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Uneven Enforcement Suspected At Nuclear Plants
mdsolar sends this news from the Associated Press:
"The number of safety violations at U.S. nuclear power plants varies dramatically from region to region, pointing to inconsistent enforcement in an industry now operating mostly beyond its original 40-year licenses, according to a congressional study awaiting release. Nuclear Regulatory Commission figures cited in the Government Accountability Office report show that while the West has the fewest reactors, it had the most lower-level violations from 2000 to 2012 — more than 2½ times the Southeast's rate per reactor. The Southeast, with the most reactors of the NRC's four regions, had the fewest such violations, according to the report, a copy of which was obtained by The Associated Press. The striking variations do not appear to reflect real differences in reactor performance. Instead, the report says, the differences suggest that regulators interpret rules and guidelines differently among regions, perhaps because lower-level violations get limited review."
And the majority of such violations tend to happen in a particular sector called 7-G.
Specifically, they know which palms to line with silver in the east because they have more invested in the industry.
This is what happens when you let companies oversee themselves without any real penalties. Imagine a speeding sign. You speed, cop pulls you over, gives you a warning. You do the same, he pulls you over and gives you a warning. ... You will keep speeding. Government has allowed many of the NRCs to self-govern causing all sorts of stupidity ranging from: "we can't do security testing here, it will bring down the grid!", to all other forms of nonsense the NRC lobbyists will throw around. The reality is simple, the gov can't just "shut these places down." What are you gonna do, allow NYC to go dark. The entire regulatory "Dosey Do" one's partner is as old as the industry itself: "If you speed..." All bark and no bite. Its surprising we haven't had any major malfunctions on a constant basis
As opposed to TEPCO / Fukushima, which is apparently run by Homer Simpson, and appears to have no enforcement at all.
I'm optimistically hoping this means the guys manning the nuke near house below Jordan Lake in NC are doing a better job maintaining it than their peers in the West. On the other hand, it could just be lazy NRC regulators.
Celebrate failure, and then learn from it - Nolan Bushnell
Burns is cheap and pays people off so the plan can pass the Inspections
perhaps because lower-level violations get limited review."
There's a simpler explanation here; Fewer reactors mean less experience for those running them. A system administrator who works with 150,000 workstations and 13,000 servers is going to do things differently than someone who only supports 1,500 workstations and 10 servers.
I think it's premature to suggest that the same agency responsible for oversight of all these different reactors is giving preferential treatment based simply on a single statistic.
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So...
1) dramatic variation: uneven enforcement OR uneven adherence to regulations?
2) low variation: no-one is looking OR that violations are petty and adherence is relatively good?
We need to understand which case it actually is - otherwise we are pressuring the overseers to "fix" the problem by gaming the numbers or having a quota of violations found.
It is also possible that the utilities in the SE are doing a better job.
At a glance, the low number of citations seems correlated with a low grade for public integrity. More corrupt states have less careful inspection. http://www.stateintegrity.org/
...
...if there is a co-relation between outsourced inspectors being paid per violation detected, and the number of citations?
Just asking...
I love this line of reasoning. It's the same reasoning that blames the Union Auto Workers and a guy who tightens bolts for a living for making shotty cars instead of the CEOs and Engineers who made the decision to use cheap bolts.
If the regulators are untrained it's by design. You don't just 'forget' to train the people that inspect your Nuclear power plants you know...
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Yet another example of anti nuclear agenda taking facts and correlating them in a way that implies that the industry is on the brink of disaster because we are a bunch of loose cannons. So transparent.
Old nuclear power is uneconomical as well. http://will.illinois.edu/nfs/RenaissanceinReverse7.18.2013.pdf
Redstates want to keep nuclear, and even *gasp* coal because they believe society needs jobs and cheap energy to grow and be stable.....so, yeah, they don't overregulate and hound the industries to death with mini-taxes meant to increase costs under the guise of safety....
Blue states - however......for them, the sanctity of gaia and a pure green earth is more important than anything else so......in those areas, they gladly double and triple energy prices and make do with much higher levels of unemployment and consider the nuclear/coal industries, when they are not banned all together, as free sources of additional state taxes....any possible violation is a way for the state to charge another fee....hip hip hooray. Whatever....it's not like someone else won't end up burning all that coal and it all goes into the same atmosphere...witness california coasts getting polution via ocean winds from china and having to export its manufacturing jobs elsewhere.
Shrooms and posting never mix.
As a person who works in the nuclear power industry, I can explain some factors.
.001 psi in a tire, and could not use it again until you found the cause of the problem, repaired it, and put in place safeguards to ensure it was not likely to ever happen again. Then prepare a lengthy report, have it reviewed with great scrutiny and hopefully approved by the regulator. Then you would likely receive a fine because you did not discover it yourself.
First, plant inspectors are moved on a regular basis, and there is enough involvement from various other NRC reviewers and experts to keep a check.
Second, the threshold for violations is so low that it is pretty much impossible to not have any. Only a small percentage of violations have safety significance, and most of those have low safety significant. Most violations are cited because they may be potential indicators of a drop in safety. By setting the threshold this low the NRC keeps operating performance within a conservatively safe margin.
Third, a final citing for a violation depends a lot on the plant's response to the initial finding. If a plant shows deference to the finding, cannot adequately explain its occurrence, or shows that there was some known programmatic fault that enabled the condition, they are more likely to get cited with a violation in the end. Some plant owners can be a bit short when responding to what they may perceive as a petty finding.
Fourth, plants that have a history of violation often get added scrutiny, therefore there is bit of a circular effect.
The utilities that own plants in the southeast are, in my opinion, the best at both preventing conditions that are potential violations and also at responding to findings. Fleet owners often do a little bit better job than single unit owners (but there are exceptions). I can tell you with certainty, those plants that are falling off the mark get exposed by both the NRC as well as INPO, and nobody lets up until they get back to a state of operational excellence with and appropriate safety culture.
If folks in other occupations got a comparable level of scrutiny as nuclear plant workers and operators do, they would probably start with tens of violations or more an hour. If car inspections were held at that same level of scrutiny, you would have to immediately park your car if air pressure dropped
We, in the nuclear industry, welcome this level of scrutiny. It is part of our lives and culture.
I am not an evil, fire breathing, money hungry fiend. I grew up in the mountains of North Carolina. A Sierra club member in my teens, I'd hike the trails and clean up other people's trash, carrying it out with me. I care as much as anyone about our environment. All sources of power have their pros and cons. Nuclear waste is a serious one for my industry, but if you compare on a true scale of impact and risk, it is hands down the best path forward for baseload generation.
Sorry for that last preachy part, couldn't help myself. Cheers.
...the idea that the guys in the west might just be being more open and being honest when it comes to reporting incidents? Or maybe the guys in the east are having just as many, but aren't reporting them, thinking "hell, it's only a tiny spill, no need to report it and get everyone riled up about it!". Why do I get the feeling that this article is just another piece of FUD? http://atomicinsights.com/accidents/
What do 'best before' dates on food really mean?
Some number pencilled into an operating permit granted in 1969 is not the last word on how long these facilities will continue to operate safely.
There was—at the time—not a single reactor of a modern design with a forty year operational record on which to base even the wildest guess. The number "40 years" had more to do with investor ROI than any engineering crystal ball.
I recall one reactor shut down for an expensive refurbish a long time ago because circulation pipes had become unexpectedly brittle in less than a decade of exposure to a constant, low level of neutron flux.
Summary: we didn't know shit.
On day one, it's extremely hard to tell the difference between a Toyota and a Chevy. At year thirty, the stakeholders think they've won the lottery because it was a Toyota after all. At year thirty-five, Toyota develops a frightening latency in response to the graphite rods. At year forty-two you've got this headache sorted—or so you would like to believe. It was operator over-reaction to upgraded SCADA data collection rates. No, it was xenon capture by surface pockets in metals exposed to decades of micro-crystalline annealing. No, it was pockets of non-uniform fission density due to a very minor change in the fuel-pellet binding agent made as older mines ceased production.
All the reactors built in the 1970s were version 0.9. No reactor anywhere had a forty year operational track record with a modern design.
Back in 1990 or thereabouts, I worked for a company building a robotic system to be used in maintaining nuclear plants - in particular replacing old steam generator tubes. I learned some things.
- some plants are so clean that you might set off the radiation alarms going IN to the plant. (This is in fact how the problem with Radon in homes was discovered. A plant worker set off the alarms going in to work at one of these very clean plants.) ... In several places changed had been accomplished by literally cutting a piece of the drawing out and taping a new piece in. ... Try carrying an 80 pound robot controller box down a walkway with 1/2 dozen pipes running across it at different heights!
- the rules for what you can and can't bring into the steam generator structure (for example) vary wildly from one company to another. This applies to things in hoses as well.
- others are the nuclear equivalent to the guy down the street with a couple of busted trucks in his yard.
- similarly, the design rules for the engineering and construction drawings for different plants ranged from aerospace quality to kindergarten sketches. One actual drawing for an outbuildings I reviewed back in 1985 for a different project - studying the possibility of scanning plant drawings into CAD - was a huge sepia toned mess, with the entire building on one drawing - structural, plumbing, electrical, finish work,
- especially back in the 1960s, when most US facilities were designed, US plants were defined as buildings, construction projects, and were designed by architects (with the help of some engineers). Each plant was different, and so each plant had different mistakes - misrouted piping that crossed through other pipes and had to be rerouted in the field, or just crossing essential walkways at waist height; cabling that wouldn't fit or couldn't be pulled through the original routing trays,
- In France and other places, all the plants were defined as machines, like airplanes, so they were all essentially the same design. When a mistake or a fault was found in one, it could be prevented or fixed in all the others at the same time much like the FAA rules on airplanes - when a problem shows up the whole fleet can be inspected.
- the water in the 'hot' side (going through the reactor, out to the heat exchanger) and the 'warm' side (from the heat exchanger to the steam generator) is so pure that it eats stainless steel. The steam generator tubes were (IIRC) over an inch thick stainless, and over 20 years that thickness would erode away until the tubes were at risk of blowing out.
- the key facts: When these plants were designed, the AEC controlled the industry. And the brilliant strategy for life planning was, "We'll build a plant, run it for 20 years, fill it with concrete, and leave it there for 50,000 years." (Yes, really). There were no serious plans for actually maintaining the internal systems like the steam generators. Then in the 70s that wasn't going to work. So for another 20 years, the plan was, "We'll hire day labor off the street. Each guy can work for two days, then he'll have had his lifetime dose of radiation and can never do this work again." (When I got involved Westinghouse was finally trying to come up with a robotic system to replace those guys.)
- finally, there are weird things about the high voltages around power plants that you have to be aware of, like avoiding leaving long power cords laying around - the voltage differentials on the ground can generate enough (induced?) current in the cord to cook it.
It's easier to be a result of the past, but more fun to be a cause of the future! http://www.spacefinancegroup.com/
Not just power plants.
There was a NPR show poking into the recent chicken contamination related
problems. The numbers cited were so extremely different that I found it incredible
that they were valid.
One caller asserted that a small european nation had zero salmonella contamination
at their chicken processing plants. I can understand a low number but not zero
for a bug that is ubiquitous to chickens.
Perhaps this plant permits sanitizing of chicken with intense gamma radiation
which has repeatedly been dis-allowed in the US. Perhaps it is a case of strict
washing with acetic acid also dis-allowed (last I heard) in the US.
Perhaps is is a simple problem that Google translate got it wrong.
In the US it appears that the energy required to file problem reports is large
and demands astounding dedication. Perhaps it is only the largest plants
that has the critical mass of inspectors to slog through the system and
file reports.
If I recall Kafka noted that unlike the mythical man month for software
bureaucracy increases in effectiveness the larger it gets. This may
simply be a measure of how effectively the system gets gamed by
a largish bureaucratic organization. Sadly Kafka was unavailable
to comment on this internet reported fact.
Truth is stranger than fiction, but it is because Fiction is obliged to stick to possibilities; Truth isn't. Mark Twain.
Here is the ggggggist of it,
Lower-level violations are those considered to pose very low risk, such as improper upkeep of an electrical transformer or failure to analyze a problem with no impact on a system's operation, such as the effect of a pipe break. Higher-level violations range from low to high safety significance, such as an improperly maintained electrical system that caused a fire and affected a plant's ability to shut down safely.
I can grok exactly where this stream of 98% low-level 'potential' violations is coming from, and I will tell you even though it will not be Politically Correct for me to do so.
There are a great many Useless Eaters (my bad) invading industrial plants these days whose direct expertise does not include knowledge of the Thing being manufactured or produced. They are graduates of a quasi-liberal arts educational process that has emitted them from university and sent them out into the world to manage or assist in the management of people. The Human Resources Type. Ask any career machinist to (politely and quietly) point one out to you, they're sure to nod their head as someone passes by within two minutes or so.
And why are these Human Resources people cruising the halls like nervous night watchmen? Because they are young and have just joined a fraternity whose senior members have established themselves as people who you come to if there is a problem. The seniors count on you to tell them when there is a problem but otherwise they stay out of your hair. It is an excellent arrangement because with a small Safety Culture in place when a machinist or other employee brings something up, you'd better listen.
But there are too many of these young Human Resources people, too soon. They were trained to 'lead' but in the glare of reality they are realizing that they will not be leading anything for years to come, because their seniors are comfortable in their positions, years away from forced retirement, made indispensable by their high degree of experience. Many of them are graduated from among the ranks of those they manage.
And quite frankly, the seniors want the juniors to stay out of their hair. But also they want the juniors to cruise the plant and perhaps gain by osmosis some of the know-how that their education has denied therm. So go forth young man and learn our trade.
But what is there for these young barely skilled people to do?? There is only one Task for which they seem suited, in a place where the actual process has been tweaked and streamlined to perfection for decades now. It is a vital task but as we see first hand, even the noblest endeavor may become absurd if undue emphasis is placed on it.
It's Safety. It has become a Zero Tolerance game that is a distant social relation to the indictment of small children who draw pictures of guns. It begins with an almost religious affirmation that everybody knows is a dumb myth, "All Accidents Can Be Avoided." It's true, but only with complete hindsight and a level of plodding procedure that would have everyone strapped securely along the walls of the room (safely) unable to reach their tools.
But we are supposed to suspend our disbelief and put ourselves into a mental Total Safety Zone (in meetings with videos and small talk and with group hugs) where we believe it is possible.
The problem is that for every small but reasonable step such as brighter yellow pained lines or enforcement of speed limits in the yard or filling that little gas can outside, there is a TON of well-meant but trite suggestions that merely clog the system.
Malfeasance takes root within a Total Safety Culture too. I was told that Halliburton had once, with great fanfare, introduced a program where anonymous tips of safety violations would net a cash bonus. Sounds like it would be great for everyone. It became apparent that only a few people were using the system and that the targets of this activity tended to be those with whom there was a strictly personal animo
<blink>down the rabbit hole</blink>
Just require that all employees live within 1 mile of the plant up to and including the CEO. No need for the regulatory dog and pony show put on with a wink and a smile. You say it's safe? Great you'll have no problem with it being in your back yard then.