More Tor .Onion Sites May Get Digital Certificates Soon
Trailrunner7 writes News broke last week that Facebook had built a hidden services version of its social network available to users browsing anonymously via the Tor Project's proxy service. Unlike any .onion domain before it, Facebook's would be verified by a legitimate digital signature, signed and issued by DigiCert. Late yesterday, Jeremy Rowley, DigiCert's vice president of business development and legal, explained his company's decision to support this endeavor in a blog entry. He also noted that DigiCert is considering opening up its certification business to other .Onion domains in the future. "Using a digital certificate from DigiCert, Tor users are able to identify the exact .onion address operated by Facebook," Rowley explained. "Tor users can evaluate the digital certificate contents to discover that the entity operating the onion address is the same entity as the one operating facebook.com."
Wait, but don't people use tor because they care about their privacy? Why would they use facebook in the first place?!
They want to track users by SSL session cache and use the information to ratmap even more users.
I mean at the point you are using Facebook on TOR all you haven't done a thing for your privacy and just slowed your internet connection down. Might as well let Verizon label all your traffic as well.
To top it off I can't imagine why anyone would want to deal with sites that are using certificates on TOR. All they do is provide a nice well defined entity that can be leaned on, to get your information.
Lavabit.
You would need to be a fucking moron to not believe there is not a warrant drafted for the FISC court already. Trust in any US web stakeholders for any users privacy is fallacy. Never mind when getting up to illegal shenanigans found on .onion like Silk Road.
The real solution would be for some kind of DNS system to appear within TOR that instead of resolving hostnames to IPs it resolves hostnames to onionsites. So instead of p7geb3m31n12rkkr3m.onion (or was it p7geb3m32n12rkkr3m.onion?) you type facebook.onion and internally you would be at p7geb3m31n12rokr3m.onion. No clue how this would ever be operated without being gamed to hell and back, with 4chan constantly trying to redirect popular sites somewhere else, but at least then a "facebook.onion" ssl certificate would make sense.
As it stands, the original purpose was to have the certificate identify p7geb3m31n12rkkr3rn.onion as the real facebook site, but it does nothing if you typo it and get another site claiming to be facebook that also has a real certificate for their onion address.
The protocol itself cryptographically ensures that you're talking to the same service every time. That's why .onion addresses look funny: The cost of choosing parts of the name grows exponentially with the number of characters you want to choose. Taking over an .onion domain requires "choosing" the entire name, and that's impossible (infeasible to the point of impossibility).
Using a certificate hierarchy with TOR can only do one thing: Expose you.
... I used the Tor browser to get to one of my burner Facebook accounts and it locked me. Such joy. I was coming at the site from another country, so Facebook had a major cow.
I went mainstream and gave Facebook a tummy rub and all is well, but it was a fun ride.
I still wonder what the Sam Hill any Facebook member would be doing on Tor, but you can bet your sweet ass that Facebook wants you no matter what route you take.
It little behooves the best of us to comment on the rest of us.
The problem with namecoin is some already made that, and people love developing their own reduncent solutions instead.
I don't mind DigiCert, as long as they will participate in Certificate Transparency.
Very soon; I will not want to trust anything issued by a Certificate authority that does not participate in Certificate Transparency.