Slashdot Mirror


Researchers Show Apple Can Read iMessages

Trailrunner7 writes "The Apple iMessage protocol has been shrouded in secrecy for years now, but a pair of security researchers have reverse-engineered the protocol [original analysis] and found that Apple controls the encryption key infrastructure for the system and therefore has the ability to read users' text messages–or decrypt them and hand them over at the order of a government agency. ... The researchers found that while that basic framework makes sense from a security point of view, there are a number of issues with the iMessage system. One major issue is that Apple itself controls the encryption key infrastructure use for iMessage, and has the keys for each individual user. The upshot of this is that Apple has the ability to read users' messages if it so chooses. The researchers who looked at iMessage, known as Pod2g and GG, said that there is no evidence that Apple is in fact reading users' iMessages, but it's possible that the company could. Users' AppleID passwords also are sent in clear text to the Apple servers."

72 of 124 comments (clear)

  1. Terrible summary by AmiMoJo · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The fact that Apple can read iMessages and hand them over to the authorities is hardly surprising, especially given that we know they co-operate with the NSA. TFS leaves the last and far more interesting bit right until the end: Usernames and passwords sent in cleartext.

    In other words all those people using Starbucks' free wifi are broadcasting their Apple ID and password to everyone else in range.

    --
    const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
    SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    1. Re:Terrible summary by JSG · · Score: 2, Informative

      The article only mentions the username going in clear.

    2. Re:Terrible summary by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      Also, the password isn't sent over the wire in cleartext; it's sent as cleartext *inside of the SSL stream*. As in: you need to defeat SSL to read it as a man in the middle. SSH does the same thing.

    3. Re:Terrible summary by Shabbs · · Score: 1

      The article only mentions the username going in clear.

      Might want to double check that...

      FTA: "Users’ AppleID passwords also are sent in clear text to the Apple servers."

      http://threatpost.com/apple-imessage-open-to-man-in-the-middle-spoofing-attacks/102610

      --
      Mark
    4. Re:Terrible summary by Laxori666 · · Score: 4, Informative
      From TFA:

      Second surprise was actually bigger: we saw our AppleID and password going through this SSL communication. Yes, the clear text password... There can be a lot of good reason to send the password as cleartext, ssh does it for instance. But here, we dont see any reason for Apple to get our password.

      Firstly, it means that Apple can replay our password using for instance our email also on many websites. Ok, Apple has no reason to do so. But what of intelligence agencies? Secondly, it also means that anyone capable of adding a certificate and able to proxify the communications can get user's AppleID and password, thus get access to iCloud accounts, backups, buy apps, ....

    5. Re:Terrible summary by gl4ss · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Excuse me, but how do we know this? Except for your prejudice and paranoia, do you have any actual evidence?

      because technically and in practice the agencies can ask and order them to co-operate. it's not like it's a choice you know. they have no choice in the matter - except choice of going out of business, *eo's potentially going to jail and so forth. that's not really an option.

      in that context proving the opposite would have been a feat. so it would have been an interesting article if they had proved that apple can't read the imessages. besides, if they can reset your password without your account breaking then they can read your stuff. eos.

      --
      world was created 5 seconds before this post as it is.
    6. Re:Terrible summary by sribe · · Score: 1

      ...it's sent as cleartext *inside of the SSL stream*...

      Why, oh why, did you post that like two minutes after my mod points expired???

    7. Re:Terrible summary by Ash+Vince · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The fact that Apple can read iMessages and hand them over to the authorities is hardly surprising, especially given that we know they co-operate with the NSA.

      Excuse me, but how do we know this? Except for your prejudice and paranoia, do you have any actual evidence?

      Any US based executive that refused to co-operate with an NSA request can be sent to prison. You can try challenging them in the relevant (secret) mickey mouse course of rubber stamps or you can look for the odd work around like just disclosing what you have from the logs then closing down your entire service so you do not have to do it again.

      --
      I dont read /. to RTFA, I read /. to offend people in ignorance.
    8. Re:Terrible summary by OlivierB · · Score: 5, Informative

      The username and password are sent in clear text in the SSL tunnel. So no, people at Starbucks won't get your username and password.

      What this suggests is that iMessage should only be sending a hash of the username and password to Apple Servers without ever sending those things even within a SSL tunnel.

      --
      Artificial intelligence is no match for natural stupidity
    9. Re:Terrible summary by DarkOx · · Score: 1

      The only facts are that Apple can read iMessages, and that this was always well known and obvious.

      Any encrypted messaging scheme where some third party handles the keys and the cipher text pretty much implies said third party *can* see the messages in clear text.

      This is even the case of asymmetric crypto because if you obtain the public key through the same channel the cipher text is to be sent over you can be man in the middle attacked easily.

      Honestly if security is of primary concern third party key management is FAIL.

      --
      Repeal the 17th Amendment TODAY! Also Please Read http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-read.html
    10. Re:Terrible summary by Andy+Dodd · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Keep in mind that between some of the more recent Snowden disclosures, and some of the disclosures coming out of Lavabit's shutdown (I think it was Lavabit that was printing SSL private keys in 4-point text???), the NSA can easily MITM these streams without anyone noticing as they are forcing US-based companies to provide them with SSL private keys for just this purpose.

      If the password were a salted hash there would at least be some level of protection here, although as long as Apple has a password reset mechanism and a way to recover "old" messages after a reset - it's nearly impossible for them to guarantee that someone who has legal power over Apple (such as the FISA courts) can't read messages.

      --
      retrorocket.o not found, launch anyway?
    11. Re:Terrible summary by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      From TFA: "we saw our AppleID and password going through this SSL communication".

      The password is cleartext over an SSL connection. So, no, all the people in Starbucks are not broadcasting to everyone else in range. Apple just isn't hashing, encrypting or otherwise obscuring the password when sent through the SSL connection. So they have access to the password in iMessage; they have access to the password when someone uses icloud.com, appleid.apple.com, or any other Web based access to Apple Services so, it isn't much different.

    12. Re: Terrible summary by um...+Lucas · · Score: 2

      Has apple ever claimed that iMessages were secure? I'm not thinking so. Just that you could send iMessages to other ios users and not get billed for lots of texts, which are far less secure still than iMessages. Next story?

    13. Re:Terrible summary by Zemran · · Score: 1

      " if they had proved that apple can't read the imessages. "

      In any situation, take an image, load said image to clone machine, reset password on interesting account and look as much as you like... Live machine still unaffected.

      --
      I love stacking my barbecues in the shed at the end of summer - you can't beat a bit of grill on grill action.
    14. Re: Terrible summary by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Informative

      I have plenty of evidence. And this topic really isn't anything new. Apple have woeful security practices that broadcast their own customers private data while using no encryption whatsoever. You need to research a little more instead of being a tool.

    15. Re:Terrible summary by JohnnyMindcrime · · Score: 2

      Encryption (e.g. in SSL) actually serves two important purposes - it encrypts clear text such that it appears like rubbish to anyone taking a look, but it also acts as authentication security because it allows you to validate that the endpoint you are communicating with is who they say they are.

      In SSH, for example, you can do away with passwords entirely by using private and public keys - the idea being that you encrypt with the private key and give the public key to the other endpoint, the algorithm used for both keys being such that when you decrypt with one you can only decrypt with the other. If you control the keys properly, then by virtue of being able to communicate with each other, you can pretty much confirm both endpoints are who they say they are.

      In the case of this iMessage issue, yes the passwords are encrypted but the keys are not properly "pinned" (i.e. controlled) meaning that a third party can potentially intrude using their own keys - and because you have a valid communication with that third party, you've no reason to assume it's not Apple you are talking to, which probably makes it that much worse as a form of exploit.

      The point is that encryption is only half the story, authentication is the other half...

      --
      Windows 10 is great - I used it to download Linux.
    16. Re:Terrible summary by JohnnyMindcrime · · Score: 1

      In other words all those people using Starbucks' free wifi are broadcasting their Apple ID and password to everyone else in range.

      I've never owned an Apple device in my life and have no intention of ever doing so - but wrong is wrong and I have to correct you.

      The passwords are encrypted over SSL and therefore anyone snooping a connection will only see gobbledigook - in no way are they broadcast in clear text.

      The actual vulnerability here is that someone can, using their own constructed SSL keys, perform a man-in-the-middle attack to step into the middle of a communication - at which point they could no doubt request the password and be sent it in what would be a decryptable and readable format.

      So, yes, it's a vulnerability, but whereas anyone can run sniffer traces to read packets on the wire or in the air, a man-in-the-middle attack takes a considerably higher amount of technical expertise to carry out.

      --
      Windows 10 is great - I used it to download Linux.
    17. Re:Terrible summary by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative
      How the fuck did this AC get modded informative with that speculative bullshit? Look at the fingerprint thing for example:

      Apple admits, ‘iPhone 5s Fingerprint Database To Be Shared With NSA

      Tim Richardson, District Manager of Apple’s North America Marketing Department admits about the sharing of Database with NSA ... he told: “Frankly, if a person is foolish enough to allow something as specific and criminally implicit as their fingerprints to be cataloged by faceless corporations and Government officials Well, you can’t exactly blame us for capitalizing upon it, can you? Personally, I believe this effort will support a greater good. Some of the folks they’re hoping to apprehend are quite dangerous. Besides, it’s not like this is covered in the Constitution.”

      What kind of braindead moron actually believes an Apple exec said this? And then, wait, is that a little update notice way at the bottom of the page?

      Update: The Source (National Report) is said to be a Parody site and the news they published is a rumor, that’s why we want to inform to all the users, “This News is awaiting confirmation”

      Uh huh. And the second link the parent gave is also from this parody site. Nobody, ACs especially, should be modded informative for posting lies or parody as fact.

    18. Re:Terrible summary by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      Apple admits, âiPhone 5s Fingerprint Database To Be Shared With NSAâ(TM)

      Um, no.

      http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/sep/27/no-nsa-iphone-5s-fingerprint-apple

      Important quote, in case you decide to not read the linked article:

      Reality check: the article claiming this comes from a right-wing "satire" site. Why are people confused? Because the satire's badly executed.

      And, before you don your tinfoil hat in an attempt to refute this information, please try to remember that my source is The Guardian - you know, the source of the Snowden information.

      So, yeah - please do think twice before spouting off moronic stupidity.

    19. Re:Terrible summary by LordLimecat · · Score: 1

      Most sane programs would throw a hissy fit if someone tried to MITM an SSL communication with constructed SSL keys--
      A) because the thumbprint would drastically change and
      B) because the cert would not be signed by a trusted CA

    20. Re:Terrible summary by DJRumpy · · Score: 1

      The Apple hate has grown to the point where they are marking satire as 'informative'? Seriously? I would expect my parents to fall for something like this. Any /. user that does needs to hand in their geek card.

    21. Re:Terrible summary by HiThere · · Score: 2

      They're also saying that any man-in-the-middle would get sufficient information to impersonate you, and could do anything that you are allowed to do.

      That was "good enough" security in 1970 on mainframe terminals, but they weren't broadcast over the internet. And there wasn't much malicious hacking. As it is.... well, I'm just glad that I don't use their services.

      --

      I think we've pushed this "anyone can grow up to be president" thing too far.
    22. Re:Terrible summary by tlhIngan · · Score: 1

      Keep in mind that between some of the more recent Snowden disclosures, and some of the disclosures coming out of Lavabit's shutdown (I think it was Lavabit that was printing SSL private keys in 4-point text???), the NSA can easily MITM these streams without anyone noticing as they are forcing US-based companies to provide them with SSL private keys for just this purpose.

      If the password were a salted hash there would at least be some level of protection here, although as long as Apple has a password reset mechanism and a way to recover "old" messages after a reset - it's nearly impossible for them to guarantee that someone who has legal power over Apple (such as the FISA courts) can't read messages.

      If the NSA were to MITM an iMessage stream - they could just as easily MITM an iTunes connection, an iCloud.com connection or even apple.com connection and get at your Apple ID and password information right there when you type it in on the web page.

      Considering all the places where your Apple ID and password are available "in the clear" (well, inside an SSL tunnel), if the NSA can MITM iMessages, it doesn't really matter in the end since they can easily MITM many Apple SSL sites to get your Apple ID. Heck, they can hijack your Mac to get it straight from OS X itself.

    23. Re:Terrible summary by cbhacking · · Score: 1

      SSH only "has the same architecture" if you use password auth instead of public key auth. The latter is considerably safer. Additionally, there are *still* other, better options, such as SRP.

      --
      There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
    24. Re:Terrible summary by isorox · · Score: 1

      Also, the password isn't sent over the wire in cleartext; it's sent as cleartext *inside of the SSL stream*. As in: you need to defeat SSL to read it as a man in the middle. SSH does the same thing.

      I tunnel my SSL traffic over an SSH tunnel through an SSTP vpn, what could possibly go wrong?

    25. Re:Terrible summary by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      You are aware that the National Report is satire, right? (Aparently not) It's like the Onion, only more obvious.

    26. Re:Terrible summary by phantomfive · · Score: 2

      iMessage should only be sending a hash of the username and password to Apple Servers without ever sending those things even within a SSL tunnel.

      If you do that, then the hash becomes the password, so anyone who gets the hash can log into your account.

      --
      "First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
    27. Re:Terrible summary by OlivierB · · Score: 1

      Ok, I could have made this a little more explicit.

      For something like iMessage, where the client and the server are trusted, but not the communication channel you could very well (for example) input your user name and password on the client, have the client generate hashes of the username and login, sign said hashes with the sever's public key and send them over to the server.

      That's one step better than cleartext auth wrapped with SSL but, as someone else remarked, a SRP (or even DH) exchange is pretty straightforward and pretty robust.

      --
      Artificial intelligence is no match for natural stupidity
    28. Re:Terrible summary by macsimcon · · Score: 1

      Sorry, that just isn't true.

      If your company creates a system that doesn't allow you access to customer information (say, because it's encrypted, and only the customer has the key), neither your nor your company can be compelled to reprogram your system so you get the keys, and can therefore hand them over to the government.

      The trick is in how you design the system. If it's onerous or impossible to provide the government the information, no amount of NSLs are going to matter.

      Now, I'm not claiming that Messages is designed that way, but it's not beyond the realm of possibility that a company could design such a system (e.g. Threema)

    29. Re:Terrible summary by phantomfive · · Score: 1

      If the communication channel is not trusted, and someone gets the hash, then how will the server know it is getting the hash from you and not from an attacker?

      That's why the hash essentially becomes the password, because in that situation the attacker can use it to impersonate you.

      --
      "First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
    30. Re:Terrible summary by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      >If your company creates a system that doesn't allow you access to customer information (say, because it's encrypted, and only the customer has the key), neither your nor your company can be compelled to reprogram your system so you get the keys, and can therefore hand them over to the government.

      The recent issue with Lavabit shows that this is no longer true.

    31. Re:Terrible summary by Urza9814 · · Score: 1

      sslstrip perhaps?

      No seriously, that's not rhetorical. I forget what all it does and I can't check because the site is blocked from work...so I dunno if it would work against iMessage or not...

    32. Re:Terrible summary by Bert64 · · Score: 1

      But this is the password to your *apple id*... Apple clearly already have that password so sending it to them again is irrelevant.

      --
      http://spamdecoy.net - free throwaway anonymous email - avoid spam!
    33. Re:Terrible summary by cgimusic · · Score: 1

      I seriously doubt that is what the researchers meant. I think they are saying the passwords will be in clear text when they reach Apple's servers, not that they are not sent over HTTPS.

    34. Re:Terrible summary by Wingsy · · Score: 1

      "The only facts are that Apple can read iMessages, and that this was always well known and obvious."

      Well, except that they can't, and never did.

      http://allthingsd.com/20131018/apple-no-we-cant-read-your-imessages/

      Now I'm sure you will choose not to believe this, but think for a minute ... just how much trouble do you think Apple would be in if they are lying about this and get caught at it? Not even a stupid company would take such a chance, and Apple ain't stupid.

      --
      If I didn't have absolutely NOTHING to do, I wouldn't be here.
    35. Re:Terrible summary by DMUTPeregrine · · Score: 1

      Use a message authentication code to ensure the hash was sent from the iPhone registered to the appropriate user. That way an attacker needs both the hash of the password and the secret key stored on the phone.

      And even if the hash becomes the password, at least it isn't the same as every other password the user uses for every service. Whereas the original password probably is.

      --
      Not a sentence!
    36. Re:Terrible summary by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      What does it matter if Apple responds reluctantly but properly to apparently valid court orders or just hands everything over gleefully? In either case the government gets what it wants, and the court orders seem to be wide-reaching enough to grab pretty much everything. Apple, like any other company large or small, is in real trouble if it doesn't cooperate with court orders.

      The only way to keep online secrets nowadays is to use strong encryption on your own machines (not shared; there are some ingenious side-channel attacks against AES), and to do your own key management. Anything else can be read by the NSA, and, the way things are going, probably will be.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    37. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      And hardly surprising either, given that the alternative, SMS (which is charged at stupendous rate) is sent in... cleartext. And email is sent in... cleartext.

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    38. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      And then they shut you down on claims of harboring terrorist communications, and because you're unable to prove otherwise (due to not having access to the content you store) you're fucked. The only secure comms that will work is encryption done on the endpoint and using whatever cleartext carrier medium. This way the government has to come after the endpoints, which is a lot more time consuming and expensive than just shutting down a central service.

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    39. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      Update: The Source (National Report) is said to be a Parody site and the news they published is a rumor, that’s why we want to inform to all the users, “This News is awaiting confirmation” - See more at: http://hackersnewsbulletin.com/2013/09/apple-admits-iphone-5s-fingerprint-database-shared-nsa.html#sthash.hTPDiee9.dpuf

      Yeah right..... and do you really think an apple exec would be that blunt and offensive about it?

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    40. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      If someone has MITM'd you, they are ALREADY IMPERSONATING YOU.

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    41. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      The NSA likely already has a trusted cert on your Mac or Windows machine, and can deploy signed code that will be transparently executed by your OS. So you're probably boned anyhow.

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    42. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      Pretty much. If you're doing dodgy stuff that you don't want to share with the NSA on any closed-source operating system, on a machine connected to the internet.... well, good luck with that.

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    43. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1
      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    44. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      NSA owns your RNG?

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    45. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      self signed certs for the win. we just need a proper random number generator, and an out-of-band method of key exchange (sneakernet/snail mail).

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    46. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      Honestly if security is of primary concern third party key management is FAIL.

      And here's pretty much the only thing that needs to be said. If you're wanting stuff encrypted, do it yourself.

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    47. Re:Terrible summary by smash · · Score: 1

      Point B does not apply if the third party owns the CA infrastructure. But yes, trusting third party keys for secure comms is retarded.

      --
      I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.
    48. Re:Terrible summary by dwightk · · Score: 1

      *eo's potentially going to jail and so forth.

      c*o's ?

      --
      Like anyone can even know that
  2. Upshot? by stevemoink · · Score: 3, Informative

    "The upshot of this is that Apple has the ability to read users' messages if it so chooses."

    I do not think upshot means what you think it means.

  3. of greater concern than TFA by nimbius · · Score: 4, Insightful

    at no time should we have any expectation of privacy in a SaaS or PaaS environment that is controlled by an american company. the government has numerous laws that require corporations to preserve data for investigation both with and without a warrant provided, which in turn guarantees corporations will engineer systems to ensure they are compliant. Corporations do not exist to pick fights with the government or question legislation until it begins to impact their quarterly earnings, and as most people arent concerned about their privacy its only natural corporations in turn arent either. if snapchat users, gmail users, facebook users and paypal users en-masse boycotted their respective service providers, im certain the message would be clearly sent that spying on customers kills business.

    but as customers are clearly powerless to do anything about the spying, and corporations are well aware of this, nothing will change. we need our gmail and our facebook if only because we're without alternative or uncomfortable with the idea of learning something new. You'll eventually need an app that resists snooping, which is hard when apple controls the platform and can simply engineer access to your messages through numerous means such as keylogging.

    --
    Good people go to bed earlier.
  4. At the order of a government agency? by stevegee58 · · Score: 1

    It seems to me that most of these big, high visibility companies haven't bothered waiting for "orders" from anyone. They've been just rolling over like good little bitches and turning information over based merely on requests.

  5. Re:Wait, what? by roc97007 · · Score: 1

    All that schpeal about how they can decrypt your messages, but this gets a single sentance at the end: "Users' AppleID passwords also are sent in clear text to the Apple servers."? Would that pe the same AppleID that is tied to a credit card, so you can buy things in the Apple store?

    That Apple can read your messages is not at all supriseing, THIS tidbit is shocking!

    Yep. I just bought the entire Grateful Dead catalog on your credit card. Thanks!

    --
    Oliver's law of assumed responsibility: If you're seen fixing it, you will be blamed for breaking it.
  6. And.... by roc97007 · · Score: 1

    ...absolutely no-one is surprised....

    --
    Oliver's law of assumed responsibility: If you're seen fixing it, you will be blamed for breaking it.
  7. Wrong by globalist · · Score: 2

    You're reverse-engineering it wrong.

  8. Really? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Did these researchers offer any insight as to the religious tendencies of the pope or the defecatory habits of bears in woodland environments?

  9. great! by nblender · · Score: 1

    Now we're closer to an imessage SMS gateway...

  10. Re:Wait, what? by Dr.+Sheldon+Cooper · · Score: 1

    It's "spiel."

    You're welcome.

    --
    Bazinga.
  11. The cold hard fact is the NSA reads them all by WillAffleckUW · · Score: 1

    One illegal unconstitutional agency to rule them all and in the darkness blind them.

    --
    -- Tigger warning: This post may contain tiggers! --
    1. Re:The cold hard fact is the NSA reads them all by AHuxley · · Score: 1

      Thanks to Snowden we now know the US brands are helpers too :)

      --
      Domestic spying is now "Benign Information Gathering"
  12. No fingerprint sharing by MikeMo · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I'm sorry, but part of your comment is just plain wrong. Firstly, Apple is not collecting your fingerprint, only something similar to a hash of the fingerprint's characteristics. Secondly, it isn't shared with anyone. Thirdly, the explicitly state in this article that your actual fingerprint can not be reverse engineered from the data the store on the phone.

    In addition to this, the NYPD's stated reason for pushing the iPhone 5s is that it makes iPhone theft a thing of the past, which it clearly, demonstrably does. The link you posted saying NYPD is after the fingerprints is clearly, demonstrably false. Now, I'm sure you can find folks that say something different, but I can also show you pictures of Obama shaking hands with space aliens - you can find anything you like, but it doesn't make it true.

    Finally, Apple (and Google) outright deny sharing data with the NSA.

    You can continue to believe that they are sharing if you like, but stating that they have admitted they are sharing is incorrect.

  13. Sweet onions by mynameiskhan · · Score: 2

    That last link is akin to reading Onion and considering it real news. Only the Chinese gov. will assume it to be true info.

  14. Re:No. by HiThere · · Score: 2

    It's a bit stronger than that. Yes, Apple can, but so can any man-in-the-middle. So you have to trust the entire chain of connections between you and Apple.

    Now man-in-the-middle attacks aren't that common, but they also aren't that difficult. It would probably only affect a small group of people at a time, depending on where the compromise took place. But this would seem to mean that Apple may have been telling the truth when they denied sharing information with the NSA. The NSA didn't need to ask them.

    --

    I think we've pushed this "anyone can grow up to be president" thing too far.
  15. Re:"UPSHOT" by Richy_T · · Score: 1

    And yet it is a word that has a meaning that fits with the way it was used in the sentence. Funny that.

  16. Re:1984 by jamiesan · · Score: 1

    He who controls the spice controls the universe.

  17. Oh no! by rabtech · · Score: 2

    Google can read your email!

    Jabber servers can read your IMs! So can Yahoo! So can AOL!

    Oh wait, this is Apple. Nevermind, carry on with the hysterics.

    (FYI: No matter what scheme you devise, key management always gets you because if Apple doesn't have the keys, it makes iMessage much, much harder to use. If they do, then someone can snoop the messages. If you use a chain of trust, who ever sits at the top of the chain can be compromised. In an ideal world, people would learn about crypto keys and understand how to manage them, but you'd have to meet face to face to avoid mistaken identities).

    --
    Natural != (nontoxic || beneficial)
  18. To add some more information about the protocol by rabtech · · Score: 4, Informative

    The system appears secure; hacking it requires injecting your own certificate into the trusted roots on the device.

    Further, forging messages requires you compromise the private key which is only contained on the device (Apple doesn't know it). The public key is submitted to Apple's push CA which generates a certificate. The public part of your key is what other devices see when they get a copy of your certificate. So far, so good.

    The issue is, of course, that Apple controls the CA so in theory if the government ordered them to issue a certificate in your name to the government, the gov could then monitor your communications or forge your identity.

    Apple claims not to be able to read iMessages and that appears to be true, and as far as I'm aware not even the Patriot act requires them to issue forged certificates (aka allow the government to impersonate you digitally). So insofar as the law works and is followed, there is no legal authority to compel Apple to issue bunk certificates.

    For the curious, when you send a message it contacts Apple and requests the list of public certs for a given URI (telephone number, email address, etc). Apple responds with a list of the public certs issued to each of your registered devices, which the client then uses to send messages encrypted with that public key to each, and also signed with your own private key. The receiver does a similar lookup and uses your public key to validate the signature (proving you sent the message and that it was sent from the correct device even), then uses its own private key to decrypt the message you encrypted with the public key.

    I'm not sure how this could be improved. No matter what you do, someone has to be in charge of saying "The certificate for mobile number xxx-yyy-zzzz is ..." and that gives you a chain of trust problem. The alternative is requiring every iMessage user to meet face-to-face to exchange keys before sending any messages.

    --
    Natural != (nontoxic || beneficial)
    1. Re:To add some more information about the protocol by kermidge · · Score: 1

      "The issue is, of course, that Apple controls the CA so in theory if the government ordered them to issue a certificate in your name to the government, the gov could then monitor your communications or forge your identity.

      Apple claims not to be able to read iMessages and that appears to be true, and as far as I'm aware not even the Patriot act requires them to issue forged certificates (aka allow the government to impersonate you digitally). So insofar as the law works and is followed, there is no legal authority to compel Apple to issue bunk certificates."

      And there's the rub; has the issue of the government being able to compel handing over a cert been settled? (I should maybe know this from the past several month's reading about all this stuff, but am having a brain fart in the recall department.)

      The chain of trust is a bitch. I know there's Web of Trust, convergence.io and similar attempts at addressing this in some manner, but don't know enough to reason out if it's worthwhile to try one of these schemes. Being a dumb-cluck luser yet reading about the risks and the realities is not a comfortable place that I find myself in - and there is an entire planet-full of people like me who could benefit from a chance at better security yet with little clue about how to proceed, other than the standard "how to stay safe on the Internet" guides.

      Meanwhile, thanks for one of the better, more cogent posts on this. Even I could follow it.

  19. Assume any providers can sniff your connections. by antdude · · Score: 1

    Secured or not. Encrypted data have to be decrypted somewhere. :(

    --
    Ant(Dude) @ Quality Foraged Links (AQFL.net) & The Ant Farm (antfarm.ma.cx / antfarm.home.dhs.org).
  20. Theory Smeary by pubwvj · · Score: 1

    Theoretically the Constitution could be changed such that only dogs are allowed to have any control of the government, vote, run for office, piss on the sidewalk, etc. But it is unlikely. Trust me.

  21. Re:No. by smash · · Score: 1

    If your SSL connection is MITM'd you are boned anyway, and have far bigger problems. If the NSA is MITMing Apple (or microsoft/google) services, then they could just as easily deploy a signed keylogging trojan (if iOS or WinMobile or Android, etc. doesn't already have one pre-installed) to monitor everything via your device.

    --
    I run: Windows, OS X, Linux, FreeBSD. Just because you have a hammer, doesn't mean everything is a nail.