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New Trusted HW Standard For Windows 8 To Support Chinese Crypto
An anonymous reader writes "A new version of the Trusted Platform Module, called TPM2 or TPM 2.0 by Microsoft, has apparently been designed specifically for the release of Windows 8 this week. The details of this new standard have been kept secret. But a major update to the original TPM standard, which came out 10 years ago, seems to have been very quietly released on the Trusted Computing web site (FAQ) earlier this month. Following in the footsteps of the original, this version is quite a challenging read (security through incomprehensibility?). But this new version also seems to support some controversial crypto algorithms that were made public by the 'State Encryption Management Bureau' of China for the first time about 2 years ago. This is roughly the time that Microsoft seems to have begun working in earnest on TPM2, Windows 8, and probably even Surface. But that's probably just a coincidence. This crypto is controversial because of serious EU concerns with domestic restrictions on the implementation, use, and importation of cryptography in China."
How does that work
If it has publicly released, its usefulness is questionable.
“He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
Your entire computer was made in china, what makes you think you are safe even if your crypto wasn't?
AES, used by NSA after beeing deemed sufficient for classified information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard#Security
The NSA/CIA may have quite a few (a lot of) bright minds, but they certainly can't compete with the best worldwide cryptographers.
But don't let the facts get in the way of your conspiracy theories.
No, as there aren't any.
---- Booth was a patriot ----
Well guys, I don't know about you, but I have only one question: Is it a separate chip on the motherboard? Because if it is, I'm hosting SMC desoldering classes the day this thing hits the market. Who'd have thought the day would come when we'd have to modchip our own damn computers...
#fuckbeta #iamslashdot #dicemustdie
This Chinese crypto is controversial "because of serious EU concerns with domestic restrictions on the implementation, use, and importation of cryptography in China". That doesn't explain much. As I understand it, TPM cannot be deployed in China because of restrictions on crypto in that country.
Does this addition enable deployment of TPM in China? (I'd expect it would, why else add it)
Is it controversial because this specific algorithm has a backdoor, giving Chinese users a false sense of security?
Is it controversial because this algorithm has a backdoor, giving the Chinese government a way to subvert TPM in any device?
In short, I have trouble understanding what the hubbub is about.
If construction was anything like programming, an incorrectly fitted lock would bring down the entire building...
Is it controversial because MS can shut down china and make them pay for software.
Is that what Microsoft is getting?
From the FAQ: "TPM 2.0 is intended to be usable for a very broad range of platforms from embedded systems to mobile devices to PCs to servers." In other words, TCG is not dead but actively pushing TPMs to new platforms.
A use case: in case of theft, the permanent storage of your device can be protected against reading the flash memory (of course, assuming your device is locked in the first place) in the same fashion as Bitlocker works on PCs. The secret key with which your corporate data is encrypted can be stored in the TPM bound to a password and/or PCRs. (Assuming, of course, that the TPM itself is not hacked using physical attacks (DPA, etc.). But at least, it raises the bar for the average thief.)
If you ignore all the weird DRM-ish uses (which are basically unsupported for now anyway [1]), the TPM makes a nice cryptographic token. Unfortunately, TPM v1.1 hard-coded the OAEP label to "TPM", which made it incompatible with everything. TPM v2.0 fixes this -- the label is now user-specified. That means that you can use it for modern hardware crypto (sadly, using SHA-1, which should be phased out).
[1] For meaningful DRM, you need an endorsed TPM, which most vendors don't provide. See http://www.privacyca.com/ekcred.html
How can you trust a computer when it can't be examined what the code is actually doing? How can you trust a computer when Microsoft are involved?
Won't be buying a PC with that "trusted" junk on it.
Take Nobody's Word For It.
Over the least few months there has been a relentless barrage of negative stories about China. Many commentators seem to assume that any technology China has is stolen, all Chinese products are cheap crap and contain government backdoors, and all Chinese people are somehow brainwashed by the government.
China is a big place. There is a huge diversity of people. They have some really strong R&D, lots of good scientists doing cutting edge work. They make some damn good products, for example world class hifi gear.
This crypto standard is open, peer reviewed and seems reasonably solid. Obviously, like all encryption, it will be under continuous scrutiny. As for back doors, considering the US record on attacking other country's IT infrastructure the Chinese are the ones who should be worried.
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
The headline is slighly misleading. It's not MSFT's spec, it's the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and their TPM spec.
One of the goals of the new TPM spec was to allow a better way to replace some algorithms because the original TPM spec entangle SHA1 hash in such a way (with the PCR extension mechanism) that it was difficult to replace that hash algorithm when weakness was discovered that algorithm and people wanted to replace it. Once you change the design and open that up you should probably include the usual suspects.
Some interesting additional algorithms added to the support library were SM3_256 and SM4 (the hash and symmetric key algorithms mandated for use in chinese DRM), WHIRLPOOL512 (hash function from NESSIE). In addition of the normal RSA public key stuff, they've also added ECC, ECDSA, ECDH, ECDAA, ECSCHNORR (a smattering of ellipitic curve based standards) to the mix in order to help gain acceptance in those markets that want/need shorter key lengths that are available to EC-derived algorithms that presumably have similar security to their RSA counterparts with longer keys.
Interestingly, although they include the SHA2 family of hash functions as an SHA1 upgrade, the newly minted SHA3 was strangely absent. Also, I don't think they have included SM2 (the chinese ECC signature technique), but that's probably just an oversight. I expect both of these omissions to be remedied with the next release.
So why can't the people of these countries have high level crypto too, so that these oppressive govs can't oppress them any more by reading their electronic communications and stored documents???
Whenever I hear people say "security through obscurity is no security at all" like some mantra first I laugh and then I remind them that passwords are an instant counter argument; the passwords, "password" or "12345678" are not obscure and thus suck. The password "g*&Gug®¥øç¥" on the other-hand rocks (Other than being really hard to remember or type)
My 16 digit CC number along with 4 digit expiry and the 3 digit number on the back are quite secure if I keep them safe and obscure but become very insecure if I hand them out willy-nilly.
And lastly good luck breaking into my safe if I don't tell you where it is or what the combo is.
The only flaw is when you completely depend upon the obscurity. If my safe is made from tinfoil then when you find it you will crack it pretty quickly. But obscurity is often a significant part of security. Again let's have a race. You try to crack my safe made from tinfoil that I hid and I'll try to crack your top of the line safe that you deliver to my welding/grinding shop. Obviously the best safe would be both tough and hidden.
So the line should be security and obscurity.
This crypto is controversial because of serious EU concerns with domestic restrictions on the implementation, use, and importation of cryptography in China.
NSS
TPM 2.0 was designed so that new algoirthms could easily be added when needed. "When needed" means both when an old one gets broken and when it is necessary to satisfy the laws of a country in which the TPM is sold. If a manufacturer needs GOST to sell in Russia, they can petition the TCG to give the GOST algorithms identifiers, add some low level support funcitons (encrypt/decrypt a blot, hash, etc.) and their TPM suppors GOST. They don't have to rototill the whole spec as was necessary with TPM 1.2.
made me laugh hard enough that I spit my coffee onto my monitor. Thanks.
Unreal apk. You post verifiable facts and they down mod you.