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Incorrectly Built SLS Welding Machine To Be Rebuilt
schwit1 writes A giant welding machine, built for NASA's multi-billion dollar Space Launch System (SLS), has to be taken apart and rebuilt because the contractor failed to reinforce the floor, as required, prior to construction: "Sweden's ESAB Welding & Cutting, which has its North American headquarters in Florence, South Carolina, built the the roughly 50-meter tall Vertical Assembly Center as a subcontractor to SLS contractor Boeing at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans.
ESAB was supposed to reinforce Michoud's floor before installing the welding tool, but did not, NASA SLS Program Manager Todd May told SpaceNews after an April 15 panel session during the 31st Space Symposium here. As a result, the enormous machine leaned ever so slightly, cocking the rails that guide massive rings used to lift parts of the 8.4-meter-diameter SLS stages The rings wound up 0.06 degrees out of alignment, which may not sound like much, "but when you're talking about something that's 217 feet [66.14 meters] tall, that adds up," May said.
Asked why ESAB did not reinforce the foundation as it was supposed to, May said only it was a result of "a miscommunication between two [Boeing] subcontractors and ESAB."
It is baffling how everyone at NASA, Boeing, and ESAB could have forgotten to do the reinforcing, even though it was specified in the contract. It also suggests that the quality control in the SLS rocket program has some serious problems.
ESAB was supposed to reinforce Michoud's floor before installing the welding tool, but did not, NASA SLS Program Manager Todd May told SpaceNews after an April 15 panel session during the 31st Space Symposium here. As a result, the enormous machine leaned ever so slightly, cocking the rails that guide massive rings used to lift parts of the 8.4-meter-diameter SLS stages The rings wound up 0.06 degrees out of alignment, which may not sound like much, "but when you're talking about something that's 217 feet [66.14 meters] tall, that adds up," May said.
Asked why ESAB did not reinforce the foundation as it was supposed to, May said only it was a result of "a miscommunication between two [Boeing] subcontractors and ESAB."
It is baffling how everyone at NASA, Boeing, and ESAB could have forgotten to do the reinforcing, even though it was specified in the contract. It also suggests that the quality control in the SLS rocket program has some serious problems.
Asked why ESAB did not reinforce the foundation as it was supposed to, May said only it was a result of "a miscommunication between two [Boeing] subcontractors and ESAB."
Bullshit. The reason is they thought they could get away with it.
Thanks for that.
These days, though, "lax testing standards" is in the eye of the beholder. I work for a Japanese manufacturer with a world-renowned reputation for quality.
In the US, having the word "quality" in your job title is a career death sentence. In this Japanese company, it means that you are the créme de la créme.
They look at testing as "black box monkey testing" at the end of the process. This is what they have done for multiple decades. They have Excel checklists that are thousands of lines long. If even one of those lines is not checked, or is anomalous, the whole shooting match comes to a screeching halt until said line is graced with a green check.
I am trying to implement an inline "process quality" to their software development. You know, TDD, CI, CD and whatnot.
My. God. It's damn near impossible.
For one thing, they have a culture that deliberately sets up an antagonistic relationship between Quality and Engineering. Quality generally has more power. Engineering is considered to be a bunch of "yahoos," bent on degrading the Holy Quality.
When Engineering managers (like me) try to suggest quality measures; even though these are not wild, "cutting edge" things, we are routinely dismissed and ignored, because we are obviously trying to avoid work and introduce bad quality.
The simple fact of the matter is, that introducing the techniques I'm talking about could have a revolutionary effect on our quality. It would drastically reduce the cost of our production, and would certainly reduce (possibly to 0), the number of "time bomb" bugs that tend to slip through those massive checklists and explode in the face of influential people with high Twitter follower accounts.
I strongly suspect that NASA has an extremely similar culture. The only way they can grok "quality," is through their 1950s-era "black box at the end" testing methodology.
This has some real benefits (Read this to see what can happen when you have super-redundant black box testing and prototyping).
However, it is screamingly -UNBELIEVABLY- expensive and time-consuming (read: "expensive"). It also doesn't guarantee quality. Nothing really does.
In the case of Apollo 13, NASA's anal prototyping and simulation exercises saved the astronauts. However, the preferred outcome would have been that the oxygen tank not have exploded in the first place. A lot more boring.
I'm not sure that your statement was fair.
Musk is an engineer. Quality folks see engineers as "out-of-control cowboys."
I'm getting very, very sick of this highly insulting, and completely inaccurate portrayal.