Slashdot Mirror
New Trusted HW Standard For Windows 8 To Support Chinese Crypto
An anonymous reader writes "A new version of the Trusted Platform Module, called TPM2 or TPM 2.0 by Microsoft, has apparently been designed specifically for the release of Windows 8 this week. The details of this new standard have been kept secret. But a major update to the original TPM standard, which came out 10 years ago, seems to have been very quietly released on the Trusted Computing web site (FAQ) earlier this month. Following in the footsteps of the original, this version is quite a challenging read (security through incomprehensibility?). But this new version also seems to support some controversial crypto algorithms that were made public by the 'State Encryption Management Bureau' of China for the first time about 2 years ago. This is roughly the time that Microsoft seems to have begun working in earnest on TPM2, Windows 8, and probably even Surface. But that's probably just a coincidence. This crypto is controversial because of serious EU concerns with domestic restrictions on the implementation, use, and importation of cryptography in China."
How does that work
If it has publicly released, its usefulness is questionable.
“He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
Your entire computer was made in china, what makes you think you are safe even if your crypto wasn't?
AES, used by NSA after beeing deemed sufficient for classified information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard#Security
The NSA/CIA may have quite a few (a lot of) bright minds, but they certainly can't compete with the best worldwide cryptographers.
But don't let the facts get in the way of your conspiracy theories.
Well guys, I don't know about you, but I have only one question: Is it a separate chip on the motherboard? Because if it is, I'm hosting SMC desoldering classes the day this thing hits the market. Who'd have thought the day would come when we'd have to modchip our own damn computers...
#fuckbeta #iamslashdot #dicemustdie
This Chinese crypto is controversial "because of serious EU concerns with domestic restrictions on the implementation, use, and importation of cryptography in China". That doesn't explain much. As I understand it, TPM cannot be deployed in China because of restrictions on crypto in that country.
Does this addition enable deployment of TPM in China? (I'd expect it would, why else add it)
Is it controversial because this specific algorithm has a backdoor, giving Chinese users a false sense of security?
Is it controversial because this algorithm has a backdoor, giving the Chinese government a way to subvert TPM in any device?
In short, I have trouble understanding what the hubbub is about.
If construction was anything like programming, an incorrectly fitted lock would bring down the entire building...
Is it controversial because MS can shut down china and make them pay for software.
From the FAQ: "TPM 2.0 is intended to be usable for a very broad range of platforms from embedded systems to mobile devices to PCs to servers." In other words, TCG is not dead but actively pushing TPMs to new platforms.
A use case: in case of theft, the permanent storage of your device can be protected against reading the flash memory (of course, assuming your device is locked in the first place) in the same fashion as Bitlocker works on PCs. The secret key with which your corporate data is encrypted can be stored in the TPM bound to a password and/or PCRs. (Assuming, of course, that the TPM itself is not hacked using physical attacks (DPA, etc.). But at least, it raises the bar for the average thief.)
If you ignore all the weird DRM-ish uses (which are basically unsupported for now anyway [1]), the TPM makes a nice cryptographic token. Unfortunately, TPM v1.1 hard-coded the OAEP label to "TPM", which made it incompatible with everything. TPM v2.0 fixes this -- the label is now user-specified. That means that you can use it for modern hardware crypto (sadly, using SHA-1, which should be phased out).
[1] For meaningful DRM, you need an endorsed TPM, which most vendors don't provide. See http://www.privacyca.com/ekcred.html
Over the least few months there has been a relentless barrage of negative stories about China. Many commentators seem to assume that any technology China has is stolen, all Chinese products are cheap crap and contain government backdoors, and all Chinese people are somehow brainwashed by the government.
China is a big place. There is a huge diversity of people. They have some really strong R&D, lots of good scientists doing cutting edge work. They make some damn good products, for example world class hifi gear.
This crypto standard is open, peer reviewed and seems reasonably solid. Obviously, like all encryption, it will be under continuous scrutiny. As for back doors, considering the US record on attacking other country's IT infrastructure the Chinese are the ones who should be worried.
const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
The headline is slighly misleading. It's not MSFT's spec, it's the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and their TPM spec.
One of the goals of the new TPM spec was to allow a better way to replace some algorithms because the original TPM spec entangle SHA1 hash in such a way (with the PCR extension mechanism) that it was difficult to replace that hash algorithm when weakness was discovered that algorithm and people wanted to replace it. Once you change the design and open that up you should probably include the usual suspects.
Some interesting additional algorithms added to the support library were SM3_256 and SM4 (the hash and symmetric key algorithms mandated for use in chinese DRM), WHIRLPOOL512 (hash function from NESSIE). In addition of the normal RSA public key stuff, they've also added ECC, ECDSA, ECDH, ECDAA, ECSCHNORR (a smattering of ellipitic curve based standards) to the mix in order to help gain acceptance in those markets that want/need shorter key lengths that are available to EC-derived algorithms that presumably have similar security to their RSA counterparts with longer keys.
Interestingly, although they include the SHA2 family of hash functions as an SHA1 upgrade, the newly minted SHA3 was strangely absent. Also, I don't think they have included SM2 (the chinese ECC signature technique), but that's probably just an oversight. I expect both of these omissions to be remedied with the next release.
I take this categorization of my post as an honor. The fact that Microsoft would deal this way with China indicates China has virtual monopolistic power over the products they allow into China when they choose to do it.
I personally do not think the Chinese can be trusted and would not believe they would play fair. For god's sake, there are people in their country who make fake baby formula and medicine which have killed people. There is no way I can trust them.
So why can't the people of these countries have high level crypto too, so that these oppressive govs can't oppress them any more by reading their electronic communications and stored documents???
Whenever I hear people say "security through obscurity is no security at all" like some mantra first I laugh and then I remind them that passwords are an instant counter argument; the passwords, "password" or "12345678" are not obscure and thus suck. The password "g*&Gug®¥øç¥" on the other-hand rocks (Other than being really hard to remember or type)
Well if you are going to ignore the accepted and industry standard meaning of terms you can laugh at anything. Saying that passwords are "security through obscurity" is like saying "booting windows is a bad idea because you might break them". See Kerckhoffs's principle: "Stated simply, the security of a cryptosystem should depend solely on the secrecy of the key and the private randomizer.[Another way of putting it is that a method of secretly coding and transmitting information should be secure even if everyone knows how it works. "
And lastly good luck breaking into my safe if I don't tell you where it is or what the combo is.
No problem. Just have a 3-year-old open it.
Did you mount a military-grade, variable-focus MASER on an unlicensed artificial intelligence?
Ah but that is exactly what groups like the NSA do. They use algorithms that nobody knows. I suspect, and would bet, that they have crack teams working on cracking known algorithms in order of popularity. The mere fact that their system is unknown or obscure gives it extra security. If they crack any of the better know algorithms I doubt they will go Eureka!, quick, publish our crack in CS101 magazine. But good luck cracking theirs the one that you don't even know exists. It might have some big holes but they are obscured.
If you look at the history of hacks they usually depend on bad security implementation of well known systems. So an SQL injection attack works best if your database is using a well known SQL. The same vulnerability of the poor cleaning of input doesn't work as well if you use an obscure database, say adabas. The hacker would have to first identify the odd database and then cobble together the injection. The same with OSs. Windows his generally hacked first due to its very commonality. Mac is probably next, then linux, and then BSD. In reverse order of obscurity. Thus if I needed a super secure system I check out BSD first just for that reason alone. Plus it seems that BSD has attracted the most paranoid types.