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A 24-Year-Old Scammed Apple 42 Times In 16 Different States

Posted by timothy on from the fool-me-42-times-won't-get-fooled-again dept.

redletterdave (2493036) writes "Sharron Laverne Parrish Jr., 24, allegedly scammed Apple not once, but 42 times, cheating the company out of more than $300,000 — and his scam was breathtakingly simple. According to a Secret Service criminal complaint, Parrish allegedly visited Apple Stores and tried to buy products with four different debit cards, which were all closed by his respective financial institutions. When his debit card was inevitably declined by the Apple Store, he would protest and offer to call his bank — except, he wasn't really calling his bank. So he would allegedly offer the Apple Store employees a fake authorization code with a certain number of digits, which is normally provided by credit card issuers to create a record of the credit or debit override. But that's the problem with this system: as long as the number of digits is correct, the override code itself doesn't matter."

58 of 419 comments (clear)

  1. Wow ... by gstoddart · · Score: 3, Interesting

    But that's the problem with this system: as long as the number of digits is correct, the override code itself doesn't matter.

    Who the hell came up with that idea?

    That's no security in any meaningful sense of the word.

    I'm betting some lobbyist made it so that the banks didn't really need to do anything concrete, just look like they were.

    If that's all that's required, the banks deserve to be getting ripped off.

    --
    Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    1. Re:Wow ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Except they're not, Apple was. TFA states that since they accepted it even after it was denied, Apple's on the hook for it.

    2. Re:Wow ... by netsavior · · Score: 4, Interesting

      The truth is that credit card interest is the highest profit gig in the whole world. Because of this, Visa/Mastercard and all the myriad banks that work with them have a vested interest in making credit/debit card purchases VERY EASY.
      Visa wakes up, takes a dump, then wipes its ass with $300,000 dollars. It is nothing compared to the billions they make in clearing fees alone.
      Vendors are not even allowed to do things like require an ID, (I know they do, but it is against the vendor agreement), even though it would make purchases a lot more secure, because EASY trumps everything, EASY makes billions. Secure override codes... Who cares?

    3. Re:Wow ... by Sockatume · · Score: 5, Informative

      The way it's supposed to work is that the store calls the issuer and requests an override code, and then keys it in themself. The bank can then tally the auth code against the store's call at the end of the day and process the charge. I have never seen a situation where the customer calls up the bank themselves.

      --
      No kidding!!! What do you say at this point?
    4. Re:Wow ... by hawkinspeter · · Score: 4, Insightful

      As the bank didn't provide an override code and have no record of providing an override code, why should they accept liability?

      --
      You're a temporary arrangement of matter sliding towards oblivion in a cold, uncaring universe
    5. Re:Wow ... by the_skywise · · Score: 5, Informative

      It's not a unique security code - it's a TRACKING NUMBER. This whole part of the process is designed specifically to work around an issue where the computer records might be incorrect or the computer system is in error and an actual human has to issue an authorization code.

      The actual fault in the system is that the Apple Employees let Sharron make the call and GIVE them the number. Instead THEY should've called Chase directly and gotten the code.

    6. Re:Wow ... by Sockatume · · Score: 5, Informative

      It's not a security code, it's a reference number. The transaction isn't formally authorised by the bank until the end of the day when they receive that reference number and tally it with the corresponding phone call from the retailer. *Then* the transaction is authorised. (Assuming said phone call included verbal authorisation of the transaction.)

      That the Apple Store didn't know this is how the system works means it was completely open to abuse.

      --
      No kidding!!! What do you say at this point?
    7. Re:Wow ... by PlusFiveTroll · · Score: 5, Insightful

      If you printed your own card and put a number for an issuer that you controlled I don't see what the difference is.

    8. Re:Wow ... by Sockatume · · Score: 2

      That would take at least five minutes' more effort than this guy had to put in. Good idea though, I might try that one myself.

      --
      No kidding!!! What do you say at this point?
    9. Re:Wow ... by naughtynaughty · · Score: 5, Informative

      Visa/MC and the banks have security measures in place, merchants who follow the process aren't liable for loss from fraudulent cards. Asking for ID provides no additional protection to merchants and to the extent they rely on it instead of established Visa/MC processes it can lessen security. But you are correct that making customers spend an extra 30 secs digging out their ID and having some clerk eyeball it and hand it back is not easy and in fact that 30 secs times all the legitimate transactions is more costly than the RARE case of credit card fraud that could be prevented by asking for ID (which is easily circumvented). The problem here is not the authorization code but that Apple didn't follow the proper procedure of contacting the bank for an override code themselves. There is no need for a secure override code.

    10. Re: Wow ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      No, no one ever contacted the bank. Apple's Point of Sale software was configured to accept any number based on length() of the number string. They held the number until the end of the day or some other convenient time, when they'd process it with the banks. That was stupid, and the scam is common. Retailers are starting to learn to call and verify immediately (before clearing tge transaction), not to wait until the end of the day.

    11. Re:Wow ... by idontgno · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I understand the long-running and much-honored Slashdot tradition of not reading TFA, but couldn't you at least have read The Fucking Summary?

      When his debit card was inevitably declined by the Apple Store, he would protest and offer to call his bank — except, he wasn't really calling his bank. So he would allegedly offer the Apple Store employees a fake authorization code with a certain number of digits....

      There was ample dumbshittery (and liability) to assign here, but it's all on the Apple Store drones. No bank involved.

      --
      Welcome to the Panopticon. Used to be a prison, now it's your home.
    12. Re:Wow ... by Chas · · Score: 2

      Because, apparently, the banks system accepted the transaction.

      No. An override code is a local thing. It doesn't communicate back to the bank.

      --


      Chas - The one, the only.
      THANK GOD!!!
    13. Re:Wow ... by ericloewe · · Score: 2

      The summary does not make it clear whether the stores' POS systems interacted with the banks' systems.

    14. Re:Wow ... by Solandri · · Score: 4, Informative

      Visa/MC and the banks have security measures in place, merchants who follow the process aren't liable for loss from fraudulent cards. Asking for ID provides no additional protection to merchants and to the extent they rely on it instead of established Visa/MC processes it can lessen security.

      The info on the ID is the security measures Visa/MC have in place. They allow a merchant to enter info like address or phone number, and their computers will tell the merchant whether or not it matches the address/phone they have on file for that card. When you pay for gas with a credit card and the pump asks you to punch in your zip code, it's not collecting marketing information. It's using the zip code as a (rather flimsy) security measure to protect against someone buying gas with a lost/stolen credit card. Yeah you can ask the customer to recite their address, but any burglar who stole the card from a house or mugger who got their victim's entire wallet would know the address. A photo ID with that info, while fairly easy to fake, requires a bit more effort on the part of the thief.

      Credit card security is in the dismal state it's currently in because Visa/MC/Amex have successfully transferred all the damage from fraudulent transactions onto the merchants. Since they lose practically no money to fraud, they have very little incentive to improve security. (The exorbitant interest rates are to cover the cost of credit card holders who default on their debt.) For market forces to work correctly, financial penalties for risks which fail must be linked to financial profits when those same risks succeed. What Visa et al have done is decouple the penalties from the profits (profits go to them, penalties to the merchant), leading to a situation where they are not penalized when the risks they take (poor security) fail. Consequently there is no motivation for them to improve credit card security beyond the laughable state it's currently in.

    15. Re:Wow ... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      The store doesn't call the card issuer for approval. The store calls their merchant bank that provided them with card processing facilities. The merchant bank then calls the card issuer to seek approval for the transaction. The merchant bank do not source the phone number of the issuing bank from the card, they use a lookup table provided my Visa or Mastercard.

    16. Re:Wow ... by RavenLrD20k · · Score: 4, Informative

      Hell, at the retail outlet I used to work at, manager made a blanket policy that if the POS returned a request for an Auth code we just outright declined the transaction, handed the customer an Experian business card and asked if they had another form of payment. If the customer asked if he could call his bank to get an Auth code (Red Flag) we would say that our business system did not allow for manual authorizations (which was true. The system the manager put in place didn't allow for ManAuths, even if the POS did).

    17. Re:Wow ... by lgw · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The customer didn't print special cards here - they're just normal, expired cards.

      The store doesn't call the number on the back of the card - the store calls their own merchant bank.

      This was just straightforward grift (a con game), not some glaring flaw in the banking system. The sales clerks got suckered, perhaps due to lack of training by Apple, or perhaps the con-man was just that good.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    18. Re:Wow ... by Serenissima · · Score: 5, Informative
      I used to work at The Apple Store. And that's really the way it should work. However, from my time there, we had credit cards declined all of the time. The Apple Store is a huge place for fraudulent purchases and credit cards routinely auto-blocked access when purchases were for Apple and outside of typical purchases. We actually had the VP of BOEING's Business credit card declined. The standard procedure was to have the customer call the bank, validate that they were them, and that they indeed DID want to make the purchase. After about a minute, we could re-run the card and it'd work.

      Now, when the payment device asked for an Override code, it was the job of the EMPLOYEE to got to the back and call up the bank. We're provided special numbers to call and special codes we have to type in. It's a horribly clunky and long process which everyone hated to do, but that was it. So, this is completely the employee's fault - albeit it's really a training issue and the blame rests with Apple. I can totally see why an employee would

      #1) Not want to go through that process when they need to get to the next sale

      #2) Possibly be new and not completely understand the process

      #3) Be susceptible to some clever social engineering - ie: There are some cases where the customer must call the bank. I need an override code from the bank to process this. The customer is calling the bank, so that means I don't have to!

      So it's a big f-up, but I can totally understand how and why it happened.

      --
      Give a man a fire and he'll be warm for a day. But light a man on fire and he'll be warm for the rest of his life.
    19. Re: Wow ... by madhatter256 · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Not really, I know people who write POS code for a company that competes with NCR. They have no ties to banks. it's all about talking to processors, like VISA, Mastercard, etc.

      I guess people are trying to pin this on the bank because banks are evil. #wallstreet #99% #ideserverwhatyouworkedfor #givemestuff

      --
      Previewing comments are for sissies!
    20. Re:Wow ... by ddtmm · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Seems to me Apple should have been the one calling for authentication, not the customer. Definitely Apple's err.

    21. Re:Wow ... by Concerned+Onlooker · · Score: 5, Funny

      "Visa wakes up, takes a dump, then wipes its ass with $300,000 dollars."

      This must be the reason that all those money laundering schemes exist.

      --
      http://www.rootstrikers.org/
    22. Re:Wow ... by idontgno · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Other than mentioning that the store declined the debit card (which is by definition an interaction between the POS and the credit/debit clearinghouse).

      But since you've raised the issue, you've shown exactly where you missed the boat.

      The exploit is completely OUTSIDE of the POS<->bank interaction. (Cuz, "debit refused"). The exploit occurs in the "call a fake bank, offer up a fake reference number, have the Apple Store drones accept it as proof of a valid credit/debit transaction" phase AFTER the machine-to-machine part.

      Apparenly, you've fallen for the same trick the Apple Store drones did: fixating on the machine-to-machine debit transaction (which failed as expected) and completely neglecting the social engineering that followed.

      --
      Welcome to the Panopticon. Used to be a prison, now it's your home.
    23. Re:Wow ... by EvilJoker · · Score: 2

      When you pay for gas with a credit card and the pump asks you to punch in your zip code, it's not collecting marketing information. It's using the zip code as a (rather flimsy) security measure to protect against someone buying gas with a lost/stolen credit card

      Sometimes. Other times, it's explicitly used for marketing purposes, and has nothing to do with card security. Gas at the pump is usually security, but any time a cashier is involved it's usually marketing.

    24. Re:Wow ... by vux984 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      it is up to the cashier to hold the card, read the number and call it themselves

      It is up to the cashier to call THEIR OWN BANK.
      They are not supposed to call the number on the back of the customers card -- for reasons that should be pretty bleeding obvious.

    25. Re:Wow ... by thinuspollard · · Score: 5, Informative

      Ok, they way it is supposed to work

      • 1. The POS is offline, or the card cannot be "read" by the POS device
      • 2. The MERCHANT is supposed to call the bank to obtain manual authorisation
      • 3. The bank actually performs the transaction against the backend, reserves the funds and issues an auth code to the merchant. This auth code is a reference number. A pretty large financial switch supplier I used to work with would use the local time (HHMMSS) as an auth number. Nothing wrong with that, transaction has already been authed online via the call centre.
      • 4. The merchant enters a manual transaction on the POS device, entering the auth number on the POS device to form part of the transaction.
      • 5. The POS does not send anything at this point in time to the bank. Remember, in obtaining the auth number, the transaction was already submitted and approved. The POS keeps this transaction in storage with the auth number
      • 6. End of day, the POS submits all transactions to the bank. This is called Banking the POS or settlement.
      • 7. Since all online transactions has been performed, these settlement records acts as a reconciliation. At this point the customer's bank account gets debited and the merchant only gets settled for the settlement transactions that were submitted to the bank, not for the online autos. If this settlement transaction does not match exactly with the original auth, the merchant does not get settled for this transaction. (It is slightly more complicated than this, since floor limits allows for the case where there was no original auth and the settlement tran is the only message seen, but for the amount of an Apple Store purchase, this would not come into play)

      So the system is relatively secure, but the MERCHANT should have called the bank, not the customer, that is where it broke down. This system also allows for floor limits, where the merchant is willing to accept a certain level of risk and the POS device approves transactions for an amount less than a set limit. At the end of the day the POS device submits these transactions to the bank and if the cardholder does not have sufficient funds, the merchant loses out.

      All these protocols have been in place for many years and dates from a time where communication between the POS and the bank was relatively expensive and slow. Dialling up for every transactions was not an option, so you would try to batch them together to achieve a lower cost per transaction.

      This is a very high level explanation of the issues involved here, but should convey the general ideas.

      Yes, the Apple Store managers and employees were idiots in this case

    26. Re:Wow ... by kiwi_jackal · · Score: 2

      I've worked in banks in New Zealand and the UK for the past eight or nine years, and we try to tell people that it's the merchant who's meant to contact *their* bank to get the auth code. The only merchants who refuse to do this are in the states. I've always just assumed things work differently over there.

    27. Re: Wow ... by jythie · · Score: 2

      The bank supplies an API that people connect to, or at minimal the intermediate network provides an API. All the bank does is plug in to the same network.

  2. in fairness... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    It might have been 300k retail sales but it only cost Apple 500 bucks.

    1. Re:in fairness... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

      ... it only cost Apple 500 bucks

      If you believe IP == worthless, then yes.

      No, Apple believes Chinese children are worthless.

  3. $7142.85 by NoImNotNineVolt · · Score: 3, Informative

    That's over $7142.85 per "scam". How the fuck do you spend that much money at a fucking Apple store?!

    --
    Chuuch. Preach. Tabernacle.
    1. Re:$7142.85 by DJCouchyCouch · · Score: 3, Funny

      A couple of iPhone cables, iTunes gift cards, iPod socks. Pretty soon it adds up.

    2. Re:$7142.85 by NoImNotNineVolt · · Score: 2

      ... Apple ... ideal server ...

      *head asplodes*

      --
      Chuuch. Preach. Tabernacle.
    3. Re:$7142.85 by Zero__Kelvin · · Score: 2

      Did I say the price was out of line with the industry? I must have missed that.

      --
      Guns don't kill people; Physics kills people! - John Lithgow as Dick Solomon on Third Rock From The Sun
    4. Re:$7142.85 by phayes · · Score: 2

      High-end 17" MacBook Pros? Really? Haven't entered an Apple Store or browsed store.apple.com in the last 2 years have you.

      Apple eliminated the 17" MBPs 2 years ago when they introduced the Retina MacBook Pro.

      As for how to spend 7 grand in an Apple store, that's easy: A maxed out Mac Pro with a Promise thunderbolt array & a 32" 4k display will cost you $16,911.00...

      --
      Democracy is a sheep and two wolves deciding what to have for lunch. Freedom is a well armed sheep contesting the issue
    5. Re:$7142.85 by SydShamino · · Score: 3, Insightful

      A few laptops gets there.

      The scam works better with a large purchase. Banks routinely deny transaction over some amount, forcing the retailer to call for an override code. Apparently the denial for "bad account" look identical to the one for "valid account, but that amount is high so give us a call, okay?"

      If his card was denied for a $500 purchase, he'd need to convince the retailer that it was a bug in the system, not just a routine check for a large purchase.

      --
      It doesn't hurt to be nice.
    6. Re:$7142.85 by geekoid · · Score: 2

      Apples server hardware is horrible. This isn't a secret. They've never been able to do it well, it has never been their primary focus. i.e. core compeanct.

      They have finally come to grips with that and partnered with IBM.

      --
      The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
    7. Re:$7142.85 by Thruen · · Score: 2

      Nice job picking out the only quote in the entire thing that suggests Macs are more expensive. You can buy a PC for less than Dell or anyone else charges too if you buy the components yourself. If you actually read the article (instead of deliberately taking out one quote that runs counter to the rest of it) you'll see that between the comparisons they did, the Mac is equal to one system and $200 less than the other. When the components were priced out separately to build a Mac Pro clone, you could save a whopping $5.67. So while they say there's little doubt you could get one for less, they don't actually manage to, and the quote you chose runs counter to the entire rest of the article. But then, that's why you chose the quote, since there's no actual evidence anywhere of Macs being overpriced besides statements from PC fanboys. They don't offer any real budget models or anything, but that's far from the same issue. Personally, I see the value in Macs, it takes a lot less effort to keep it running well for a very long time, and the fact that most people hear that and say you've set your computer up wrong only proves that point. I have two at home that we use regularly, and they're great. But, I also keep a custom PC running Windows 7 for gaming, because it is definitely easier to upgrade than even the Mac Pro and I don't have to wait for ports. There are definitely many pros and cons to each side, but the price isn't really an issue for Apple unless you're only trying to buy a budget system. It's really only fanboys who still say it, and the fact that you deliberately took that one quote out of context knowing what the rest of the article contains suggests that's all you are, continuing on even when you know you're wrong.

      As for $7-10k being an absurd amount for an individual to spend on one computer, I'm aware, you'll see I already pointed out most people wouldn't notice any benefit from doing so. However, like I said before, if you're a criminal and you know you're not going to pay for it, why not go all out?

  4. shift of blame. by Antony+T+Curtis · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Once upon a time, the retailer would have to take the blame for this because it is the retailer who is supposed to make the call to the financial institution on the retailer's own phone line, not using the cardholder's phone or trusting the cardholder's ability to dial the number.

    Unfortunately, the retailers are successfully using the police to cover for the incompetence of their staff.

    --
    No sig. Move along - nothing to see here.
    1. Re:shift of blame. by gstoddart · · Score: 2

      No matter how stupid Apple was to fall for this, and how much they disregarded good practice, this is still definitely fraud.

      Why wouldn't they call the police?

      --
      Lost at C:>. Found at C.
  5. Re:Brilliant... by Sockatume · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Presumably he was treating it as a source of income rather than a source of Apple hardware.

    --
    No kidding!!! What do you say at this point?
  6. Re:Brilliant... by ArcadeMan · · Score: 5, Funny

    Because.... 42?

    --
    Get free satoshi (Bitcoin) and Dogecoins
  7. Cult of Personality by FutureRobertOverlord · · Score: 2

    Have you never been to an Apple store? They charge $20 for a freaking USB to iPod cable. Think different (like everyone else).

  8. This is an Apple/retailer fail by xxxJonBoyxxx · · Score: 4, Interesting

    From TFA:
    >> merchants can be liable for charges if they override a credit or debit card denial in this fashion

    >> In (another) case...after defrauding Victoria’s Secret, Banana Republic, and several other retailers out of $557,690 in the same manner, which is known as a “forced sale” or “forced code.”

    I think the operational problem here is that store managers have the authority to override denials to boost their own sales numbers...while the risk for bad credit decisions may fall on the owners.

  9. 42 by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    So the ultimate question to life and everything is: "How many times was Apple ripped off by an single individual?"

  10. What a strange title. by Atzanteol · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Does the fact that the guy was 24 have any bearing on the story what-so-ever? Why not say "scam artist" or something more generic?

    --
    "Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge"

    - Charles Darwin
    1. Re:What a strange title. by kwoff · · Score: 2

      Maybe it is a steganography key, color #244216

  11. Re:And now.. by Zero__Kelvin · · Score: 3, Funny

    Don't forget the free sex!

    --
    Guns don't kill people; Physics kills people! - John Lithgow as Dick Solomon on Third Rock From The Sun
  12. Exploited procedural loophole by John3 · · Score: 5, Informative
    Based on TFA this scam has been done before to other retailers. When a merchant receives a "decline" they can optionally call the bankcard processor to obtain a verbal authorization code. The merchant can then "force" the sale to go through using the authorization code they received over the phone. The two huge procedural holes that Apple (and the other retailers) left open are:

    1: The clerk is the one that should be calling for an approval code, and the call is made not to the cardholder's bank but rather to the bank that processes the cards for the retail store. It doesn't matter what the customer's bank says (or in this case the fake bank) since the approval/authorization code must come from the retailer's bankcard processor.

    2: At my store a manager override is required to "force" a bankcard approval. So even if the clerk makes the call and gets a voice approval code a manager/owner must also provide a password to allow the approval to go through. Apparently Apple has no such security check in place and clerks tan type a manual code into the POS system to force the sale to go through.

    Amazingly simple scam, but also amazingly simple to prevent if the stores involved had even rudimentary procedures in place.

    --
    "We make our world significant by the courage of our questions and by the depth of our answers." Carl Sagan
    1. Re:Exploited procedural loophole by John3 · · Score: 3, Informative

      A simple work around is to alter the phone number on the card to a number you control.

      Then the retailer could call the number receive the code from your accomplice and provide a valid false code.

      The retailer doesn't call the number on the card, the retailer call's the merchant service center. For example, customer has a Chase Mastercard and when Apple tries to post a transaction the card receives a decline. Apple would never call Chase, but instead calls their provider (which at my store is First Data Merchant Services). Apple's provider in turn electronically contacts Chase and then provides an approval code back to the clerk. The customer (or scammer) never has an opportunity to change the phone number unless they physically get behind the checkout counter and overwrite the numbers that are posted for the retail clerks to use. So it doesn't matter what phone number is on the card, that number is for the customer's use and not for the merchant's use.

      --
      "We make our world significant by the courage of our questions and by the depth of our answers." Carl Sagan
    2. Re:Exploited procedural loophole by Sockatume · · Score: 2

      Every time I've done it, it has been the customer's bank on the other end of the line.

      --
      No kidding!!! What do you say at this point?
  13. I worked in retail a long time by singularity · · Score: 2

    I worked retail for a long time, including an Apple Store. I cannot remember the policies at Apple when I was working there, but most places will not take a verbal approval code.

    If the person on the other end of the phone (generally you get to them by calling the 800 number on the back of the card) has the ability to run the transaction, they have the ability to clear whatever prevented the card from going through the first time. They would have to - they have to clear the hurdle before they can run the transaction themselves.

    So policy at most places is that the telephone operator clears the issue (usually it is a daily spending limit that card issuers never mention) and then the store runs the card again. There was no procedure for manually entering a verbal approval code.

    My memory of Apple Retail (this was '04-'06), however, is that they had almost every contingency covered. The POS machines all had USB modems attached so that in case the Internet went down at the store, credit cards could still be processed. We even had the old CH-CHUNK imprint devices when everything went pear-shaped. I do seem to remember having the ability to enter a manual authorization code for a credit card transaction. It is Apple Retail - there are supposed to be no hurdles keeping a Specialist from keeping a customer happy.

    --
    - (c) 2018 Hank Zimmerman
  14. Re:Arrest the Credit Card Issuers? by VGPowerlord · · Score: 2, Informative

    It sounds like the real scammers are the credit card issues that have a system in place to override that has ZERO security in place.

    The security is supposed to be that the retailer is supposed to call the bank themselves to verify it. Which they didn't do.

    --
    GLaDOS for President 2016! "Well here we are again. It's always such a pleasure." -- GLaDOS, 2011
  15. Sharron Laverne? by fuzznutz · · Score: 4, Funny

    Should I assume his parents REALLY wanted a girl?

  16. Re:And now.. by Jason+Levine · · Score: 5, Funny

    Don't worry. He's called the parole board and says that they said he should be released as per override code number 12345.

    --
    My sci-fi novel, Ghost Thief, is now available from Amazon.com.
  17. Re:A 24 year old BLACK... by jsepeta · · Score: 2

    pretty terrible comment there. but if he was African american, then that explains his name. there's a whole chapter on that in Freakonomics.

    --
    Remember kids, if you're not paying for the service, YOU ARE THE PRODUCT THAT IS BEING SOLD.
  18. Re:And now.. by FuzzNugget · · Score: 2

    "Hey, I'm actually supposed to be getting *out* of prison today, so..."

    "You're in the wrong line, dumbass!"

  19. Re:Brilliant... by naughtynaughty · · Score: 2

    You only read about the crooks that get caught so naturally you would conclude that crooks are stupid. The smart ones go completely undetected, the slightly less smart ones are never identified but the crime is detected The brilliant ones have enough money and lawyers to make their crime unprosecutable