TrueCrypt To Go Through a Crowdfunded, Public Security Audit
An anonymous reader writes "After all the revelations about NSA's spying efforts, and especially after the disclosure of details about its Bullrun program aimed at subverting encryption standards and efforts around the world, the question has been raised of whether any encryption software can be trusted. Security experts have repeatedly said that it you want to trust this type of software, your best bet is to choose software that is open source. But, in order to be entirely sure, a security audit of the code by independent experts sounds like a definitive answer to that issue. And that it exactly what Matthew Green, cryptographer and research professor at Johns Hopkins University, and Kenneth White, co-founder of hosted healthcare services provider BAO Systems, have set out to do. The software that will be audited is the famous file and disk encryption software package TrueCrypt. Green and White have started fundraising at FundFill and IndieGoGo, and have so far raised over $50,000 in total." (Mentioned earlier on Slashdot; the now-funded endeavor is also covered at Slash DataCenter.)
But who will audit the auditors?
So they're getting crowd-funded money to do all their testing to ensure no one can see the NSA's back doors they have in place.
Alright, I'll volunteer. Once the money has cleared my account, consider it "validated."
Are you nuts?
The Windows version is compiled with MSVC, which almost certainly has a NSA backdoor that gets compiled into the TrueCrypt binary.
I feel like this has been reported on 5 times by now. Yes we know they are raising money, please no more updates until the findings from the audit are in.
In the mean time is there any actual point to this? While TrueCrypt can be one of the best methods for a typical home user or even tech savy business person to encrypt that naughty folder. But it honestly isn't as widely used as they make it out to be. Most softwares or businesses use their own encryption. Not to mention the nature of TrueCrypt means its most often used to secure locals files or drives, meaning unless the NSA has direct control over your computer they really cant get at your stuff.
Also would this resolve anything? As soon as the audit is done people will either, question the findings for one reason or another. When in the end all the audit can say is if there is an intentional backdoor or if there is an obvious flaw in the code that would leave it vulnerable. Even if neither of these turn up there is still a very real chance the NSA found their own unintentional flaw in the code that allows them to greatly reduce the time required to decrypt the drive.
We know that the current version of GCC doesn't have the "Ken Thompson" trojan. The original version could have, theoretically a but it couldn't survive so many versions. Also, gdb would have revealed it long ago. ...
Maybe gcc also trojans gdb? And ptrace, and
You have to imagine that the author wrote specialized trojans for a bunch of programs that hadn't been created yet, and hid them all in a few kilobytes. That's beyond impossible, even for the best programmer in the world.
The best way to deal with strong encryption is to go around it, to use the back door. Those are the flaws an audit would reveal, issues not with the actual encryption, which is a fairly small part of the software, but with the other 90% of the code .
The encryption itself has been analyzed, and will continue to be analyzed, outside of Truecrypt, which is just one of many packages that use the same encryption.