Game Theory Calls Cooperation Into Question
An anonymous reader sends this excerpt from Quanta Magazine:
The physicist Freeman Dyson and the computer scientist William Press, both highly accomplished in their fields, have found a new solution to a famous, decades-old game theory scenario called the prisoner's dilemma, in which players must decide whether to cheat or cooperate with a partner. The prisoner's dilemma has long been used to help explain how cooperation might endure in nature. After all, natural selection is ruled by the survival of the fittest, so one might expect that selfish strategies benefiting the individual would be most likely to persist. But careful study of the prisoner's dilemma revealed that organisms could act entirely in their own self-interest and still create a cooperative community.
Press and Dyson's new solution to the problem, however, threw that rosy perspective into question (abstract). It suggested the best strategies were selfish ones that led to extortion, not cooperation.
[Theoretical biologist Joshua] Plotkin found the duo's math remarkable in its elegance. But the outcome troubled him. Nature includes numerous examples of cooperative behavior. For example, vampire bats donate some of their blood meal to community members that fail to find prey. Some species of birds and social insects routinely help raise another's brood. Even bacteria can cooperate, sticking to each other so that some may survive poison. If extortion reigns, what drives these and other acts of selflessness?"
Press and Dyson's new solution to the problem, however, threw that rosy perspective into question (abstract). It suggested the best strategies were selfish ones that led to extortion, not cooperation.
[Theoretical biologist Joshua] Plotkin found the duo's math remarkable in its elegance. But the outcome troubled him. Nature includes numerous examples of cooperative behavior. For example, vampire bats donate some of their blood meal to community members that fail to find prey. Some species of birds and social insects routinely help raise another's brood. Even bacteria can cooperate, sticking to each other so that some may survive poison. If extortion reigns, what drives these and other acts of selflessness?"
Why isn't this headline, "Game Theory Called Into Question for Failing to Predict Observed Examples of Cooperation?"
Real Life isn't Spherical Cows. They need a better model.
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
The selfish gene theory popularized by Richard Dawkins states that evolution works on genes, not on individuals. Any gene which gives rise to behavior that will cause more copies of that gene to survive, will increase its percentage in the gene pool at large.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G...
[Theoretical biologist Joshua] Plotkin found the duo's math remarkable in its elegance. But the outcome troubled him. Nature includes numerous examples of cooperative behavior. For example, vampire bats donate some of their blood meal to community members that fail to find prey. Some species of birds and social insects routinely help raise another's brood. Even bacteria can cooperate, sticking to each other so that some may survive poison. If extortion reigns, what drives these and other acts of selflessness?"
I'm not sure Joshua Plotkin read the paper. It does not claim (as I understand it) to represent every scenario, merely a special case of a specific scenario. Explicitly, it requires the organism to have enough intelligence to remember what happened in previous games, so a bacteria without memory is not covered under this model. The strategy requires multiple rounds be played.
Also worth mentioning that 'good for the individual' is not the same as 'good for the species,' and nature selects the latter
I know almost nothing about vampire bats (except don't get bit, you'll need rabies shots!), but if someone understands how it relates to the prisoners' dilemma, I'd be interested in hearing it.
"First they came for the slanderers and i said nothing."
In other news, some people believe economic theory.
It's that simple. They have a neat mathematical model which is interesting, but if it doesn't make accurate predictions when applied to a more realistic scenario then it's missing something.
BeauHD. Worst editor since kdawson.
It's about procreation and the survival of the genetic line. Individual survival is irrelevant, especially once one has procreated. (Though even those who don't contribute to the survival of the genetic line of their family - the person who has a sibling willing to sacrifice themselves to save the family enhances the chances the family will procreate.)
This kind of confusion is what happens when people try to do research outside of their expertise. If you want to understand biology, ask a biologist, not a physicist or a computer geek. (Though a lot of biologists make the same mistake, of course.)
The physicist Freeman Dyson and the computer scientist William Press [..] have found a new solution to [...] the prisoner's dilemma
So... what you're saying is... these two guys have cooperated to call cooperation into question...
Riiight...
systemd is Roko's Basilisk.
except it's the selfish assholes who equip themselves to guard what they have against anybody else getting it. The selfish assholes survive because they have the keys to the grain silo, everybody else (read: who hasn't got a copy of the key) can go die in a field. Selfish asshole (=selfish gene) survives, the meek inherit the Earth. From six feet beneath it.
Political debates have me rolling my eyes so much I think I got optical whiplash. I should sue. - Foamy The Squirrel
You fall into the common error of equating the selfish gene with selfish individualism. Life is more complicated than that. There are times when protecting your family or the wider community at the risk of your own life is absolutely what is best for the survival of your genes.
And for sure, 'dove' is a lousy strategy in iterated prisoners dilemma. Hit him if he hits me first works fairly well though.
Spite often benefits the group over time - the individual sacrifices a little bit to increase the group benefit (which should be returned to him in aggregate as a non-zero-sum game). It can also benefit the individual by trading one thing of value for another in order to alter an adversary's value equation (like the legendary nuns who cut off their noses to avoid being raped by the marauders). Sometimes the costs are quite high but it's always a lesser-value for greater-value trade (as far as the individual values those things).
My God, it's Full of Source!
OUTSIDE_IP=$(dig +short my.ip @outsideip.net)
The advantages of tit-for-tat are that it will stay cooperative against cooperative opponents, maximizing the total gain, and that it will not lose to its other player by more than one defection. It isn't necessarily the best strategy, but it has some provable advantages.
Therefore, if this strategy, whatever the heck it is, plays against tit-for-tat, it will come out ahead by a small amount. No extortion is possible against tit-for-tat, since it has a very short memory. Any serious attempt to hurt it hurts the opponent almost as much. The outcome of the game will be determined by the opponent, but it isn't clear to me that this is good for the opponent.
In a series of games, with players changing algorithms, tit-for-tat is not particularly susceptible to extortion, since it fundamentally yields the opponent one extra defection/cooperation win. Any attempt to extort it into more than one will fail in a competitive environment, since, if tit-for-tat is trashed the opponent is trashed almost as much. Tit-for-tat against itself, or any other strategy that won't defect first, will get straight cooperation rewards, while defect-first strategies have to accept some mutual defections, lowering the total score.
So, while I'm willing to concede that the mathematics is correct (it's been a long time since I read a mathematical paper, so I haven't checked it out fully yet), it doesn't look like it's going to make much of a difference in final score.
"When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
There is some real life applications for this. Since I am a bleeding heart liberal I see the Republicans being reckless with government shutdowns and pushing the envelop on filibusters etc as this "I will first show you I am reckless then let us play chicken". (If you are a Republican you might strongly disagree with this example).
I also see this as the explanation for being reckless revenge and disproportional response. Typically in India riots would erupt on the rumor Some boys of set A teased some girls of set B. The sets could be caste, religion, language. In the over the top response for something minor the riot inciting group suffers as much damage as all others. It is totally irrational. But the purpose is to set the stage for others for all future interactions, "Malabar Muslims or Dharavi Tamils or Biharis are known to be violent. Be more careful around them".
Or like John McEnroe's tantrums in the tennis matches is to intimidate the line judges into giving him the benefit of doubt in the future calls.
So the theory is not without its merits. But, as usual, the title is more provocative than warranted.
sed -e 's/Chuck Norris/Rajnikant/g' joke > fact