dopey - at best the logic's blurred!

      --
      Crumb's Corollary: Never bring a knife to a bun fight.
    2. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

      "Blurred" is just the kind of logic that the quantum minds require.
      Like Hellen's scientists, with their Earth, Wind, Water, Fire.
      You see, a lot of the mystery becomes quite easy to explain
      By introducing "aether" - why that's what's in the brain!

    3. Re:This Place Is Full Of Quantum by MarkRose · · Score: 2

      Uhh.... did I forget International Poetry Day or something?

      Seriously, what gives?

      To counter silly sophistry, one must speak in poetry
      Not a matter of philosophy, but to convince with eloquence
      To simply plead all blustery's, a technique of futility
      Best use good ol' artistry, to win the argument.

      --
      Be relentless!
  10. What a terrible article by Old+Wolf · · Score: 2

    The article basically says "We shouldn't jump to conclusions just because consciousness and quantum theory are both weird" , with an extra page full of waffle to pad it out. I didn't learn anything substantial from this article and I doubt anybody else would have either. The article doesn't propose anything useful of its own, nor does it successfully debunk any other proposal.

    It doesn't even understand what "jump to conclusions" means. Penrose is cited as doing that for the WMAP result, but in fact what he did was propose a theory (that turned out to be wrong). That's what science is about. People propose theories or hypotheses, and then people try to prove or disprove them, perhaps discovering new truths along the way. There's no 'shame' to be had in theorizing something and turning out to be wrong, nor does that make the scientist 'bad' if he does propose a wrong theory at some time.

  11. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

    You're playing pointless, autofellating wordgames.

    So, uh, keep up the good job with your philosophy courses!

  12. Quantum Theory is not relevant by Bugpowda · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Professional Neuroscientist here... In fact, I'm recording from a sensory neuron that is partially responsible for the conciousness of an awake behaving mouse right now while browsing slashdot.

    There is no reason to think that quantum physics has anything to do with the nature of conciousness. It is not useful to explain free will, or the illusion of free will, of the qualia of objects, or the steadyness of perception on a background of constantly varying spike rates in the brain.

    Perhaps the best, short, free, relatively recent summary of the field was written by Christof Koch and Francis Crick, A Framework for Conciousness, and is available here : http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/29/1/438.pdf

    I also have a little essay on the nature of free will on my blog here, if interested. http://brainwindows.wordpress.com/philosophy/philosophy-the-science-of-free-will/

    1. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by MoellerPlesset2 · · Score: 5, Informative

      There is no reason to think that quantum physics has anything to do with the nature of conciousness. It is not useful to explain free will, or the illusion of free will, of the qualia of objects, or the steadyness of perception on a background of constantly varying spike rates in the brain.

      Quantum chemist here (my username's a hint at that), and I couldn't agree more. I fight against this nonsense all the time.. You'd think that if there was anything to it, we'd be all over it - since explaining chemistry and biochemistry in terms of quantum mechanics is exactly what we do. But nope, I don't know anybody in the field who thinks those ideas have any merit whatsoever. (And let's just point out that as merited a guy Penrose is, he's not a quantum chemist, and more a mathematician than a physicist. His main area of expertise is topology, which has applications in cosmology but is totally unrelated to this area)

      It breaks down like this: Electrons in atoms and molecules behave entirely quantum-mechanically. It's why QM was invented in the first place. Since chemical properties are the result of how the electrons behave, all of chemistry is intrinsically quantum-mechanical in some sense.

      However: Molecules as a whole do not act quantum-mechanically. They move about according to classical mechanics - and that's how we model them physically too. Because once things get as heavy as an atomic nucleus (save for hydrogen, under some circumstances), their quantum 'uncertainty' in position etc is so small that it's chemically insignificant. So you need QM to describe how two atoms are bonded, but classical mech does a good job of describing how the molecules as a whole bounce around.

      So the question is: Are there 'non-trivial' quantum effects in biology? I.e. ones that aren't explainable in terms of 'ordinary' chemistry (which is still ultimately quantum-mechanical). There are a few examples, such as magnetoreception in birds, and energy transfer during some photosynthetic processes. But: despite a lot of the hype surrounding them, these things are still dealing with individual, sub-atomic particles. They don't cast any doubt on 'conventional wisdom' that QM phenomena don't happen at the biological scale. There's nothing in the cell that depends on the actions of a single small molecule, or a single chemical reaction, or anything that's small enough to act quantum-mechanically.

      The physics here doesn't make sense (Penrose's ideas in particular don't even hinge on established QM, but rather his own speculative ideas about quantum gravity.. of all things), we have every reason to believe you wouldn't have quantum phenomena at that scale in that environment, and no reason to believe otherwise. The chemistry doesn't make sense, as there's basically nothing hitherto found in biochemistry that doesn't fit into established chemistry. (Which isn't to say biochem hasn't expanded the boundaries of established chemistry, but it hasn't changed the foundations at all) And the biology doesn't really make sense, as cells are not built anything like Geiger counters, sitting in a labile state waiting for a single sub-atomic event to trigger them.

      Finally, the philosophy doesn't really add up either. The quantum-consciousness people seem to have an agenda along the lines of 1) QM is non-deterministic 2) If the brain's higher functions rely directly on QM processes, then the brain is non-deterministic 3) That nondeterminism means we have free will.
      Little of that makes sense to me. (1) is in fact a matter of which interpretation of QM you choose, and ultimately a question of metaphysics, since any non-deterministic theory could be postulated to be the result of a deterministic underlying 'reality' (as is the case with the Bohm interpretation of QM), or vice-versa. (2) is unwarranted speculation and (3) especially doesn't make much sense to me, since the philosophical question of 'free will' tends to hinge on whet

    2. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by mbone · · Score: 4, Informative

      1) QM is non-deterministic

      (1) is in fact a matter of which interpretation of QM you choose, and ultimately a question of metaphysics, since any non-deterministic theory could be postulated to be the result of a deterministic underlying 'reality' (as is the case with the Bohm interpretation of QM), or vice-versa.

      Uh, not so easy. The whole point of the Bell's Theorem tests is that QM is not reducible to a local deterministic theory. Bohm's theory is deterministic, but non-local, which means that it is not causal. So, chose your poison. You can't have it all; QM is not just a normal classical theory hiding behind some measurement weirdness.

    3. Re:Quantum Theory is not relevant by dkf · · Score: 2

      The whole point of the Bell's Theorem tests is that QM is not reducible to a local deterministic theory.

      But good luck on applying that in any meaningful way to structures larger than a molecule with as much interaction with the environment as happens in a neuron.

      --
      "Little does he know, but there is no 'I' in 'Idiot'!"
  13. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by DeadDecoy · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Ok, can someone explain to me how consciousness is represented mathematically? I'm not aware of any theorem that proves you can't have consciousness on higher scales unless it occurs at the quantum level. Mostly because consciousness is usually dealt with as an abstract topic.

  14. Q: Does Quantum Theory Explain Consciousness? by Jeremiah+Cornelius · · Score: 3, Funny

    A: No.

    Signed, God.

    --
    "Flyin' in just a sweet place,
    Never been known to fail..."
  15. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by Jeremiah+Cornelius · · Score: 3, Funny

    If a a man disagrees in the forest, where his wife cannot hear him, is he still wrong?

    --
    "Flyin' in just a sweet place,
    Never been known to fail..."
  16. Re:Standard Model is enough by elucido · · Score: 2

    If we don't experiment and look we wont find out whether or not new physics are involved.

  17. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by biryokumaru · · Score: 2

    Sarah said she was locked up in the madhouse and we were all a delusion. When they came to lock her up, she said "Oh not this again. Now I'm in five deep."

    --
    When you're afraid to download music illegally in your own home, then the terrorists have won!
  18. Uncertain by DoomHamster · · Score: 2

    Maybe...but we can't say with any certainty.

  19. Re:consciousness is represented mathematically? by TaoPhoenix · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Kind of a strange Slashdot topic since as pointed elsewhere Penrose has been working on this since 1989!

    Meanwhile bear with me for a mini rant, in that Submitter dived right into a topic covered by some 50 books, by taking a simplistic double quote of Roger Penrose, famous British physicist, recently argued "that we will need to invoke 'new physics and exotic biological structures': rewriting quantum theory to make sense of consciousness," Brooks writes. (Which he then dismissed as disappointing.)

    Meanwhile, back at the more erudite book level, let's see some of what's out there.
    Pleading rustiness on the original Penrose text, Douglas Hofstadter has been working for 20 years on analogy-based thinking. To get to your question, he calls the electrons and cells and even small neurons little billiard-ball-like stuff that "careens around in a careenium". Then from a second story window, you don't see those individual balls anymore, nor does any one matter. But the holistic big level then becomes consciousness as a "emergent" property that you just can't dissect past a certain point.

    On another tack, Stephen Wolfram of Wolfram Alpha fame put another 20 years at about the same time period doing computational pattern science developing the idea that within perfectly special cases in what otherwise look like simple rules, fantastic complex structures simply emerge "out of nowhere". Yet the trick is that they have to be computed, and no fancy equation quite produces the whole result in one sweep - some data absolutely requires the raw minimum iterative processing. He called this something like the law of irreducibility. For consciousness, this means that there are limits to genius, and cavemen can't make cars because it simply takes a raw amount of pre-processing to produce the context that pushes forth an idea. Past that absudium example, it also means for non-geniuses that you can't know why cattle won't go into a vaccination ramp until someone else discovers that cattle hate shifts in light intensity and the ramp looks like a big cave.

    --
    My first Journal Entry ever, in 8 years! http://slashdot.org/journal/365947/aphelion-scifi-fantasy-horror-poetry-webzine
  20. Re:Empathy by Chris+Mattern · · Score: 2

    Empathy is easily explained by the noting (both conscious and subconscious) of the physical emotional cues of the other party. Or, if you're talking about ESP empathy, then you first need to demonstrate that there's something that needs to be explained; despite many attempts, this has not been done yet.

  21. Re:Consciousness is mysterious not weird. by Chris+Mattern · · Score: 2

    Sarah said she was locked up in the madhouse and we were all a delusion. When they came to lock her up, she said "Oh not this again. Now I'm in five deep."

    Sarah is apparently a slow learner. After the third or fourth recursion, I would've figured out to keep my mouth shut.

  22. Re:Quantum theory is at least a little relevant by Sir+Mouse · · Score: 2

    This would mean that quantum theory is a relevant consideration for all processes in the universe. The fact is that quantum theory generally only applies on the atomic and sub-atomic scales. When trying to understand more advanced systems you rely on the highest level abstraction which provides an understanding of the function. In neuroscience this is the neuron, which, if the neuron doctrine holds, means that the neuron is the lowest level abstraction in the central nervous system which processes information, it would only be necessary to look to a deeper explanation should it not be possible to understand why and how a neuron works using biological and higher-level chemical principles. (This isn't my area of expertise, Bugpowda might be able to explain in more detail)

    Furthermore, the only thing that quantum theory could provide as part of the explanation of consciousness is a source of randomness. And it's obvious to anyone who observes the world around us, there are many sources of apparent randomness in the macroscopic world. You can't accurately predict the outcome of dice rolls, this isn't an issue of quantum theory, it's just that the difficulty of calculating all the variables. In this same way the randomness of human consciousness can easily be assumed to be the result of an inability to calculate all the variables that go into the brains internal processing, which are astronomically more then in the roll of a die.

  23. Re:Please Explain by grumbel · · Score: 2

    "Observer" has nothing to do with a conscious human observer, but just refers to whatever tool or technique you use to measure a physical effect. At large scale you can shine a light on an object and observe it by the photons are reflected without problem, if you want to observe a single atom on the other side by shooting photons at it, the photons will have an effect on the atom.

  24. If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange... by catchblue22 · · Score: 2, Informative

    For those of you who hear that quantum mechanics is strange, but aren't sure exactly why, here is a little primer, based on the opening lecture from my intro quantum course:

    Pass a a beam of electrons through two closely spaced gaps. If the electrons were like bullets, one would expect to detect two bright spots on the detecting screen directly opposite the holes. This is not what you will observe however. Instead you will see on the detector a single location midway between the two holes with many electron strikes. The locations opposite the holes receive few electron strikes, but continuing outward there will be locations with lots of electron strikes followed by locations with few electron strikes. How can we explain this?

    Well the bright and dark patterns are consistent with wave diffraction and interference. We see similar interference patterns with light, and with other types of waves. So the electrons have wavelike properties. Are multiple electrons "interfering" with each other? Well, if you reduce the beam intensity so that only single electrons are passing through the slits, perhaps only one every few seconds, then the same pattern of diffraction and interference occurs! So, that seems to imply that single electrons are passing through both slits and once, and then interfering with themselves! I thought single electrons were particles!??? !

    Now install a device or mechanism that measures which slit electrons pass through and indicates the results to you. What do you observe now? The electrons will now behave like bullets, dutifully going straight through one hole or the other and striking the detector screen directly opposite the holes. No diffraction. No interference, or at least not enough to speak of. Experiments like this led Bohr to exclaim that "those who are not shocked when they first see quantum mechanics cannot possibly have understood it."

    One interpretation of this is that if you don't know which hole the electron goes through, then it goes through both holes at once. If you don't know what spin an electron has, then it has both spin up and spin down. At the small scale, probability seems to be everything. If there is a 40% chance that an electron is at location A, and a 60% chance that the same electron is at location B, then 40% of it is located at A, and 60% of it is at B. It seems your lack of knowledge about the electron can cause it to be "smeared" over multiple locations. This smearing is related to the wavelike properties. As soon as you pin down the location of the electron, then it is no longer in two places at once. It is a definite particle.

    Consciousness seems to play a role in this, as it seems our measurement of either the momentum or the position of an electron seems to fundamentally change its properties. It seems that our knowledge of the particle changes the particle. I understand this is difficult to accept. But any alternative explanation must take into account the strange results from experiments such as the one described above. I am not sure where the logical fallacy would lie here.

    --
    This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when first he appears as a protector - Plato (423 to 327 BC)
  25. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by Have+Brain+Will+Rent · · Score: 2

    I have to wonder what you consider to be "free will" that it may be caused by some particle. Do you see that in a deterministic, i.e. no free will, scenario you drink that cup of coffee because that was the inevitable action, but then some free will particle comes along and ZAP! you are drinking that cup of coffee because you "decided to"?

    If the universe is deterministic then there is no free will. If it is not deterministic then it is random and there is no free will. Free will as it is usually thought of would require a physics that was neither random nor deterministic.

    However it could be random in a sufficiently complex way so as to falsely appear that we have free will. Or was I destined to think that? Hmmmm....

    --
    The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny - Aesop
  26. Deepak Chopra by Swarley · · Score: 2

    "And as the great Deepak Chopra taught us, quantum physics means that anything can happen at any time for no reason."

                        -Prof. Farnsworth

  27. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by BuildingSnowmen · · Score: 2

    That is the point. Only the observable universe exists.

    Citation needed. It might appear that only the observable universe exists, but that may not be the case, unless you want to get into semantics regarding "exists". I would be hesitant to say with 100% certainty that there is only one universe. How would that be possible for anyone to know? What's to prevent other, separate universes from existing, both ones with and ones without conscious observers within them?

    No observers would mean no universe because there wouldn't be a thing in it to perceive of itself. This means either our current universe is conscious, or our current universe is an illusion. And I don't think both these theories can be right.

    While you might think both these theories can't be right, there are millions of Hindus who think exactly the opposite, in the concept of "maya".

    So if it's an illusion, then consciousness is not real, when you look into the mirror thats not real, and nothing you observe or experience can ever be said to be with 100% certainty the real universe. Because in the universe typically you are going to see yourself as the most real thing in it, and if your consciousness is fake or illusion, then how would you jump to conclude that all these particles and other stuff you observe is anything more than information at best?

    One can take another tack and look at Buddhism, which doesn't necessarily consider the everyday experience as illusion, only that what you consider "real" is not the only permanent reality. More accurately, the illusion is that you (your consciousness) and the universe are distinct entities. It's like each drop of seawater proclaiming, "There's the ocean, and then there is me."

  28. Re:Nobody said anything about soul. by Have+Brain+Will+Rent · · Score: 2

    Will implies control. You do understand that if it is random then there is no such thing as free will, right?

    --
    The tyrant will always find a pretext for his tyranny - Aesop
  29. Re:Electrons cause consciousness. by wytcld · · Score: 2

    Classical physics describes a mechanical universe in which everything is fully pre-determined, such that conscious awareness of things can make no difference at all in outcomes and actions. As such, there would be no basis for consciousness to be selected for by evolution. As such, there would be no reason to expect consciousness to be part of biological creatures.

    Therefore either classical physics suffices, and we have no free will, and possibly aren't even really conscious, in fact most likely aren't ... or else classical physics is only a crude approximation of the universe quantum physics describes. At a minimum, quantum physics describes a universe which is not deterministic. There are some who argue that it nonetheless only introduces chance, still leaving no reason for biology to include consciousness, or method for consciousness to alter the course of ones life.

    But there are others who argue that quantum physics at least opens the door to a true explanation of consciousness. And if you're satisfied that there's an explanation for consciousness in a universe in which it could not, literally, have evolved, because it provides no advantage to select for since every motion of matter is predetermined independently of it, well, good luck getting through life. Because to live like that would be to be clinically insane. And some of us perceive that would have dire consequence. If it does, if we're right, then classical physics is insufficient for explanation of consciousness, so we move to the next available candidate, quantum physics. Or the successor thereof at which Penrose points.

    --
    "with their freedom lost all virtue lose" - Milton
  30. You sir, make the logical fallacies by thelandp · · Score: 2

    The article is a "Straw Man" argument, that is to say based on misrepresentation of an opponent's position.

    To my knowledge, no one makes such a statement as "Quantum Theory Explains Consciousness". There are some sceculative attempts to explain consciousness, but none that I know of use Quantum Theory as the be-all and end-all.

    What people might be saying is, there are some interesting relationships between Quantum Theory and Consiousness, which merit further exploration. This is hard to dispute, given the seemingly important role of the conscious observer in the act of measurement.

    Thus, "Quantum Theory relates to consciousness" has been mistaken for "Quantum Theory explains consiousness". These are two very different ideas, as "relates", and "explains" are two different kinds of relationships. In fact, "explains" is a special case of "relates to", is the meta-relationship, but I digress.

    This sounds more like someone wants to work in the field of philosphy of consciousness, but is grizzling about being expected to know the difficult field of Quantum Theory.

    What would make you happy? That thinking about Quantum Theory be banned in all discussions about consciousness?

    In the middle, there is a clear example of tautology, with the phrase "no apparent causal link", expressed as though it is an observation to use as input. "Consciousness is not explained" because "there is no apparent link", both expressing essentially the same idea, and the latter is just assumed to be true.

    Your argument degenerates into terms like "very basic". When you just keep saying how obvious it is, usually it's the result of the argument lacking any real content.

    Now I don't expect this will serve any purpose, but I will take this criticism and make it constructive. It would advance the cause if Science better for you to say what you think consiousness *might* be explained by, rather than what you think it "probably isn't" caused by.

    Or if you really want to help rule it out as a cause (which *would*, I admit, have some benefit), then MAKE A MORE SOLID CASE.

    --

    -- the only thing we have to fear is really scary things
  31. Deepak Chopra is a Penrose fan (of course) by frrrp · · Score: 2

    Chopra also wants to create a woo equivalent of the Templeton Prize for this kind of crap. As others have mentioned - this is old news and something of a personal obsession with Penrose and requires numerous leaps of faith to follow. Penrose has been taken down by Victor Stenger quite some time ago - http://www.csicop.org/sb/show/is_the_brain_a_quantum_device/

    --
    smilies are for reetards
  32. Conciousness is an emergent property by benwaggoner · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Well, what a blast from my college past. I vividly recall all the late night manic chat sessions trying to decode Patricia and Paul Churchland's Neurophilosophy and Daniel Dennets Conciousness Explained.

    Anyway, after years of rumination, to me it's clear that:

    Quantum mechanics are definitely a part of neurobiology, and hence a critical building block of conciousness. We couldn't think without quantum mechanics. But plants couldn't photosynthesize without quantum mechanics either.

    The quantum mechanical properties of neurophysiology apply just as much to clams as it does to humans. And it's just as applicable to those in a coma as to those engaged in a peak experience of some sort. So quantum mechanics definitely don't explain the conciousness of humans and in lesser degrees of other species.

    Conciousness is an emergent property of the brain. Most of our evolutionary ancestors weren't concious in the sense we mean it today. Our massive brains are evolutionarily adaptive. Humans pay a big biological cost in having these big brains; very difficult childbirth, very long period of helpess infancy, wide pelvises to accomodate these giant heads, and a whole lot of extra calories and oxygen needed. But we're obviously breeding like rabbits as a species, and the primary limitation on further explosions of population are conciousness-driven (deciding not to have children, and having developed the means to do so).

    Conciousness is, pretty much by definition, a really thorny thing to think about and almost perfectly designed to drive philosophers and cognitive scientists into mental loops. Since conciousness can also be described as self-insight, you get into a deep virtualization question in trying to have accurate insight into how you have insight :)!

    So the trickiest part about conciousness is figuring out our own conciousness! It's a lot more easy and productive to try and consider someone else's conciousness than our own. Thinking about our own conciousness can easily get to the "eye of the universe question" - even if one has a good biological theory of conciousness, why do *I* have an experience of unique selfhood? That winds up being one of those unsolvable Big Questions, like "why is there something instead of nothing." Whether the existence of existence is explained via the Big Bang or theology, there's still the unanswerable question of what was the first mover. What started the cosmological ball rolling for there to be a universe in the first place?

    Well, that was my moment of peak nerditry for the day! I'm going to go kiss a pretty girl for a while as penance...

  33. Re:Not trolling by grumbel · · Score: 2

    Is it true that this interpretation (which I am told is the most accepted), requires the presence of consciousness?

    No, its just a very common misinterpretation. An observer in quantum mechanics is essentially everything that interacts with a particle. So if two particles collide, one of them is an observer. It has nothing to do with consciousness.

  34. Consciousness. by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 2

    Consciousness is either a product of the natural physical world or it is supernatural. If it is supernatural then it is very surprising that things like sleep, injury, drugs, and electromagnetic fields have such great (if not total) control over it and we would do well to simply study it as if it were only natural until we discover the ways it actually differs from natural processes. If consciousness is natural then it almost certainly arises solely from the interaction of the matter and energy in the brain and nervous system. If the definition of cognition is a complete theory of the operation of the brain and nervous system (something which we obviously don't have yet) then that model would also describe consciousness. I understand the distinction between merely calculating a result (cognition) and being aware of performing the calculation (consciousness). I think it's obvious that our consciousness is the direct cause of much of our cognition and as such a complete model of human cognition must necessarily include consciousness.

  35. Once Again: The relevance of J. Searle by aojensen · · Score: 2

    The journalist and prominent thinkers behind this article ought to read the paper 'Is the brain a digital computer' by John Searle (http://philosophy.wisc.edu/shapiro/Phil554/PAPERS/Is%20the%20Brain%20a%20Digital%20Computer.htm). Not only is it relevant to current research into strong/weak AI paradigms and philosophy of cognition --- it also provides a nice counterargument against physicalistic reductionism around human cognition.

  36. *David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by billstewart · · Score: 4, Informative

    Tall Aussie guy, long hair, wears leather jackets, sings a mean Zombie Blues*. Chalmers, who's a philosopher, and Stu Hameroff, an anesthesiologist, started a series of conferences at the University of Arizona on "Towards a Science of Consciousness" a decade or two ago; they alternate between Tucson and Somewhere-outside-North-America, and attract a mixed crowd of neuroscientists, consciousness researchers, philosophers who talk about phenomenology, FMRI imagers, tourists (e.g. me), and a few newagey people and random cranks. A few years ago, there were two "Science and Consciousness" conferences in Arizona around the same time - the scientific one in Tucson, and the Deepak Chopra one in Phoenix**.

    Hameroff's done work with Penrose on things like quantum effects in microtubules (which are brain cell parts that are small enough to actually have quantum activity going on, though it's a very long step from saying "quantum noise might be affecting chemical reactions a bit" to "Woo-woo! Consciousness is, like, Quantum, man!". I can't say I really understand Stu's arguments about the connections, because while I know a certain amount of quantum physics and biology and philosophy, I don't do neurology or brain cell structures or phenomenology, so the couple of conferences I got to were interesting and a very steep learning curve.

    From one perspective, either the world, and therefore consciousness, are entirely deterministic, or else they're not. (Deterministic doesn't mean calculable - Heisenberg among others make it very clear that you can't really simulate the universe using machinery smaller than the universe - but from a philosophical standpoint it doesn't matter if humans can predict what you're doing to do, it just matters whether you've got free will about it.) If you'd like things to be non-deterministic, physics doesn't give you very many ways to hook that into the world, and you're pretty much stuck with quantum mechanics.*** Does that mean that quantum entanglement is involved in any of the processes, particularly between neurons that aren't directly adjacent to each other? Not necessarily (IMHO, probably not.) Does it mean that a non-physical spirit can grab onto some molecules and shake them around in ways that translate up to conscious thoughts, or does it just mean that the chemistry's a bit noisier because God's playing dice with the Universe but your consciousness is still fundamentally a materialist process?

    * "Zombie" is a term of art, referring to a hypothetical person or machine that reacts externally as if it were conscious, but doesn't actually perceive qualia the way conscious beings claim that we do, so for instance it can tell you which ball is the red one or the green one, but doesn't experience redness or greenness. ** So of course Chopra caught on to this, and has been one of the sponsors of the more recent round or two of the scientific conference, and he and Hameroff have put out one or two popular press articles together. There are a number of meditation people who come to the conference, but they tend to be the serious "Here's what an FMRI shows about blood flow in your brain while you're meditating" folks, while the cranks are more likely to have opinions about quantum. *** There are some theories of quantum mechanics that say it's still deterministic, just with underlying hidden variables that we can't observe or measure, but it's been too many decades since college physics for me to remember if those got disproved or are still around.

    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
    1. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by Black+Parrot · · Score: 2

      ** So of course Chopra caught on to this

      Chopra makes Penrose look sensible.

      *** There are some theories of quantum mechanics that say it's still deterministic, just with underlying hidden variables that we can't observe or measure, but it's been too many decades since college physics for me to remember if those got disproved or are still around.

      I don't pretend to understand the proof, but physicists are adamant that hidden variables have been ruled out.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    2. Re:*David* Chalmers, Stu Hameroff, Hard Problems by carlzetie · · Score: 2

      I don't pretend to understand the proof, but physicists are adamant that hidden variables have been ruled out.

      That's a popular misconception, but almost completely untrue. J.S. Bell (of Bell's Theorem fame) himself was a proponent of DeBroglie-Bohm wave mechanics, a hidden variable theory, stating explicitly that it was consistent with his theorem and lamenting that it was given so little attention.

      Bell's Theorem shows this: no local, hidden variable theory can reproduce the predictions of QM.

      Now let's unpack this. First of all, it doesn't disprove local, hidden variable theories; it does provide a way to distinguish experimentally between those theories and standard QM, i.e. because they make different predictions in a specific experiment. So far, experiments (starting with Alain Aspect) are on the side of standard QM, BUT conscientious experimentalists point out that no experiment so far has precisely and pedantically fulfilled the requirements of Bell's Theorem, so there is still some wiggle room.

      But let's grant for a moment that tests of Bell's Theorem are one day confirmed on the side of standard QM. All that rules out is local hidden variable theories. As Bell himself pointed out, non-local hidden variable theories, such as DeBroglie-Bohm, survive just fine (as do local, non-hidden variable theories). Basically, you have to give up either locality or "reality" [a term of art in QM]. And the more we understand about entanglement, quantum information, and related topics, the less tenable locality becomes anyway. So at this point, both flavors of non-local theory -- those with and those without hidden variables are equally supportable.

      The big advantage of hidden variable theories is that they do away with the need for the "and then some magic happens" special pleading required in the other two main interpretations, where they introduce a mechanism to resolve the outcome of experiments that has no basis or description in the physical theory. (In the case of the Copenhagen interpretation, "and then the wave function instantaneously collapses everywhere at once"; in the case of Many Worlds, "and then the entire universe instantaneously splits, and you find yourself in one of the copies". And if both of those sound pretty damn non-local to you, well done.)

  37. Terry Pratchett Didn't by billstewart · · Score: 2

    One of the really annoying things about atheism as a possible alternative to Christianity or other religions that involve an afterlife is that you don't get to know if you were right or wrong. I'm sorry, but when I die, if I don't get a real afterlife or some ghostly existence or reincarnation, I at least want the guy with the scythe to show up and tell me "SORRY, DUDE, THAT'S ALL YOU GET, TIME'S UP." And atheists tell me I won't even get that.

    --

    Bill Stewart
    New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
  38. Re:If you don't think quantum mechanics is strange by neonsignal · · Score: 2

    Consciousness seems to play a role in this, as it seems our measurement of either the momentum or the position of an electron seems to fundamentally change its properties.

    Saying that the measurement 'changes' the properties is an interpretation. There is an interesting correlation between the measurement and the change in properties; using terms implying causation is starting to move into the area of interpretation. These different interpretations are philosophically interesting, but it is hard to come up with ways to distinguish them experimentally.

    For example, in a many-worlds interpretation, the different particle states 'cause' the multiplicity of conscious states. Or there is even the time-symmetric interpretation, where there is 'retro-causality' as well as 'causality'.