TrueCrypt Website Says To Switch To BitLocker
Several readers sent word that the website for TrueCrypt, the popular disk encryption system, says that development has ended, and Windows users should switch to BitLocker. A notice on the site reads, "WARNING: Using TrueCrypt is not secure as it may contain unfixed security issues. ... You should migrate any data encrypted by TrueCrypt to encrypted disks or virtual disk images supported on your platform." It includes a link to a new version of TrueCrypt, 7.2, and provides instructions on how to migrate to BitLocker. Many users are skeptical of a site defacement, and there's been no corroborating post or communication from the maintainers. However, the binaries appear to be signed with the same GPG key that the TrueCrypt Foundation used for previous releases. A source code diff of the two versions has been posted, and the new release appears to simply remove much of what the software was designed to do. It also warns users away from relying on it for security. (The people doing an audit of TrueCrypt had promised a 'big announcement' soon, but that was coincidental.) Security experts are warning to avoid the new version until the situation can be verified.
A FOSS project shutters itself and, rather than linking to a fork or posting tarballs of a few versions' worth of source, recommends commercial alternatives? If this isn't a hacked site then I'm thinking Lavabit - someone pressured someone else and in order to spill without spilling, they made the most absurd possible kind of announcement that they were closing.
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If the dev's decided to go full Lavabit mode after getting a NSL for the keys. So instead of letting people know that specifically they did this.
Also in the new version they removed all of the code to encrypt data, only the decryption remains.
That works fine for now, but it's a terrible idea to just keep using software that has known flaws (which will continue to accumulate) but no longer gets patches. At some point, while 7.1a will still be executable, it will no longer be safe in any way.
I took Archeron's question to mean "So, what should we start migrating to now?" That's a very good question, sadly...
There's no place I could be, since I've found Serenity...
The Register has no idea what it's talking about.
This is pure speculation.
Yes, they might have been compromised. But very early analysis shows they aren't blatantly backdoored, but that's all we know and they have no business claiming the changes are "eyebrow-raising" and hinting that it is malware. The changes are mostly removing the encryption/volume creation part of TrueCrypt.
Wait and see. They probably just want to "make the buzz".
truecrypt.org
>This URL has been excluded from the Wayback Machine.
Hmmm. SourceForge forced a password reset last week citing "changes to how we're storing user passwords." Coincidence?
Please provide proof for any of the following:
1. There exists a method to detect a hidden volume within an unmounted TC container file.
2. There exists a method to detect a hidden volume in a TC container file when the outer volume is mounted.
Otherwise, stop wasting our time.
Alas, one or more of the TrueCrypt devs (syncon?) have been located and are acting under duress, as a 'canary' previously agreed upon has been published: .rc's language from "English (United States)" to "English (U.S.)" as it was in VC6;
1. Compiling with VC2010, and then not manually changing the
2. Changing the published release date from "on " to "in ";
3. Format/InPlace.c #12, remove reference in comment to "(likely an MS bug)" - changing this parenthetical should not be counted as canary, but removing it should
TC's build process is surprisingly arcane (includes old software due to bootloader code size, etc), and while a lot of it is accumulated dust, some of the dust is deliberately placed.
I do not know precisely what this means, as I have no contact with the developers anymore: but this is what was agreed upon.
They should no longer be trusted, their binaries should not be executed, their site should be considered compromised, and their key should be treated as revoked. It may be that they have been approached by an aggressive intelligence agency or NSLed, but I don't know for sure.
While the source of 7.2 does not appear to my eyes to be backdoored, other than obviously not supporting encryption anymore, I have not analysed the binary and distrust it. It shouldn't be distributed or executed.
From the "new" website, in red letters: ...TrueCrypt is not secure as...
Now, with added emphasis: ...TrueCrypt is Not Secure As...
NSL for sure. Nicely sidestepped.
(Captcha: "collects" Really.)