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Ask Slashdot: Post-Quantum Asymmetric Key Exchange?

First time accepted submitter LeDopore writes "Quantum computers might be coming. I'd estimate that there's a 10% chance RSA will be useless within 20 years. Whatever the odds, some of the data we send over ssh and ssl today should remain private for a century, and we simply can't guarantee secrecy anymore using the algorithms with which we have become complacent. Are there any alternatives to RSA and ECC that are trustworthy and properly implemented? Why is everyone still happy with SSH and RSA with the specter of a quantum menace lurking just around the corner?"

262 comments

  1. Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    that isn't vulnerable to Shor's algorithm and get back to us. (Is ECC even vulnerable? I know RSA and Diffie-Hellman are...)

    1. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      ECC is AFAIK theoretically vulnerable (i.e. while there aren't KNOWN quantum gate implementations of ECC, there are no good reasons to think it is unfeasible).

      McEliece and the Lattice-based stuff are promising, they just hadn't be as inspected as RSA yet...

    2. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'm the same anonymous coward who posted the FP. Somebody with mod points please mod this other anonymous coward up?

    3. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by marcosdumay · · Score: 2

      They not being as inspected as RSA is a rational reason for not using them, and not using them is a rational reason for not inspecting them. Thus, I forsee that they stay less inspected than the RSA until we discover some importan weakness on RSA, then that fact won't matter anymore. Notice that I'm not complaining about that, this is a reasonable way of handling things, and nobody is getting hurt.

      Now, to answer the original question. People are ignoring quantum computing because it is not even on the horizon. Entangling 11 bits (we are here now, aren't we?) is hard, 12 is way harder, and your breathing space gets exponentialy smaller when the number of bits increase. So, when people finally entangle 127 bits, what means that we are roughtly halfway through a quantum computer that can break the currently outdated 128 bits RSA, wake me up. By them I'll be willing to consider those computers a threat.

    4. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by Bengie · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Lockheed installed a 128bit quantum computer this year

      http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2011/10/31/lockheed-martin-installs-quantum-computer/

      I have no idea of the specifics, but it sounds as if they have a working version.

    5. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by ewanm89 · · Score: 5, Informative

      Different sort of quantum computer, it can't do general computing or schors algorithm, it's more like a quantum calculator, relegated to very specific statistical calculations rather than generic 3 bit computing.

    6. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by ewanm89 · · Score: 1

      s/bit/state/

    7. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by tbonefrog · · Score: 1

      These folks crack a 150-bit elliptic curve in one month (NOT one of the NIST curves...yet) with relatively inexpensive hardware.
      Down form hundreds of years. This is non-quantum.

      Cover and Decomposition Attacks on Elliptic Curves
      Vanessa VITSE
      Joint work with Antoine JOUX
      Universite de Versailles Saint-Quentin, Laboratoire PRiSM
      Elliptic Curve Cryptography – ECC 2011
      Cover and Decomposition Attacks on Elliptic Curves
      ecc2011.loria.fr/slides/vitse.pdf

    8. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by Alsee · · Score: 1

      The Lockheed computer is a quantum computer in the same way that a glass abacus is a silicon computer.

      -

      --
      - - You can't take something off the Internet! That's like trying to take pee out of a swimming pool.
    9. Re:Fine. You find an asymmetric primitive by PurpleAlien · · Score: 1

      That's only applicable for curves over extension fields...

      --
      My blog, if you're interested: http://www.purp
  2. Sky isn't falling by Desler · · Score: 1

    Why is everyone still happy with SSH and RSA with the specter of a quantum menace lurking just around the corner?"

    Because the sky isn't falling, chicken little?

    1. Re:Sky isn't falling by hawguy · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Why is everyone still happy with SSH and RSA with the specter of a quantum menace lurking just around the corner?"

      Because the sky isn't falling, chicken little?

      I use SSH to keep someone from snooping my password, or hijacking my session to take over my servers.

      I'm not so worried that someone is recording all of my SSH streams for future use in the hope that Quantum Computing becomes a reality and they can decode the stream and see that I typed "sudo service apache2 restart".

    2. Re:Sky isn't falling by Fallingcow · · Score: 5, Funny

      I'm not so worried that someone is recording all of my SSH streams for future use in the hope that Quantum Computing becomes a reality and they can decode the stream and see that I typed "sudo service apache2 restart".

      Clearly you know more than you're letting on since that's the exact command I ran over SSH on my server an hour ago!

      I guess SSH is insecure after all, since you were able to break it so easily and post a line from my super secret command line session on Slashdot.

    3. Re:Sky isn't falling by shadowrat · · Score: 1

      yeah. i've always felt ssh and rsa are pretty good against the current imaginary state of quantum computers.

    4. Re:Sky isn't falling by Java+Pimp · · Score: 1

      I don't think the attacker is so much interested in the "sudo service apache2 restart" command but rather the response to the password prompt immediately following...

      --
      Ascalante: Your bride is over 3,000 years old.
      Kull: She told me she was 19!
    5. Re:Sky isn't falling by hawguy · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I don't think the attacker is so much interested in the "sudo service apache2 restart" command but rather the response to the password prompt immediately following...

      If he can break the RSA key exchange to get to the symmetric key encrypting my session, he can already log in as me, he doesn't need the password. But unless he gets his quantum computer within the next 90 days, I'll have already changed the password.

    6. Re:Sky isn't falling by marcello_dl · · Score: 2

      You admit you use sudo instead of logging as root. Wise move. Nobody believes it, but wise move.

      --
      ---- MISSING MISCELLANEOUS DATA SEGMENT --- [sigdash] trolololol
    7. Re:Sky isn't falling by sootman · · Score: 1

      I'll do exactly that just so I can laugh at you for not issuing "sudo apachectl graceful" instead. :-)

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      Dear Slashdot: next time you want to mess with the site, add a rich-text editor for comments.
    8. Re:Sky isn't falling by PetiePooo · · Score: 1

      I use SSH to keep someone from snooping my password...

      Password authentication is so last century. You should be using public key authentication for security.

      Put these lines in your sshd_config:
      PubkeyAuthentication yes
      PasswordAuthentication no


      Oh, wait... cracking RSA keys is what this thread is about. NM.

    9. Re:Sky isn't falling by isama · · Score: 1

      real men use su. even for shutting down a laptop.

    10. Re:Sky isn't falling by Architect_sasyr · · Score: 1

      Real men log in as root and never touch the su commans

      --
      Me failed English...
      FreeBSD over Linux. If my comments seem odd, this may explain...
    11. Re:Sky isn't falling by The+Creator · · Score: 1

      Real men have edited /etc/inittab and can shut down using Ctrl-Alt-Delete.

      --

      FRA: STFU GTFO
    12. Re:Sky isn't falling by reve_etrange · · Score: 1

      Real men use ferrite cores that can be power cycled and retain state. Of course, they just pull the plug.

      --
      .: Semper Absurda :.
    13. Re:Sky isn't falling by The+Creator · · Score: 1

      No, i was being real.

      --

      FRA: STFU GTFO
    14. Re:Sky isn't falling by fortapocalypse · · Score: 1

      I thought real men just got up from the chair, went to the fridge, grabbed a PBR, popped it open, had a few gulps, said "ahhh", farted, then burped, then grabbed a wrench and started tuning their '57 chevy, after which they cleaned their gun, build a shed out back, killed a bear with their bare hands, shot a man, and then went to sleep by the campfire with one eye open.

  3. There's one uncrackable method by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    One Time Pad.

    1. Re:There's one uncrackable method by GameboyRMH · · Score: 1

      This doesn't help with one of the most common uses of asymmetric keys, which is secure initial key exchange...

      --
      "When information is power, privacy is freedom" - Jah-Wren Ryel
    2. Re:There's one uncrackable method by nomadic · · Score: 2

      Easy, one time pad to encrypt your one time pad exchange.

    3. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But what about the first key ? shouldn't we encrypt it as well with a one time pad ?

    4. Re:There's one uncrackable method by tom17 · · Score: 5, Funny

      It's one time pads, all the way down!

    5. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Nah, after the first two One Time Pads, it's turtles all the way down.

    6. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You take advantage of SSH today to send a 100 Terabyte one time pad key. duh

    7. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      You forgot data retention. Didn't you hear? They record everything you send through the net. Now we know why.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    8. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Talderas · · Score: 2

      Tis obvious. There must be one one time pad to rule them all.

      --
      "Lack of speed can be overcome. In the worst case by patience." --Znork
    9. Re:There's one uncrackable method by TemporalBeing · · Score: 1

      This doesn't help with one of the most common uses of asymmetric keys, which is secure initial key exchange...

      You could probably build the one-time pad into the initial message and then use the data stream itself to continue the one-time pad on. It does leave you vulnerable to anyone that receives that initial message, but would probably be otherwise unbreakable unless you start repeating a lot of data in the data stream - but then, even a true one time pad would then be vulnerable too.

      --
      Truth is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it ain't goin' away. - Elvis Presley (source: imdb.com)
    10. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      yo dawg, i heard you like unbreakable encryption, so we put a one-time pad in your one-time pad so you can encrypt while you encrypt.

    11. Re:There's one uncrackable method by sexconker · · Score: 1

      This doesn't help with one of the most common uses of asymmetric keys, which is secure initial key exchange...

      The only secure initial key exchange that will ever exist is IN PERSON, BY HAND. And even then you have to be cautious.

      No matter how complicated (either logistically or mathematically) you make your handshakes, EVERYTHING about encryption boils down to a key sharing problem.

    12. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      It's one time pads, all the way down!

      That's what the plumber said when he fixed our toilet at work.

    13. Re:There's one uncrackable method by 19thNervousBreakdown · · Score: 1

      Blaaaaaaugh!

      --
      <xml><I><am><so><damn>Web 2.0</damn></so></am></I></xml>
    14. Re:There's one uncrackable method by pjt33 · · Score: 1

      A one time pad allows you to encrypt one bit of plaintext per bit of key. If you use that plaintext to communicate a new key, you gain precisely nothing.

    15. Re:There's one uncrackable method by TemporalBeing · · Score: 2

      A one time pad allows you to encrypt one bit of plaintext per bit of key. If you use that plaintext to communicate a new key, you gain precisely nothing.

      You're not quite following what I am suggesting, which is along the following:

      1. build a protocol that the initial message communicates a one-time pad to be applied in the subsequent message, such as the entire first message itself.
      2. the each message exchanged uses the decoded previous message as its one-time pad after the initial message is communicated

      The only big issue with the above is when the message being sent is larger than the message received. However, that could be resolved by buffering the old messages and only tossing away the data as it is used for the one-time pad, so if the message is sufficiently larger than the few messages after it it may be a few messages before those messages are used in the one-time pad. Of course, you will have a problem if there is not enough data to properly apply a one-time pad to the larger message, but that could be managed by the protocol - e.g. generate a message that sends back a dummy message to get additional data for more one-time pads to have sufficient information. This also means that any two parties would be essentially making new key-exchanges with each message set sent/received.

      Now of course, the main security issue is that the entire one-time pad is in the data stream itself. Intercept the data stream and you could have sufficient information to decode it if you knew how the protocol worked and buffered enough of it to decode the one-time pads. Depending on the use, it may be just as secure as a true one-time pad if all messages were equally sized so that you had to get the initial message to really be able to decode anything.

      So, I am not saying it is not without fault but that depending on use, it may be good enough.

      Now, to your comment, you don't really seem to understand a true one-time pad. The algorithm is rather simple - is just an XOR of bytes over the message. The hard part is the data source. In a true one-time pad all parties wishing to communicate have access to the same exact data source and know where the other is going to operate within that data source to encode the information. This is truly secure - unbreakable - so long as you do not repeat over the same data set.

      That is, a one-time pad is secure as long as the source for the one-time pad is never reused. Think of a file of random data. You share the file with the other party and you both exchange data using a known offset into the file. If you both start at the start of the file then as long as you never wrap around to the start of the file you have a secure means of communication that cannot be broken. If you start to wrap around the file, so you start repeating the use of the data used for the one-time pad then the source information can eventually be decoded from the data stream by pattern recognition techniques thus defeating the security of the one-time pad. This is resolved by simply using a file that is large enough to never be wrapped by the data you communicate. Such methods are used by the NSA and CIA and others to securely communicate information with a guarantee that no-one else can intercept and decode the data.

      Now back to my proposal - the source of the one-time pad becomes the data stream itself. This has a slight fault in that the source is available, but if properly utilized may be just as secure. The primary vulnerability is receipt of the first message since the second message would use it to pad itself when responding.

      Also, you don't typically use a one-time pad to communicate something to setup a key-exchange for Diffie-Hellman or RSA. They have their own protocol already for doing the key exchange. In the case of Diffie-Hellman, you send the public information of your key and get back the public information for the other party's key. You then both use your own private key with the o

      --
      Truth is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it ain't goin' away. - Elvis Presley (source: imdb.com)
    16. Re:There's one uncrackable method by gumbi+west · · Score: 1

      Repeat after me, the first two words in one time pad are?

      Your scheme can have a name, but it can't start, "one time" okay?

    17. Re:There's one uncrackable method by slew · · Score: 1

      I don't think you understand the theory behind a one-time pad. Basically the one-time pad is unbreakable if the pad is not predictable (not that it is some arbitrary data stream) which usually requires it to be random. If you use some well-known text as a one time pad or a pad stream with non-uniform statistical properties (say attackable via english letter or word frequency analysis), then your one-time pad is not only theoretically breakable, in practice it's probably not very secure either.

      For example, if you knew the pad-stream and the plain-text are both english text, you could xor the "encrypted" data with the 4 characters "space", ETAONRS (some of the most frequent letters), and try to recover likely characters and spaces. As we know, knowing the first and last letter of a word, some words are easy to figure out.

      For a one-time pad cipher to be throretically unbreakable, the pad-stream must in practice be random (or created using an essentially random source).

    18. Re:There's one uncrackable method by darkonc · · Score: 1

      If you used the same one-time pad to encrypt 2 different one-time pads, Just how detectable would the double-use be?

      --
      Sometimes boldness is in fashion. Sometimes only the brave will be bold.
    19. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Your.Master · · Score: 1

      You are proposing:

      P(1) * O = C(1)
      P(2) * C(1) = C(2)
      P(3) * C(2) = C(3) ...
      P(N) * C(N - 1) = C(N)

      Where O is the one time pad, P(N) is the plaintext message N, C(N) is the encrypted ciphertext for message N, and * is the encryption operator. Since it happens to be XOR, it is commutative.

      Let's expand out C(2) since we know C(1):

      C(2) = P(2) * P(1) * O

      What's this? The one-time pad got re-used more than one time!

      That's a critical flaw: you don't have a one time pad, you have a two time pad, because you used it to encrypt two different messages. The only way this can be as secure as a OTP is if you have something at least as strong as the one time pad encrypting the one time pad itself. Otherwise you can tease it out.

      You simply disguised the fact that you re-used the "one time" pad fact from yourself by encrypting it using plaintext, but plaintext is not a good one time pad.

      On a more intuitive level: if that worked, there's no reason you couldn't apply it at the level of a single character and iterate it across all characters in a message of arbitrary length. This is the case where the "plaintext" size = 1, and the number of messages is unbounded. Your key would have to be only a single letter and be totally unguessable. And yet, clearly that's not true.

    20. Re:There's one uncrackable method by TemporalBeing · · Score: 1

      You are proposing:

      • P(1) * O = C(1)
      • P(2) * C(1) = C(2)
      • P(3) * C(2) = C(3)
      • ...
      • P(N) * C(N - 1) = C(N)

      In correct. I am proposing:

      • P(0) is transmitted in unencrypted and contains O.
      • P(1) * O = C(1)
      • P(2) * P(1) = C(2)
      • P(3) * P(2) = C(3)
      • ...
      • P(N) * P(N-1) = C(N)

      The difference is you are using the unencrypted text to make the next encryption. Otherwise yes you are correct.

      And I do agree there is a vulnerability there, but don't necessarily agree that it is easy to tease out unless you are able to capture the first message - P(0).

      --
      Truth is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it ain't goin' away. - Elvis Presley (source: imdb.com)
    21. Re:There's one uncrackable method by TemporalBeing · · Score: 1

      I don't think you understand the theory behind a one-time pad. Basically the one-time pad is unbreakable if the pad is not predictable (not that it is some arbitrary data stream) which usually requires it to be random. If you use some well-known text as a one time pad or a pad stream with non-uniform statistical properties (say attackable via english letter or word frequency analysis), then your one-time pad is not only theoretically breakable, in practice it's probably not very secure either.

      For example, if you knew the pad-stream and the plain-text are both english text, you could xor the "encrypted" data with the 4 characters "space", ETAONRS (some of the most frequent letters), and try to recover likely characters and spaces. As we know, knowing the first and last letter of a word, some words are easy to figure out.

      For a one-time pad cipher to be throretically unbreakable, the pad-stream must in practice be random (or created using an essentially random source).

      True. As I said, it is not without its flaws, and it depends on its use. In some cases it may be good enough - but there are certainly limits to what I proposed (which I acknowledged in the proposal) for the security to remain sufficient.

      --
      Truth is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it ain't goin' away. - Elvis Presley (source: imdb.com)
    22. Re:There's one uncrackable method by TemporalBeing · · Score: 1

      Repeat after me, the first two words in one time pad are?

      Your scheme can have a name, but it can't start, "one time" okay?

      The original one-time pad is only ever used once - on the second message transmitted. This is a true one-time pad scheme, just applied with a slightly different data sourcing mechanism to allow both sides to communicate.

      A 100% secure one-time pad does as slew suggests per a statistically provable fully random data source - but both sides have to have access to that same data source, or a synchronized version of it at the very least. This imposes a limit on the parties that can communicate using the one-time pad mechanism. That is, it can't replace SSL, Diffie-Hellman Key Exchanges, etc as those are typically used by two parties that may not be aware of each other until the session is created.

      Conversely, my proposal would enable the use of a one-time pad scheme to replace SSL or a Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, but as I noted it has its limits too so it is still not without fault but it might be good enough for some uses.

      --
      Truth is like the sun. You can shut it out for a time, but it ain't goin' away. - Elvis Presley (source: imdb.com)
    23. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Maybe you do understand the concept of a one-time-pad, but you did say it only had a "slight" fault, and "if properly used may be just as secure" which appear to me (anyways) that you did not. The main security of a one-time-pad is not that padding data is not reused, it is that the padding data is not predictable. This gives a false

      Although your scheme may be analogous to a one-time-pad, it is really a type of convolution cipher. Most things that pretend to be "just like a one-time-pad" are not at all like a one-time pad, and do not share i's security properties at all (just like this proposal). This is how snake-oil encryption is designed.

    24. Re:There's one uncrackable method by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      yo dawg, i heard you like unbreakable encryption, so we put a one-time pad in your one-time pad so you can encrypt while you encrypt.

      Two years ago called, they want their meme back?

  4. Vulnerable in 20 years by TaoPhoenix · · Score: 1

    Without overly snarking, 20 years is too long a time frame to care.

    When we get down to 3 years take a "miniscule amount" of $100,000 (in "then dollars") and hire 30 mathematicians/cryptos/NSA types + 1 Slashdot Geek/1 Local Prodigy/2 Hotshots of the month/1 Sales guy/1 admin/1 Hotel Lodging rep and tell them to get cracking for 3 months. Problem solved.

    --
    My first Journal Entry ever, in 8 years! http://slashdot.org/journal/365947/aphelion-scifi-fantasy-horror-poetry-webzine
    1. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by steevven1 · · Score: 4, Informative

      I think the author's point is that data sent today could be sniffed, stored, and cracked in 20 years. Some of that data may still be sensitive in 20 years, so we need to switch now.

    2. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by MozeeToby · · Score: 2

      20 years is too long to care true; but I see two points to his argument.

      First, it's going to take time to roll out a replacement. How fresh does the data have to be for you to consider it worrying? If it takes 5 years to develop a consumer grade replacement and 5 years for it to become ubiquitous online all the sudden data recorded at the end of that window is only 10 years old at the hypothetical 20 year mark. Of course, that just raises the question, is there any asymmetric key encryption algorithm that can't be cracked with quantum computers?

      Second, data that is a bit more sensitive than banking information is sent using encryption that is substantially similar. Do governments really want to have potentially classified data from 20 years ago suddenly available to their allies and enemies?

    3. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You need to add a few 000's to that. One NSA type will cost you more that $100k.

    4. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by Waffle+Iron · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Well the person is an idiot. His estimation of 20 years is laughably naive.

      My response to this statement is a quantum superposition of two thoughts:

      A. I agree. A 20 year estimate is ludicrous. It's far too much time.

      B. I agree. A 20 year estimate is ridiculous. It's far too short.

    5. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by postbigbang · · Score: 1

      More practically, it presupposes that his traffic is being captured. To capture 100% of the traffic of the Internet exceeds all forms of storage.

      Let's say that his traffic is being targeted right now, and 100% of his currently secret SSL/SSH traffic is being captured and madly attacked. The poster supposes that he/she wants 100yrs of privacy. The poster is a three letter agency, or similar. That agency can pay for its own problems and I suspect that there are back doors to RSA, and most forms of encryption today. Twenty years? Few secrets need to be kept twenty years. The post is too nebulous to even begin to answer-- if it were real-- and I suspect it's not.

      --
      ---- Teach Peace. It's Cheaper Than War.
    6. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by sexconker · · Score: 0

      More practically, it presupposes that his traffic is being captured. To capture 100% of the traffic of the Internet exceeds all forms of storage.

      HELLO! McFLY!!
      We have quantum computers and quantum storage. Just buy the largest hard drive on the market and fill it with qubits. The qubits will hold all possible states at the same time, thus you have captured all packets ever sent over the internet, and you have also written all the works of Shakespeare.

    7. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      More practically, it presupposes that his traffic is being captured.

      I just thought the OP was presupposing that within 20 years we'd have time machines as well as magic quantum computers.

    8. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by postbigbang · · Score: 1

      Correct me if I'm wrong, but backward travel seems to be currently judged as not possible. Quantum breaking of RSA may happen in 20yrs, but not to go back in time and break encrypted information. If you capture the info and bring it time-forward, then you can open it up, presuming you can crack the encryption keys.

      --
      ---- Teach Peace. It's Cheaper Than War.
    9. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by jd · · Score: 2

      For a company to consider commercial secrets "secure", it should be aiming for around 50 years security, which is why Serpent and MARS were aiming for that sort of level during the AES contest. Government records, including census data, are also covered by a 50 year rule and should again be encrypted to that kind of standard. Highly classified material is usually put under a 100 year rule, assuming it is to ever be released at all. I'd consider a century to be adequate for most national secrets, there really can't be anything so perilous that would actually warrant more. But if you don't think 100 is enough, and obviously some governments do not, then you've got to encrypt accordingly.

      Ok, so whilst most of us aren't doing anything super-secret, if even basic commercial and domestic information is supposed to be kept confidential for 50 years then no. 20 years is not too long a time frame to care. If 50 years is the law, then 50 years is the absolute minimum timeframe worth considering. (Remember, people in offices will use what's out there. So if 50 years is a legal minimum for them, 50 years has to be a practical minimum for us because we're the ones who ultimately decide what offices have available to use.)

      --
      It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
    10. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by jd · · Score: 1

      Almost anything commercial will certainly be sensitive in 20 years time and almost anything that relates to official records is absolutely guaranteed to be classified as sensitive in 20 years time. Absolutely nothing that is sensitive will be encrypted better than the common publicly-used standards available. If it's not in OpenSSL or some other widely-used library, nobody will use it.

      I argued on this thread that essentially all encryption in common use should be kept to a minimum standard of safe for 50 years. However, I am considering revising that. Remember, medical records are also being shared over the Internet and medical records should be kept a hell of a lot better secure than the 50 year rule. At the very least, such records should be encrypted to be safe for 100 years AND the algorithm used should be commonly installed (because those aren't the brightest and best places when it comes to IT).

      By "commonly installed", I mean it should be de-facto present on every OS/X, Linux and Windows desktop and server. A 50-year level of protection should be the default for all encrypted traffic, with lesser security optional but discouraged.

      --
      It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
    11. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by BlackSnake112 · · Score: 1

      You forgot the beer and hookers

    12. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by EdZ · · Score: 1

      20 years is too long a time frame to care.

      Worked for date storage and IP address ranges!

    13. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by gumbi+west · · Score: 1

      Census is 72 years. The IRS and soda recipes are never, ever.

    14. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by Alsee · · Score: 3, Funny

      is there any asymmetric key encryption algorithm that can't be cracked with quantum computers?

      Yes and no.
      The answer won't collapse until we open the quantum computer box and look inside.

      -

      --
      - - You can't take something off the Internet! That's like trying to take pee out of a swimming pool.
    15. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by atisss · · Score: 1

      Company data is not most of the issues. Many voting systems are using some kinds of Diffie - Hellman keys for authority / verifying.
      So, once our voting is completely electronic, having quantum computer would be like having election results at your control. Naturally institution having this would not let anyone know.

    16. Re:Vulnerable in 20 years by jd · · Score: 1

      I was going by the UK's standard. But because the familiar, commonly-available tools are the ones that dictate what is used, then you'd have to obviously support 72-year encryption on those tools to support countries that used longer timeframes. Regardless of what the timeframe used is (other than infinite), it has to be widely available or people will invariably cut corners and use something that cannot be held securely for the necessary length of time.

      I'd argue IRS records shouldn't be kept secret forever - even allowing for the longest human lifespan ever recorded plus a little extra for modern medicine, 150 years should be plenty. That kind of data from 150 years ago would have zero harmful impact on anyone alive today but would be a goldmine for biography writers, historians and genealogists. (The chances are that even children would be dead and grand-children would be too old and independently established to care.) If you wanted to be ultra-paranoid, make it 200 years. That adds an entire generation extra in distance.

      --
      It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
  5. It's not that bad by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Quantum is still in it's infancy, and it still has a lot of moore's law to catch up on. There are quantum safe (at least so far) cryptomethods, but the danger of untested and poorly understood crypto is larger than the danger of quantum computers to regular crypto.

  6. One Time Pads by TheMiddleRoad · · Score: 0

    Last I checked, they're still secure.

    There's also security through obscurity. If they don't know the math you're doing, it can be hard for them to analyze its flaws.

    1. Re:One Time Pads by Desler · · Score: 1

      And how is a one-time pad going to help for asymmetric key exchange?

    2. Re:One Time Pads by Desler · · Score: 3, Insightful

      To elaborate asymmetric key exchange involves passing a key in the clear to setup the secure channel. How does a one-time pad help you securely exchange that key in the clear? Or did you just make your idiotic post hoping to get modded up for trying to sound smarter than you are?

    3. Re:One Time Pads by TheMiddleRoad · · Score: 1

      And how is a one-time pad going to help for asymmetric key exchange?

      You just might have to go symmetric if you care that much about your data.

    4. Re:One Time Pads by Surt · · Score: 1

      Well, if you have a one time pad, you don't have to exchange your key in the clear, for one thing.

      --
      "Who is the Journal of Quantum Physics going to believe?" --Stephen Hawking
    5. Re:One Time Pads by TheMiddleRoad · · Score: 1

      I'm saying that you don't swap keys in the clear if your data is so important that it needs to be secure 20 years from now. Clear?

    6. Re:One Time Pads by adonoman · · Score: 1
      No, but if you have a secure channel to get the one time pad to both parties, why not just use that to transmit the data you want to send. And if you don't have a secure channel to get the one time pad to both parties, then it becomes useless.

      The only time that a one-time pad works, is if you have a secure channel at one point in time, but need to send the data at a later time over an unsecure channel. So if you want to start going to your bank in person once a month to pick up a DVD worth of random data for the convenience of being able to do your online banking, then it might be possible.

    7. Re:One Time Pads by jasomill · · Score: 1

      Well, if you have a one time pad, you don't have to exchange your key in the clear, for one thing.

      In other words, "having already exchanged keys solves the key exchange problem." How Zen. As a follow-up, why not rid the world of all known diseases?

    8. Re:One Time Pads by Surt · · Score: 1

      Having already exchanged large one time pads solves the key exchange problem, forever.

      --
      "Who is the Journal of Quantum Physics going to believe?" --Stephen Hawking
    9. Re:One Time Pads by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Um, you do realize that "there is no security through obscurity" is simply a watered down version of Kerchkhoffs' principle, which was first enunciated precisely in response to those who said "If they don't know the math you're doing, it can be hard for them to analyze its flaws." Kerckhoffs' principle, better said, is "don't think they don't know your algorithm. They do."

    10. Re:One Time Pads by JesseMcDonald · · Score: 1

      Having already exchanged large one time pads solves the key exchange problem, forever.

      For values of "forever" which are limited by the rate at which you need to communicate and the entropy in the pad. Hyperbole aside, however, this is exactly right. You can exchange one-time pads whenever you want, perhaps terabytes at a time on physically-secured HDDs. If the pads are compromised during delivery, and you are aware that they have been compromised, nothing of value has been lost; you just need to send another pad. Once the pads have been exchanged you can use them to communicate securely at your convenience.

      A one-time pad trades one secure communications problem, delivering many small plaintexts over time while maintaining complete privacy, for an easier secure communications problem: delivering a single random pad while merely ensuring that leaks are detectable.

      Finally there is quantum encryption, which is basically a one-time pad where quantum properties are used to detect anyone eavesdropping on the key exchange. With quantum mechanics, securely synchronizing one-time pads is a much more tractable problem than securely transferring the equivalent amount of plaintext.

      --
      "The state is that great fiction by which everyone tries to live at the expense of everyone else." - Bastiat
    11. Re:One Time Pads by gumbi+west · · Score: 1

      I think the idea was to pre-exchange keys and then continue to rely on AES for bulk encryption. I believe this would make the bulk encryption much harder (maybe gives you until 10 to 20 more years after quantum computing reaches the bit level in question).

    12. Re:One Time Pads by darkonc · · Score: 1
      Not forever -- only for as long as you have unused entropy in the pads exchanged. Exchanging encryption keys can help extend the life of the pads... but then if you can exchange pads, then why not just exchange keys.

      On the other hand, the whole point of asymmetric keys is that they're for communicating securely with someone that you haven't been able to otherwise exchange secure keys (or pads) with.

      --
      Sometimes boldness is in fashion. Sometimes only the brave will be bold.
    13. Re:One Time Pads by gumbi+west · · Score: 1

      By forever he was saying that there is no number of years at which an eavesdropper could decrypt your message (this assumes the randomization was done correctly).

  7. Quantum computer = circumvention device by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Since DRM is based on encryption, devices that break encryption are TPM-circumvention devices. Canada is about to outlaw them as well in proposed Bill C-11 (even in non-infringing situations, and even when the copyright expired (after hell froze over).

    1. Re:Quantum computer = circumvention device by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Ohhhh, watch the battle. RIAA vs NSA.

      Whoever loses. We win.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    2. Re:Quantum computer = circumvention device by mooingyak · · Score: 1

      They always find a compromise that combines the least desirable elements of each.

      --
      William of Ockham had no beard. The most likely explanation is that it was chewed off by squirrels every morning.
  8. Oblig. by MachDelta · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Get your most closely kept personal thought:
    put it in the Word .doc with a password lock.
    Stock it deep in the .rar with extraction precluded
    by the ludicrous length and the strength of a reputedly
    dictionary-attack-proof string of characters
    (this, imperative to thwart all the disparagers
    of privacy: the NSA and Homeland S).
    You better PGP the .rar because so far they ain’t impressed.
    You better take the .pgp and print the hex of it out,
    scan that into a TIFF. Then, if you seek redoubt
    for your data, scramble up the order of the pixels
    with a one-time pad that describes the fun time had by the thick-soled-
    boot-wearing stomper who danced to produce random
    claptrap, all the intervals in between which, set in tandem
    with the stomps themselves, begat a seed of math unguessable.
    Ain’t no complaint about this cipher that’s redressable!
    Best of all, your secret: nothing extant could extract it.
    By 2025 a children’s Speak & Spell could crack it.

    You can’t hide secrets from the future with math.
    You can try, but I bet that in the future they laugh
    at the half-assed schemes and algorithms amassed
    to enforce cryptographs in the past.

    And future people do not give a damn about your shopping,
    your Visa number SSL’d to Cherry-Popping
    Hot Grampa Action websites that you visit,
    nor password-protected partitions, no matter how illicit.
    And this, it would seem, is your saving grace:
    the amazing haste of people to forget your name, your face,
    your litanous* list of indefensible indiscretions.
    In fact, the only way that you could pray to make impression
    on the era ahead is if, instead of being notable,
    you make the data describing you undecodable
    for script kiddies sifting in that relic called the internet
    (seeking latches on treasure chests that they could wreck in seconds but didn’t yet
    get a chance to cue up for disassembly)
    to discover and crack the cover like a crème brûlée.
    They’ll glance you over, I guess, and then for a bare moment
    you’ll persist to exist; almost seems like you’re there, don’t it?
    But you’re not. You’re here. Your name will fade as Front’s will,
    ‘less in the future they don’t know our cryptovariables still.

    Now it’s an Enigma machine, a code yelled out at top volume
    through a tin can with a thin string, and that ain’t all you
    do to broadcast cleartext of your intentions.
    Send an email to the government pledging your abstention
    from vote fraud this time (next time: can’t promise).
    See you don’t get a visit from the department of piranhas.
    Be honest; you ain’t hacking those. It’d be too easy,
    setting up the next president, pretending that you were through freezing
    when you’re nothing but warming up: ‘to do’ list in your diary
    (better keep for a long time — and the long time better be tiring
    to the distribution of electrical brains
    that are guessing every unsalted hash that ever came).
    They got alien technology to make the rainbow tables with,
    then in an afternoon of glancing at ‘em, secrets don’t resist
    the loving coax of the mathematical calculation,
    heart of your mystery sent free-fall into palpitations.
    Computron will rise up in the dawn, a free agent.
    Nobody knows the future now; gonna find out — be patient.

    1. Re:Oblig. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What's with the short margins? Makes you sound crazy.

    2. Re:Oblig. by GameboyRMH · · Score: 1

      Sounds better than I thought it would:

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BA6kG-tOkBs

      --
      "When information is power, privacy is freedom" - Jah-Wren Ryel
    3. Re:Oblig. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What's with the short margins? Makes you sound crazy.

      They're lyrics from MC Frontalot. The track is Secrets from the Future , and was "[c]omposed at a hacker convention, while Front muttered curses at himself for having just logged into three different chat accounts across the 'free' wireless."

    4. Re:Oblig. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It reads a lot better than it sounds. Rap is so 20th century.

  9. Estimate on what grounds ? by dirvine · · Score: 2

    I for one would be interested to understand the grounds of your estimation ? In terms of key exchange you could also estimate quantum entanglement may replace the requirement for intercept-able information exchanges. If the estimate of the latter is greater than the former then I estimate based on that conjecture we will be fine and broadband is dead :-) Oh and long live time travel at the same time!

    1. Re:Estimate on what grounds ? by afabbro · · Score: 1

      Indeed. After reading "I'd estimate that there's a 10% chance RSA will be useless within 20 years" I knew the poster was just a kid who'd read Crypto-Gram for the first time and wanted to sound crypto-l33t.

      --
      Advice: on VPS providers
    2. Re:Estimate on what grounds ? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Agreed, anyone who understands statistics knows that probabilities do not work this way. Understanding statistics is, of course, a requirement for doing proper crypto. The issue, however, is a valid one.

    3. Re:Estimate on what grounds ? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      ...or someone with an interest at making people believe that RSA is safe for the 20 next years to come.

  10. 2 vs. 3 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    The article mentions two ways to overcome the problem of QC breaking traditional cryptography, but IIRC there are three ways:

    1. Develop "classical" algorithms that are immune to QC, which is what the article mainly refers to
    2. Develop crypto algorithms that require QC to execute with viable performance and would require at least "QC^2" to be broken, which we don't assume to exist (not mentioned by the article)
    3. Quantum cryptography, which the article mentions but which is totally different and required specialized communication hardware (non-switched optical fibers or a similar medium that doesn't interact with the signal at all)

  11. ECC is not voulerable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

    There is no known attack on ECC using quantum computers.

    If you assume it might be broken because there is no proove that it's secure, you might assume the same fron any other method - there is no known method to proove that some algorithm is _not_ attackable by quantum computers.

    (Of course, knowing the "new" slashdot, AC comments are never moderated +1, so noone will read this).

    (And, hey, my captcha is 'druggist'...)

    1. Re:ECC is not voulerable by n01 · · Score: 2

      Minor correction: the so called one time pad is easily proven to be uncrackable by any method. The only problem with it, of course, is the key exchange. (The key is as long as the message, and needs to be securely transferred beforehand.)

    2. Re:ECC is not voulerable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Uh, Shor's Algorithm solves the discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time on a quantum computer, which does indeed break ECC.

    3. Re:ECC is not voulerable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      there is no known method to proove that some algorithm is _not_ attackable by quantum computers.

      Actually there's exactly one that is provably secure as long as it is implemented correctly. Unfortunately implementation is where people screw up, and on that front it is very vulnerable.

    4. Re:ECC is not voulerable by CuBr · · Score: 5, Informative

      There is no known attack on ECC using quantum computers.

      This should not have been modded up, because it is blatantly false. The security of ECC relies on the presumed hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (in elliptic curves over finite fields). But Shor's algorithm can solve the discrete logarithm problem in ANY finite group (assuming you have an efficient way of operating on the group elements).

    5. Re:ECC is not voulerable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      No, you're wrong.
      http://www.mathcs.richmond.edu/~jad/summerwork/ellipticcurvequantum.pdf
      It's even on wikipedia:
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_cryptography#Quantum_computing_attacks

      But the audience may be interested in reading:
      http://www.amazon.com/Post-Quantum-Cryptography-Daniel-J-Bernstein/dp/3540887016

      Essentially nobody's developed a quantum algorithm to attack lattice-based public key systems and code-based systems (e.g. McEliece).

    6. Re:ECC is not voulerable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes, there is a attack on ECC using quantum computers: http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0301141

    7. Re:ECC is not voulerable by rubycodez · · Score: 1

      Not true, the one time key is easily provable to be crackable by several methods. Suppose I'm watching you type your message for encryption. Suppose you're generating the one time key with compromised wares. etc. etc.

    8. Re:ECC is not voulerable by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's not cracking. Those can be considered security attacks, but they are not crypto attacks. It is not the job of the encryption mechanism to counter them, nor is it the job of the encryption mechanism to keep the key safe.

    9. Re:ECC is not voulerable by EETech1 · · Score: 1

      Which is???

      Bonus for example why its so easy to screw up or hard to do right!

    10. Re:ECC is not voulerable by rubycodez · · Score: 1

      you are correct, those are not crypto attacks, however the common meaning of the word "crackable" extends beyond crypto, it is merely that a system was breached by whatever means. It is silly to say that a system relying on one-time-pad for access is "uncrackable", of course it is (see xkcd cartoon regarding suitable application of wrench to the crypto user)

  12. what's old is new again by Nightshade · · Score: 4, Informative

    This 1978 crypto is supposed to be safe against quantum computers: http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/25629/ (if that's the specific angle you're worried about). The downside is the key management because the keys have to be really really long (i.e. 20,000+ characters vs having a memorable passowrd or passphrase that you'd be able to use today).

    1. Re:what's old is new again by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      you'd be able to use the md5 of your passphrase :)

    2. Re:what's old is new again by arose · · Score: 1

      You don't remember asymmetric crypto keys, they are too big already. Your password/passphrase is used to symmetrically encrypt your key. So that part is not a problem.

      --
      Analogies don't equal equalities, they are merely somewhat analogous.
  13. Non-issue to 99.9% of us by pla · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Why is everyone still happy with SSH and RSA with the specter of a quantum menace lurking just around the corner?

    Because the vast majority of us don't need to keep our data secure for the next century... Even for some of the most nefarious uses of crypto, merely lasting long enough to exceed the statute of limitations will suffice, and I'd put that as a serious fringe case.

    Personally, I only use encryption for my financial documents and to make myself a more difficult target in the present (whether to identity thieves or the government or to my ISP trying to control my traffic). For the former, I consider basic access control (ie, keep it offline) as the first line of defense, and the encryption as a fallback; for the latter, if it takes even five minutes more effort than merely watching the wire, the crypto has done its job.

    Even corporations don't tend to care about a scale longer than five years out (and that, only when they can even see past the next quarter)... Which leaves really only governments caring about how soon someone like Assange can find a way to embarrass the talking heads.

    1. Re:Non-issue to 99.9% of us by bberens · · Score: 2

      I record all of your encrypted transactions. In 20 years I will gain access to your 20 year old bank statements. Muahahaha!

      --
      Check out my lame java blog at www.javachopshop.com
    2. Re:Non-issue to 99.9% of us by mrxak · · Score: 1

      Plus all your current transactions, if you never changed your password on a line I wasn't watching.

    3. Re:Non-issue to 99.9% of us by ediron2 · · Score: 1

      A countercase exists for Memoirs, trade secrets, very sensitive (military) research, and data that is incredibly expensive to reproduce all qualify for 'more than 20 years' protection.

      Twain wanted decades beyond the death of anyone involved in some of his memoirs. Nixon probably wouldn't have disagreed. Ditto RandomJoe's pron archive.

      Companies like Coca Cola and manufacturers with proprietary manufacturing steps keep things proprietary expressly because that information's value might last longer than a patent's 17 years.

      Securing data based on governmental research (nuclear power design) is the difference between [Canada, Iran, Russia, India, China, North Korea, Belgium, USA, etc] spending immense money to reinvent reactor fuel configuration designs that increase maritime reactor duty cycles tenfold (6m running:2 years in the drydock vs. 2+ years running, 6m in the drydock). That qualifies for both of my last examples above.

      And then there's the obvious one: Espionage / diplomatic information might easily have a lifetime beyond 20 years. The effects of leakage can range from a pissed off Israeli PM to covers blown and people killed in retribution. This applies whether it involves governments, drug cartels, or encrypted bank transactions by despots. For those last 2, it may not matter WHEN the money moved -- the existence of the money is enough to awaken a search.

      (I'm not in favor of all of these... just aware of times when things matter for lifetimes).

    4. Re:Non-issue to 99.9% of us by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      But what about the 00.1%? Occupy the Intertubes!

    5. Re:Non-issue to 99.9% of us by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Because the vast majority of us don't need to keep our data secure for the next century...

      I recall attending a talk about encryption and the speaker fielded a question about why we're using ###-bit encryption when it can be broken with just 10 years of computing time... how come we're not using ####-bit, blah blah blah...

      His response what pretty much the same as yours, except it wasn't about whether we need to keep things secure, but whether we can keep things secure for 10 years. For example, he said, your janitor can be bribed fairly cheaply, and there goes any secret you have on paper. Furthermore, I imagine that anybody who can afford a quantum computer (while they're still cutting-edge) could, for less money, just hire some Blackwater dudes to come kidnap you and waterboard the secrets out of you. Or they can tap your phones, or hire a hooker to seduce you.

      The encryption just weeds out the lazy ones who know how to run WireShark. If they're more-determined than that, then you've got to start buttoning things down elsewhere.

    6. Re:Non-issue to 99.9% of us by arkenian · · Score: 1

      But what percentage of traffic is this? Assuming even that quantum encryption really does start changing the game . . . . this sort of thing presumes you have a record of all traffic from all that time ago. But the percentage of today's encrypted data that's useful in 20 years is . . . low. Even if you target it to DoD, lets say you had every piece of encrypted traffic off SIPRNET... in 20 years, I'd be surprised if 0.1% of it was useful. You would not only need to decrypt it (and its a lot of data with continually changing keys you have to crack) you also then need to find the interesting bits... so you spent a fortune intercepting my encrypted communications, an additional fortune storing the petabytes of data at archival quality for 20 years and then time and materials to decrypt it, analyze it etc. there's so incredibly few targets that are worth 20 years of sustained effort, and frankly most of those, if you're in a position to execute that sort of sustained effort, you can probably find the same secret a different way for less.

    7. Re:Non-issue to 99.9% of us by muckracer · · Score: 1

      > Or they can tap your phones, or hire a hooker to seduce you.

      YES!!

      Allow me to mention, that I've got a *lot* of secrets to divulge... ^__^

  14. No expert but... by TheCarp · · Score: 3, Informative

    In previous discussions it has been pointed out that not all encryption algorithms are susceptible to quantum computers. If I remember right (I am sure someone has a reference that I don't) it only effects RSA and others that rely on the hardness of factoring discrete logarithms.

    Anyway...only reference I can find, from wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_computers#Potential ):

    However, other existing cryptographic algorithms do not appear to be broken by these algorithms.[11][12] Some public-key algorithms are based on problems other than the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems to which Shor's algorithm applies, like the McEliece cryptosystem based on a problem in coding theory.[11][13] Lattice based cryptosystems are also not known to be broken by quantum computers, and finding a polynomial time algorithm for solving the dihedral hidden subgroup problem, which would break many lattice based cryptosystems, is a well-studied open problem.[14] It has been proven that applying Grover's algorithm to break a symmetric (secret key) algorithm by brute force requires roughly 2n/2 invocations of the underlying cryptographic algorithm, compared with roughly 2n in the classical case,[15] meaning that symmetric key lengths are effectively halved: AES-256 would have the same security against an attack using Grover's algorithm that AES-128 has against classical brute-force search (see Key size). Quantum cryptography could potentially fulfill some of the functions of public key cryptography.

    --
    "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    1. Re:No expert but... by Nightshade · · Score: 1

      see the comment above on the 1978 cryptosystem...

    2. Re:No expert but... by TheCarp · · Score: 1

      Um.... I have expanded every comment posted to this article so far, above and below, and yours is the only that contains the string "1978".

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    3. Re:No expert but... by rochberg · · Score: 2

      hardness of factoring discrete logarithms.

      For clarification, you are talking about two separate problems. One problem is integer factorization. In the case of RSA, encryption and decryption are done modulo some n = pq, where p and q are large prime integers. While n is public, p and q are private. If you know p, q, and a public key, you can compute the corresponding private key efficiently.

      The other problem is computing discrete logarithms (sometimes over a finite field, as in ECC). RSA encrypts message m with a key e by computing c = m^e mod n. The discrete logarithm problem has to do with the hardness of discovering e given knowledge of m, n, and c. Many other cryptosystems (like ECC) do the same thing, but the multiplication operation underlying the exponentiation is different, and those systems do not require that n be the product of two primes. As such, determining the prime factors of n does not undermine the security.

      Hence, the security of something like ECC cannot be broken by integer factorization, but can be broken if there is an efficient way to compute the discrete log. As of right now, I am not aware of any quantum algorithm for computing discrete logs.

    4. Re:No expert but... by smallfries · · Score: 1

      The basic math in the quoted section is wrong so I wouldn't trust anything it says. If you reduce the number of invocations by a factor of two then you lose one bit of security. To reduce the security level by half you would need to only use the square root of the number of invocations.

      --
      Slashdot: where don knuth is an idiot because he cant grasp the awesome power of php
    5. Re:No expert but... by TheCarp · · Score: 1

      Um.... reducing the keyspace by 1 bit cuts the keyspace in half, it also cuts the time required to brute force in about half, since most of the time spent is in the invocations. How is that not reducing the security level in half? Maybe you are using a definition that I am not familiar with?

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    6. Re:No expert but... by TheCarp · · Score: 2

      Whats really interesting about your comment is that, thats exactly what I had seen before and was referencing when I was typing my earlier post. However, When i started hitting up wiki and looking for the reference I saw before, I saw several places where it was claimed that ECC was vulnerable to shor's algorithm, which surprised me (and made me edit that out of my comment before I posted) because it contradicted what I had seen before.
       

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    7. Re:No expert but... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Breaking an instance of the RSA scheme can be reduced to solving a discrete logarithm problem:

      Given a public key (e,n), one can deduce d such that a^(e*d)=a (mod n) by computing the base a discrete logarithm of e in Z_n. Selections of a that are coprime to n should be sufficient to break the RSA scheme.

    8. Re:No expert but... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So... have half the key encrypted with rsa and the other half with ecc. Attacker would have to crack both algos! (and if we find other more clever methods... just add them to the mix).

    9. Re:No expert but... by dido · · Score: 1
      --
      Qu'on me donne six lignes écrites de la main du plus honnête homme, j'y trouverai de quoi le faire pendre.
    10. Re:No expert but... by letsief · · Score: 1

      Security level usually refers to the number of bits of security in a given algorithm as a given key size. It's easiest to explain it using an example of a secure symmetric encryption algorithm, like AES. Brute force attacks on AES are still the best attack, enough though the biclique attack has lower computational complexity on paper. A brute force attack on AES with a 128-bit key takes about 2^128 work. So, you would say is has a 128-bit security strength.

      Having a security strength means going from 128-bits to 64-bits. So, having the security strength doesn't mean you've made something twice as fast to attack. In that example it means you've made it 2^64 times faster.

      In the case of asymmetric algorithms you have to look at the computational complexity of the best known attacks. So, for something like RSA, that means the best known factoring algorithms. Looking at the computational complexity of the number field sieve, you come to the conclusion that a 2048-bit RSA key takes about 2^112 work, so it has a security strength of 112-bits.

    11. Re:No expert but... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Shor's paper (http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9508027v2) mentions prime factorizations and the discrete log problem as separate problems that could be solved in polynomial time. I'm also not an expert, so I have no idea whether there'd be any problems in computing them over the elliptic curve's group.

    12. Re:No expert but... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There is, Shor's algorithm. Wikipedia does not do a very good job of explaining this, but the thing is that Shor's algorithm is not about integer factorization, it is about the quantum order-finding problem. And both these problems (factorization and discrete log) reduces to quantum order-finding in polynomial time, hence giving polynomial type algorithms for them both.

      A technical yet friendly source for all of this is Nielsen and Chuang's book, Quantum Computation and Quantum Information, which I heartedly recommend if you're interested in this subject.

    13. Re:No expert but... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The part about AES' resistance is irrelevant (in some situations, but SSL is one of them). If attacker cracks RSA, which gets them an AES session key, then they don't need to crack AES.

      I hadn't heard about this lattice stuff. Neato.

    14. Re:No expert but... by EETech1 · · Score: 1

      That was an awesome explanation!

      Thank You!

    15. Re:No expert but... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Yes, you're right. This ask is a bit of a facepalm.

      A quantum computer is by its very nature a nondeterministic turing machine, so it can in principle execute all NP algorithms in P time.

      A better alternative to RSA, i.e. a "trustworthy" one, pretty much requires a proof that P != NP. But even if that proof existed, a quantum computer doesn't care because it can execute NP problems in P time anyway.

      So we'd have to move into a higher complexity class than NP, which pretty much means that the verification process has to be in NP to be practical (so it can be run on a quantum computer in P time).

      BUT, and here's the rub, if the verification process is in NP, we have a decision problem outside NP which can be verified in NP, which implies that P != NP (since if P = NP, the verification is in P, so the decision problem is in NP - a contradiction).

      Given that it is not known if P = NP or not, there is clearly no known algorithm that does this. Conversely, finding such an algorithm proves P != NP as a side effect.

      In other words, it's a hard problem, and it looks like quantum computers screw encryption up completely, until we develop new math.

    16. Re:No expert but... by smallfries · · Score: 1

      Formatting. Just went to the page that you quoted from to check and each of the n's is superscripted where-as in your quote they are not. Carry on.

      --
      Slashdot: where don knuth is an idiot because he cant grasp the awesome power of php
    17. Re:No expert but... by TheCarp · · Score: 1

      Yah um well... that was a copy&paste job.... its not my fault that the interaction between the wikipedia text, X11 copy/paste functions and firefox are not cooperating, but its not surprising either.

      --
      "I opened my eyes, and everything went dark again"
    18. Re:No expert but... by rochberg · · Score: 1

      RSA can also be broken by factorization. e and d are selected because of Fermat's little theorem, built on the totient function. That is, ed = 1 mod Phi(n), where Phi(n) = pq. If you know p, q, and e, you can compute d very efficiently regardless of the message encrypted.

    19. Re:No expert but... by rochberg · · Score: 1

      Yes, but Shor's paper is talking about computing the discrete log within a cyclic group for which the operation is multiplication over integers. ECC (there are actually multiple types of ECC...but that's a different discussion) is built on a different operation. For instance, you can do ECC using bilinear mappings such as the Weil pairing. It is not clear, based on what I've read, whether or not Shor's algorithm would apply to these other operations.

    20. Re:No expert but... by rochberg · · Score: 1

      See my comment above. Shor's paper talks about the discrete log problem for a cyclic group in which the group operation is multiplication over integers. That is, modular exponentiation. There are other forms of ECC that do not use modular exponentiation. It is not entirely clear (to me, at least) whether or not Shor's algorithm would apply to the discrete log problem in other settings.

  15. What kind of data? by hawguy · · Score: 1

    I'm more interested in finding out what kind of data you're protecting that needs to remain private for a century. A century ago, telephones were new and uncommon in homes (a few million phones existed, but no transatlantic lines, there was no dialing -- calls were placed through manual exchanges where a switchboard operator manually connected the callers), there was no TV, there were no commercial radio broadcasts. Electricity to the home was uncommon except to the wealthy in urban areas.

    I'd really like to know what kind of information you have that still needs to be a secret in the year 2111 when we'll all be driving fusion powered flying time traveling cars and vacationing in hotels on the Moon and Mars and carrying petabyes of data on our iMicrosoftPods with end-to-end DRM that terminates in chip implanted in our brains.

    1. Re:What kind of data? by Dewin · · Score: 1

      I'd really like to know what kind of information you have that still needs to be a secret in the year 2111 when we'll all be driving fusion powered flying time traveling cars and vacationing in hotels on the Moon and Mars and carrying petabyes of data on our iMicrosoftPods with end-to-end DRM that terminates in chip implanted in our brains.

      The keys to the DRM, of course.

      --
      Of course nobody reads the FAQ! If people read the FAQ, the Questions wouldn't be so Frequently Asked.
    2. Re:What kind of data? by tepples · · Score: 0

      I'm more interested in finding out what kind of data you're protecting that needs to remain private for a century. [By that time] we'll all be driving fusion powered flying time traveling cars and vacationing in hotels on the Moon and Mars and carrying petabyes of data on our iMicrosoftPods with end-to-end DRM that terminates in chip implanted in our brains.

      The keys for said end-to-end DRM.

    3. Re:What kind of data? by LeDopore · · Score: 1

      My father works at a law firm, and they do remote incremental backups over ssh. I don't really expect that anyone is recording all ssh traffic for later cracking, but on the other hand it would be easy to do. Law firms have all sorts of documents, including a few really secret ones that could incriminate clients. Lawyer-client privilege exists for a reason.

      In any case, if ssh fails in 20 years, law firms will be screwed. With documents like these, I have to think ssh isn't good enough, since a 10% chance (rough estimate) of losing all your data in 20 years is an unacceptable risk.

      --
      Expected time to finish is 1 hour and 60 minutes.
  16. Easy fix: by falzer · · Score: 1

    Square the number of bits used in your asymmetric keys.

    (Tongue in cheek.)

  17. Setec Astronomy by InlawBiker · · Score: 1

    Crack my code bitches!

  18. Not so worried about quantum by tempest69 · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Quantum entanglement is being studied hard by bright people, who are publishing. I think that the technology is a ways off, and I expect that there are some limitations on entanglement. Being able to collapse 2^2048 super-positions seems a bit preposterous to me. I could be horribly wrong, but I have a feeling that there are going to be limits on how many "entanglements" can be made by a given subatomic particle.
    I'm a bit more worried about someone who finally get's a eureka on factoring large numbers. Then the genie is out of the bottle, and no-one knows it. Heck it might already be cracked, and held as a state secret, only makes sense.

    What would you do if you had a factoring algorithm that could factor a RSA number as fast as the generator could make them?
    What would be the fallout?

    1. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Basically you're asking "what if P=NP?"
      Suffice it to say the question has been considered quite thoroughly, and everyone agrees it would be something of a big deal.
      Not very likely though.

    2. Re:Not so worried about quantum by junglebeast · · Score: 1

      I would probably inform some major banks, CC companies, etc and offer to withhold the secret for $10,000 a day up till 1 month. Then I'd go public and collect some of the prizes and scientific awards, retire and live a life of luxury never having to work again.

    3. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Professr3 · · Score: 1

      Didn't they make a movie about this? It looked like an answering machine, but it was really a [REDACTED] in disguise.

    4. Re:Not so worried about quantum by gedhrel · · Score: 1

      "What would you do..?"

      Publish it as widely as possible, publically. As a secret it's worth killing over.

    5. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Factoring is in NP. It is not known if it is in P. It is not known if it is NP complete. Thus there might be a polynomial algorithm and the world might still not be any wiser about P=NP.

    6. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sneakers (1992)

    7. Re:Not so worried about quantum by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Tell the world. If I didn't it, no matter how bright, someone else is just around the corner, or possible doing it now.

      So the only way to damage by rogue actors is to let everyone know it's there.

      Or transfer all the banks money to some well armed country.
      hard to say.

      When everyone can crack secrets, there won't be any secrets.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    8. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Sneakers

    9. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Omnifarious · · Score: 1

      Factoring is known to not be NP-complete. In fact, the complexity is known to be less than O(2^n), though larger than O(n^a) for any value of a.

    10. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      you'd probably be dead within 3 days of your blackmail. if your message reaches the right people they know that buttons to push

    11. Re:Not so worried about quantum by broken_chaos · · Score: 1

      Heck it might already be cracked, and held as a state secret, only makes sense.

      I doubt this. My instincts say that any government holding the key to breaking all cryptography would, at the very least, quietly start using something more secure for their most sensitive data. If one person has solved the problem, another is bound to do so soon, even entirely independently.

    12. Re:Not so worried about quantum by JoshuaZ · · Score: 1
      No. We don't know that factoring is not NP-complete. If for example P=NP then factoring would be NP complete (in a trivial sense). We can't even prove that P != NP implies factoring is not NP complete. We do know that if factoring were NP-complete then the polynomial hierarchy will collapse pretty badly but that's a reason to believe that it isn't NP-complete, not a proof.

      In fact, the complexity is known to be less than O(2^n), though larger than O(n^a) for any value of a.

      Again, strongly suspected but not known for the second part. Proving that factoring is not O(n^a) would in fact prove that P != NP in an extremely strong fashion.This result is strongly suspected but definitely not proven. If you could prove it you would have a straight shot at a Field's Medal.

    13. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The device was branded SETEC Astronomy if I remember correctly

    14. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That's why I always ramble against a realist view of quantum mechanics. The collapse is only in your mind. It is no more mysterious than being able to read the state of 2048 bits. That's only a measurement. What is actually difficult is to manipulate 2048 qubits, its a hideously complicated system.

      As for entanglement, the issue is about the same; the ground state of some condensed matter systems is entangled; we're talking about 10^23 entangled particles. But again, how to access these particles individually and manipulate them? It's awfully hard.

      That someone's got a classical algorithm for factoring integers in polynomial time, that seems implausible to me. The fact that it's a classical problem in mathematics people have been trying to solve for hundreds (if not thousands) of years might give you a hint of its hardness.

    15. Re:Not so worried about quantum by captjc · · Score: 1

      " I want peace on earth and goodwill toward man."

      --
      Slow Down Cowboy! It's been 1 hour, 47 minutes since you last successfully posted a comment
    16. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Alsee · · Score: 1

      Being able to collapse 2^2048 super-positions seems a bit preposterous to me.

      That's kinda like swimming 99.9% of the way from London to New York City, and quitting because the last mile might be "a bit" moist.

      Everything about quantum mechanics is wildly preposterous.

      -

      --
      - - You can't take something off the Internet! That's like trying to take pee out of a swimming pool.
    17. Re:Not so worried about quantum by DamnStupidElf · · Score: 1

      If you could translate any 3-SAT problem into a factoring problem in P time, then factoring would be NP-complete. Otherwise it's just in NP.

    18. Re:Not so worried about quantum by Omnifarious · · Score: 1

      Really? I thought NP-Complete problems all had a very particular structure to them, and it was known that factoring didn't have that structure. But, I'm not a mathematician, and I will happily admit that I'm wrong in this regard.

      As for the point about O(n^a), you're right.

    19. Re:Not so worried about quantum by JoshuaZ · · Score: 1

      Well, all known NP-complete problems have that sort of structure, but proving it is a strictly harder problem than proving P != NP (it is easily to see that it would force P !=NP but it doesn't seem possible from any obvious fashion to go in the other direction).

  19. GPG / PGP works for me by randomErr · · Score: 1

    I believe that GPG maybe your best alternative to look into. If those don't work for you there are the fishes - Blowfish and Twofish.

    --
    You say things that offend me and I can deal with it. Can you?
    1. Re:GPG / PGP works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      GPG's underlying algorithms of RSA and DSA will fall. Symmetric won't save you when the key can be extracted from the handshake.

      I cannot find a reference that DH will fall but I believe it will fall if DSA falls.

    2. Re:GPG / PGP works for me by IsThisNickTaken · · Score: 1

      And if you are a Dr. Seuss fan don't forget Redfish and Bluefish.

    3. Re:GPG / PGP works for me by geekoid · · Score: 1

      you anti onefishians.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    4. Re:GPG / PGP works for me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You've listed two symmetric ciphers. Symmetric ciphers are not the problem. The issue with quantum computing is asymmetric ciphers.

  20. 20 years is extremely unlikely by JoshuaZ · · Score: 3, Informative

    I wouldn't be surprised if in 20 years we can use a quantum computer to factor a number greater than 100. But that only requires a handful of functioning qbits. It is unlikely that the technology will be that advanced. There are however non-factoring based cryptosystems that are not as of yet known to be vulnerable to quantum computing. Unfortunately, we're a long way from proving that. The claim that there exists an encryption system which is not breakable by a quantum computer is a claim which is much harder than P != NP (you are in fact making a claim that us substantially stronger than NP not being a subset of BQP which many people aren't even sure they believe). In fact, even the existence of encryption secure against classical computers requires believing claims which imply P != NP. Moreover, if one starts implementing other encryption systems that aren't as widely studied as things like RSA one opens up the danger that those encryption systems have their own flaws as well.Also, at a practical level, there's very likely not going to be someone who is going to be recording all your RSS sessions on the offchance that they can decrypt them thirty years down the line. But if you really care then use one variant of elliptic curve cryptography. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_cryptography. ECC systems are well-studied and have implementations. The people who study these sorts of things seem to think that ECC is one of the systems that is more likely to not be unable breakable by quantum systems.

    1. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by Surt · · Score: 1

      Factoring 100 requires a 7bit quantum computer. We've successfully operated a 4 bit computer to factor 15. You really think it will take 20 years more to get those next 3 bits?

      --
      "Who is the Journal of Quantum Physics going to believe?" --Stephen Hawking
    2. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by JoshuaZ · · Score: 3, Interesting

      15 has been factored using NMR machines which have been abandoned for most serious research precisely because they can't be scaled very well. There are other systems which are more scalable in theory but they haven't been successful so far as getting the minimum number of qbits needed to factor 15. (Also this isn't quite accurate in that you need slightly more than log_2 n qbits to factor n in the general case, but the basic point is sound.)

    3. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by blueg3 · · Score: 1

      15 happens to be an unfairly easy number to factor with a quantum computer.

      Factoring 100 using Shor's algorithm really requires closer to 70 qbits.

    4. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by geekoid · · Score: 1

      Bitch slapped with facts. well done.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    5. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      15=5*3

      It's not THAT hard!

    6. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by SoftwareArtist · · Score: 1

      Darn it! I guess I'd better stop using 4 bit encryption. I'll move up to 16 bit keys - that should keep me safe from quantum computers for the next 20 years.

      --
      "I'm too busy to research this and form an educated opinion, but I do have time to tell everyone my uninformed opinion."
    7. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      15, in a recent experiment (not published as of yet) they have factored 21 using the Shor algorithm. It is in an optical experiment and the approach is not *quite* scalable, but smart people are finding more and more tricks all the time. Who knows, maybe we can factor 28 soon enough.

    8. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by JoshuaZ · · Score: 2

      Er, apparently I'm somewhat wrong here. I thought that the nature of the groups involved in ECC were sufficiently different such that the basic idea of Shor's algorithm wouldn't work, but it looks like that's wrong. ECC encryption is vulnerable.

    9. Re:20 years is extremely unlikely by JoshuaZ · · Score: 1

      Do you have a citation for that? Note by the way that 28 isn't the next relevant number: Shor's algorithm assumes that a number is odd and not a perfect power (those are both easy to reduce to the case of not being in that situation) so the next number after 21 would be 35.

  21. Nothing to respond to. by Vellmont · · Score: 2

    This article should never have been posted. There's no facts to respond to. Linking to a wikipedia article that talks about the possibility of Quantum computing is not a topic for discussion. Where does the estimate of 20 years come from? What will Quantum computing be able to do in this imagined 20 years? How much will it cost?

    Unless the submitter can give real answers to the above question, based on facts and not idle speculation, there's nothing to talk about.

    --
    AccountKiller
    1. Re:Nothing to respond to. by blair1q · · Score: 1

      All you're telling me is that you have yet to decrypt the summary, which is cleverly encrypted to look like a real summary, but contains clues that it's not realistically a real summary.

    2. Re:Nothing to respond to. by letsief · · Score: 2

      It is a real concern though. Quantum computers are by no means around the corner, but we're in serious trouble if someone manages to build a working quantum computer. So many of our important crypto protocols rely on RSA, DH, ECC-DH, etc. There actually are some pretty decent alternatives to the current used set of asymmetric algorithms, but getting those algorithms into standards (e.g., getting Ntru into the TLS cipher suite) is going to take time, and getting those updated standards implemented and deployed will take even longer.

      In some cases, protocols will have to change because of the new asymmetric algorithms. Some protocols really need to have small public keys, because their packet formats are only so big. ECC is great for that. But, the asymmetric algorithms all have larger public keys than ECC to achieve a comparable level of security.

      This is a real problem that people need to start thinking about. Of course, its not the slashdot crowd that is going to solve this problem.

  22. Easy... by blackcoot · · Score: 1

    SSH != crypto algorithm.

  23. Blank by TDyl · · Score: 1

    Surely the Republic of South Africa has been useless since Mandela gave up politics?

    --
    Todd: I hope it proves as delicious as the farmers that grew them
  24. Things to keep in mind. by KeithIrwin · · Score: 4, Insightful

    You should keep in mind that although theoretically there may be efficient quantum algorithms for a variety of problems on which cryptographic schemes are based, in practice, the only one which has been found is factoring. So, yeah, RSA will become toast if we can get the number of qubits in a quantum computer up into the neighborhood of RSA key lengths (1024, 2048, 4096). But, exceedingly few of the other major cryptographic systems rely on factoring being hard. So, for example, Diffe-Hellman or El Gamal (both integer and elliptic curve versions for both) will probably not be appreciably easier to crack. So, there doesn't seem to be any serious reason to be worried about public key cryptography, just RSA. So changes to SSH are pretty straight-forward.

    As for why people aren't worrying about it, my guess would be that most people don't follow quantum computing, and the few which do may have reason to wonder if we will ever actually reach the 1024 qubit size in a functioning quantum computer. A few years ago, I would've told people not to worry about it because I was following the state of the art and it was around 5 qubits and research had shown that under current models, you needed 9 qubits of output to reliably output 1 normal bit (if my memory is correct). So, we weren't even one 0.1% of the way to cracking RSA. These days, the number of qubits is higher, but it's still not clear how long it will be until we can actually functionally factor a 1024 bit number.

    1. Re:Things to keep in mind. by letsief · · Score: 1

      You corrected yourself, but I want to stress that asymmetric algorithms relying on the hardness of factoring and discrete logs both fall to quantum computers. That means DH, ElGamal, and DSA all fall. Some other crypto algorithms fall too, like identity-based encryption algorithms that rely on difficulty of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.

      There are alternatives, though. Probably the closest thing to a drop-in replacement for RSA for key establishment is NTRUEncrypt. But, NTRU isn't necessarily a good replacement for ECC (or even RSA), because it has larger key sizes. That may or may not be a problem, depending on the protocol. SSH and TLS should be fine. DNSSEC is more of a problem, since there's only so much space available in the packet format.

    2. Re:Things to keep in mind. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Discrete logarithm is also covered by Shor's quantum algorithm that covers the hidden subgroup problem (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hidden_subgroup_problem) for finite abelian groups, so Diffie-Hellman and El-Gamal are no Good.
      There exists cryptosystems that do not fall under this umbrella, based on "Learning with Error" (LWE - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Learning_with_error) (that reduces to certain worst-case Lattice problems, cool stuff). For example http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/613.pdf

      Recently even Fully Homomorphic Encryption based on solely on LWE was found: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/344.pdf

      Other problems that people have basing public key cryptography on that might not be exponentially faster with a quantum computer are "Subset Sum" (http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/576.pdf) and "hardness of decoding general linear codes" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McEliece_cryptosystem).

      The topic is called "post-quantum cryptography" in litterature.

  25. Submitter, RTFA by shadowrat · · Score: 1

    Even though current publicly known experimental quantum computing is nowhere near powerful enough to attack real cryptosystems, many cryptographers are researching new algorithms, in case quantum computing becomes a threat in the future.

    Did the submitter even read TFA? Everyone is happy with ssh and rsa because they work. People are working on encryption methods for when they don't. Nobody knows what's going to happen in the future but it's not here yet because there are no flying cars.

    1. Re:Submitter, RTFA by geekoid · · Score: 1

      but we have robes people wear backwords!
      the future is great..*weaps*

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
  26. Ooops by KeithIrwin · · Score: 1

    I double-checked things after I wrote this, and I'm wrong. I didn't realize that Shor's algorithm could be used to solve discrete logarithm problems. So, the ECC versions of things are not affected, but the integer versions of El Gamal and Diffe-Hellman are.

  27. Quantum menace? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Not really a menace, it will take some effort to implement a quantum cryptographic system. So it will be more than 20 years out. But AES is still good and has a future.

    The one thing you have to look at is its to prevent tapping into communications real time. If someone were to get the packets of a vpn tunnel and decrypt them oh lets say in a few weeks most likely months or years depending on the equipment, how will that data be relevant?

  28. Well, by AdamJS · · Score: 1

    Chances are, anything that does need to be secured against such threats, already is. Anything that does not, is probably fine with RSA.
    Barring gross incompetence.

  29. probably by superwiz · · Score: 5, Insightful

    because most people estimate that the cost of putting a software of even hardware-based keylogger is cheaper today than quantum computing will be even when matures. ie, the powers that be, that need to keep tabs on you, already can keep tabs on you.

    --
    Any guest worker system is indistinguishable from indentured servitude.
    1. Re:probably by rochberg · · Score: 1

      Mod parent up. Just because an attack exists in theory does not mean that a potential attacker has the incentives or resources to do it.

    2. Re:probably by SlashV · · Score: 1

      Just to illustrate this

  30. Re:This is actually very easy... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Assume hypothetically that every packet of your transmission has been recorded for future decryption when technology has advanced sufficiently.
    Can you confirm or deny that your method is safe if, say, quantum or otherwise fast solutions have been discovered that solve both the factorization problem and discrete logarithm problem?

  31. You can't hide secrets from the future with math by Captain+Spam · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Whatever the odds, some of the data we send over ssh and ssl today should remain private for a century, and we simply can't guarantee secrecy anymore using the algorithms with which we have become complacent.

    If I may, I would like to quote the MC Frontalot song, "Secrets From The Future":

    You can't hide secrets from the future
    with math, you can try, but I'll bet that in the future
    they laugh at the half-assed schemes and algorithms
    amassed to enforce cryptographs in the past.

    The rest of the song does a pretty good job of explaining exactly how absurd the entire concept of keeping data private, long-term (like, say, a century as suggested, or even twenty years when RSA is theorized to fall), entirely using encryption algorithms. Brings up points like how nobody's going to care about things like your shopping habits (as embarrassing as they may be), credit card transactions from cards expired twenty years previous, sensitive SSH streams decades old, etc. And that it's a moot point anyway, as it's impossible to predict technology out that far, so it's more than a bit futile to count on math to protect things on a time scale like that.

    Best of all, your secret: nothing extant could extract it
    By 2025 a children's Speak & Spell could crack it.

    --
    Demanding constant attention will only lead to attention.
  32. NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    NTRU is probably the most trustworthy and useable post-quantum cryptosystem.

    1. Re:NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign by rochberg · · Score: 2

      Posting as AC, huh? Are you an NTRU Cryptosystems employee?

      Here's a paper that surveys a number of quantum resistant cryptosystems. "NTRUEncrypt has also been found to be vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks based on decryption failuress [18, 21, 31, 38], but a padding scheme [30], which has provable security against these attacks, has been developed." "A comparatively greater number of problems have been found in NTRU-based signature schemes." "In 2006, it was shown by Nguyen that the unperturbed NTRUSign could be broken given only 400 signed messages [42]."

      I'd say that the jury is still out...

    2. Re:NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Do you think I would have posted a link to the free and open NTRU implementation if I worked for the NTRU company?

  33. There are good algorithms by johndoe42 · · Score: 1

    There are several asymmetric protocols with very nice security properties, even against adversaries with quantum computers. My personal favorite is based on the Learning With Errors problem, which is in turn based on some lattice results. Wikipedia has a decent summary, and the original paper is here. The old McEliece cryptosystem might be secure against quantum attack. NTRU is commercialized but its security bounds make me very nervous. There also systems based on elliptic curve isogenies, but a new quantum algorithm comes somewhat close to breaking them. The main problem with these cryptosystems is that the resulting ciphertexts and signatures tend to be fairly long. RSA produces ciphertexts that are about the same length as the original messages and DSA produces nice, short signatures. ECC protocols are even better, but Shor's algorithm breaks them just as easily as RSA and DSA. The fancy post-quantum protocols, on the other hand, tend to produce large messages that are slow to work with.

    1. Re:There are good algorithms by David+Jao · · Score: 1

      There also systems based on elliptic curve isogenies, but a new quantum algorithm comes somewhat close to breaking them.

      I'm one of the authors of that algorithm. You might be interested in my latest work: an improved cryptosystem based on elliptic curve isognies which seems to be more secure against quantum computers than previous isogeny-based schemes. (In particular, my algorithm for breaking the old isogeny-based schemes doesn't work against this new scheme.) Since posting the paper, we have improved the performance of the new scheme to the point where it is faster than RSA for the same (conjectured) level of security, even against classical computers (never mind quantum computers).

      I am obviously biased, but I think my new scheme is the best candidate for quantum-resistant key exchange. It's faster than RSA, it uses shorter keys than RSA, and it's security is based on relatively standard results in elliptic curve theory compared to other systems that involve difficult-to-analyze problems on lattices. It is very much a classical cryptosystem with some nice features, which happens to be quantum-resistant. It's not some kind of cumbersome scheme which you would use only if you cared about quantum computers.

      In general, I've given up on replying to Slashdot crypto articles, unless I have a personally relevant reason to do so (your post certainly qualifies). The general level of ignorance in the discussion is so stratospheric that it is painful to read. Even worse, the vast majority of commenters think that they know what they're talking about (they don't), and the vast majority of moderators mod up ignorant (but plausible sounding) drivel while ignoring the comments made by actual cryptographers.

      The correct answer to the submitter's question is what you just said: there are plenty of quantum-resistant key-exchange protocols available, among them NTRU, McEliece, learning with errors, and my scheme. The submitter should also have asked about quantum-resistant digital signature schemes. Here the answer is much less reassuring: there is only one, namely, NTRU. This is a huge problem for crypto if we ever build a quantum computer, since authentication is at least as important as encryption. It's a real shame that this entire discussion is based on the wrong question.

  34. One-Time Pad by solinari · · Score: 2

    Your only option for keeping data secret for 100 years is use one-time pad of really good, truly random data and keep it secure until the instant you no longer need to retrieve the data, then completely destroy it. Once it's completely destroyed, then it's even safe from two guys with blowtorches going to work on your knees. On the other hand, now you don't have anything you can say to save your knees! So it may be a matter of defining priorities for you.

    If somebody with massive resources is seriously committed to getting a particular piece of data, they are probably going to be able to get it. Yes, I could save network captures of SSL traffic and decrypt it someday to get some credit card numbers, but it's a whole lot easier just to steal your wallet and it's a whole lot more efficient to run a social engineering scheme some credit card processor and steal 100,000+ at once.

    1. Re:One-Time Pad by geekoid · · Score: 1

      If people know what you did, then your knees no longer matter to them.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    2. Re:One-Time Pad by blair1q · · Score: 1

      I'm just going to encrypt my knees. Seems like the solution to everything.

    3. Re:One-Time Pad by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      what does this have to do with ipads?

    4. Re:One-Time Pad by cfalcon · · Score: 1

      If someone is willing to torture you for a secret, it stands to reason that they will torture you for any reason at all.

      In other words: if someone is willing to bring force to bear, that doesn't let validly propose social contracts. "Do not negotiate with terrorists" comes to mind.

  35. The McEliece Cryptosystem by LegoEvan · · Score: 1

    is a public key system that is resistant to quantum fourier sampling attacks (ie. attacks of the type Shor discovered). That's not to say it's resistant to quantum mechanical attacks, but that if it is, nobody knows what the attack looks like. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McEliece_cryptosystem http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.2390

  36. What world do you live in? by slaad · · Score: 3, Informative

    I'd estimate that there's a 10% chance RSA will be useless within 20 years. Whatever the odds, some of the data we send over ssh and ssl today should remain private for a century, and we simply can't guarantee secrecy anymore using the algorithms with which we have become complacent.

    Maybe I'm just paranoid, but I pretty much assume that every algorithm that we have now could well be effectively useless in 20 years. And I would never presume to think any of them even has a chance of lasting 100 years, or even close to that.

    Computers will get faster. Weakness will be found in algorithms. Any other number of things that no can predict might happen. It would be silly to assume things encrypted today, left untouched, would be safe in 20 years and completely naive to have even a sliver of hope they'd be safe in 100, quantum computers or not.

    --


    ~Warning!~ The above is encrypted using rot676!
    1. Re:What world do you live in? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The NSA contributes to the majority of what is used today. That makes me believe that they already can crack / break what is available now....

    2. Re:What world do you live in? by letsief · · Score: 1

      I highly doubt AES-128 will be crackable in 20 years. You're not going to be able to brute force a 128 bit key in 20 years, so you'd need to hope that someone discovers a weakness in AES. Keep in mind that no one ever found a serious weakness in DES- it was only cracked because a 56-bit key size is way too small. A 128 bit key is 2^72 harder to brute force than a 56-bit key.

      But, quantum computers can crack AES-128 in 2^64 work, so maybe its vulnerable. But, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find a cryptographer that thinks AES-256 is going to be broken in 20 years.

    3. Re:What world do you live in? by letsief · · Score: 1

      NSA itself uses what the rest of us use. AES-256 is cleared for top secret data

      Believe it or not, but NSA wants to see strong crypto available in commercial products, because they use a lot of commercial products.

    4. Re:What world do you live in? by EETech1 · · Score: 1

      What would it take for computational resources to store every prime number in the key space, and even the result of the multiplication or mathematicification of those numbers into a database to allow you to just look up the key and find the prime factors and problem solved.

      Like a rainbow table, or lookup table instead of brute force.

      How many years are we away from being able to solve the problem of factorization of a 2048 bit number (or any other hugely complicated problem) with a simple query to a massive database containing every possible answer?

      Could all of Google's computing resources come close to storing this amount of data and searching it for the result faster than brute forcing it?

      Cheers!

    5. Re:What world do you live in? by Kristian+T. · · Score: 1

      Short answer: NO!

      Longer answer: Your proposed solution is much slower than enen the simplest algorithm of trial division. As others have stated, brute forcing the symmetric 128-bit or 256-bit ciphers is considered practically impossible for the forseeable future. Your method would be similar to those brute force attacks - only on a 2048 bit key. Current factorting is in fact a lot more efficient than that - that's why you need 2048 bits instead of only 256 to be safe. The best know running time of factoring algorithms is in some sense 2/3 polynomial and 1/3 exponential - though the 1/3rd is still enough to twart any attempts at 2048 bit.

      --
      Run with the lemmings, and you'll get your feet wet.
    6. Re:What world do you live in? by EETech1 · · Score: 1

      Looking into it from the bare minimum requirements and the current state of storage, and plugging a few of the numbers into Wolfram Alpha I see the problem here! While a books in LOC * Size of Google would be a better number, I took the size of the latest IBM Megadrive that is 120 petabytes and guzinta'd how many of these drives you would need just to get 2^256 bytes of storage.

      8.57 *10^59 of IBM's largest drive clusters are required to store 2^256 bytes of data.

      Wow...

  37. NP remains NP by migloo · · Score: 0

    So called quantum computing does not break the computational complexity barriers, it just shifts them a bit.
    What is exponential (like the RSA) remains exponential; we may have to increase the key size a little and that's it.

  38. Quantum Computing by Cameron+Fwoosh · · Score: 1

    I think a key argument being lost here is that, while Quantum Computing may tear through current encryption, it will also be responsible for the creation of new and improved cryptography methods. In fact, with quantum factoring, there is a theoretic possibility to create an encryption that is so difficult to break, it could be considered impossible...and it could be done with very basic quantum mathematics (If you can call quantum mathematics basic). As for SSH and RSA, until the "Quantum Menace" actually rounds that corner, these will remain the industry standard for a while. Even once someone creates a quantum computer that is actively breaking encryption, companies will not likely have the technology available to counter this for a while. You can't simply walk into Radio Shack and pick a quantum computer up. All we can hope is that the good guys get it up and running first, and make a solid encryption method that follows.

  39. Steganography Cryptograhphy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ...For future-proofing, at least. Encryption always tends to be broken (think Enigma), but it's quite effective to combine encryption with, yknow, actually HIDING the stuff:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steganography#Digital_steganography

  40. The Quantum Menace? by geekoid · · Score: 1

    hahaha.

    Creating messages that can be decrypted more then one way; one of which is used to the key from a book only known to the actor pretty mush solves that.

    For the rest of us, I'm not sure when it will become cost effective to implement.

    --
    The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
  41. Re:You can't hide secrets from the future with mat by geekoid · · Score: 1

    That's what popped into my head as well.

    --
    The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
  42. Too many secrets by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I'll be sneaking up on you...

  43. Bullshit, as usual by gweihir · · Score: 1

    Here is the relevant quote from Bruce Schneier:

    A quantum computer will reduce the complexity of an attack by a factor of a
    square root. So it will effectively halve the keyspace; that's all.
    -- Posted by: Bruce Schneier at August 18, 2011 8:34 AM

    Nothing at all to worry about. Doubling the key-space quadruples
    usage effort and is not really a problem.

    --
    Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    1. Re:Bullshit, as usual by letsief · · Score: 1

      That's only true for using a quantum computer to break symmetric crypto. Asymmetric crypto algorithms that rely on the difficulty of factoring or computing discrete logs are hit much harder.

    2. Re:Bullshit, as usual by gweihir · · Score: 1

      I doubt that. I expect that there actually is a O(n^9) factoring algorithm out there somewhere. O(n^9) would be quite infeasible for typical RSA keys though. Even then, you still get O(n^3) with Shor's algorithm and O(n^3) _can_ be used for asymmetric crypto. The requirement that one direction has to be exponential is basically intellectual laziness on the part of the researchers specifying this.

      Then there is the problem that asymmetric keys are much longer and you need a proportionally larger QC to put them even in there, let alone to do computations. 128 bit AES may just be feasible one day. 2048 bit RSA is rather unlikely.

      I have no idea about discrete logarithms, but th observation about the size of the QC needed remains valid. And remember that wile the defenders can scale up with something like quadratic effort, the attackers have to keep everything entangled, which may just require exponential effort and would neatly reverse any complexity gains.

      And there is an additional problem with QC: It is quite possible that when tried on real computations (if ever a large enough one can be built), the computation will fail and physical theory will have to be adjusted. Remember that it really is just the theoretical model that allows quantum computing, not any practically observed effect. My personal guess would be the model is wrong or maybe just not quite accurate enough. Even a small amount of, say, "quantum noise" would make complex calculation with long numbers quite infeasible.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  44. THE INTERNET IS NOT SECURE by blair1q · · Score: 1

    Why are you sending sensitive data over a network that can ship your packets blithely through any router on the planet?

    Encryption? Are you kidding?

  45. Commenter, RTFS by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The question was about a possibility that someone might record all our communications now, crack it when it's possible - maybe 20 years from now - and the data might still be sensitive at that point.

  46. One Time Pad by Zan+Lynx · · Score: 1

    To fix this, we abandon public/private key entirely.

    Instead, your bank, or Facebook, or any entity that you do business with sends you a USB storage stick with 16 GB of random OTP (One Time Pad). This can be sent through postal mail or by secure courier or exchanged in person.

    Once you've sent and received 16 GB of data you need to get a new OTP.

    There should be no way to break OTP encryption except by having a copy of the OTP or if the OTP was generated by non-random methods, or if the attacker was nearby and could recover most of the OTP random noise during generation. The most likely way to break the OTP would be to attack the client or server computer system to install spyware or to break in physically and make a copy of the OTP.

    1. Re:One Time Pad by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It's much simpler than that. Someone will start an pad distribution service so you can get new pads directly from them:

      1. I pick up a DVD of pads at best buy for free, or for a couple bucks depending on the business model. Likely it would be free at the physical distro point.

      2. I install the pads on my computer.

      3. When I go to https://www.amazon.com my browser sends Amazon the ID of the pad it wishes to use for the key exchange (the goal is secure symmetric key exchange, which is the same as the current goal of the public-key part of this process).

      4. My browser simultaneously goes to the distributor and says "I want to communicate with www.amazon.com using pad 99CFAB8C98D11375FA8E5FB8BC91880F56F8CEAF368407497ACAE25FD972ADE9. Please give them that pad."

      5. Amazon's web server goes to the distributor's API and says "Someone is asking to communicate with me using pad 99CFAB8C98D11375FA8E5FB8BC91880F56F8CEAF368407497ACAE25FD972ADE9. I need that pad." (Amazon's server is already in possession of pads that allow it to communicate securely with the distributor, having obtained them earlier just as I did. Once anyone picks up a DVD of pads, secure, direct communication with the distributor is a solved problem.)

      6. The distributor shares the requested pad with Amazon's web server. (The distributor has previously vetted and accepted the official association between Amazon the organization, with whom they have established secure communications via physically-shared pads, and www.amazon.com, just as a CA does today. Thus if a customer like myself requests that a pad for communication with www.amazon.com be shared with the appropriate organization, the distributor knows who to give it to and has a provably secure mechanism with which to accomplish the sharing.)

      7. Amazon's web server begins secure communication with my browser using the shared pad. We use the pad only to share symmetric keys, which we burn through at the same rate we do today. These can be keys that are beefed up to remain secure in the face of the quantum menace, but all the keys are really doing is making our pad last longer at the cost of some of our excess security (and with OTP's you have a lot of excess security). When you have used the pad up on key exchanges, you do the "handshake" again via the distributor.

      You might have to trust the distributor a bit more than you trust a CA currently, I haven't bothered to figure it out. But if so, this doesn't matter for anything but crime and government secrets. And of course there's nothing stopping you from running your own distribution system, just like you can be your own CA today. You just have less of the distribution work done for you out of the gate. For 99.99% of communications, trusting a distributor isn't a problem.

      Even if completing an SSL handshake required 1024 bits of secret, shared data (it doesn't), a 4.7GB DVD would allow you to run over 36 million secure sessions. Each of those sessions can transfer a ton of data. This is a perfectly feasible way of running all security, everywhere, until some of us leave the planet. It would be annoying for a year or so, and then it would be the new normal. You'd pick up a DVD (or thumb drive, etc.) once every year or so at most.

  47. As a former QC researcher: by drolli · · Score: 1

    I am not worried. Unless there is an unexpected breakthrough there will be no QC able to factorize anything beyond 2^30 in 20 years.

  48. I suppose we'll muddle through by psydeshow · · Score: 1

    If you've got something so secret that it has to remain secret for a century or more, then you're just going to have to re-encrypt it periodically as requirements change.

    Or you can simply rely on the fact that after about 20 years, no one will be able to read the data stored on that USB stick anyway without some seriously ancient, clunky equipment that's so full of tin hairs and accumulated smoke and coffee breath that the error-correcting code slows it to a crawl and prevents even quantum-style brute force in any reasonable time scale.

    It's fun to imagine the future, and think that people will value then what you value today, but you're most likely going to be proven wrong. Secrets may very well be of utterly no consequence in a world where everything of consequence is already transparent.

  49. Re:I use analingus-based key exchange by Mr+Thinly+Sliced · · Score: 0, Offtopic

    Gee, you guys are getting me all misty eyed for the old slashdot.

    Browsing at -1 used to be such fun here, but kudos to Taco he really killed the fun off.

    Now I'm going to go drink a bottle of whisky and jerk off my cat.

  50. huh? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    speaking as someone who is applying to work in the semiconductor industry, where the company in question fabricates the secure PIN chips that you see embedded on your credit or debit card, its common knowledge within the industry that the chips are designed to be secure only for a given lifetime (5 years is the highest i know of). beyond that there is no manufactures guarantee of security. so what point am i trying to make?

    that the goal of cryptography isnt to try to design THE MOST SECURE SYSTEM EVER, then start worrying when it fails. accept that at some point IT WILL FAIL. instead the goal is to always be actively researching new ideas and to stay one step ahead of the competition (hackers) trying to thwart your system.

    for people working on the secure systems that matter, whatever "LeDopore" writes about has already been discussed and analyzed many many years ago. the reason we are still happy with ssl/RSA and such is that they are still (relatively) secure for the time being, and slowly they will be phased out and replaced as it reaches its end-of-life. no need to fear-monger or worry :)

  51. Re: GPU before cubits by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Perhaps I'm looking at this rather simply... but I thought it's easy enough TODAY to build a computer with 2048 GPU threads... wouldn't this be much easier?

  52. zero wait state by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The reason quantum computing is so powerful is that this device effectivly has zero wait state. The changes to the entangled bit are instant, faster even than the speed of light. What this means is that a quantum computer would instantly solve any problem that has an answer, That makes even the simplest quantum computer more powerful than all the other computers on earth put together.

    Things that seem impossible now will be reality soon. The intelligence singlularity is upon us.

  53. you want NTRU; its faster than RSA & QC resist by aztennenbaum · · Score: 1

    From wikipedia:

    "NTRU is an asymmetric (public/private key) cryptosystem. It has two characteristics that make it interesting as an alternative to RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography; speed and quantum computing resistance. There are two NTRU based algorithms: NTRUEncrypt and NTRUSign.

    Because it is based on different mathematics (lattice-based cryptography) from RSA and ECC, the NTRU algorithm has different cryptographic properties. At comparable cryptographic strength, NTRU performs costly private key operations much much faster than RSA. In addition, NTRU's comparative performance increases with the level of security required. As key sizes increase by n, RSA's operations/second decrease at n3 whereas NTRU's decrease at n2."


    open source java implementation of ntru:
    http://ntru.sourceforge.net/

    Cyassl - an openssl replacement that supports ntru
    http://freecode.com/projects/cyassl

  54. Just found this a while back by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    This might be of interest:
    http://middleware.internet2.edu/idtrust/2009/papers/07-perlner-quantum.pdf

  55. McEliece cryptosystem security. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The McEliece cryptosystem is a strong candidate for post quantum cryptography.
    It has been shown to resist the quantum attacks that break the security of most standard asymetric key exchange protocol.

    Link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McEliece_cryptosystem,
                      http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.2390

  56. meh. by JustNiz · · Score: 1

    Consider the rate at which mankind is currently generating and spreading basically useless data that at some stage happens to get encrypted. How much more data will there be in say 20 years?

    I think its naive to imagine that of all that data, some unknown man-in-the-middle is gonna capture and waste say 20 years of storage on one of your ssh streams or whatever, until the power to brute-force decrypt it is reasonably available, just on the off-chance that it may contain something still useful by then.

  57. Cooty Rat Semen? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    For all your anagrammatical Sneakers snickers.

  58. ECC is still discrete logarithm by Myria · · Score: 2

    I double-checked things after I wrote this, and I'm wrong. I didn't realize that Shor's algorithm could be used to solve discrete logarithm problems. So, the ECC versions of things are not affected, but the integer versions of El Gamal and Diffe-Hellman are.

    ECC is still the discrete logarithm problem, just applied to a group other than integers mod another integer.

    --
    "Screw Sun, cross-platform will never work. Let's move on and steal the Java language." - Visual J++ Product Manager
  59. Re:I use analingus-based key exchange by spazdor · · Score: 0

    Not a day goes by when I don't think fondly of the Brown Rope guy.

    --
    DRM: Terminator crops for your mind!
  60. And there you have it by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    IIRC all the public key systems fall to quantum computers. The only known way around this problem is algorithms that require quantum computers. So the replacement becomes available at the same time the present methods fail and not sooner.

  61. Re:But if you don't think 100 is enough by TaoPhoenix · · Score: 1

    Nice reply.

    The theme I am grasping at though is that "100 years is overkill soon". Even 50 is something fierce, like when these blog posts surface with stuff from 1962 we're like "oh cool" not "OMG our country is doomed!".

    I know I know, since 1981 we're saying "It's a Fast Paced World" but it really wasn't, sorta. It's the fresh new Wikileaks-Anonymous effect, which is arising in response to authority abuses. It's like one of those xkcd's, paraphrased, "what use is it encrypting for 20 years when you can just have a hooker get the key?" Then twelve days later it's all over the net forever. Even in bad old security breaches that never happened.

    --
    My first Journal Entry ever, in 8 years! http://slashdot.org/journal/365947/aphelion-scifi-fantasy-horror-poetry-webzine
  62. Re:beer and hookers by TaoPhoenix · · Score: 1

    Heh those aren't hired, those are "development accessories!"

    And to an AC earlier, yes, I was sorta snide in my currency amount, it was a joke that everyone works cheap lately, so maybe that's cheap beer and cheap hookers.

    --
    My first Journal Entry ever, in 8 years! http://slashdot.org/journal/365947/aphelion-scifi-fantasy-horror-poetry-webzine
  63. Drakes Equation by JTW · · Score: 1

    Perhaps it explains why intelligent life hasn't been detected in the Universe. First they develop Telnet then they come to their senses and develop SSH - a bit in line with Stephen Hawking's idea that the recipients of an encounter with an alien civilization might wish they weren't... and would do better to actively "hide" or make their communications hard to decode.

    Quantum entanglement also brings to mind, if it can be done in a laboratory, shouldn't it be possible in nature. And if that is so perhaps there are bits of quantum entangled matter all over the Cosmos. Perhaps it is so common that's it rarer to find matter that isn't quantum entangled nearby. Wouldn't it be cool to work out the approximate location of a bit of quantum entangled matter a long ways away and use it for communications.. like a wormhole.. only not a wormhole. The best delivery agent I could think of on a very large scale would be the jet firing out of black hole, neutron star, or some other stellar event. But its all pure science fiction speculation right now.. hmm a Quantum "telescope".

    1. Re:Drakes Equation by JTW · · Score: 1

      Funny side thought.. what if "Looking for Intelligent Life" is the real problem.. and our only hope of finding alien life is finding the altruistic, benevolent or "not so smart" type. Which rather than abundant might be somewhat harder to find.

      Look at it this way, a bacterium could be "intelligent" but might focus all that intellect on healthy self interests and getting on with its own life.. rather than expending enormous resources to speculate and think up ways of sending messages to other star systems that could never be answered in its life time.

      On the otherhand a fairly "not so smart" bacterium with abundant resources might splurge on all sorts of unlikely projects in its lifetime, only to end up extinct.. but we might actually detect one of its messages.

      Glass is half Full or Glass if half Empty.. by the Third law of Thermodynamics.. it always seems to be running a bit low. Optimism aside it might take a fortunate alien civilization to have the surplus of resources to contemplate sending text messages to the stars.

    2. Re:Drakes Equation by JoshuaZ · · Score: 1

      Quantum entanglement doesn't work that way. Among other problems you can't use quantum entanglement to transmit information faster than the speed of light. You can use entangled particles as a shared source of randomness but that's a much weaker property. Also, entanglement in any useful form is a delicate issue, random particles won't just be entangled, and if things happen to get entangled it won't last for long.

  64. Digital signatures by d0cu · · Score: 1

    What happens to the legal system if digital signatures become untrusted? I might not own my house in 20 years because the "papers" where signed with digital signature?
    Note that digital signature is a norm in my country and is used extensively.

  65. Mindless drones by Cant+use+a+slash+wtf · · Score: 1

    Screw your shitty, generic pop music.

    I only listen to Post-Quantum.

    You probably haven't heard of it.

  66. Lets see a quantum computer break OTP by WaffleMonster · · Score: 1

    There is no credible evidence anyone has the faintest idea how to build a scalable QC.

    Noone can currently credibly approach the question of whether it is possible such a computer could exist.

    If the question is how can one develop a strategy to deal with an unknowable future. One half answer is crypto agility however this will not protect prior communications.

    A better ancient solution is to exchange a few gigs of quality thermal noise with your pals. Enough OTP for years of text and voice conversations. No quantum computer, genius or three letter agency EVER stands any hope of breaking that.

    Obviously preventing a TLA from breaking you and your pals is a much harder problem to solve than keeping your secrets safe on an unfriendly wire.

  67. QKD is one solution by Flarston+Marston · · Score: 1

    If you're asking about key exchange specifically, then there's quantum key distribution, which is equivalent to a one-time-pad. It relies on an initial shared secret, but once the key has been exchanged, it can be proven whether it's been eavesdropped, so this is not as much of a problem as it sounds. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_cryptography#Quantum_key_distribution

  68. Quantum-Crack? by muckracer · · Score: 1

    Out of interest: are there, presumably theoretical, estimates, just how long it would take a quantum computer to crack RSA and the like? Would this be an instantaneous thing, would it take minutes, days, weeks?

    Inquiring mind wants to know...

  69. lattice-based algorithms. by valpr · · Score: 1

    Even so I think 20 years estimate is way too optimistic... but for what it worth - lattice-based algorithms don't have know quantum computer attacks and Shor algorithm would not work for them.

  70. ObXkcd by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    http://xkcd.com/538/ (and be sure to read the alt tag)

  71. Obligatory XKCD by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    http://xkcd.com/538/

    What use is a 20" steel door if the wall is made of styrofoam? There are much easier ways to get to the goods than to break encryption. Breaking legs, keyloggers, whathaveyou.

  72. quantum crackheads by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    quantum computing is just around the corner? what a joke! :D