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Ask Slashdot: How Can We Create a Culture of Secure Behavior?

An anonymous reader writes "Despite the high news coverage that large breaches receive, and despite tales told by their friends about losing their laptops for a few days while a malware infection is cleared up, employees generally believe they are immune to security risks. They think those types of things happen to other, less careful people. Training users how to properly create and store strong passwords, and putting measures in place that tell individuals the password they've created is 'weak' can help change behavior. But how do we embed this training in our culture?"

169 comments

  1. This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anrego · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Users are gonna do stupid things when it comes to security. Trying to fix that is a noble goal, but good luck.

    The direction we need to keep going towards is idiot proofing. Assume the user will screw up and mitigate or eliminate the impact.

    1. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Amen. And it is not just about idiot users either. It is basic human psychology. We are all wired to do insecure things at times. We need to engineer around this vulnerability.

    2. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by drakaan · · Score: 2

      Seconded. The people that understand the risks generally don't represent a problem, but the people that don't understand them often also don't benefit from an explanation in a way that would change their behavior. Computers are not magic, but many people believe that they are. They also believe that antivirus software catches every single bad thing before it happens.

      --
      "Murphy was an optimist" - O'Toole's commentary on Murphy's Law
    3. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by jovius · · Score: 2

      Exactly. What helps is a step by step process which doesn't allow any missteps, and which guides on the way. Encryption is perceived as sorcery; something summoned by the high priests. Even a shortcut key combination and a password is too much. Strong passwords are hideous monsters from the netherworld anyway. The concepts are too complicated. They need to be hidden away or in some way built in. Maybe a key analogy would work, something like the final key or similar setup.

      Anyway, the process should function as a learning platform for all. In the corporate world the security culture is often found only in the proper IT department, and everybody else are more than happy to throw out their responsibility of the matter, because the days are too busy nevertheless. What is needed is a common vision about what is IT security and why is it so important. If the users know why does it matter the process becomes natural.

    4. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      It's not that. Most people know that data breaches happen, like the Target one that was all over the news a bit ago.

      The problem is that the security advocates make (seemingly) random behavioral demands that awkwardly often do not actually enhance security if followed. (I'm thinking of the entropy-neutral "strong password" dogmas)

      When you make a system change that affects other employees, let them know why. When you propose a policy change for security purposes, defend it in front of a crowd of those affected. If you missed the trend, treat the other employees as equals (even if you don't believe they are) and explain why you are changing the firewall to block bittorrent at work or whatever change you have in mind.

    5. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Geoffrey.landis · · Score: 2

      In general, this is because IT departments are dictatorial about forcing users to do "security" requirements that do little or nothing to improve security.

      --
      http://www.geoffreylandis.com
    6. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by lgw · · Score: 4, Informative

      Preach it! You cannot try to fix a software problem by fixing the users. Requirements for strong passwords have no place in modern security. A 4-digit PIN works great for my ATM card, because of the combination of:
      * Two-factor auth
      * Good, fast system for repudiation and reclamation
      * Many, many back-end processes in place to limit harm

      Is your IT system set up this way? Why not? Two-factor auth is easy, off-the-shelf stuff these days. Sharply limit password tries before account lockout, and abandon any thought of strong passwords, changing passwords, and so on - all of that is accomplished by the certs (and rotation thereof) on the second factor. The user's password is just there to make it OK if the second factor is stolen, during the time before the user reports it.

      Everyone's "real" password is crypto-strong, because there's a properly-generated cert involved, and rotated at ITs discretion with no burden on the user. But people only need to remember something easy, just something that would take more than 3 tries to guess.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    7. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      >The direction we need to keep going towards is idiot proofing.

      No, this is equally doomed to fail for reasons that can be pithily explained by two quotes:

      "Programming today is a race between software engineers striving to build bigger and better idiot-proof programs, and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better idiots."

      and

      “If you make a system simple enough that an idiot could use it, only an idiot would want to use it.”

    8. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by whit3 · · Score: 1

      Truly, it is foolish to think millions of 'users' can be handed the
      security problem, and advised to take action individually.

      We should all cringe in horror when we hear that
      millions of nontechnical users are being encouraged to
      'take the problem seriously'. It's like asking all the residents
      of an apartment building to safety-check the steam boiler (probably
      only one or two will want to tighten the relief valve spring).

      There have been attempts to 'take the problem seriously' with
      draconian legal sentences: that, too, is doomed. The law moves
      too slowly, and relies on things, like electronic documentation,
      that can be SO easily corrupted.

      There have been attempts to 'take the problem seriously' with
      proliferation of passwords, and password-generating rules and
      password replacement schedules, and by moving controls into
      obscure places (what port do YOU open for SMTP?),
      which entirely miss the target of security, because the poor
      user has to write those things down (I know I have to!).

      Instead, we should be building institutional watchers and code
      (walls, if necessary, and alarms, and a few traps) to deal with
      such issues. Sadly, government and commercial interests
      aren't good for personal computer security- we need OTHER
      institutions.

    9. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by PRMan · · Score: 4, Interesting

      How many ATM heists and skimmers have their been over the past 10 years? I'd hardly say it's working WELL.

      --
      Peter predicted that you would "deliberately forget" creation 2000 years ago...
    10. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by lgw · · Score: 3, Interesting

      It's working quite well. The cost of all that is very low on the scale of the banks and that's what matters. It's simply not about "0 incidents", it's about limiting the damage to little enough that it's not important.

      Partly that depends on the bank, of course, as some are total dicks about it if your card gets skimmed, but that's a customer service problem. Detecting the problem, limiting the cost, and so on are all important systems that banks take seriously. And the banks are gradually making systemic, low cost changes to reduce the ease of skimming, or of hacking an ATM, but they're not in a hurry as it's just not that expensive of a problem (how many ATM heists to equal a single mortgage default?). More importantly, they're not trying to fix their customers!
       

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    11. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Developers are gonna do stupid things when it comes to security. Trying to fix that is a noble goal, but good luck.

      FTFY. You seem to be forgetting that web developers specifically, and software developers in general, implement anti-security features in their products.

      Things like requiring login passwords to be only upper/lowercase letters and some numbers and then further limit that to a 10-15 character maximum. If they're doing passwords correctly and storing a salted hash (instead of plaintext) then I should be able to have a 50 character password, or paste in the Old Testament in Klingon Unicode, or anything more complex than 10-15 upper/lowercase letters and some numbers.

      Instead of relying on actual mail delivery with "click this link to validate" methodologies they use dumbass RE matching on email addresses that they've copied from StackOverflow or some other source as "validation" and disallow normal useful characters like "+".

    12. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Lotana · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Sharply limit password tries before account lockout

      Let me introduce you to a very simple business plan:

      1. Get the usernames of some company that is making good money. Not too hard, majority of them should be first/last names concatenated.

      2. Keep logging in with the usernames and password as "password". Watch as the IT is brought to their knees trying to deal with hundreds of employees being constantly locked out.

      3. Contact the company asking for good sum for you to stop it.

      4. PROFIT!!!

      In essence this is a very trivial DoS attack. This is the reason why login attempts get long pauses before letting you try again and why accounts don't get locked down.

    13. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      How are you making login attempts without the second factor?

    14. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by TENTH+SHOW+JAM · · Score: 1

      Training. 6 monthly mandatory security training. Presented well, covering all aspects of security.

      Accountability. If a user does a stupid thing, make them personally liable for it. Warnings and firings work well.

      Usability. My workplace offers 5 free licenses of a well known antivirus/firewall package for every employee for home use. That extends the circle of safety one more ring.

      Security. Lock it down. Lock it down. Lock it down. What are the minimum rights that should be given for a user to do their job? That is all the rights they get.

      --
      A sig is placed here
      To display how futile
      English Haiku is
    15. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by lgw · · Score: 1

      As the AC asked - how are you making the attempts without the second factor? And you lock out the device, not the person, of course.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    16. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Lotana · · Score: 1

      Good point. I have miss-read the original post.

      I was under the impression is that the second level is accessed only after the initial weak-password passes.

      My bad.

    17. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Ash+Vince · · Score: 1

      Is your IT system set up this way? Why not? Two-factor auth is easy, off-the-shelf stuff these days

      How do you do 2 factor auth with SSH and is it more secure than a decent password requirement?

      I ask because I had this argument a few years back and realised that password protected private keys are not really 2 factor auth since if someone gets the private key then they can brute force the passphraase out of it client side since they have unlimited attempts without the possibility of lockout (the passphrase is only used to unlock the private key, not exchanged with the server as part of the auth process). Compare that to a decent password policy, where the server locks the user out after a few wrong attempts and which is more secure?

      I am not advocating one over the other but it is worth remembering that both have their drawbacks. Strong two factor auth in my book would be a private key coupled with a password that was only validated server side.

      --
      I dont read /. to RTFA, I read /. to offend people in ignorance.
    18. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Or do the same for your very own CxOs (just look up their usernames in your company directory). I'd give it a fortnight before the policy started to change ;-)

      Sadly, this method probably has the reverse effect in that your profit will probably be negative :-(

    19. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Users are gonna do stupid things when it comes to security. Trying to fix that is a noble goal, but good luck.

      The direction we need to keep going towards is idiot proofing. Assume the user will screw up and mitigate or eliminate the impact.

      Exploit mitigation. *slow clap*

    20. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by lgw · · Score: 1

      I'm, not sure I understand your question. The part of SSH that the user is unaware of is therefore not bound by the need for user-memorable passwords. Plenty of issues with CAs and all, but not really what I was talking about.

      I'm talking about a device (smart card or company-issued computer) with a very strong password (randomly generated by IT, rotated by IT, etc) that the user never sees, which must be combined with the user's weak password to do anything. As long as the attacker can't test whether a given user-password is correct without actually trying to log in (and hitting lock-outs fast), the user-password just needs to be good enough to survive 3 guesses.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    21. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by dgatwood · · Score: 1

      Sharply limit password tries before account lockout

      No, don't. Besides the DOS problem that other folks have already mentioned (which can be solved by doing per-IP bans), there's also the "Your site isn't as important as you think it is" problem.

      Most folks have a handful of low-security passwords that they use for sites that they don't care about. If you limit the number of login requests to anything less than about ten, a user who hasn't logged in for a while won't remember which of those old passwords he or she used, and will hit the limit before successfully logging in. At that point, the user may just not bother to visit your site anymore, or worse, may create a second account.

      No, good security requires multiple levels of security, depending on the harm that allowing the action would cause. For example:

      • Amazon won't let you ship to a new address without reentering some of your credit card info.
      • Banks won't let you add a new account for transfer without some additional verification.
      • Good banks will contact you before authorizing a large transfer to a new account.

      These techniques significantly reduce the damage that can be caused by someone breaking into your account.

      Unfortunately, too many organizations use security questions for their additional verification. Security questions need to die already. They are an almost completely useless form of verification, because (unless you're smart enough to lie in your answers) they're highly vulnerable to identity theft.

      As of this writing, we lack a robust, general-purpose second factor for authentication purposes. Email doesn't work, because odds are, they got access to the user's account on your server by compromising the user's email account. Cell phone text messages may or may not work for the same reason. Even a phone call is dubious in this age of VoIP. A physical crypto token could provide an appropriate level of verification, but only if combined with a shared authentication server that can be queried by anyone, and only if broadly deployed. Otherwise, users will end up with a hundred crypto tokens in their pocket, and nobody wants that. And AFAIK, nobody is doing this.

      Everyone's "real" password is crypto-strong, because there's a properly-generated cert involved, and rotated at ITs discretion with no burden on the user. But people only need to remember something easy, just something that would take more than 3 tries to guess.

      That's fine for a corporate VPN, where your IT folks are at least to some degree in charge of the hardware, but it isn't realistic for websites, which is how the vast majority of e-commerce happens these days.

      --

      Check out my sci-fi/humor trilogy at PatriotsBooks.

    22. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Finite9 · · Score: 1

      in the same vein of making claims without knowing what im talking about...

      I agree, there are lots of skimmers at work, and even if the banks absorb the cost (most of the time), and even if it's only a fraction of what they earn, i would hardly say that it's efficient. Plus, the 'only' loss is virtual currency, which is easy to replace if the bank accepts the loss.

      If we're talking about passwords to systems, it's data that is stolen, which can have a more profound impact on the person losing the data. So saying that we could go to PIN codes and use the same system as banks would not be evaluating the risk correctly.

      --
      "Everyone knows that vi vi vi is the number of the beast" -- Richard Stallman
    23. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      You do 2-factor for ssh the same way you do 2-factor with anything else, there's no ssh-specific issue. Two common easy examples:

      * Prepend the code from my hardware token to my password and just login normally
      * Login normally and when prompted by the agent on the server enter the code that just sent via SMS

      Less common but easy:

      * Asymmetric key authentication with hardware smart card (It's obvious that ssh key login is 1-factor.)

      You can also easily configure sshd_config to require multiple authentications, e.g. authorized_keys + PAM.

    24. Re:This approach has gone nowhere for years by Ash+Vince · · Score: 1

      It's obvious that ssh key login is 1-factor.

      Is it? I had a generally very good sys-admin previously insist we move to key based from passwords specifically because he thought it was 2 factor. It did not ring true in my mind when he said that though so I thought about it on the way home and then explained the above to him the next day. I wondered if this was a commonly held misconception about SSH?

      --
      I dont read /. to RTFA, I read /. to offend people in ignorance.
  2. If only there was a template for this by Krishnoid · · Score: 4, Funny

    Perhaps we could take the lead from government departments already tasked with maintaining security, hold on, let me google this ... I'm finding 'Transportation Security Agency' and 'National Security Agency'. That should be a good start.

  3. Good morale, perhaps? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    In my experience, a company with high employee morale has people who will tend to listen and follow security procedures, even when it might be time consuming. Even small things like stopping someone who slips past a door without badging in, or asking who someone is who is in a building without some ID.

    With poor morale, there isn't much for the people to bother with security. I've seen companies try to save money by offshoring... then lose a lot more due to breaches than they would have spent by keeping existing talent in house.

    1. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by bhcompy · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Time consuming = won't do it. I've got enough things to worry about with all the bullshit administrative tasks I have to do to accomplish my non-administrative job. Give me security that doesn't force me to do more work, like encrypting my drive, single badge identification(no separate key fobs for doors I should have access to anyways), automatically encrypting my attachments, forcing me to change my password every 30 days, forcing me to have different passwords for different resources because password requirements are different(some requiring special characters, some not allowing special characters), forcing me to change my passwords for different resources at different intervals, etc.

    2. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by bhcompy · · Score: 1

      err, fucked that one up good. All instances of forcing should be prefaced with "Not".

    3. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by TENTH+SHOW+JAM · · Score: 1

      Sounds like you need someone to decide on a defined set of access systems and ONLY USE THOSE.

      --
      A sig is placed here
      To display how futile
      English Haiku is
    4. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by gregor-e · · Score: 1

      Offer a bonus and recognition to any employee whose computer doesn't get hacked by the hired pen tester. Publish tips on how to avoid being hacked. Compliance rates will soar. Also, knowing they are being targeted by an actual human translates an abstract notion of why security practice is important into something concrete.

    5. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by dbIII · · Score: 1

      doesn't get hacked by the hired pen tester

      Pen testers are often reformed script kiddies without enough understanding to comprehend how the networks they are attempting to get into work. They fail people on such criteria as having ssh on the correct port. The way to do things properly is to be able to see what is going on from both the inside and outside and examine any holes that become apparent. If they are not given full access from the inside how are they going to find any problems that have nothing but obscurity to hide them? If you don't know everything that is listening and prepared to respond to packets from the net then it's nothing but a superficial exercise.

    6. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by Mr.+Freeman · · Score: 1

      Not to mention that most pen tests stop the very second even a single vulnerability is found. Some tester might drop a bunch of flash drives in the parking lot, wait for an employee to take one inside, and then conclude that they've penetrated the building and that the test is finished. They never find the fact that you could clone someone's badge from 50 feet away, or that the network ports in the public lobby aren't VLANed separately from the network ports in the high-security areas, or...

      --
      -1 disagree is not a modifier for a reason. -1 troll, flaimbait, redundant, overrated are NOT acceptable substitutes.
    7. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      We found that security improved markedly after we walked around sending random emails from people's unattended and unlocked computers.

    8. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by Ash+Vince · · Score: 1

      Not to mention that most pen tests stop the very second even a single vulnerability is found. Some tester might drop a bunch of flash drives in the parking lot, wait for an employee to take one inside, and then conclude that they've penetrated the building and that the test is finished. They never find the fact that you could clone someone's badge from 50 feet away, or that the network ports in the public lobby aren't VLANed separately from the network ports in the high-security areas, or...

      Have you ever been through a real pen test?

      I have (twice, two different security companies several years apart on the same web application) and they certainly did not stop after the first thing they found. They kept trying and trying and provided a report detailing every single issue they found, coded on a 1 to 5 scale based on importance. The reports came both came to pages and pages for probably less that 20 issues, less than 5 critical. Obviously in both cased the only sent us the reports in encrypted form and only gave us the decryption pass phrase over the phone, when they were 100% sure they were speaking to the correct people.

      If you get a pen test done and they stop after the first thing they found then the company you hired is crap.

      --
      I dont read /. to RTFA, I read /. to offend people in ignorance.
    9. Re:Good morale, perhaps? by dbIII · · Score: 1

      Yes I've written nice long technical reports too - but if they can't be let in, given root and allowed to take a proper look around on systems for stuff that's not on their checklist then they are not going to be able to be sure that they have found everything. A decent security audit and people playing Mission Impossible games are two different things if all they do is the games. Especially if the games mean that they mark things being on the correct ports as a fatal flaw (eg. a joke of a pen testing outfit that a friend at another company dealt with - clueless script kiddies that did not even look at IPv6 stuff so missed some huge holes found later).

  4. Start with the software developers and type safety by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    We can start by making the software developers use type safe languages (Ada is one such example) so we have fewer of these problems to deal with in the first place.

    Using C is irresponsible when better alternatives exist.

  5. Strong passwords == useless by Dr.+Crash · · Score: 1

    Strong passwords are useless - well, they're useful only against a brute-force attack and that's not the big threat anymore. A 64-character password is worth nothing against a phishing attack, and is worse than nothing if you have to write it down.

    Maybe the cure is to have the incoming mail server destroy all clickable links (or point them at an internal "you will need to navigate to that URL manually" warning page, and simply delete anything executable.

    1. Re:Strong passwords == useless by jythie · · Score: 1

      After that you need to cure customer support too since that is a common social engineering target. In fact you might have to wipe out tech support in general...

    2. Re:Strong passwords == useless by mlts · · Score: 1

      I've wondered about more adaptation of CAC-like cards for logging in, where the card reader (or even better, access tokens that work with a USB port) is standard on all new computers. This way, a host has a list of public keys for authorized users, rather than sensitive passwords (even if stored as salted hashes.) The way malware can work would be to generate bogus signatures/decryptions with the user's access token, and that is a lot more intrusive than just slurping a password typed in.

      Of course, this is a double-edged sword against anonymity, so this isn't a perfect solution. However, for SSO in a company, it might be useful.

  6. Start early on with training and rules by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    While it may seem draconian, the best way I've found is to start from the ground up with recurring training. Make the training mandatory, but unobstructive, and ensure you get the people to sign they understand the rules. You'd be surprised just how much of a difference you will get from anyone if you have a piece of paper with their signature on it, there just isn't the same value in an emailed "ok, I got it".

    There is a delicate balance between security and convenience, so you need to make sure that whatever you do to your end users doesn't bother them too much. Having purely random passwords is sure to get them to write it down and stick it under their keyboard. Having too loose of passwords is what will get you on the front page. However, if you can give them some leeway while maintaining some length and complexity in the passwords (i.e. pointers on using passphrases or self-made acronyms), you can go a long way. You might make a game out of your training too, give out some cheap prizes like lollipops or something, for various categories of passwords that the users create as part of the training. Who can make the best 24 character password? Who can make the funniest 12 character? etc... Engage them, give them something to remember, but hold them accountable for their (lack of) actions as well.

    1. Re:Start early on with training and rules by Mr.+Freeman · · Score: 1

      >Make the training mandatory, but unobstructive

      That's not possible. If it's mandatory then it's obstructing something, period.

      --
      -1 disagree is not a modifier for a reason. -1 troll, flaimbait, redundant, overrated are NOT acceptable substitutes.
  7. Wrong question by blue+trane · · Score: 2

    How can we create a culture where there is no incentive to hack or steal?

    1. Re:Wrong question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Invent the holodeck, that's the only way everyone can have anything.

    2. Re:Wrong question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      First you create a cybernetic platform restricted by Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics. Then you upload Ray Kurzweil's consciousness and launch it into space with instructions to return to Earth once it's found the means by which to reproduce organically. By the time that's happened man will be purged from biosphere and whatever's left and has evolved into the next iteration of Gaia might be able to support such a concept.

      In the mean time, the discussion's about imposing secure behavior onto an inherently insecure kludge that would have to be rebuilt from the ground up in order to facilitate such a culture. Either that or technology must become a religion where everyone's a priest. Where's the fun in that? Religions require someone to dominate.

    3. Re:Wrong question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      First, you kill all the people... problem solved!

    4. Re:Wrong question by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      you let us know when you find a solution. in the mean time the rest of us will work on looking for a solution to the problem that could actually be solved.

    5. Re:Wrong question by jbmartin6 · · Score: 2

      You are right, this is the better question. Why do we have a world where a few pieces of information that are effectively public have any sort of value? I have to tell my address, phone number, SSN, and so on to every bank, doctor, potential employer, landlord, and so on. Yet we continue to delude ourselves that somehow the information is going to remain secret. Well, 30+ years of "the bad guys are winning" shows that keeping (essentially) public information secret just isn't going to happen.

      Look at it from another perspective. Since I am not liable for false charges on my credit card, I don't care much at all about keeping that number secret. It is the bank's problem, not mine. (I suppose if I just posted it here on /. the law might be different though, since that is an intentional thing). And frankly, if we look at the numbers, not caring very much might be the best strategy. So the Target breach involved say, 200 million people. How many were impacted by anything more than some false credit charges? The banks paid the price for their failure to implement a better system, card holders are not liable for those charges.

      What this story is saying is, why don't billions of people change their behavior instead of a few dozen financial institutions? I think we can see why the banks want us to ask questions like in the article. I am asking why we don't ask a few banks to change their process instead of an unrealistic expectation that human nature is going to change.

      Yes, I understand I made a few oversimplifications and left some stuff out. Only for brevity, I assure you, I think the core point is still solid.

      --
      This posting is provided 'AS IS' without warranty of any kind, implied or otherwise.
    6. Re:Wrong question by tqk · · Score: 1

      Invent the holodeck, that's the only way everyone can have anything.

      Idiot. That buggy piece of crap damned near destroyed the ship almost every time it was used. They should've spaced the twit who came up with the idea before they had a chance to implement it..

      --
      "Tongue tied and twisted, just an Earth bound misfit ..." -- Pink Floyd.
    7. Re:Wrong question by blue+trane · · Score: 1

      Solutions exist, like Aristarchus's heliocentric system existed for millenia while everyone wasted their time working on epicycles.

      Solution: basic income, and challenges. Encourage hackers and crackers to work on software that will help, because they don't have to steal to make a living. Improve VRs so anyone can have the experience of owning a boat or whatever.

    8. Re:Wrong question by blue+trane · · Score: 1

      I don't think the banks paid much price, or any. They borrow short at 0% and lend long at 10% or 18% or whatever. All they have to do is make the payments by borrowing short, and give people more credit, and they've created the money they supposedly "lost".

    9. Re:Wrong question by dontfearthereaper · · Score: 1

      simple... you remove greed and malice from humanity

    10. Re:Wrong question by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Step 1: Wipe out humanity.

      Step 2: Find an intelligent life-form that isn't tempted to hack or steal for some reason.

      Step 3: ????

      Step 4: Profit. (Probably by exploiting all those overly trusting tripedal beings.)

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  8. Stop using passwords by flightmaker · · Score: 0

    It's high time we stopped using the term 'password'. Those in the know realise by now that a word or words is no good.

    I'd like to suggest replacing the term with 'passcode'. For those who still use passwords, it might encourage them to cease and desist. Or maybe not, but it would surely be worth a try.

    1. Re:Stop using passwords by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Depends on the application. A password like the one you use to log into your home Windows box can be weak. There's no Internet-facing "door" that uses that password.

    2. Re:Stop using passwords by Minwee · · Score: 1

      I used to use passwords like "love", "sex", "secret" and "god", but now that we have switched to passcodes I just use "12345".

  9. A Well-Informed Workforce is Key. by SightTraining · · Score: 4, Insightful

    This is a great question, and one that plagues businesses of all sizes. Based on our experience writing security training and consulting companies on the best ways to plug the security holes in their organizations, it comes down to three things: 1) Spelling it out: A proactive approach to security awareness includes open lines of communication, telling employees exactly what sorts of things to look out for. One major mistake that corporations often make is assuming too much—mainly, assuming that their employees know how to identify malicious situations over the phone or through email. Instead, spell out the situations that may trip them up, either through policies or training. 2) Repeat, repeat, repeat: Even in companies that make a concerted effort to raise security awareness among workers, there is a tendency to backslide into comfortable complacency unless the danger is kept at the forefront of their minds. This doesn’t have to be onerous for management or irritating to employees, since there are so many effective ways to make security awareness a part of a worker’s daily experience. E-newsletters, security briefs, and clever, eye-catching security awareness campaigns are a few ideas. 3) Create a culture of teamwork: Often, corporate environments in large companies use impersonal policies to “teach,” hoping to generate desirable behaviors with a “Don’t think, just do” mentality. This approach makes employees feel like a tiny cog in a huge machine, a piece not worthy of more than minimal information. Smart employers give employees more credit. An attitude of inclusion should permeate every policy, every training campaign, and every common area. A real “good guys vs. bad guys” attitude makes everyone feel like part of a team that is working toward the common goal of security.

    1. Re:A Well-Informed Workforce is Key. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Create a culture of teamwork: Often, corporate environments in large companies use impersonal policies to “teach,” hoping to generate desirable behaviors with a “Don’t think, just do” mentality. This approach makes employees feel like a tiny cog in a huge machine, a piece not worthy of more than minimal information. Smart employers give employees more credit. An attitude of inclusion should permeate every policy, every training campaign, and every common area.

      Mod comment up as it's a widely applicable principle, one that has destroyed many organizations when ignored. Employees must be valued for their brains or they won't use them... Explain the problem and treat employees as the solution, not just a laundry list of rules to "solve" it. Yeah, some employees can't handle this - get rid of them and respect the ones who can.

  10. It's a challenge by flufythedestroyer · · Score: 1

    good luck with that 40 yr old secretary that still hold old behavior at heart. Computers have good memories, people have crappy shitty memories. Thats why they tend to use words or something similar to what they know instead of gibberish random password generator for their security. I've seen people in high places which holds sensitive info that could easy kill a person if that info is leaked and they still used weak passwords... I've tried to tell them everything I can to use good behavior and it's a difficult challenge.

  11. Make computers harder to use. by Nutria · · Score: 1

    Then the people who don't deeply care about using computers properly won't use them except for boring business stuff, and then we can replace Windows with z/OS or OpenVMS and all those PCs with terminals.

    --
    "I don't know, therefore Aliens" Wafflebox1
    1. Re:Make computers harder to use. by Bing+Tsher+E · · Score: 1

      We can get you a lab coat to wear. There can be a half-door for people to come to to submit jobs and get back printouts. Congrats, IT fuck, you're back in charge. When does my fucking job get done?

      No. Nice try, though. Now go put paper in the LJet in finance. Chop chop now.

    2. Re:Make computers harder to use. by Nutria · · Score: 1

      to submit jobs and get back printouts.

      Someone's too stupid to know that the phrase replace ... with terminals means that there's no dropping off card decks at the dutch door, and no picking up printouts, because... they display on the terminal.

      --
      "I don't know, therefore Aliens" Wafflebox1
  12. Eh, kind of wrong by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Security isn't a destination! It's a journey! Often with potholes, tornadoes, zombies, and other obstructions along the way.

    You want your environment secure? Implement rigorous security training for all personnel, and make sure your admins are on their game! I.e. pay them enough to warrant the time that's required for that type of time/knowledge investment across your entire enterprise.

    Are your Admins following the bug reports, ON EVERYTHING, or actively searching for firewall or software holes?

  13. Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Cars are not idiot proof, but we require that people be licensed and pass a test to drive them

    Of course it will be the death-blow of the free-and-easy interwebs that we love much, what with them pesky net-cops passing out tickets for unsafe behavior

    Sigh... every frontier has seen its freedoms fade as the masses trounce forward, I suppose that this was inevitable

    Unless... unless... we could just freaking expect people to not act like total asshats, follow some simple rules and accept that they are going to get mugged if they do not follow the rules...

    naw, that could never happen

    1. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Because reasons

      Also, this entire "logged in on the front page, not logged in on the comments page" sucks major ass.

    2. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by Anrego · · Score: 1

      The problem with that analogy is that we still have car accidents, many of which are serious.

    3. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Cars are much, much easier to use than computers, and we require months of training. After all, cars have only one purpose-carrying people and stuff around, and only a few controls are required to operate then.

      Would you rather have users training for years before they can use computers? (Not programing, but merely using). Sorry, but that ship has sailed long ago.

    4. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by pr0fessor · · Score: 1

      I have never heard anyone say

      I had a download that was just flying when a kid on a bicycle came out of nowhere and I had to crash my computer to avoid hitting him.

      Firefox crashed, my wrist was broken in two places and I got a concussion, I was lucky compared to the guy with internet explorer.

    5. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I never had my identity stolen and had a house bought in my name while driving a car

      before you start picking apart the headline of my comment, why don't you try fucking reading the whole thing

    6. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by blue+trane · · Score: 2

      Financial loss is not the same as physical harm. Money is psychological.

    7. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      On the other hand, depriving somebody of the money they need is similar to depriving them of the health they need, and physical pain can be equated to emotional distress. I suspect a broken arm would be a lot less hassle then a bad case of so-called identity theft. (I know about the broken arm. I'm surmising about identity theft.)

      The psychological is real. It's the foundation of how we perceive the world.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
    8. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by blue+trane · · Score: 1

      The harm in the case of identity theft is virtual, and can be fixed much quicker than a broken arm, by voiding any unauthorized transactions, reimbursing the victim.

    9. Re:Forget idiotproofing, how about licensing by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

      Exactly. The best way to "encourage" a culture of security is regular beatings until things improve.

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
  14. Answer: Onagawa Nuclear Station by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Come on if this has not been posted to slashdot recently it should have

    http://www.nucnet.org/all-the-news/2014/03/17/safety-culture-protected-japan-s-onagawa-nuclear-station-researchers-say

  15. How Can We Create a Culture of Secure Behavior? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    ...by monitoring everything, duh!

    1. Re:How Can We Create a Culture of Secure Behavior? by bill_mcgonigle · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Or more succinctly: incentives matter. What incentive does an employee have to keep data secret? Will he be demoted in rank and lose pay if he does something stupid?

      What incentives do companies have to maintain a secure infrastructure? Will their insurance policy hold them liable if they do not?

      I'm just in the middle of polishing up a puppet module to deploy a bunch of new certs on my infrastructure. My incentive is that my reputation looks pretty bad if I advise clients to be secure but my own infrastructure is not up to snuff. That's really an incentive to avoid lost opportunities, I suppose.

      Google is talking about scoring up pages that are secure. Another very wise incentive.

      Let's keep this ball rolling: what other incentives can we offer or explain?

      --
      My God, it's Full of Source!
      OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
  16. The technology has to change by petes_PoV · · Score: 1
    Security is a pain. It slows you down. it gets in the way. It makes you jump through hoops and it is inconvenient. If I had to spend as much time unlocking my front door as I do to log into some websites: ones that don't even contain any information I value, I'd probably leave it open a lot more often.

    So until the software (or hardware) necessary to make systems more secure improves a great deal people won't use it. I can't say what the nemchmark is for user tolerance / acceptance, but if I had to guess I'd say is was about 1 second of "automatic" activity, zero intellectual input and one simple mechanical movement. Implement that and you've probably invented computer security.

    --
    politicians are like babies' nappies: they should both be changed regularly and for the same reasons
    1. Re:The technology has to change by mlts · · Score: 2

      Sometimes good security isn't a pain. Had client certificates been used more often, or just having a website ask the user to PGP/gpg sign a blob of text for logging in, passwords would be less critical.

      With a client cert, almost all authentication troubles go away. However, client certs are troublesome for users to manage (have to remember the key's password as well as copy the private key to every device in advance), so it comes at a cost, although if people got as used to it as they are used to the like button, it wouldn't be that much of a speedbump.

    2. Re:The technology has to change by sudo · · Score: 1

      Client Certs are a pain because the S/W is lacking decent cert management.
      In fact most of security is lacking. It should be written better and applications should have proper security integration.

    3. Re:The technology has to change by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There are precisely eleventy billion free Password Managers out there. Everyone I've introduced to KeePass loves that they can have extraordinarily long and complex password that are different for every web site, etc., and they only have to remember the one password that encrypts the KeePass database.

  17. Hahahahahah by argStyopa · · Score: 1

    People can't be bothered to take moderate, reasonable precautions with their own LIFE-PRESERVING behaviors, you think that they're going to be motivated to change their behaviors because some tech has to fart around with their laptop for 3 days re-imaging it?

    Seriously, people need to stop assuming that humans aren't just hairless primates with a knack for tools and language.

    --
    -Styopa
  18. yeah, lemme see where was that in the requirments by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Sure, just was devs need, more users, who never requested a feature in the first place, coming in and demanding that a particular language be used in the implementation because the read an article about how its 'more secure'

    Welcome to my nightmare, this rarely works out well

    And for the inevitable, 'why didn't you make it secure in the first place' comment

    fuck you, fuck you fuck you and your childish, 'I changed my mind, I don't want it fast, I don't want it cheep, I want you to read my mind and know the future and give me something that I can't break because I am a fucking idiot... and I need it tomorrow' attitude that makes everything somebody else's fault

  19. You don't. by DaveV1.0 · · Score: 2

    People still drink and drive, smoke, do drugs, and have unsafe sex despite years and sometimes decades of having admonitions against all of those things embedded in our culture. Why? Because people still "think those types of things happen to other, less careful people." It is human nature, hubris, and magical thinking all rolled into one.

    --
    There is no "-1 offended" or "-1 you don't agree with me" mod options for a reason.
    1. Re:You don't. by Bonker · · Score: 4, Insightful

      An important caveat to this line of thought is that GOOD education DOES work to prevent risk behaviors.

      A blanket 'Just Say No' campaign like the one ran by Nancy Reagan in the 1980s did more harm that good because, when a lot of the kids had it force-fed to them for a decade grew up and discovered that marijuana didn't immediately kill your or turn you into a junkie, many of them threw out the entirety of 'Drugs are bad, m'kay?' and went on their merry way destroying their bodies with harsher and harsher drugs.

      However, kids who had explained to them what drugs really did to a person's body and which drugs were more addictive and which drugs were less were, and are, less likely to actually do those drugs.

      The same is true of sex education. It's been shown with frequently tragic consequences that 'Abstinence Only' education usually makes the teen pregnancy and STD situation worse in places where it's taught. However, more complete sex education that explains pregnancy, STDs, and all the other associated risks that go along with sex causes a notable decline in teen pregancy, STDs, and an actual increase in the average age at which teens start having sex.

      I have found the same line of logic to be true with IT security. If you make a point of explaining the whys and wherefores, perhaps going so far as to make an interesting, engaging education program, the people who are your 'risk vectors' decrease, as do the number of security incidents you have to deal with.

      No, you never can completely eliminate the problem. However, by offering education that is interesting, complete, and that doesn't treat the recipient as an idiot, you can dramatically reduce the problem.

      --
      The next Slashdot story will be ready soon, but subscribers can beat the rush and slashdot the links early!
    2. Re:You don't. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hey at least my passwords are secure, just like they've been for the last 5 years :p

  20. You can't. by bravecanadian · · Score: 5, Insightful

    As long as there is incentive to skip security and get things done.

    ie. let the nerds in IT worry about security - I'll worry about selling/making/doing and getting my bonus.

    So technically I guess you could do something to foster this sort of secure behaviour but it won't happen because the powers that be don't give a shit.

    So yeah, you can't.

  21. The Solution by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If we execute anyone who has more than one security issue, artificial selection will fix this for us in future generations.

    Right now we're probably genetically predisposed to risk taking (men more than women).

  22. You can't. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    It would require eradicating laziness, ignorance, and plain old stupidity. Manage that and life would be such a paradise that you probably wouldn't need security in the first place.

  23. Read what you wrote by tomhath · · Score: 1

    Despite the high news coverage that large breaches receive, and despite tales told by their friends about losing their laptops for a few days while a malware infection is cleared up, employees generally believe they are immune to security risks. They think those types of things happen to other, less careful people.

    Untrained users are not the cause of large breaches. Malware infections happen to even the most careful users. In other words, training users and trying to change your company's culture won't make a significant difference.

    Encrypt the laptop before a user can touch it. Make sure a decent virus scanner is running (and keep your fingers crossed). Get well trained sysadmins who see their job as keeping your network and servers as secure as reasonably possible.

    1. Re:Read what you wrote by mlts · · Score: 5, Insightful

      If I had to give five general things a company could do, it would be similar to the following the parent stated:

      1: First and foremost... separate and isolate. Finance should be isolated from everything else, with a Citrix or TS server so people working there can browse the web with the browsing well separated from critical assets. If a breach does occur, it will be limited in scope.

      2: Laptop encryption is trivial. BitLocker [1] and the AD infrastructure to recovery is a must-have. Depending on level of paranoia, AD policy can be set to auto-encrypt USB drives, so a dropped thumbdrive doesn't mean a massive data breach. In fact, it would be wise to have BitLocker on all desktops as well, so repurposing of the machines is easy -- just a simple format or clean command in diskpart.exe.

      3: Backups. Often overlooked, but a humble tape drive can mean the difference between a quick restore versus paying some guy out of Russia a lot of BitCoins. Disk arrays != backup because one command (blkdiscard for example) can render all backed up data gone in seconds.

      4: A clear chain of command. This way, someone can't hack a VoIP connection, browbeat some lackey to get some critical access or knowledge about internal networking.

      5: Active pen-testing from a guy running a script on boxes to actual blackhats using everything at their disposal including sending people on site in coveralls and fake badges to get in.

      [1]: Yes, TrueCrypt is a good utility, but this is the enterprise where recoverability is as important as security.

    2. Re:Read what you wrote by Xaedalus · · Score: 3, Informative

      I work in Tape, and I can tell you that I've run into sysadmins and CTOs who have overlooked #3 (particularly with their belief in cheap disk arrays) to their sorrow. Tape is boring old tech, but it's damn near bulletproof in saving the bacon every damn time something goes wrong and a restore needs to occur. Ethernet with NAS boxes my ass, you need a tape library in there somewhere to completely insure that your company doesn't go down permanently after the inevitable rogue wave of human stupidity hits your network.

      --
      Here's to hot beer, cold women, and Glaswegian kisses for all.
    3. Re:Read what you wrote by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A couple years ago, a colleague of mine worked at a company that swallowed the "yes, all backups should go to the SAN" Kool-Aid. They happily tossed their perfectly working LTO-5 silos and went fully with online disk with replication. Well, one goof by one of their SAN admins that purged all the logical drives ended that illusion. All the RAID-6 protection with hot spares, online drive checking and autotiering didn't mean squat. Replication meant that the erase commands were echoed asynchronously across the WAN to the remote site, so the data was trashed in two locations. Thankfully, this was "just" backup data and the SAN admin quickly took snapshots of everything as some form of backup, but if a production machine went down or was corrupted, there would be no way to recover.

      With tapes, erasing all media -can- be done. However, part of backup 101 class is offsites, or even just keeping a set out of the silo and offline. This way, if someone zeroes a media set/backup pool/whatever the backup utility calls it, the data can still be reconstructed. Just the fact that tapes have a read/write switch can help mitigate an attack from remote trying to zero all data. One can't just delete a backup set and all data on the offsite tapes magically disappear. It might be a PITA to reindex the data, but it is still recoverable, especially if a catalog backup is sent offsite as well.

      Personally, I think some more players should jump in the tape industry. A consumer level tape drive would be very useful, especially one that has enough RAM to slow down and not "shoe-shine" when plugged in a USB 3.x connection. However, until people realize HDDs are not backup media, this likely won't happen.

    4. Re:Read what you wrote by dbIII · · Score: 1

      Active pen-testing from a guy running a script on boxes to actual blackhats using everything at their disposal including sending people on site in coveralls and fake badges to get in

      Pure theatre.
      Instead of embarrassing the helpful who will still be just as helpful to the next guy with a fake badge it's better to have a proper audit with full access instead of port scanning games or whatever.
      That obscure and insecure thing listening to the net that can't be seen from the outside by a pet script kiddie because it's on their list could be found by looking properly at all net facing systems and seeing everything that is running on them. A security audit, looking at things from both inside AND outside instead of a game that only has value in training the outside security folk at being better script kiddies.
      As for tapes, yes they are under-rated and a lot cheaper per GB than the used to be. I have saved millions by getting some old tapes out of storage. It is amazing what people discard. You'd think an oil company that had spent millions on a survey would keep all the necessary data for the entire length of time that they were considering drilling in an area wouldn't you? Then you'd think that two other companies wouldn't make the same mistake. Luckily tape is a handy medium for transport and subcontractors are rarely asked to send transport copies back (until the originals are lost a decade later!)

    5. Re:Read what you wrote by dbIII · · Score: 1

      A consumer level tape drive would be very useful

      Tape got it's bad reputation from 4mm consumer priced shit that broke and cheap and nasty drives that were unreliable. If we ask for something at consumer prices I doubt it will end up like an LTO5 and it will probably compared badly with blue-ray.

    6. Re:Read what you wrote by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Posting AC, just because...

      I just don't get why tape isn't more prevalent in the enterprise. Yes, the drive is expensive... but no more expensive than a consumer level 4mm or 8mm SCSI drive was when they were being sold.

      Of course, I checked tape prices for LTO-5 tapes. $19.99 at Amazon for a cartridge that stores 1.5TB of data uncompressed. Yes, I can buy a 4TB external hard disk for $150. However, there is no malware out today that actively infects/destroys tape. That 4TB HDD with critical data can be destroyed in milliseconds.

      Don't forget physical issues. I drop a tape, and if the case isn't obviously physically damaged, the media is still usable. I drop a HDD, and the drive at best has to have all data copied and be replaced, or at worse, all data on it is gone, especially with ceramic platters that can shatter.

      To boot, 20 years from now, the LTO-5 tape will likely be readable. The HDD... who knows. They are not archival grade, so there are no long term tests.

      Maybe I've been in IT too long, but no matter how fancy SANs and offsite storage get, there is nothing yet to be something that approaches tape for reliability [1], security (LTO-4 and newer have AES-256 in hardware), and tamper resistance [2]. Until we get cheap WAN links over 10 gig/sec, there is nothing that will replace offline/near-line storage.

      [1]: At one job, I used tens of of thousands of LTO cartridges. After five years, I destroyed three bad tapes, total. Anecdotes don't mean that much, but with the large sample size, it does show something to me.

      [2]: WORM tapes, and setting the media read-only when pulled from the drive/silo. It would take a rogue flash of the drive firmware in order for data to be tampered with.

  24. How Can We Create a Culture of Secure Behavior? by Rob+the+Bold · · Score: 1

    Same way as every other behavior: reward desired behavior and/or punish undesired behavior.

    --
    I am not a crackpot.
  25. People guard against old threats by jfdavis668 · · Score: 1

    People are used to guarding against security threats, but are always defending against old ones. By the time you get everyone trained in defending the threat, the attackers have already moved on to a new one. The only way to defend yourself is have a small group of people who can anticipate or react to the ever changing threat and have them defend everyone else. Unless you are primarily interested in security, they will never focus on preventing new attack avenues.

  26. Yeah, blame the victim by Animats · · Score: 2

    Users are not the problem any more. Crap code is the problem.

    C is the source of buffer overflows. Microsoft is the source of autorun problems, or "if it's executable, run it". PHP is the source of most SQL injection problems. Vendor-installed backdoors are the source of most router vulnerabilities. None of these are end-user problems.

  27. Re:yeah, lemme see where was that in the requirmen by sinucus · · Score: 1

    Where the hell are my mod points??!! I'd mod you up to 9000 if I could.

  28. Re:Start with the software developers and type saf by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Heartbleed would simply not have happened if OpenSSL was written in Ada or another type safe language.

    That is a extremely convincing argument for abandoning C style languages in favour of type safe ones when writing core libraries.

  29. By making it easy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Right now there's a lot of commandline work that goes into making something secure.

  30. Some people.... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Some people won't respect fire until they get burned.

  31. Re:Start with the software developers and type saf by Minwee · · Score: 1

    Heartbleed would simply not have happened if OpenSSL was written in Ada or another type safe language.

    Right you are. Heartbleed happened because everybody was _using_ OpenSSL. Fix that and the problem goes away.

  32. when you start firing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    When you start firing people for not following security policies. that is the only way. Look at what happens now you get a virus and what happens IT fixes you computer and you are maybe slightly inconvenienced for a short time while you wait for them to replace or re-image it. The whole time you and your manager get to yell at IT for not fixing it fast enough even though it was caused by you clicking on that email from the Nigerian prince for the 5th time this month. There need to be individual consequences or nothing will change.

    1. Re:when you start firing by Anrego · · Score: 4, Insightful

      This requires security to be a priority over whatever that user is doing. In most cases, it's not. The job of IT is to keep the system running and support the people doing the things that the company actually cares about (buying widgets, making widgets, selling widgets, whatever). When IT folk get ideas of grandeur and images of violators of their well defined policy being given the boot, it never ends well.

      Much as it sucks, I think the onus is on us to build software and systems that the user can't screw up. People clicking links and attachments.. filter out all links and attachments save for whitelisted senders. Careless with their password? Time for a 2 factor system where the hacker on the other end of the phone doesn't have easy access to one of the factors. Spearfishing becoming a problem? Implement something that makes it really obvious an email is from an outside source (and don't make it a big paragraph, just a simple large font "THIS EMAIL WAS SENT FROM SOMEONE OUTSIDE OF THIS COMPANY" at the top.

    2. Re:when you start firing by RobertLTux · · Score: 1

      "Time for a 2 factor system where the hacker on the other end of the phone doesn't have easy access to one of the factors. "

      this is where dial-backs come in handy .
      the way it works is :

      1 you get a call from "Joe Smith in the Texas Office"
      2 you tell "Joe" im going to dial you back give me Line 3 when i call
      3 you use your phone list to dial him back and
      4 Joe gives you Line 3 (this is from a key string list) AND You as instructed give him line "5"
      5 You then continue with business

      Or Video Phones with the system doing Face Recog on both persons

      --
      Any person using FTFY or editing my postings agrees to a US$50.00 charge
  33. *They* are immune to security risks? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Well, they are immune. It's their employer's computer that's at risk, not themselves. I couldn't give a rat's ass for my employers' computers. Securing that is the employer's problem, not mine. I'm not forgetting about identity theft and my personal information. There's no way I'll tell somebody else's computer (with nebulous security regimes designed by others) anything personal about myself. I'm not a fool.

    Many of those nitwits won't even let me install less sucky web browsers, so fsck 'em! Live by the sword, die by the sword. They can consider it an expensive education on their part, until they smarten up.

  34. Password strength is overrated by Tony+Isaac · · Score: 4, Interesting

    In my 25 years working in IT, none of my passwords, weak or strong, have ever been hacked. Even my teenage sons, who have no idea about password strength, or site security, have never been hacked. And I doubt YOU can point to a single instance of someone hacking YOUR password.

    Does password hacking happen? Yes, of course. Should we be careful? Yes. But there are much greater dangers, such as malware (which you no doubt HAVE had a personal brush with).

    So if we need to put up with annoying security measures, let's at least focus on the more relevant dangers, rather than forcing us all write down our passwords and stick them to the bottom of our keyboards!

    1. Re:Password strength is overrated by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      My wife's throwaway email address had its pretty weak password (it was a 6-digit number) hacked last year.

    2. Re:Password strength is overrated by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Oh, and I've never seen malware in my life (been using PCs since MS-DOS 2.11).

    3. Re:Password strength is overrated by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I once hacked your wife ... you can have her back.

  35. Teach the benefit - a system that keeps working by raymorris · · Score: 1

    I've recently learned a new definition of security, one that's a little bit different from what I'd thought about before.

    A secure system is a system that continues to work as expected, even in the face of unexpected events.

    Users like a system that works the way they expect. They don't like crashes, endless popups, and systems slowed to a halt by malware.
    So teach them the benefits they can expect. You can have a fast, trouble-free computer by doing x, y, and z. Clicking on "virus alerts" makes your computer slow and prone to crashing. Opening unexpected PDF files causes a huge hassle of needing to change your passwords and all that mess.

    1. Re:Teach the benefit - a system that keeps working by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      A secure system is a system that continues to work as expected, even in the face of unexpected events.

      After decades of BSOD, what fraction of computer users have ever seen such a system?

    2. Re:Teach the benefit - a system that keeps working by Imagix · · Score: 1

      That's not security (well, not the security that the rest of this thread is posting about). That's resiliency.

  36. Losing battle? by scoticus · · Score: 1

    For a company of decent size, having some sort of mandatory training may be in the realm of possibility, but good luck with all of the small business (20 employees) out there. My company provides IT services to these types of businesses, mostly medical practices. There is no way to do anything other than individual, one-on-one training, and then only after something has already gone wrong. The owners don't want to pay for our time, and the staff are simply too damn busy to deal with it. This could just be a medical office thing, but I doubt it. It seems like simply being a "business" is itself a hindrance to instilling safe habits. At least with my home user clients, I have the time to educate them in a way that resonates. Back when I was in school, "computer class" was typing, a little BASIC, and that's about it. I wonder if there is anything in the current curriculum regarding safe surfing and proper security practices?

  37. Long story short by Charliemopps · · Score: 2

    A number of years ago I worked for a large (Global) company that wanted to make their new ticketing system secure. So they implemented a new password standard for the system that required a 35 character password, it reset every 30 days, and required 5 non-alpha numeric characters. The result? Within a week everyone in my department had their passwords written on a post-it note stuck to their monitor. The biggest problem with network security is usually the network security department.

    Use common sense 2 factor authentication that's not too difficult for your users to comply with and they WILL comply. Make it overly complex and hard for the average non-tech person to understand and your own people will undermine all of your security efforts. Publicly fire any employe that violates your simple rules and it will quickly become apparent that adhering to those easy to follow rules is worth the effort.

  38. Mod parent up. by khasim · · Score: 2

    The people that understand the risks generally don't represent a problem, but the people that don't understand them often also don't benefit from an explanation in a way that would change their behavior.

    And in the corporate world there is the problem of status. People higher on the hierarchy do not like being told that they cannot do something by people lower on the hierarchy.

    And if something goes wrong then it is YOUR fault because "security" was YOUR responsibility.

    Computers are not magic, but many people believe that they are.

    The problem there is that software has all the problems of a magical system. If you do A, B and C and then expect D to happen ... maybe it will, maybe it won't. Had you previously done X, Y or Z without rebooting?

    There was a CAD program that had a problem with memory fragmentation. Even if you closed the previous files, eventually you ran out of contiguous memory and then your computer would complain about "issues" when you tried to open a file larger than your available contiguous memory. So first thing in the morning everything was fine. But around lunchtime things got weird. And the weirdness wasn't evenly distributed. On Monday, Alice would have a problem but Bob would work fine. On Tuesday Bob would have a problem but Alice would be fine. Etc. .....

    And that was a problem that I could diagnose. There are hundreds more where all I can say is "perform the rite of reboot" and only open the app you have trouble with right now and let me know if it's still having trouble my god what are all those apps that are loading on start-up.

    1. Re:Mod parent up. by dbIII · · Score: 1

      It's really a wonder (and a variety of corporate privateering) that a quick and nasty CAD program such as AutoCAD with all it's faults over the years became the default. These days I can only run the version that people like with a WinXP virtual machine or on linux via WINE.

  39. People will care when they have something to lose by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    if they don't.

    Penalize negligence, just like we do IRL.

  40. Basic Trainging in Computer Use by X!0mbarg · · Score: 1

    Unless people have some training or background, thy will proceed blindly along until something actually Makes them pay attention.

    Start with such basics in high-school, or even earlier than that. Explain (and mark their understanding) of things like strong vs weak passwords, and simple security procedures. E-mail safety tips. Good file management practices. Even basics like how to take care of a keyboard and/or pointing device would go fairly well in such a course.

    Oh. Almost forgot: MAKE IT MANDATORY! Nobody gets to use the school computers/labs (even Office Staff) if they don't show proficiency. No personal systems should be allowed access to the school network without a valid certificate either, lest they infect the whole thing from their own carrier box. Ban those who violate the practices and cause problems. Make them responsible for what they caused, and Sit Through the repair procedures with a technician as an additional education in what happens, and what has to be done to Fix things, or no forgiveness, and therefore, no regained access! Give them a sense of what they are avoiding, and even what to do to fix a problem on their own system, should they get afflicted at home.

    Start 'em young, and train them in the ways of the system. The results will be worth the effort.

    Seriously: If people don't show they are responsible enough to use the school (or company) systems, they have no business accessing them, and probably shouldn't be working there in any capacity.

    1. Re:Basic Trainging in Computer Use by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      MAKE IT MANDATORY! Nobody gets to use the school computers/labs (even Office Staff) if they don't show proficiency.

      I agree. They should apply these same rules to all parts of life. Did you wash your hands when you came into the restaurant? No? Slap the food out of their hands and throw them out!

      Did you buckle your seatbelt in the taxi? No? Throw them off into the gutter!

      Did your dog just shit on the grass where kids play? Looks like poochie is getting Ol' Yeller'd!

      It's only when every aspect of our lives is subject to draconian absolutism imposed by every other person's personal bugaboos that we can really be safe from irresponsible people.

  41. culture of paranoia by Khashishi · · Score: 1

    It's not known exactly how to instill a culture of paranoia, but one idea is to subject employees to traumatic experiences involving police and/or gangsters.

  42. Not passwords by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 4, Insightful

    First off, stop worrying about passwords. Most malware doesn't get into systems by way of an attacker cracking passwords. It comes in in ways that bypass passwords entirely, either by getting a user to run it or by getting the user to give the attacker their password.

    Second, look at your management culture. Do you expect your employees to routinely click on links in e-mail? Look for things like HR or IT sending e-mails that instruct people to follow links they've provided, or "secure" or "encrypted" e-mail systems that store the messages on Web servers and expect your employees to use a link to get at the contents of the "secure" or "encrypted" message. If you find such things, realize that you're training your employees to be insecure, because you're training them to expect to do as a normal part of their job exactly what the malware will need them to do to infect their systems. Start by removing such things from your management culture. If you need encrypted e-mail, do it within your own e-mail system so that users never need to follow links to read encrypted or secured e-mail. Outlook and Exchange offer this directly. If you need to give employees links to internal web applications or documents, create a Web page or site with a directory of links and train your employees to use a bookmark in their browser to access that site and navigate to the appropriate section where you'll put all the new links they need.

    Third, look at your IT policies. Not the ones you wrote, the ones you expect employees to follow. If your policy manuals say "No user-installed software." but your actual policies require users to get and install software from outside, you have a problem. It can be as innocuous as sending zipped archives while not having a program to handle them pre-installed on user computers. It can be as pervasive as not having your IT able to support the myriad of tools your developers need, most of which will by definition not be the kind of thing most desktops would need. But every time you have a situation where what you expect of your employees requires software you didn't pre-install on their systems and where it'd negatively impact an employee's job performance and more importantly their performance evaluations if they refused to install that needed software themselves, you're creating security problems. Sit down and decide how you're going to address this, then address it. It can be as simple as a page of "approved" links to sites you know are safe and where employees can get all that useful software that gets used every day.

    Fourth, evaluate your software update policies and IT budget and staffing. If your IT department doesn't have the staff or the budget to monitor the vendors of all the software in use in your organization, test changes and push updates out to your desktops and servers, you need to re-evaluate your IT budget and staffing levels. You need to get most updates installed within 30 days of their release, and you need to be able to get major critical security updates analyzed, tested and deployed within 24 hours. Your IT staff can't do that if security updates are a side item they're expected to handle in between doing everything else. If management wants security to be a priority, they need to back up their words with the resources and budget departments need to make it a priority.

    Yes, a lot of that comes back to management. Attitudes towards security come from the top. More importantly, they come from what those at the top do and expect rather than from what they say.

    1. Re:Not passwords by ThatsDrDangerToYou · · Score: 1

      Fourth, evaluate your software update policies and IT budget and staffing.

      LOLS! What is this "IT budget" of which you speak? Staffing?!

      I worked for a series of startups, and at the last place the CEO was like "Wtf am I paying $10k a year for with this IT management company?" Hilarity ensued. :-|

  43. Re:Start with the software developers and type saf by BreakBad · · Score: 1

    I used the same approach my requiring my users tattoo their passwords on their foreheads. Eventually my user base dropped to almost zero...but for those who stayed I did see an interesting trend. Passwords like %uS*32Ldi# started prevailing because passwords like wafflebunny make for an embarrassing tattoo.

  44. Internal phishing attacks by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    My empoyer periodically sends out convincing phishing attacks to employees. You click the link, you get a clear reminder that world is unsafe. It doesn't address all concerns, of course, but helps keep security in people's conscious mental mix.

  45. EDUCATE END USERS (especially Windows) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Since it's MOST used worldwide on PC's & Servers combined: A good read (by "yours truly" that actually got me PAID for it no less - "the Lord works in mysterious ways") -> http://www.bing.com/search?q=%...

    * It uses a HIGHLY ESTEEMED tool http://www.computerworld.com/s...

    (Whose makers have taken a few of MY suggestions to improve it no less)

    CIS Tool actually makes it "fun" to do (in a nerdy kind of way) - almost like a performance benchmark software does, albeit, for security instead!

    It works!

    APK

    P.S.=> CIS Tool is also MULTI-PLATFORM capable (not just for Windows users, but also *NIX variants of many kinds as well)...

    ... apk

    1. Re:EDUCATE END USERS (especially Windows) by TrollingForHostFiles · · Score: 1

      APK tells
      Nothing but lies
      'Cept when he tries
      To spamvertise

      BURMA SHAVE

      --
      cat /dev/random
    2. Re:EDUCATE END USERS (especially Windows) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Spamvertise = the jealous cry of the "ne'er-do-well" with nothing at all named Zontar the Mindless.

  46. LART the offenders? by rainer_d · · Score: 1

    Well, you have to start somewhere, right?

    --
    Windows 2000 - from the guys who brought us edlin
  47. Do you want to? by LainTouko · · Score: 1

    The first question is not actually how you can create such a culture, but whether it's actually a good thing in the first place. You seriously need to evaluate this. One of the primary means of being secure is not trusting others. But trusting others is an incredibly useful tool to get things done, and it may be worth taking the security hit. Stand on a crowded railway platform, and you're trusting so many people, each of whom could push you off and kill you so easily, without even thinking about it. Without trust, society itself would be impossible.

    So for example, if everyone believed they were immune to the security risk of terrorism, this would very obviously be such a good thing for society. There have been security economic analyses done of various security measures recommended by security guys, thinking their users to be fools who just wouldn't listen, which established that the users who ignored them were actually completely right, that the cost of implementing these measures was hundreds of times greater than the benefit of preventing the attacks they were effective against.

    A security professional who thinks doing things securely must always be a priority just because that's his field, instead of taking the time to gain a more holistic understanding of the situation, deserves to be ignored.

  48. Incentives by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Sue them for negligence when circumventing security actually results in damages. If I get fired for not skipping a security thing and missing my deadline, and don't get fired when I meet the deadline but infect the network...

  49. How is a password written down "worse than nothing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Suppose I have a private office with a lockable door, do not anticipate being targeted for physical espionage, and personally know everyone who has keys (except the janitorial staff). How is writing 'horse correct battery staple' on a sticky and putting it under the keyboard worse than forcing password to empty? This is exactly as effective as memorizing "348Chj#(hf.4%!g'; DROP TABLE Students; 'fh2^*Hcvbmmz" at preventing anyone who does not have access to my office from accessing my computer.

    I worked in the CS division of a US National Lab last summer - yes, people there have left their laptops alone in a conference room while they go pee, and come back to find someone attacking their machine. We were under advisement to always, always, always lock screen if you're away. If we are worried about casual espionage attempts, I'll keep the sticky note in my wallet.

    If you wish to evince a scenario where either my home will be burglarized and/or myself physically attacked so they can steal my credentials, or my computer will be physically attacked and compromised, then we're past the point where storing the password only in my neural engams is sufficient so the argument is now moot.

  50. Re:yeah, lemme see where was that in the requirmen by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    make the SOBs sign a finalized specification and then throw it in their face when they get stupid, saying, "OK, you can have the new stuff you now demand if you tell me what in this spec you don't want or how much more time you will give me". If they won't sign a spec or won't deal with the realities of mission creep, get their asses kicked from above.

  51. culture is easy by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Culture is easy; it's the implementation that's hard.

    Every single day people make a value assessment about what they should do: do I be lazy and post on slashdot or do I finish my assignment? If I can get away with being lazy without finishing my assignment, I'll be lazy and procrastinate. If I value discipline and the joy of hard work and a job well done, I'll finish it early. Etc etc.

    Culture is simply a single world that assesses what a community of people value and do not value. So the key to embed something within your organization's culture is to MAKE it valuable, either through a system of rewards/punishments or some other method; essentially testing your user group's security habits and rewarding those who are good and lightly punishing/training those who are bad.

    The problem with that method is it takes time and resources to implement a program like this, so you will likely need some higher up approval to do so. Culture in an organization like a company usually comes from the top, so you need a higher up as your champion, because that higher up will create a policy that grants you the power to give out rewards and punishments etc.

    Higher ups in an organization are usually concerned with efficiency; typically that means cost. So what I would do is create some sort of explanation or proposal for a higher up, explaining the costs and risks (and if you can quantify the risks in terms of dollars that's good) of having bad security habits, and outline a program that would encourage it and what program would cost in terms of hours/costs to the organization. Sold right, they will grant you the power and authority to implement the program, and if they are the champion of it bringing it to the organization as a whole, the others will fall into line.

    The key though is also value. When you understand the costs and risks of a security breach, is that risk and cost high enough to warrant a program ensuring proper safety protocols? Value is absolutely key.

  52. You can't. by seebs · · Score: 1

    1. It's annoying.
    2. Most people don't think like that.

    People are not built for that kind of caution.

    --
    My blog: http://www.seebs.net/log/ --- My iPhone/iPad app: http://www.seebs.net/seebsfrac/
  53. Best Approach by MrKaos · · Score: 1

    I'll probably be modded down for this but the most effective way is to pwn the users to show them that they are merely bitches that any moderately skilled geek can defraud completely. Since they only learn from being fucked over, being fucked over is the only way they learn - otherwise you are just considered to be paranoid.

    Repeat this for every user you meet and add the strange looks you get from them when you do things a secure way.

    --
    My ism, it's full of beliefs.
  54. Just Remember by naris · · Score: 1

    If your users can do their job, then obviously IT Security is not doing theirs and stricter security policies are required!

  55. FLEE! FLEE FOR YOUR LIVES!!! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    A culture of secure behavior is a culture of paranoid, suspicious minds.

    We can't go on together, with suspicious minds, and we can't build our dreams on suspicious minds. We're caught in a trap, and I can't walk out. ...because I love you too much baby.

  56. TrollingForHostsFiles = Zontar the Mindless by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What lies, Zontar the Mindless? See January 2008 winners http://techtalk.pcpitstop.com/...

    * ... & as-per-YOUR-usual, vs. myself? "EAT YOUR WORDS..."

    I see you haven't managed to eat them ALL yet (lol) after your failed attempt @ libeling me -> http://mobile.slashdot.org/com...

    APK

    P.S.=> As to my subject-line, for anyone's that curious on that account? See here (Zontar admits TrollingForHostsFiles is HIS sockpuppet, SEVERAL times) -> http://slashdot.org/comments.p... (What a TOTALLY reprehensible little scumbag that Zontar the Mindless is...)

    ... apk

  57. "Strong" Passwords are not the answer by naris · · Score: 2

    Requiring users to change their password often and requiring long and "strong" passwords that are difficult to memorize is not the answer to better security. This results in people having to write down their password someplace convenient for them (and any nefarious people around). This is well demonstrated by the movie "Ferris Bueller's Day Off" where the main character find the schools' passwords taped inside a desk and alters his and his friends grades. It also trains users, and the help desk, that they will have to reset their password often. This has the effect of making the actual passwords irrelevant to security. All a nefarious person has to do to gain access to the system is convince the help desk that they are an employee that needs to change their password.

  58. The 20% who have used something other than Windows by raymorris · · Score: 1

    Our company, for example, uses Linux and measures uptime in years. Machines are rebooted for CPU and kernel upgrades and that's about it. Hard drive upgrades don't require a reboot, and they sure as heck don't crash. One machine had a bad memory module that caused a crash. We don't have users or software that crashes.

  59. sure it is - open a malicious attachment, things s by raymorris · · Score: 1

    That definition absolutely includes what this thread is about. TFA talked mostly about malicious email attachments. When you do that, things stop working right. The discussion has talked about poor passwords. When your poorly chosen password is cracked, things stop working right. Using a good passphrase helps keep things working they way you expect them to work.

  60. Only 1 way by maliqua · · Score: 1

    As bender would put it "kill all humans"

    because if any of us remain the likelihood of us being careless and stupid is guaranteed

  61. Anxiety! by Myu · · Score: 1

    A culture of intense security awareness is a scared culture. Knowing that your colleagues are not going to leave a gap in to your file servers is important from the perspective of keeping your data safe from potential outside threats, but a state of persistent distrust is going to ultimately hamper the work of your organization through dehumanizing its members and tying them up in procedure.

    A few simple policies and a few general guidelines should be the extent of an active security presence in the wider culture of an organization, with the exception of people specifically there to deal with security issues or sensitive items.

    --
    Myu: ... The map's upside down...
  62. Reduce Complexity by ClayDowling · · Score: 1

    The first step would be to reduce the number of separate passwords that have to be used. That means minimizing/eliminating the use of outside vendors that interact with your users via the web. If there's some vital human resource service that is needed (testing, training, employee reviews, whatever), bring it in house rather than contracting it out to an outside vendor. Because every single outside vendor you use means another set of credentials to be maintained.

    The second step would be to eliminate password expiration. This may mean eliminating people in your organizatoin who think that password expiration is necessary. Depending on that person's position within the company, that might be as simple as telling them to knock it off, or might involve a complicated scheme to convince another company to recruit them away. When all else fails, compromising photographs are always effective.

    But as the situation stands, I have to maintain half a dozen passwords, many of which I only use once or twice a year. So they are written on a post it note in my desk drawer. Sure, that pisses off the data security people. But before they steal that they'll nip the $200 backup drive sitting on my desk.

  63. Negative reinforcement. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Be a dick. I steal employer-owned equipment when employees leave their offices or desks unlocked. I leave notes on their desktops detailing what I could have done instead of just leaving a note when they leave their computers unlocked. When they start to say their password, I start making loud noises to make them shut up and then explain they should 1: never say it out loud. 2: never tell anyone. 3: especially never tell anyone in IT; IT can get in your account whenever they like without knowing your password anyway. When they root their laptop (can't lock it down completely; it's a laptop), I reimage it and explain company policy regarding end-user use of administrator accounts and proper privilege request procedures.
    A large part of being a sysadmin or desktop support is being the little brother of the BOFH because even other IT folk (developers, project coordinators, database admins, backup operators, sysops, and yes, even desktop support and sysadmins) aren't paranoid enough to buy into the necessity for a culture of secure behavior. It takes a jerk to make end users have a portion of their subconscious say "What would the BOFH do here?" or at least "If I leave my door open while I go get my coffee, BOFH will steal my stuff" which, while not the intended mental result, does turn into the preferred physical result.

  64. Problem solved by shifting from PCs to smartphones by jphamlore · · Score: 1

    How many times has one's smartphone been infected by malware? How many people do you know whose smartphone was infected by malware? What about tablets? The problem has already been solved by shifting to a different type of computer than a PC.

  65. move along, its just the stazi by sudo · · Score: 1

    I work at a large IT company and there is so much fragmentation and inconsistent security policies that seem to come from knee-jerk decisions by middle managers that have been chewed up because of specific security exposures.

    This ends up being difficult for an end user as you end up jumping through extra loops for a service that less important that the one you normally use.

    Security personnel, don't listen to reason, they just perform their goosestep and salute to the leader.
    If I find a loophole to make my life easier I will use it.

    Companies need to realize security needs to be thought out and need to be integrated properly, not a strap on what I see used by large companies.

     

  66. Security Starts With Good Programming & IT by HannethCom · · Score: 1

    The first problem is security through stupidity that you see all over the place. This is where you are required to change your password every x months, or days. It has been found that the maximum number of password changes per year, without storing it, is 2. That is maximum. It is still recommended to have people change their password, but currently the recommendation is if you do, to set it to once a year. I think Microsoft on their server products has this set to 3 months by default.

    Low maximum password length. While it is expected there will be some length limitation. I have found places that limit you to 8, or 16 characters. Space is pretty cheap these days, can't you afford to store 50 characters, or more as the maximum? Also there are some places that require you to have really high minimum number of characters. 12 as a minimum is too high, 6, or 8 I see as more reasonable. I am constantly boggled by the places that require exactly x characters.

    My other personal favorite is only allowing alpha, or numeric characters. Honestly, why limit which characters can be used?

    On the other hand, requiring at least 1 character from 4 different groupings is also a bit excessive. Having to require from 2-3 groupings may be okay.

    Basically many of the problem I see come from putting limitations on password that make it harder for people to remember their passwords, while making it easier for people to guess the passwords.

    Also if you have a forgot password feature with a limit of number of tries. Make sure you warn the person before they are locked out, so they can use the forgot password feature. There should be a limit on the number of tries of a password, as not having this allows people to brute force the password, which is one of the more common ways getting passwords.

    --
    Microsoft, Apple, Google, Amazon what's the difference? All steal money from devs and control with walled gardens.
    1. Re:Security Starts With Good Programming & IT by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      You're missing something here. You mention affording to store 50-character passwords.

      Your password should never be stored. That's an insecure practice right there. The system should have some sort of hash or other transform to put your password through and then store that (we'll leave the details to the security people).

      The biggest worry I have with short password length limits is that it suggests that some incompetent has designed a system that stores my password in the clear.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  67. Continuous White-Hat Hacks by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Troll your user base, trying to get them to do things they should not. Then publish the results.

    I learned a long time ago that social pressure is a powerful weap-, er, motivational tool. Seriously, there needs to be a price to be paid for engaging in insecure behaviours. You want it to be low enough that people don't fear for their jobs but high enough that they are uncomfortable and motivated to change. So embarrass them. It's a good fit for the problem.

    It's especially effective if some high-level staffers get caught and outed. If the workforce gets the message that "we're all in this together, it's a priority and management wants it done" then it will be done.

    Our current problem is that security is seen as IT's problem. There are few if any repercussions for an average staffer doing something really dumb, so long as they had no malice or intent to breach security. This reinforces the image that security is a technical problem that is the sole responsibility of one department. If you don't change that then you'll never get a secure culture. To the point of the OP, a culture change cannot happen when it is delegated to one specialist department.

    1. Re:Continuous White-Hat Hacks by Todd+Knarr · · Score: 1

      The problem is that you run into situations like one I ran into during the last security evaluation:

      1. An e-mail from the company's HR e-mail address says that I need to click on a link within the e-mail to view information from HR that I'm required to review and respond to.
      2. An e-mail from the company's HR e-mail address says that I need to click on a link within the e-mail to view information from HR that I'm required to review and respond to.

      One of those is a legitimate message from an executive and failure to follow it's instructions will result in possible termination. The other is a fake from IT Security. I have described all significant differences in the messages. Now, tell me which one is which?

      The above, in a nutshell, is the problem with most attempts to enforce security policy: the people making policy in the company ignore the security policies when deciding how to do things.

  68. One Word by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Accountability. Fuck everything else. Make people own up to their mistakes which cost the company (including the CxO suite). It doesn't matter if its security, ethics, or pick a topic of your choice. If they won't be caught/punished, you sure as hell can bet they won't care.

    This goes for all layers involved - users, IT admins, and management. I lost three months of work to the Blaster worm in 2003 because IT wouldn't give me Admin privileges so I could secure my own workstation (remember kids, this was before XP implemented a firewall in SP2 in 2005). Why did IT not allow it? Because management wouldn't allow it.

    Accountability. Fuck everything else. Make that work and everything else will fall into place.

  69. Re:yeah, lemme see where was that in the requirmen by swillden · · Score: 1

    Sure, just what devs need, more users, who never requested a feature in the first place, coming in and demanding that a particular language be used in the implementation because the read an article about how its 'more secure'

    Heh. That reminds me of a meeting some 15 years ago. Java was gaining a strong foothold as an enterprise app development language at the time (especially in IBM Global Services, which is who I worked for), and at the same time we were living through a seemingly neverending series of Java sandbox security defects. Running code automatically downloaded from random websites in your browser is a devilishly hard thing to make safe, but that's completely irrelevant to enterprise software.

    But the fact that the two contexts are completely different didn't prevent a clueless PM from boldly asserting (to the even more clueless customer!) that using Java is a bad idea because "it's insecure". I was the lead architect on the project and I had a hell of a time convincing the customer that the PM was wrong and that Java was, in fact, a good choice for the application. Especially since it would be impolitic to just come out and say the PM was full of shit, since he was ostensibly on my team.

    --
    Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  70. Re:Start with the software developers and type saf by david_thornley · · Score: 1

    Ada would not have affected the "goto fail;" bug, since that was simple repetition of a line. If I understand Heartbleed correctly, it wouldn't have helped there.

    Not to mention that any idiots who mangle C like that for the sake of a few additional cycles (really, calloc() instead of malloc() would have stopped that bug cold) are going to manage to screw up in any language.

    --
    "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  71. Security is not just computer security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    When you put a road block in that person's way what will he do? He will find the easiest way around your road block and just do what he wanted anyway, regardless of how bad it is for him.

    Most drugs are bad for you and also illegal, but people still find ways and take them.

    Speed limits and other road rules exist for a reason. Ignoring rampant revenue raising, if there is a posted limit for a road you should be safe to assume everyone is travelling at or below it. Nope, there's always bunch who want to travel at the detection threshold above the posted limit. There's even a few arrogant bastards who feel it's their god-given right to travel at any speed, anywhere, swerving in and out of lanes to get around more responsible drivers, and even overtaking dangerously on the wrong side of the road.

    Look at ATM cards as an example. Most people choose the shortest PIN their bank allows and probably the most memorable. How many cover the keypad when they enter their pin, or even check the machine for obvious signs of tampering?

    Look at FaceBook. How many people load up every tiny detail of their life into Facebook, despite it being widely documented that Facebook is building profiles to sell to advertisers. How many people use the 'check in' feature from home while posting photos of all the lovely expensive stuff they have in their house? Then they post vacation photos and check in from half way around the world. They may has well put a sign on the door that says "house full of lovely stuff, owner away from house for 1 week". Try to explain that to people. You get called a tin-foil hat paranoid loony. when you try to explain it. "Nobody would want to spy on *me*", they say. "I'm not doing anything wrong, I've got nothing to worry about", they say (that one applies to the whole Snowden revelations too. "None of my friends would want to steal my things" they all say. They don't understand that once it's on FaceBook practically public, despite your "privacy" settings.

    Let's look at another example. I watched a kid yesterday cross a busy city street on his bicycle. He was only about 10M from the pedestrian crossing where he could wait for a safe time to cross. Nope, too much inconvenience. He just turned and rode out across busy traffic without even looking. He had half to road to notice that there was a bus speeding down the far lane. The kid didn't even think to slow down. In his selfish, arrogant rush to do what *he* wanted to do , *right now* he kept riding right out in front of the bus. He is fortunate the bus driver was paying attention to the road and had good reaction time.

    Another example. How many door to door salesman scams are there? I regularly get knocks on the door. A lot are asking for donations to charity but they won't accept small cash and offer a receipt. Several want to look at bills and other identifiable information for "we can help you save money, just get a few of your bills". The charity ones often want a credit card number and a bunch of other details I don't hand out my details to these people because I can't verify they are who they say. A lot of people must, because they keep coming around and knocking. Those people just don't think about the what-if. They see "ooh charity, feel good, give give give" and sign their lives away.

    Still with me? Let's look at contracts. How many people do you know who actually read contracts before signing them? I don't know too many. Some will flick through and read a few choice words then sign on the dotted line. It took me nearly a week to get through the last big contract I entered into (property purchase/mortgage). It was huge, and full of curly terms. Your personal (financial, housing, etc) security is dependent on some of these terms, but many people don't even read them before they agree. It turns out that ignorance of the document you signed doesn't prevent you being bound by it.

    People don't care about security. They care about what they want, *right now*, with *minimal effort*. People are stupid, lazy, arrogant, selfish and trust certain "authority" figures implicitly. Part of that is conditioning, part is just human nature. But you won't change it.

  72. Re:yeah, lemme see where was that in the requirmen by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Except that he was right (by accident)?

    By using Java you were also importing a massive API surface onto production machines.

  73. Re:Start with the software developers and type saf by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    really, calloc() instead of malloc() would have stopped that bug cold

    No, it wouldn't have. The bug exploited lack of checking allocated buffer boundaries, reading freed memory. Some hypothetical "cfree()" (clear, and then free() allocated memory), OTOH, would.

  74. I can't get no by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The moment you agree that forcing your CNS into euphoria by direct stimulation of pleasure centers is a good idea, you are a junkie. From then on, the only thing between you and becoming "proper" junkie is the balance of counterweight fear from consequences of using various shortcuts to pleasure. You become junkie if you realize that with enough pleasure you won't care (much) about consequences any more. It doesn't start with marijuana. It starts very early in life, with discovery of candy or with discovery of masturbation. Those are common and readily available to humans early short circuits of natural survival-motivating system. So, yes, marijuana won't drag you in and under on its own. Your realizations and your decisions will. However, it is a signal that you may be on your way down. On a larger scale than individual one, it is a signal that our lives suck and that we are unable to find happiness. No satisfaction!

  75. No by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    No

  76. Re:How is a password written down "worse than noth by Dr.+Crash · · Score: 1

    Most people don't have a private, lockable office.

    Most people don't even have an office that has a door.

    They have a cubicle, and one without a lockable file drawer... (as though typical office furniture locks weren't jokes to anybody with two paper clips and the MIT Lock Picking Guide)

    Some people don't even have a cubicle. Look at an "Open Architecture Office"... they have one two floors down. I'm not sure if I would pick that or pick McDonalds as better or worse.

    That's the problem. You need to keep the security token (be it a yellow stickie-note or an RSA key) on your person, all the time.

    And it still doesn't stop a good phish, or the next Heartbleed.

          - Dr. Crash

  77. First, decide what you mean by "security" by badzilla · · Score: 1

    Everyone has worked somewhere and the rule said wear your security badge at all times. Nobody ever looked closely at them and jokers would routinely wear badges with Jar-Jar Binks photos. So long as a piece of plastic was dangling from your neck however then "security" had somehow been delivered. Everyone (including the person who wrote the rule) knew it was bullshit but if the rule were abandoned then the ISO-compliance security box could not be ticked and the auditors would get mad. The same essentially goes for frequent password cycling containing at least one character from the Klingon alphabet and so on.

    The first problem with promoting a genuine culture of [anything] is deciding what you really want to achieve.

    --
    "Don't belong. Never join. Think for yourself. Peace." V.Stone, Microsoft Corporation
  78. Meh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    At best, 'security' is an arms race. At worst, it is an illusion.

  79. Re:Problem solved by shifting from PCs to smartpho by Culture20 · · Score: 1

    Smartphones don't automatically create a security culture. Ask the parents of kids who bought $5000 worth of in-game purchases with real money.

  80. Re:yeah, lemme see where was that in the requirmen by swillden · · Score: 1

    Except that he was right (by accident)?

    By using Java you were also importing a massive API surface onto production machines.

    No different than any other language. And massive libraries are better than creating massive amounts of new code to solve the same problems any day, in terms of both effort and security.

    --
    Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
  81. Our systems are more broken than people by WaffleMonster · · Score: 1

    Passwords need only be as secure as the effective aggregate retry policy of whatever is accepting credential inputs.

    Half the problem are all these 'hashes' stored in the clear on disk where administrators incorrectly assume users are responsible to select big enough password to make up for lack of effective protections. This of course is a complete failure having never worked continuing to grow more laughably amusing over time as computing power per unit cost increases.

    Next we have security standards actively mandating complexity AND password change policy with no regard for the collateral damage: post-it notes, password wallets with access passwords that never change, complacency regarding frequent administrative change requests.

    Next we have the breathtaking idiocy of completely untrusted email systems where sender identities are trivially spoofed by anyone .. a height of insanity eclipsed only by those same email systems allowing for convenient file attachments and one click execution of untrusted code in the users security context.

    What do you expect? Do you really think ANY amount of vigilance in such an environment is worth anything? The basic security problems enumerated in TFA are much more representative of underlying infrastructure failing to provide any useful contextual information to the user... aint the users fault. While it absolutely is productive to teach awareness of technical and social engineering threats most of it stems from catastrophic failures of systems and their administrators.

  82. self destructive behavior by cevioux · · Score: 1

    Clearly we can't convince folks to stop at stop signs. We can't convince folks to "just say no" to drugs. We can't prevent un-safe sex. Why would we think for a minute that on-line security would be important to anyone else. Perhaps penury is an excellent teacher as are automobile wrecks, brain damage, and gonorrhea.

  83. Unfortunately by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    I have seen where security is paramount, security policies prevent me from implementing more secure solutions. For example not being allowed to use full disk encryption, not being allowed to use secure password managers [Last pass, keepass], software updates prevented by airgapping with no allowed means to download updates