Lockbox Aims To NSA-Proof the Cloud

Daniel_Stuckey writes "Lockbox, a tech startup founded in 2008, just received $2.5 million in seed funding for its end-to-end encryption cloud service, Client Portal. So, how does end-to-end cloud encryption work? Lockbox encrypts and compresses files before they are uploaded to the cloud. Only a person in possession of the corresponding key can unlock, or decrypt, the files. This means that the NSA, malicious hackers, business competitors, and even crazy girlfriends and boyfriends won't be be able to peer into users' most sensitive and private files."

Comments

I like the idea

[bondsbw]

But I prefer that my encryption tool and my cloud storage service be completely separate. (How do I know Lockbox isn't sending the keys to the NSA, or whoever?)

Re:I like the idea

[Garridan]

Yup. It's only secure as your OS, and the NSA pwns that. Always airgap your private key, or it's theirs.

Re:I like the idea

[JWSmythe]

A friend of mine offered that kind of service quite a few years ago.

It was a backup service. The user had the key. It was encrypted on the user's site, and only encrypted data sent up to the server.

It's not novel. It's a slashvertisment. {sigh}

Re:I like the idea

[mysidia]

It would defeat the point. You can probably safely assume they are not sending them right now.

The problem is: in the future, when more than 2 people start using their service --- the chance gets higher and higher over time, that NSA agents will descend upon them, and provide a legal order requiring they insert backdoors into their service, or protocol, or otherwise: provide the NSA with the resources required to get at the content, AND requiring they tell nobody.

In other words : No US-based cloud service can really fight the NSA; unless they are prepared to shutter the service and go to jail for the cause, which is not likely.

An overseas service is even better for the NSA getting a better chance at capturing the data -- because the things that are legal for them to do expand; gathering intelligence on overseas communications falls within their government mandate; and the techniques they employ could espionage, infiltration into the organization providing the service; and include compromise of computer systems and implanting malware bugs.

Re:I like the idea

[0111 1110]

I don't think an overseas service is better for the NSA. They don't have to even pretend to have ethical or legal constraints, but they are limited by international politics. They are stuck asking for cooperation. Or trying to bribe the right people. Within the US they have the full force of the US government behind them and can simply put uncooperative people in jail.

Nevertheless things have reached a point where you might get idealogically motivated people starting anti-NSA encryption systems and there isn't much the NSA can do against someone willing to risk prison or flee the country or shut down their entire company rather than deal with the devil. The NSA and the government in general are used to dealing with people who are easily controlled with nothing more than money.

But, yeah, the NSA can at least shut down pretty much any US based centralized system intended to fight them. Outside of North America and Western Europe it's a different story though. They don't have any legal power to shut down anything over there.

Re:I like the idea

[mysidia]

you could air gap the encryption task from the transfer task, and even with a court order and a shot gun to their head, the company couldn't give you data away.

The order could say to covertly insert a backdoor of the NSA's choosing in the "open source" client; or provide the NSA operatives root access to the server that distributes the client binaries, and the keys to push out a new release of the software.

Someone maintains the code that the users are using. And the maintainers could very easily be subject to a gag order; to not discuss the covert backdoor, even if it's visible in the open source code ----- it doesn't have to be, though: most people will just download the project's (NSA-patched) binary builds of the release.

Re:I like the idea

[Zemran]

If you go outside of North America and Western Europe, the NSA have big wallets and a bribe is more likely to work. You may think that somewhere like Venezuela hates the US enough to allow a business like this but I guarantee that the average sys admin in Venezuela could be bought for a few hundred. I would opt for a European country with more a sensible legal system like Switzerland. It will take years for the NSA to get in and the fight would be public. I know that they got into the banks but we all knew about it long before they got there. There are still other option with more effective privacy options and zero corruption but outside of Europe you know they are easily bought.

Re:I like the idea

[VortexCortex]

But I prefer that my encryption tool and my cloud storage service be completely separate. (How do I know Lockbox isn't sending the keys to the NSA, or whoever?)

It's pointless anyway against the NSA. Seriously. Every single modern operating system (including on routers) has tons of unpatched exploit vectors. There's even a black market for them. The NSA can just infect your machines and ex-filtrate your data and/or the encryption keys... See the previous story:

[NSA] Budget documents say the $652 million project has placed 'covert implants,' sophisticated malware transmitted from far away, in computers, routers and firewalls on tens of thousands of machines every year, with plans to expand those numbers into the millions.

Hell we have multiple celebrations of insecurity every year called "computer security conferences" where without fail new systems are compromised. How can you even look at stuff like Pwn 2 Own, and not have your brain melting in cognitive dissonance as you try to believe there are network attached scenarios where your data is safe from the NSA?

You want your data kept secret? Use whole drive encryption on machines that are never connected to any networks -- And even then there's the Ken Thompson Microcode Hack, so your systems could be theoretically pre-hacked from the factory... I won't buy a CPU that has remote cellular capabilities... Like Intel's Sandy Bridge. Laughed my ass off when I heard about that! "Security Feature" indeed. At least if the machine can't get on the networks there's a much lower chance of your data escaping if it's pre-hacked.

I don't know of any hacker worth their salt -- black, gray or white hat -- that doesn't have a directory of unpatched zero day exploits.
I keep mine in: ~/with/great/power/comes/great/responsibility/
Me having to navigate the directory structure has saved many a newb... The NSA has no such sensibilities.
If the data's encrypted, they assume it could be from a foreigner, and thus give themselves license to get at it, and they can.
This is what happens when you let Threat Narrative run amok.

Re:I like the idea

[vux984]

In other words : No US-based cloud service can really fight the NSA;

The key to fighting the NSA is to provide a completely transparent API.

And then rely on 3rd parties to deliver software that uses the API.

Even if the NSA knows that I have account with the cloud service, they don't know what client I use, (and even if i do, the client is on my equipment not "service based" there is no easy target to send a gag order too.

Essentially, dropbox, skydrive etc are all perfectly suitable cloud services.

What we need is them to do isopen them up wide open to 3rd party client development.

Re:I like the idea

[Andtalath]

Tpb was raided due to a threat from USA regarding an embargo towards Sweden.

So, well, if bloody Hollywood can put that type of pressure on a country, I believe a branch of the government can as well.

Re:I like the idea

[Anonymous Coward]

Tarsnap should also be mentioned in this context. It's a business started by Colin Percival, noted cryptographer and BSD developer. The client is 100% open source and runs on your machine. When Colin developed Tarsnap he found existing key derivation functions lacking, so he developed his own memory hard scrypt, which has found wide applications in other areas.

The major problem with "encrypted cloud" solutions is that encryption severely limits what can be done in the cloud. You can basically do encrypted file storage. You can't run virus or spam filters on your data, you can't index it and search it etc. So all the useful features we have in a Gmail session need to awkwardly and inefficiently be re-implemented on the client side.

The providers have very little incentive to do this and transform ad supported free services into paid ones (since data mining no longer works, ad revenue drops dramatically). While I would love encrypted email for everyone, it just won't happen for economic reasons. The NSA affair will be quickly forgotten and people will return to business as usual.

Re:I like the idea

[icebike]

When someone is buying a security product, and buying one that specifically bills itself as open source you can bet there will be many many sets of eyes on the code. It only takes one person to spot something like that, and you would be able to add your own layer of encryption on top of what was already in the open source.

So, no, open source is not as easy to beat as you suggest.

Re:I like the idea

[TheRaven64]

Full homomorphic encryption is really hard. Homomorphic encryption allows you to encrypt your data, do some computation on the result, and then perform some operation on the output to get the same result as doing the operation on the unencrypted data. Current solutions are at least a factor of 1000 slower than doing it on unencrypted data, but that's only for general case. There are ways of encrypting data that preserve certain properties so you can, for example, perform simple database operations on it in the encrypted form and only interpret the results if you hold the keys. The down side of these approaches is that they increase the size (effectively doubling it for every primitive operation that you want to support), but with storage becoming cheap they may become interesting...

Re:I like the idea

[Anonymous Coward]

if bloody Hollywood can put that type of pressure on a country, I believe a branch of the government can as well.

Hollywood is a branch of the US government!

Re:I like the idea

[Joce640k]

What's to stop me encrypting my files then putting them on normal dropbox?

Re:I like the idea

[Alef]

It's pointless anyway against the NSA. Seriously. Every single modern operating system (including on routers) has tons of unpatched exploit vectors. There's even a black market for them. The NSA can just infect your machines and ex-filtrate your data and/or the encryption keys...

If you are individually targeted by the NSA, then yes, you probably don't stand much of a chance. But they couldn't use that kind of attack vector en masse without it being discovered fairly quickly, so it still helps against dragnet fishing.

Re:I like the idea

[Shemmie]

Another service offering:

SpiderOak uses AES256 in CFB mode and HMAC-SHA256. SpiderOak uses a nested series of key scopes: a new key for each folder, version of a file, and the individual data blocks that versions of files are composed from. Having keys with such limited scope allows for selective sharing of chosen portions of your data while keeping the remainder private.

        Most importantly, however, the keys are never stored plaintext on the SpiderOak server. They are encrypted with 256 bit AES, using a key created from your password by the key derivation/strengthening algorithm PBKDF2 (using sha256), with a minimum of 16384 rounds, and 32 bytes of random data ("salt"). This approach prevents brute force and pre-computation or database attacks against the key. This means that a user who knows her password can generate the outer level encryption key using PBKDF2 and the salt, then decipher the outer level keys, and be on the way to decrypting her data. Without knowledge of the password, however, the data is unreadable.

        SpiderOak accounts also include a 3072 bit public/private RSA key pair. This is currently not used for anything, but is included with all accounts with the expectation that SpiderOak will add multi-user private collaborative and sharing features which would necessitate the use of the the public/private keys.

https://spideroak.com/ .

Re:I like the idea

[Zimluura]

tinfoil hats used to be a fashion choice. now they're a necessity.

Re:I like the idea

[Dunbal]

For the truly ultra-paranoid conspiracy theorists of you.

No, the ultra-paranoid are thinking about the back doors built into hardware/firmware. Hacking into your network chip without it even reporting activity to you, and silently scanning your computer underneath the OS. Rootkits/backdoors in the OS itself are not only a possibility, they are likely - no matter how much Microsoft denies it. Certainly there is documentation claiming they can at least grab anything in your "Outlook". But once you're in - you're in.

Re:I like the idea

[Dunbal]

Drop "US-based", because the US government has already made use of foreign police (Sweden illegal server raids, New Zealand illegal server raids, extradition of "hackers" from the UK, etc) to shut down foreign sites claimed to be violating US laws. Perhaps it's better to say "No cloud service in a US friendly country can really fight the NSA". So you can always go for storing your data in an UNfriendly country. But since they're unfriendly what makes you think your data would be safer there? Quite the conundrum.

Re:I like the idea

[BitcoinBenny]

I think I have some insight into this as I have an end to end encrypted cloud service called coinlock.com My slashvertisement on the subject was ignored though ;) millions in funding tends to get people noticed.

Anyway on this particular subject I think you have hit the nail on the head. The key to long term security is to completely open up the API and separate the client side components so that third parties can use te service with their own sotware or with the software that you have provided them directly on their local computer.

This is easier said than done for most services, but its something that I am striving towards and intend to do a full client auditable release as well as publish the public facing api. This idea that people can move their services outside of the country and it matters I think is very flawed. U.S. companies are subject to the law regardless of where they do their hosting, and the managment team is the weakest link in the security chain. This is something that is best solved by transparency.

Re:I like the idea

[Zontar The Mindless]

Thank goodness most of those chips are made in China!

Re:I like the idea

[dlingman]

Having actually done tests on tinfoil hats, we came to the conclusion that tinfoil just doesn't work. Steel wool does though. Maybe you can use the tinfoil to wrap the steel wool to contain it so it's less scratchy.

(and yes, this was real - we needed to determine behavior of a device as it slowly lost it's incoming signal - wrapping in steel wool worked great for this.)

Re:I like the idea

[Luckyo]

You misunderstand. Hollywood is the propaganda arm of US government. As a result, while it does enjoy significant protection of US government as to enable it to perform its task (financially self-sustainable domestic and international propaganda), it most certainly does not command US government beyond its ability to influence the puppets, otherwise known as politicians in the same way that other similar agencies can influence the same puppets.

It still has to combat all the other agencies, and in that game agencies like NSA and CIA hold much stronger cards as they have blackmail material on everyone, as well as ability to simply remove people they do not want.

Re:I like the idea

[mysidia]

If it were my choice, there wouldn't be any. The installer pulls down a well-known compiler (say a specific version of gcc) from a server known to publish it and source code from our source code server, builds it, and installs that.

Ah, but if the NSA tampers with the binary, the installer covertly puts down something else as well; as in it puts down the compiler, downloads the source, compiles it, and then as the last step before linking: quickly applies a binary patch to a .O file, and then links them, forming the executable.

As long as there is binary code executing that was downloaded, even an installer; you never know for sure.

And yeah.... altering a compiler works just as well as altering a program -- because a compiler can be altered to emit a patch

Re:I like the idea

[Anonymous Coward]

That's a lot of nice buzzwords that are thrown out there. But they're closed source and in the USA, so it all comes down to "Trust us." Do you? Why?

Re:I like the idea

[ThatAblaze]

Compressed cypher text should be quite easy to crack shouldn't it? Most compression algorithms use a dictionary..

Of course I welcome any insight from anyone more knowledgeable since I am not well versed in cryptography.

Compression algorithms are easy to "crack", the algorithm to uncompress is known but that algorithm is very different for encryption algorithms. Compressing an encrypted file does not break the encryption in any way (however it also fails to reduce the file size, so what's the point really?) First compressing and then encrypting can make the file more secure, since brute force encryption cracking scans the file for text most of the time, and compression eliminates most of that text. However, if an attacker knows that your file is compressed and then encrypted they can just brute force against the compression headers and you've gained nothing.

Compression does not compromise your encryption in any way though. It's just a different layer with a different purpose.

Re:I like the idea

[RespekMyAthorati]

How about having a separate computer, not on the internet, that does the encryption?

Re:I like the idea

[RespekMyAthorati]

If Scientology can scare /. into submission (Scientology v.s. Slashdot), the NSA sure as hell can.

Obligatory 5 dollar wrench.

[JWSmythe]

http://xkcd.com/538/

Re:Obligatory 5 dollar wrench.

[DirePickle]

With the recent "revelations" (they're not), it would be obvious that xkcd was pretty far off the mark here. The NSA is engaging in a far-reaching fishing expedition that is not practical to conduct with wrenches.

Re:Obligatory 5 dollar wrench.

[jamesh]

With the recent "revelations" (they're not), it would be obvious that xkcd was pretty far off the mark here. The NSA is engaging in a far-reaching fishing expedition that is not practical to conduct with wrenches.

But on the other hand if their "far-reaching fishing expedition" doesn't give them the information they want, and they want it badly enough, a wrench always works.

Re:Obligatory 5 dollar wrench.

[Urkki]

Even so, this service does not protect an individual against wrenches.

Indeed it doesn't, but a wrench is not guaranteed to work either.

If the wrench does not work, you're holding it wrong.

Re:Obligatory 5 dollar wrench.

[currently_awake]

I believe standard practice is for police to back up your hard drive before they start forensic stuff. So you give them a wipe password, then they go for the real one.

Wuala

[ruhrguide]

... exists. But as mentioned by bondsbw, you can't control wether it sends your keys to a third party.

Great idea but...

[Zemran]

...based in California - cannot trust the security... ...UK - what is security? ...Australia - the FBI asked us nicely...

If only the hardware wasn't already compromised

[ReallyEvilCanine]

Without known-secure hardware and and OS to run it, all the fucking encryption in the world don't mean squat. And before the fanbois scream, "Lunix is Teh Shiznit Seckyoor!" remember that you have to know the compiler is safe as well (*cough*Ken*Thompson*cough*).

Re:If only the hardware wasn't already compromised

[Microlith]

The thing about Ken Thompson's theoretical attack is that it would inevitably be detected. It's an interesting thought experiment, but a functioning example that would be able to discern the right program to attack (and differentiate between a kernel and a userspace application) has not been shown as far as I am aware.

Re:What exactly is $2.5 million funding?

[GPLHost-Thomas]

It's funding the advertising campaign on slashdot.

Clown Computing!!!?? Stop already.

[marienf]

Can we stop pretending that "The Cloud" has actual meaning, technical relevance, etc..?
Do we really have to go back to the fracking mainframe with all our eggs into one (someone else's) basket,
and at the mercy of whatever corporate greed du jour? Your Brains! They are SOOOO CLEAN!

We have so much computing power and bandwidth in the home and office that it should be perfectly feasible
to go exactly the other way, do away with the stupid client/server model and go 100% P2P, keeping
one's own data on one's own hardware in one's own home.

ISP's that go symmetric and neutral will survive.

Is it really safe / free (libre) software?

[Anonymous Coward]

In this months Free Software Foundation news Bulletin the FSF points to what appears to be a similar offering that is free software friendly:

https://leastauthority.com/press_release_2013_07_30

I took a quick look at lockbox and nothing I saw screamed free software. I could be wrong. Maybe they are even using the same underlying software as LeastAuthority. However they haven't advertised that clearly enough (on front page). I'd be concerned in using a service that is more concerned about looks, isn't clear, and might even be snake oil.

If somebody has the time to take a better look please post a reply with the relevant facts and links to the source/evidence/etc.

Trusted client?

[Anonymous Coward]

What's to stop the intelligence agencies from compelling the company to produce a compromised client? For example, logging the encryption keys somewhere, or subtly introducing flaws into the algorithm... I mean, right there on their website, "Only naive users would trust their cloud vendor" - so instead trust us - we *promise* we won't let the NSA sneak anything into our software...

About the only way you could have any real confidence in this is if you write your own client to manage all the encryption and use it as a dumb storage backend. And that assumes you can trust the OS and all the other software on your computer - I mean, the company pretty much has to operate out of a country, and that country probably has provisions in its law to compel co-operation with police investigations or intelligence agencies.

All they need to do is rock up with a court order that includes non-disclosure provisions, and wham, next time something auto-updates you're screwed. And if you don't install the updates, there's probably _something_ on your computer that phones home that could be used to identify your system and use all the un-patched vulnerabilities to sneak in a keylogger or similar.

You're probably better off writing coded letters, but even that is highly vulnerable to a wrench attack.

Encrypts and compresses?

[TheTrueScotsman]

One would hope they do the compression first otherwise there's very little point.

the cloud is dead

[0111 1110]

At best the service will simply be shut down by the NSA if they cannot compromise it. Lockbox claims to use client side encryption. If the system is executed perfectly and all of your data is fully encrypted before it leaves your computer this might be difficult, but if the service is shut down you will probably lose your data anyway. Which means you will need a local backup which would seem to ruin the point. I think it's about time to admit that saving any data on a remote server in the US, UK, or close allies of either has to be considered to be stored by the NSA/GCHQ and forwarded to other law enforcement agencies if deemed appropriate. And international cooperation in this regard among close allies cannot be ruled out.

In the sort of privacy-hostile environment currently faced in the US, UK and much of the world going full tin foil hat is the only way. Any information you want to remain private has to be encrypted by a system fully under your control before it leaves your computer and your passphrase has to not just be secure, but NSA/GCHQ secure. And it wouldn't hurt to toss in some multifactor authentication and steganography as well.

SpiderOak does it without using Java

[TheSeatOfMyPants]

SpiderOak has had client-only encryption/decryption using 2048-bit RSA & 256-bit AES for its sync/backup/versioning service for years -- I believe ever since they opened in late 2007. That sure sounds like what this newcomer is touting, except that SpiderOak also has free 2GB accounts with live versioning, and uses binary executables on all platforms to do the encryption/decryption (Lockbox uses a Java web client, which I thought was a security no-no).

FWIW, I don't get jack out of pointing out SpiderOak. I've just been really relieved that it has restored documents that I completely fucked up (live versioning FTW) and think it's seriously overlooked/underrated.

Re:not secure

[GigaplexNZ]

Doesn't necessarily mean they know the decryption keys does it?

Online or Secure

[toygeek]

Pick one

Need to close their US office

[bradley13]

Seriously. If they want to be taken seriously as offering a service proof against the NSA, they need to not be an American company and to not have any physical US operations. Otherwise a secret FISA order (e.g., issue a client update that sends the encryption keys along with the next batch of data), and their customers are screwed.

No cloud service (or any other service) in the US can be trusted.

Lastpass does that for Passwords

[Skylinux]

This is how LastPass.com works. Very good idea and works well but I must trust that future updates are not modified by an "NSA Patch" or some sort of court order.

One way to somewhat "NSA Proof" it would be to separate the encryption and storage software.
Storing an encrypted Linux container on a service like crashplan.com works well

Re:I think they understimate the cloud

[cheros]

Yawn. Yet another tech answer to what isn't a tech problem to start with. I suspect there will be gazillions more coming your way over the next few months because all the Silicon Valley entrepreneurs want to milk that market before people realise they've been had: IT IS NOT A TECHNICAL PROBLEM.

For a US based company it is 100% pointless to install any defence mechanism if some random official can walk in and ask for corporate data - the owner has to offer the data., unlocked.

For any organisation outside the US, it should simply ask the question: what are the chances that a US based organisation will NOT have a backdoor in its technology if such can be legally prescribed? As you have seen with Lavabit and Silent Circle, there are in principle only two ways forward: comply, or close shop. I leave you to note the clear risk in using security products from those who provide security products who have not closed down yet. Note: I'm not stating that all US sourced security products HAVE been provided with a backdoor, merely that it is legally possible to force the suppliers to implement them.

Eventually, someone will realise the real risk to the US economy: it's a profound lack of trust. This will take decades to fix, mainly because it involves a fight to either repeal those emergency laws or introduce some independent transparency and supervision. Meanwhile, whole swaths of Silicon Valley people will continue to sell what is at best privacy theatre, but which also risks becoming nothing more than security theatre as well.

Because backdoors and security do not combine very well.

The Root Problem

[some old guy]

The root problem, appalling pun gleefully intended, is political, not technical.

Between unlimited resources and questionable legal tactics, the NSA and other sigint agencies can and will always compel or bribe that which they cannot hack. Software crowbars, legal hammers, and moneybags of grease are everything they need. For every new solution, they will create a new problem.

The only guaranteed solutions are either the (don't hold your breath) complete abolition these government entities, with no successor remakes, or the courts and Congress must hamstring them with crystal-clear transparency (still possible, but politically unlikely).

To believe otherwise underestimates the present unfettered powers, technical, legal, and financial, of the government.

Re:Lockbox

[rvw]

Didn't Al Gore already invent this a long time ago?

Al Gore invented inventions. So basically - yes.

Re:If they want you

[jon3k]

Explain to me how they attach to my "PC 'end point'" on my linux workstation.

RLY? Switzerland?

[TarPitt]

It's been done already:

For half a century, Crypto AG, a Swiss company located in Zug, has sold to more than 100 countries the encryption machines their officials rely upon to exchange their most sensitive economic, diplomatic and military messages. Crypto AG was founded in 1952 by the legendary (Russian born) Swedish cryptographer Boris Hagelin. During World War II, Hagelin sold 140,000 of his machine to the US Army.

"In the meantime, the Crypto AG has built up long standing cooperative relations with customers in 130 countries," states a prospectus of the company. The home page of the company Web site says, "Crypto AG is the preferred top-security partner for civilian and military authorities worldwide. Security is our business and will always remain our business."

And for all those years, US eavesdroppers could read these messages without the least difficulty. A decade after the end of WWII, the NSA, also known as No Such Agency, had rigged the Crypto AG machines in various ways according to the targeted countries. It is probably no exaggeration to state that this 20th century version of the "Trojan horse" is quite likely the greatest sting in modern history.

http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/01/nsa_backdoors_i.html