New App Detects Government Stingray Cell Phone Trackers
HughPickens.com writes IMSI catchers, otherwise known as stingrays, are those surveillance tools that masquerade as cell towers and trick mobile phones into connecting, spewing private data in the process. Law-enforcement agencies have been using them for almost two decades, but there's never been a good way for individuals to detect them. Now Lily Hay Newman reports that SnoopSnitch scans for radio signals that indicate a transition to a stingray from a legitimate cell tower. "SnoopSnitch collects and analyzes mobile radio data to make you aware of your mobile network security and to warn you about threats like fake base stations (IMSI catchers), user tracking and over-the-air updates." say German security researchers Alex Senier, Karsten Nohl, and Tobias Engel, creators of the app which is available now only for Android. The app can't protect people's phones from connecting to stingrays in the first place, but it can at least let them know that there is surveillance happening in a given area. "There's no one set of information, taken by itself, that allows you to detect an IMSI catcher," says Nohl. "But we do stream analysis of everything that happens on your phone, and can come out with a warning if it crosses a certain threshold."
Stingrays have garnered attention since a 2011 Arizona court case in which one agent admitted in an affidavit that the tool collaterally swept up data on "innocent, non-target devices" (U.S. v. Rigmaiden). The government eventually conceded in this case that the "tracking operation was a Fourth Amendment search and seizure," meaning it required a warrant. But given that the Justice Department has continued to claim that cellphone users have no reasonable expectation of privacy over their location data, it may take a Supreme Court judgement to settle the Stingray issue countrywide.
Stingrays have garnered attention since a 2011 Arizona court case in which one agent admitted in an affidavit that the tool collaterally swept up data on "innocent, non-target devices" (U.S. v. Rigmaiden). The government eventually conceded in this case that the "tracking operation was a Fourth Amendment search and seizure," meaning it required a warrant. But given that the Justice Department has continued to claim that cellphone users have no reasonable expectation of privacy over their location data, it may take a Supreme Court judgement to settle the Stingray issue countrywide.
Remember the 90s and early 2000? People sent all kinds of small applications as attachments in emails. It could be everything from a small animation to some stupid happy face. Almost all were infested with malware. Apps are the new version of these. But today, malware has become mainstream. It is no longer considered bad practice to harvest all the private data from someones phone. That's just the way it should work. The platform makers (Google and Apple) don't care. In fact, at least when it comes to Google, they almost seem to promote the idea with utter an worthless permission system. So... Okay, dear security researchers, where is the source of your app? Because I don't trust any app that is not open source.
Lots of 4A searches do not require warrants -- searches incident to arrest, custodial searches, searches with consent, and probably more. The warrant requirement only kicks in when a warrantless search would be "unreasonable" (violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, and such expectation is narrower than most non-lawyers would believe).
That's one thing. But these are ILLEGAL devices being used without even so much as warrants.
"This app requires root access and will only run on devices with Qualcomm chipset."
That's not "for android". That's playing a Qualcomm trick with the baseband.
I also wonder if a better way might be (but I'm speculating here) to use the measured distance from the nearest cell tower (called Timing Advance), as in http://stackoverflow.com/a/137... - and couple it with a public database of known celltowers locations to spot recent "additions".
-- There are two kind of sysadmins: Paranoids and Losers. (adapted from D. Bach)
It's still better than having nothing at hand.
Can't we add support to Android so that e.g. I can load a carrier cert into a special store used only for the cell radio operations and then have an option to authenticate towers before connecting to them? Is there any way for a carrier to publish a whitelist of tower info that can't be easily cloned? How do we have this infrastructure where anyone can start broadcasting and sweep up everyone's traffic and very little is being done about it?
In fact, there's already something similar: http://wiki.opencellid.org/wik... and probably https://github.com/SecUpwN/And...
-- There are two kind of sysadmins: Paranoids and Losers. (adapted from D. Bach)
One still needs a way to prevent the cellular device from being pushed to the "New" tower.
Sadly, handset makers and mobile OS makers have not been able to give a "Blacklist tower" feature, or have not been willing to give such a feature. The towers MUST be uniquely identifiable for the tower mesh network to communicate reliably-- so, a means of uniquely identifying and refusing to play ball with a specific "Tower" should absolutely be possible.
Google and Apple should step up to the plate on that.
What is the frequency range of an IMEI snatcher...could the RTL-SDR (software defined radio) dongle with the correct firmware and antenna pinpoint these as well?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S...
Instead of just spotting recent additions, also looking for timing advance shifts over a certain margin while the tower/antenna ID remain the same. I am not cellular engineer, but it would see that would be a possible indicator of a spoofed tower.
Silence is a state of mime.
Are these towers allowed by the FCC? I would think hijacking signals would be extremely illegal. Also, how do they make sure these stingers only allow connections from the person that they are tracking? If they are not narrowing it down to a single person and non-targeted persons are able to connect with it and are not covered by a warrant, then that would be extremely illegal.
If you are not allowed to question your government then the government has answered your question.
I just looked at one of the apps using opencellid -- and I'm not sure how clean the data will be. The default is to upload the position of any cell tower it sees, which means it would be uploading the position of Stingrays too. Then when a user connects to a Stingray listed in the database of towers, well, they've been given a false sense of security.
What changed under Obama? Nothing Good
Isn't the tower handoff stuff all handled in the baseband firmware, though? I'd think that there would be memory limitations in current designs to prohibit that being feasible. And I'd also think that adding more memory wouldn't be feasible because handset manufacturers want tiny, low power components, and more memory and more complicated firmware logic might "blow their budget" so to speak.
Rawr
All you need is a few kilobytes of storage. Most phones have this already in the underlying hardware for use with things like the region ID and the like.
Seriously, each entry in the blacklist needs only the UUID of the blacklisted tower. That's it. Hell, this could live in the damned SIM card.
Everything else can live in the app.
The primary methods of detecting IMSI-Catchers and Fake BTS's is described here (pdf), and due to the variety of manufacturers' baseband interfaces, there wasn't an easy way to uniformly detect these devices.
IMSI-Catcher doesn't seem to work on my old, non-GSM Android, but I've also found OsmocomBB to be interesting; it's an open source GSM broadband implementation that seems to work on some older, cheap phones, like some motorola candy bars; check out Catcher Catcher for more info.
In terms of the IMSI Catcher devices themselves, I've seen estimations of $20 to $1500 to make one, from using cheap RTL-SDR devices to a full SDR (~$400-1500) to run a full fake GSM BTS.
The legal usage of IMSI-Catchers doesn't seem clear to me. It is essentially a MiTM attack, which at least android devices seem to go out of their way to ignore. The law enforcement usage seems worded in ways that would just confuse 50+ year old judges. And they have to go far out of the way to make sure that you don't notice an interruption in service, by forwarding any on-going communications to their intended recipients and tunneling them back, if they go are run over time and don't disassociate.
I haven't seen any estimation on how often these things are used. Besides, hacked femtocell's are probably also responsible for a lot of these rogue BTS's; I wonder if that would be discovered with such detection methods?
If you're interested in facts I'll tell you what they are and I'll give you sources - Chomsky on The Big Idea
Seems to run fine on my rooted Galaxy Note 3.
Many thanks for the link !
BTW, does the app works in countries outside of US? I routinely go to countries where the government is known to have been spying on their own citizens, such as Singapore and Saudi Arab for business trip, and I suspect the 'stingray' towers are set up there as well
If this app works in those countries as well, it would be *MOST WONDERFUL* for users worldwide, at least enable them to know when they are being spied to, and so on
Even without baseband support, if your OS/platform of choice exposes the cell tower ID to the main processor and gives you APIs to trigger it you could have an app that looks for the towers you dont like and when it finds one, switches the phone to airplane mode and gives you a warning. Apple does not provide the relavent APIs (although anyone concerned enough about privacy that they are worried about rogue cell towers shouldn't be using a crApple phone anyway)
Android appears to provide APIs for getting the cell tower ID. Switching airplane mode on cant be done by apps as of Android 4.2 (it was made a protected setting, presumably for valid reasons) but if you root your device you can overcome that limitation.
If you have an N900, you can easily get access to the cell tower ID AND toggle airplane mode via dbus calls.
Not only does this app detect suspicious network configurations and behaviors on your phone, you can also optionally upload your results to improve a web site where the security level and abnormal behavior of networks worldwide is crowdsourced: gsmmap.org.
The app, the theory behind it and information about other attack vectors beside IMSI catchers, SS7 in particular, was presented at the 2014 Chaos Communication Congress in Hamburg, Germany. You can download videos of the talks by Tobias Engel and Karsten Nohl. Of course those weren't the only interesting talks. Almost all recordings should be available on the CCC-TV page by now. There are more SS7 talks, but for something different I recommend this presentation. OMFG.
Unfortunately, that will primarily give false positives. Cell companies bring in COWs to serve in temporary situations, such as county fairs, sporting events, concerts, and disasters. A COW is indistinguishable from a StingRay.
John
which is available now only for Andriod. Queue the editors bullcrap.
Of course it's "for android", you idiot. It's for Android because it requires a device running Android. The extra restriction of requiring Qualcomm's chipset doesn't negate the primary requisite.
You seem to know more than I do,however, the COW, being a device inserted into the carriers network by said carrier, I would think would have a different ID for whatever loadbalancing/handoff protocols occur on that network. This may not be true, as it may be easier to just copy an existing base station ID than provision all the backend hoo haw for a temporary device. But if it is true, my scheme should not produce as many false positives as thought.
By their nature (unless willingly installed by the carrier), a stingray would be spoofing its identity and therefore slightly easier to detect. Combined with a crowdsourced map to create a basic whitelist, you could do quite a bit I wager.
Silence is a state of mime.
IMSI catchers work in part by forcing a channel downgrade to the earlier GSM standard where the phone has to authenticate to the tower, but the tower does not have to authenticate to the phone. UMTS requires two-way authentication. Current cell phones allow "fallback" to GSM from UMTS to handle service areas and IMSI catchers exploit this. If your phone supported only UMTS, an IMSI catcher would be unable to authenticate to your phone. I'm sure it's no coincidence that phones do not allow you to select UMTS only, but you can change this on a jailbroken iPhone my modifying one of the configuration files. When picked up by an IMSI catcher, such a modified iPhone would be unable to make/receive calls, but at least you would know what is happening and there is nothing for the government to tap into.
No, the 4th Amendment bans "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The warrant kicks in when a court thinks a search or seizure *would* be reasonable, and has a lot of limitations like particularly describing what's being searched for, and the court's supposed to kick the prosecutors out if the search wouldn't be reasonable. (Yeah, right, don't hold your breath too long.)
Wiretapping a phone requires a warrant, and it's not clear whether broad general wiretaps like IMSI catchers violate the 4th Amendment even if they can get a court to rubber-stamp them. (It's clear to me that they're not, but I'm not in charge of policy, and with Roberts in charge of the Supreme Court, he's presumably just fine with them.)
Bill Stewart
New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
What I'd really like for an application like this is something that can run on a $50 burner phone, most of which run Android 2.3 because they don't have the CPU horsepower for 4.x (or more realistically, something I can run on my old Android 2.1 phone :-) There are starting to be
This is mainly because I'm not interested in rooting my main phone, but would like to try it anyway, but also, if I were doing the kinds of protests where cops are hauling around IMSI catchers to track people, I'd want to be using a burner phone.
(Yes, I realize that here in the San Francisco Bay Area, a "Burner Phone" can just as well mean a propane-powered phone with a steam whistle and an MDMA dispenser in the back that only runs on the Playa.)
Bill Stewart
New Fast-Compression-only CPR http://preview.tinyurl.com/dy575ks
Some time ago I have worked with a cellular modem. The cellular modem has lots of AT commands including the ones that show the actual frequency, base IDs, power and all this stuff. I also have looked at cellular modules for Arduino, and they have such commands too. I've seen no cellphones that have such functions (I don't count smartphones since nobody knows what kind of malware are there).
In every location there is a fixed set of visible bases. There may be some bases visible intermittently but such bases would have a low power level (Stingrays have a high power level by definition). And this is the one of lots of methods of stingray detection.
What does it mean? That it's possible to assemble the Arduino or PIC with such module and make a simple cellphone with Stingray detector and everything else you like (including the scrambler). Since you need a programmer to load a program such device would be absolutely immune to malware, too.
I looked at GSM modules on Ebay. They are small enough to fit in a watch and they have all the needed features in their only firmware. They only need a battery, mike, speaker and something that would give them AT-commands to connect. And they are cheap enough.
I recently purchased and starting playing with the one plus one. It's easily rooted (this is my first non-apple mobile phone) and I've already have many apps that track tower ID's, but...
For someone like myself who doesn't travel all that often, I look at these apps every now and then to remember where my towers are. This is so that when I do need to do something I want private, I can simply recall if the tower I'm connected to is what I remember.
Not hard to do
Thats an easy one: just invoke DMCA. If we are not allowed to "circumvent security measures" -- no matter how pathetic -- than others should not be allowed to circumvent ours.
Oh wait: its "the bullies of the block" who are ignoring such stuff with impunity, and who's going to tell them that they should not be doing it ?
But they're not, as I understand it, circumventing the encryption. They're simply using it to track you by your cellular signal, as opposed to some other method that would require installing a program on your phone and activating GPS. It's closer to radio direction finding than snooping in on your phone calls (which is already easy enough to do, just get a warrant for a tap on your line).
My point was, though, since there are numerous examples of weaknesses in the phone system that no one should simply assume it's secure, or that any data transmitted across it is private. You're carrying a portable radio tower in your pocket, for crying out loud, broadcasting each and every bit for everyone in a certain area to hear. What's to stop anyone from setting up an unlicensed device and snooping in on your signals?
I never said they should be doing it, only that within the context of existing laws the devices themselves are legal, and that because of known problems with cellular phones no one should expect anything done with them to be private. It's like complaining that someone abused a security vulnerability on Facebook and leaked some private stuff: Facebook has a long history of privacy snafus, putting private information on there and expecting it to stay private and nothing to ever go wrong is the act of a dum-dum.
Rawr
Say you're an ordinary person, and you got ahold of one of these Stingrays, and started gathering data? Would you be breaking any laws?
What if you were interested in blackmailing the people you snooped on? Would you have to actually threaten to reveal the information you had gathered to get arrested, or is possession of the device and the gathered information enough?
Not sure what good those answers would be, if I had them. The police are above the law, more often than not. What is a crime for someone not in a blue uniform is just another day at the office for cops, most of the time.
There's no time like the present. Well, the past used to be.
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