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Security Researchers Want To Fully Audit Truecrypt
Hugh Pickens DOT Com writes "TrueCrypt has been part of security-minded users' toolkits for nearly a decade — but there's one problem: no one has ever conducted a full security audit on it. Now Cyrus Farivar reports in Ars Technica that a fundraiser reached more than $16,000 in a public call to perform a full security audit on TrueCrypt. 'Lots of people use it to store very sensitive information,' writes Matthew Green, a well-known cryptography professor at Johns Hopkins University. 'That includes corporate secrets and private personal information. Bruce Schneier is even using it to store information on his personal air-gapped super-laptop, after he reviews leaked NSA documents. We should be sweating bullets about the security of a piece of software like this.' According to Green, Truecrypt 'does some damned funny things that should make any (correctly) paranoid person think twice.' The Ubuntu Privacy Group says the behavior of the Windows version [of Truecrypt 7.0] is problematic. 'As it can't be ruled out that the published Windows executable of Truecrypt 7.0a is compiled from a different source code than the code published in "TrueCrypt_7.0a_Source.zip" we however can't preclude that the binary Windows package uses the header bytes after the key for a back door.' Green is one of people leading the charge to setup the audit, and he helped create the website istruecryptauditedyet.com. 'We're now in a place where we have nearly, but not quite enough to get a serious audit done.'"
I am shocked, and frankly a little pissed off that Version 6 and Version 7 aren't identical.
Thirty four characters live here.
'As it can't be ruled out that the published Windows executable of Truecrypt 6.0a is compiled from a different source code than the code published in "TrueCrypt_7.0a_Source.zip"
I would hope version 6.0a is compiled from a different source than 7.0a. Why roll a version number with no change?
TrueCrypt has a custom license and it is unclear how it mixes with other licenses. This makes code-sharing between TrueCrypt and other projects problematical.
According to TFA nobody knows who wrote TrueCrypt.
The answer to the problem is simple: relicense TrueCrypt. If there are no known authors, there's nobody to complain.
All typos in the writeup aside, the TrueCrypt FAQ states:
In addition to reviewing the source code, independent researchers can compile the source code and compare the resulting executable files with the official ones. They may find some differences (for example, timestamps or embedded digital signatures) but they can analyze the differences and verify that they do not form malicious code.
If so, why would it cost $16,000 to do that? Heck, I bet somebody would do that, and also do "a full security audit" of the source code, for free.
When I used to use TrueCrypt years ago, I assumed someone had already done that. But I never found any proof, so I stopped using it. Will the $16,000 maybe be used to pay someone to do that formally and publish the results?
...I thought the main point of the "open source is more secure" argument was that this process supposedly happened on its own, organically?
For your security, this post has been encrypted with ROT-13, twice.
...if you distribute modified versions of TrueCrypt, you cannot charge for copies. That is non-free...
...nothing in the license constitutes a promise not to sue for copyright infringement. Our counsel advises that a plain reading of this indicates that if Fedora complies with all the requirements of the TrueCrypt license, we would nonetheless have no assurance that TrueCrypt will not sue me for my acts of copying, distribution, creation of derivative works, and so forth...
TrueCrypt seems to be reserving the right to sue any licensee for copyright infringement, no matter whether they comply with the conditions of the license or not. Based on this, our counsel advised that above and beyond being non-free, software under this license is not safe to use...
Our counsel advised us that this license has the appearance of being full of clever traps, which make the license appear to be a sham (and non-free).
Given all of this, plus the problems with TrueCrypt authorship etc. I think the best course of action is replacing with a free implementation, maybe starting with something like this?
Geeks like to think that they can ignore politics, you can leave politics alone, but politics won't leave you alone.-rms
Pink pony ... fully audited Truecrypt ... Pink pony ... fully audited Truecrypt ... choices, choices, choices.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
"Green is one of people leading the charge to setup "
One of which people?
'Set up' is two words.
was8't on Steve's long tePrm survival
I do have one question, if you need reliable encryption and privacy why is your operating systems Windows?
"If any question why we died, Tell them because our fathers lied."
http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/3664/
"If any question why we died, Tell them because our fathers lied."
I use the best encryption ever for everything I need to keep secret. The algorithm is a simple bitwise XOR applied to every byte in the file, using the data itself as a one-time pad. Completely uncrackable unless you know the data that was used for the pad.
The output also compresses really well!
=Smidge=
Seriously, now, if Bruce is really that reluctant to run a Linux installer, then he can find plenty of us willing to give him a hand, for the cause.
Setting up, say, Fedora 19 (or some other distro with LUKS in the installer) with VirtualBox, to run the Windows apps he needs and a basic set of productivity apps, is a 1-2 hour job for somebody who has done it before.
It's pretty strange that anyone would find an audit or TrueCrypt "trustworthy". It's not open source. You can't compile it yourself. You have no idea what is in the source. At least with Gnupg you have to option of going through it line-by-line to see what the ingredients are. You can't, and never will be able to, do that with proprietary software. Even if you were to verify a single code branch, the publishers may be under a gag order to reveal certain details -- much like Lavabit making this whole argument pointless.
Join the Slashcott! Feb 10 thru Feb 17!
The writing random bytes thing, but only on Windows, is rather puzzling. It seems like one way to build confidence that's faster than setting up a deterministic build (which at any rate, would not necessarily be accepted by the TrueCrypt authors it seems), would be to open up the binaries in IDA Pro and figure out if the bytes written there on Windows truly are random or if they are not.
"TrueCrypt has been part of security-minded users' toolkits for nearly a decade — but there's one problem: no one has ever conducted a full security audit on it except the NSA.
FTFY
Ask the author how they compile it. Get that exact source and compile it that way. Then work out each difference. Libs get searched in directory or date order? Tweak that. Till all that is different are a few timestamps NIC MAC's, etc.
Then just audit the source. Non-trivial in itself.
Maybe Brasil could be asked for sponsoring this audit ?
It would fit into their current intentions, eg
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/20/brazil-dilma-rousseff-internet-us-control
Is it actually that the NSA can't break TrueCrypt, and this is FUD to make people think twice about using it?
Be in no doubt. You are NOT witnessing an attempt to ensure the security of Truecrypt. You ARE seeing a standard FUD play by NSA people against one of the greatest thorns in their side.
Put this in the same category as those regular stories that appear on Slashdot and elsewhere, telling you that you CANNOT ever be sure that your erased data on your Hard-drive cannot be recovered by sophisticated forensic analysis of the magnetic surface. The NSA even paid to have a peer-reviewed paper placed in the scientific literature claiming such recovery is possible- despite the fact that such a claim is provably laughable.
Here's the mathematical proof of NONE recoverability of properly deleted data.
- let us say that you fill a HDD with target data, and now over-write that data with a RANDOM series of bytes. If the original data CAN be recovered, we have DOUBLED the capacity of the HDD, because logically there can be no distinction between the original data, and the random data used to erase it.
- now, let's say we wipe again with another random sequence. If the original data can be recovered, we have TRIPLED the capacity of the HDD, for the reason stated above.
- and again, we wipe with another random wave. If the original data is STILL recoverable, we have quadrupled the functioning capacity of the HDD.
- repeat, etc.
The problem is that the HDD is designed, given the head, recording signal, and surface material, to only support the original capacity under the signal theory that covers the current method of recording. It does NOT matter that in theory, the disk material MAY be able to save far more data with a different head, and signal method. Only the current method matters.
But the owners of Slashdot will allow periodic FUD articles to appear that DISCOURAGE people from using proper file erase tools, on the basis that its actually a waste of time, because the NSA can still get your data no matter how you erase it.
Much of what the NSA engages in is PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE. Major US TV networks and film studios, for instance, have been ordered to NEVER reveal the fact that ALL mobile phones in the USA have their location continually tracked by cell tower triangulation methods. While is is actually LAW in the US that every cell phone must have continuous location tracking ability, the US government believes many criminals are inherently stupid, and will allow their cell phones to produce evidence against them ***IF*** they have false ideas about how cell phone technology works. US Dramas like 'Shameless' (the US remake) and films like 'The Call' have actually informed the audience that ONLY phones with real GPS chips can be location-tracked- a complete and total lie, but a lie designed to sink into the unsophisticated minds of the sheeple.
The truth about the strength of Truecrypt is the complete LACK of stories about Truecrypt being defeated in practice. Shills will try to tell you that this is because Truecrypt is defeated in super-secret cases you can't be allowed to hear about, but this is a nonsense for two reasons. If you are a high level target of the NSA, nothing can save you, so the security of any encryption system is irrelevant. If systems like Truecrypt are defeated as part of ordinary governmental actions, the government, by law, has to allow this fact to be known (the RIGHT to a fair trial, etc).
So instead, you get this FUD attack against Truecrypt, which will persuade a certain percentage of suckers to NOT bother using Trucrypt in the first place, give up using it, or transfer to a commercial alternative that is DEFINITELY compromised by the NSA (ALL commercial encryption software is compromised).
The ones setting up the auditing.
The first thing that needs to happen (I don't see it on ther website) is to develop the world's trust in this audit team's leaders.
(Seriously?)
It passes the "intent of copyright law" test (if they aren't exercising their monopoly (the very incentive that copyright offers) then the copyright serves no purpose). Copyright without market participation just doesn't make any sense at all.
It passes the "golden rule" test (if I released something anonymously but forgot to grant explicit permission to make derived works, then I wouldn't bitch if someone else opened it, thereby allowing my software to become maintained). Put the shoe on the other foot, and it fits.
Furthermore, if you don't know who did it, then for all you know, they're literally dead. A corpse cannot possibly be a victim; there's basically nothing unethical you can do with a corpse, except maybe feed it to someone for purposes of distressing them. Along the same lines, they might simply not-give-a-fuck (but be alive). You can commit an ethical infringement against someone who doesn't consider it to be an infringement.
You have no reason to suspect that whoever wrote it, has a problem with relicensing. I'm not saying that makes it permissable/safe/etc to relicense, but ethical? I think the ethics here are pretty well covered. Copyright currently has totally insane durations, far beyond the 5 years that ought to be normal for software. When someone releases something anonymously under such a system, they are damn well accepting that plenty of people wil be ethically disregarding any copyright, and that from a purely (i.e. admittedly non-pragmatic) ethical viewpoint, it simply isn't copyrighted. You can't have an anonymous ethical copyright. There's nothing to infringe, except per the law, and ONLY the law.
Look at it this way: I'm not saying it's ethical to do just anything to anonymous people, of course, but when someone chooses to be anonymous, they really are consenting to give up certain rights, pertaining to the action they perform anonymously. Asserting an anonymous copyright is a totally bullshit move and it's an ethical error to assign the same respect to it, that you'd give to a serious person.
The current version of TrueCrypt is 7.1a. Why are they only talking of older versions?
It's time to assume that all forms of encryption and communication have been compromised and probably have been for many years. There's no coming back from this when the most powerful country on Earth intends to keep things this way.
Why bother audting a closed binary which can change drastically from one version to the next, requiring a near-complete (if not total) re-audit (a laborious process the first time around)?
The better solution is to look to open source implementations, like tcplay. Audit an open source implementation, where it's easy to see exactly what changed and how it might affect the machine's state.
This is a bad solution to a non-problem.
Well they would have to come forward to launch legal proceedings, wouldn't they?
"Copyright (c) 2008 TrueCrypt Developers Association. All rights reserved."
No. Only a legal representative of the TrueCrypt Developers Association needs to come forward. No programmer is necessary. Business types and lawyers will do.
You can't see the source, you are in the position of having to trust.
Windows source code was (is ?) available to university researchers working on projects that Microsoft finds interesting. A friend (PhD candidate) was on such a research project.
If Microsoft allows professors and students to see the Windows source code I'd wager that governmental entities are allowed to see it as well.
In both cases, you can see the code, and compile it. In both cases, the license does NOT grant you permission to copy the compiled binary anywhere, or to distribute it.
That is irrelevant with respect to audits. If your build matches the official build then your build does not need to be distributed, its redundant.
As was mentioned above, digital signature key used to sing Windows executable are not released. Therefore, it will never be possible to get a binary result identical to what is published on TryueCrypt website.
If the code is the same and the differences are only in an appended signature and embedded timestamps then it would be practical to verify the binary.
To be honest the last time I did such a comparison was a couple of major revisions of Dev Studio ago.
> but forgot to grant explicit permission to make derived works
They did not forget - they laid out the permissions they wanted to grant in their license.
> You have no reason to suspect that whoever wrote it, has a problem with relicensing.
Suspect? We KNOW exactly what they have a problem with and what they don't - it's right there in black and white.
There are so many things you can pick on this way, it seems like these guys have business model to use crowd-funding to get paid (in advance) for work they can't get or do otherwise. Not fooled.
http://www.jetico.com/
Tried and tested. Been around for decades. While not "open source," the full unix source code is free and is well maintained, including package metadata for popular distributions. They charge for binaries but the full software is free (including GUI) if you download and compile it yourself.
Compilers themselves have been known to plant backdoors in the software they create as well.