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Crypto Experts Blast Gov't Backdoors For Encryption

loid_void writes with a link to a New York Times report about some of the world's best-known cryptography experts, who have prepared a report which concludes that there is no viable technical solution which "would allow the American and British governments to gain "exceptional access" to encrypted communications without putting the world's most confidential data and critical infrastructure in danger." From the article: [T]he government’s plans could affect the technology used to lock financial institutions and medical data, and poke a hole in mobile devices and the countless other critical systems — including pipelines, nuclear facilities, the power grid — that are moving online rapidly. ... “The problems now are much worse than they were in 1997,” said Peter G. Neumann, a co-author of both the 1997 report and the new paper, who is a computer security pioneer at SRI International, the Silicon Valley research laboratory. “There are more vulnerabilities than ever, more ways to exploit them than ever, and now the government wants to dumb everything down further.” The authors include Neumann, Harold Abelson, Susan Landau, and Bruce Schneier.

102 comments

  1. Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    You cannot, under any circumstances, convince the government that having a backdoor into all those things is a bad thing.

    1. Re:Falling on deaf ears by fustakrakich · · Score: 2

      Nor can you convince most people. They prefer to believe the FUD campaign.

      --
      “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
    2. Re:Falling on deaf ears by ShanghaiBill · · Score: 5, Insightful

      You cannot, under any circumstances, convince the government that having a backdoor into all those things is a bad thing.

      But you can convince individuals that their privacy will not be protected, and you can convince companies that few will buy their products. The Clipper chip did not fail because the government was convinced, but because of a backlash from consumers that didn't want it, and from companies that threatened to move their production overseas. The current proposals will fail for the exact same reasons.

    3. Re:Falling on deaf ears by mwvdlee · · Score: 4, Insightful

      That's because backdoors give private information to governments at the cost of instilling justified fear in it's citizens.
      It's a win-win situation as far as they're concerned.

      --
      Slashdot social media options: AIM, ICQ, Yahoo, Jabber and Mobile Text. Why no MySpace?
    4. Re: Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

      The world has changed. Move the production where, Europe? Trade treaties will take care of that. Australia? Same thing. Russia? Sanctions. Asia? Treaties again. Governments are not like ordinary people, like you and me: if at first they don't succeed they bring out bigger and bigger weapons until they crush all the opposition. As with protests... Remember OWS? The gloves have come off. They don't have to hide anymore. Remember when being a journalist was almost an insurance policy? No more. They will use as much brutality as they see fit. And nobody will dare resist.

    5. Re:Falling on deaf ears by CBravo · · Score: 1

      Not when the keys get found and their own security is breached beyond repair.

      --
      nosig today
    6. Re: Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Open source.

    7. Re:Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Considering the number of people who want a backdoor to changing the Constitution, is it any wonder they can't be convinced that backdoors elsewhere are bad?

    8. Re:Falling on deaf ears by wbr1 · · Score: 3, Informative

      That was before oogie boogie terrists. Most of the plebes will fall in line now. Witness the scare up before july 4th to keep the fears alive.

      --
      Silence is a state of mime.
    9. Re:Falling on deaf ears by sconeu · · Score: 1

      Come on, dude. You REALLY believe that the .gov would use backdoored encryption for itself?

      It will use the real stuff.

      --
      General Relativity: Space-time tells matter where to go; Matter tells space-time what shape to be.
    10. Re:Falling on deaf ears by davester666 · · Score: 2

      They don't want a back door into everything. Just whatever services the little people get to use.

      --
      Sleep your way to a whiter smile...date a dentist!
    11. Re: Falling on deaf ears by ShanghaiBill · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Move the production where, Europe? Trade treaties will take care of that.

      Nonsense. There is no way that European countries (other than Britain, of course) are going to force their citizens to use devices that the American government can monitor. If they try that, Marine Le Pen will be the next president of France.

      Asia? Treaties again.

      China is far less likely to agree to American backdoors than Europe is. It is not going to happen.

    12. Re:Falling on deaf ears by Sique · · Score: 2
      Come on, dude. You REALLY believe that the .gov contract does not go to the cheapest bidder, the one who uses off-the-shelf components?

      Computing has an interesting problem right now: The most viable, the most powerful, the cheapest components are the ones available to consumers (or at least very closely related to them), because of the sheer amout of units shipped and the harsh competition in the market. Any we-don't-use-off-the-shelf-components attempt at computing right now is doomed to be late, extremely expensive, full of bugs, and at least two generations behind.

      --
      .sig: Sique *sigh*
    13. Re:Falling on deaf ears by SomePoorSchmuck · · Score: 1

      Come on, dude. You REALLY believe that the .gov contract does not go to the cheapest bidder, the one who uses off-the-shelf components?

      Computing has an interesting problem right now: The most viable, the most powerful, the cheapest components are the ones available to consumers (or at least very closely related to them), because of the sheer amout of units shipped and the harsh competition in the market. Any we-don't-use-off-the-shelf-components attempt at computing right now is doomed to be late, extremely expensive, full of bugs, and at least two generations behind.

      Yes but if you've worked for the government nearly all your life as I have, you'll know that the bolded part is going to happen for any government-grown solution regardless of whether it's a piece of software or a tilt-rotor aircraft. My point being, if you're offering that result as something that is supposed to stimulate government agencies to avoid that approach, well, it usually doesn't.

      --

      Hollywood, Television, has become the dream machine. We need to take that back; each of us is a Dream Machine
    14. Re:Falling on deaf ears by ne0n · · Score: 2

      If they ate their own damned dogfood you'd expect all intel to be declassified and data opened to public scrutiny. Failing that, the idiots espousing backdoored crypto are a bunch of whining hypocrites and should be shoved in a sack with a few tonnes of FISA transcripts and cannonballed into Victoria Falls.

      --
      $ :(){ :|:& };:
    15. Re:Falling on deaf ears by CBravo · · Score: 1

      There is not much use of strong encryption on govt. stuff if the rest of the economy and infra is down or compromised.

      --
      nosig today
    16. Re:Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Like they did at OPM?

    17. Re:Falling on deaf ears by currently_awake · · Score: 1

      Yes, you can. Tap the private communications of the government and their family/friends and put everything on the front page in the middle of an election and they will change their mind about security. If they are personally harmed by security gaps then they will want that fixed.

    18. Re: Falling on deaf ears by currently_awake · · Score: 1

      You could set up shop in Greece. I hear they will do anything for money and jobs.

    19. Re:Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      The government does not need a "back door". They are the government, they can demand full access through the "front door". If they want, say, bank transactions - they can walk into the bank and demand a database dump. Or make a law requiring the bank to file monthly reports with some goverment agency. They have zero need to crack crypto for this - they can position themselves inside where data is unencrypted.

      For example - I no longer have to report my earnings or money to the government so they can tax me. They have arranged to have every bank report the balance of every account yearly. And every employer have to report all wages/benefits they pay. No back doors needed, the taxman goes through the front door. Government has no need to hide this.

    20. Re:Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      No they won't.

      They'd just write an exception to the law that allows then to use unbreakable encryption for "National Security" reasons and fuck the rest of us.

    21. Re:Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Nonesense, they use the same crap as the rest of us, only older. This exact problem has already bitten us on the ass once before; there is still a whole bunch of government services using 1990's era "export" grade encryption.

    22. Re: Falling on deaf ears by Altrag · · Score: 1

      The idea isn't to sell them to European (or Asian or whatever) countries. The idea is to produce overseas and sell locally. Which is already happening in most cases anyway so its mostly a matter of including the changes in the next round of fab blueprints (or whatever they use) that you fire off to the factories in China.

      Of course the next step by the govt would be an import ban on such devices.. but they'd have a hard time punching that through when the devices you're talking about are things like iPhone7 and whatever Google calls the next Nexus product.

      People might not understand/care about back doors, but they sure as hell care about not being able to buy the newest gadget and if the manufacturers of such gadgets understand/care about back doors, the government will find themselves in a bit of a pickle.

    23. Re:Falling on deaf ears by Altrag · · Score: 1

      Given the flurry of government breaches over the past year or so, I'm not sure they're using either backdoored or real encryption to any great extent at the moment.

    24. Re:Falling on deaf ears by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Stop quining.

    25. Re: Falling on deaf ears by Baki · · Score: 1

      The fear will come after a few devastating incidents.

    26. Re: Falling on deaf ears by Agripa · · Score: 1

      And then they make it unlawful to use non-sanctioned encryption.

    27. Re: Falling on deaf ears by lucien86 · · Score: 1

      Watch out they will be trying to contaminate your sacred bodily fluids. They will be putting fluorine in the tap water, the damn 'commies'. Even our tin foil hats wont be enough then.

      --
      Below the speed of light Special Relativity is one of the most accurate theories in physics - above the speed of light..
  2. They tried it before. by GerbilSoft · · Score: 4, Informative

    The Clipper chip was designed by the NSA and had a government-sponsored backdoor. Unsurprisingly, it failed.

    1. Re:They tried it before. by gstoddart · · Score: 4, Interesting

      But now they have more secret "national security" laws which can be used to force it without people knowing or having the choice to reject it.

      So you'd never know if they're demanding it from companies.

      --
      Lost at C:>. Found at C.
    2. Re:They tried it before. by spacepimp · · Score: 1

      How can that work with GPL'd software: PGP etc.?

    3. Re:They tried it before. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I don't understand the question. You are acting as though something being licensed under the GPL gives it some magical, physical barrier that prevents actions such as these.

      In order to make this work with GPL'd software, the government would simply say "Fuck the GPL, we can do whatever we want." And then they would do whatever they want.

    4. Re:They tried it before. by John+Allsup · · Score: 2

      Quite possibly by making GPL'd crypto illegal.

      --
      John_Chalisque
    5. Re:They tried it before. by Darinbob · · Score: 1

      That was before the terrorists won their war against us!

    6. Re:They tried it before. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Hasn't there been pictures going around for a good few years now showing some rooms of people intercepting and installing chips in to computer parts that people have ordered to, I assume, spy on them?

      I remember seeing some board diagrams posted with some stuff, as well as chips that had blatantly been removed from some boards after they were confiscated and returned that seems to back it up.

      Not sure if there is any truth to it though. But given everything that has happened, hardly surprising they'd be reviving clipper without permission.

    7. Re:They tried it before. by Altrag · · Score: 1

      That would be.. a hard sell. OpenSSL and many other encryption technologies are open source, already exist, and are already used by many many people and companies (which are more important to the govt these days.)

      Even if you convinced the OpenSSL team to implement a back door.. its open. Someone would just remove the back door. And someone else would simply read the code to find the back door and use it nefariously. So they'd not only have to figure out how to ban or enforce restrictions on new software, force old software to be upgraded to restricted newer versions.. they'd also have to blanket ban all open source products that include any sort of encryption layer, regardless of compliance.

    8. Re:They tried it before. by BranMan · · Score: 1

      GPL means open source. Means you, I, and Frank down the road can download and read the source. We can compile it ourselves from the source, to make sure we have what we expect. We can inspect the code to discover back doors (hiding a direct back-door in source is REALLY REALLY hard to do) - crypto experts in this or other countries can look through it to ascertain if it is secure or subject to attacks (theses have been based on this, so it is no idle task)

      In fact no one with any standing in the cryto community of experts will say any crypto algorithm is anything but *insecure* until the whole world has tried to break it, and all fail.

      Good crypto is possible. GPL means open source, so good crypto applications *are* possible. Anything close sourced, i.e. commercial or government furnished, as binary only, cannot be trusted.

      That is why GPL is so important. It isn't magical, but no one can muck with it in secret. Just isn't physically possible - you get the source code too.

  3. government wants to dumb everything down further by fustakrakich · · Score: 2

    Yes... how many times must it be said? Ignorance is strength!

    --
    “He’s not deformed, he’s just drunk!”
  4. Experts? by hyperar · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Who doesn't know that backdoors are there for everyone who finds them and not just those who put it there?

    1. Re:Experts? by NatasRevol · · Score: 1

      All the governments requesting it?

      That seems obvious...

      --
      There are two types of people in the world: Those who crave closure
    2. Re:Experts? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Who doesn't know that backdoors are there for everyone who finds them and not just those who put it there?

      But the government can make a law against using it. That should be enough to stop the bad guys.

    3. Re:Experts? by ancientt · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I can't believe I'm going to contribute to this side of the discussion. "Loathe" is the mildest word I can think of for how I feel about a government accessible decryption system, but I'm going to explain why it's not infeasible to maintain security and have government access, unlike so many posters seem to assume.

      Lets take cell phones as a starting example. The encryption of my phone isn't done with the password I put into the phone when I reboot it, the encryption is done with a randomly generated key which my password decrypts. There is no reason the same key that is actually decrypting the phone couldn't be encrypted with a phone manufacturer password. That government mandated password would encrypt the real decryption key just like my password does, but the government password wouldn't change when I change the password I'm using.

      Note the government password isn't the same for multiple phones, it's unique to each phone. The government password is a randomly generated complex string of numbers, letters and symbols and it's not stored on the phone.

      The government password for my phone is created at OS installation time and then the phone manufacturer encrypts it with the public key provided by the government. Those encrypted password media are sent to the companies selling the phones and those companies keep that media physically secured.

      The government must subpoena the key for a specific phone in order to decrypt its contents.

      The government password is now protected by:
      A) A PKI private key stored by a government agency
      B) Physical security at a non-governmental agency
      C) The somewhat abused but best available legal processes of our government

      Encrypted computer drives work the same. The assumption in both scenarios is that people fall into one of these groups:
      A) don't know it is there
      B) use the system their device came with
      C) don't understand how to change the system

      That covers 99.999% of people, probably even 99.99% of criminals. I may repartition my drive and install varying operating systems, and I may install a different OS on my phone, but normal people don't. Even drug dealers and terrorists are unlikely to do that when there are far easier ways to avoid incrimination. The fact is we could have such a "backdoor" already in play and we wouldn't necessarily know about it. I'm geekier than most by far, and I don't recompile the kernel on my boot partition to make sure it matches the one that is actually there. Granted, I do tend to wipe drives and start fresh, but if Redhat and Canonical are compromised, the NSA is good enough at their jobs, that I'll probably never notice. Do you know for sure the signature of your running kernel matches the one that you could compile for yourself?

      --
      B) Eliminate all the stupid users. This is frowned upon by society.
    4. Re:Experts? by Altrag · · Score: 1

      Its not that we don't trust the technology, its that we don't trust the people implementing and operating the technology.

      They don't have our best interests in mind, and are far too often either too incompetent or too cheap to properly implement the necessary measures even if they do have good intentions. And even if they manage to pass that test, their replacements in 4 years may not be so noble.

      And that's the government. Private companies don't even have to pay lip service to our best interests. I mean they'll do so anyway in some cases (such as Apple pre-enabling encryption) but its not because they have to, and they'll stop as soon as it becomes more financially advantageous to screw us over.

      And even if by some miracle, all of that goes in the favor of us average citizens.. somebody, somewhere is eventually just going to make a mistake and leak the keys by pure accident.

      And once the keys are out, there's no take-backs. Every single device using those keys must be considered immediately and permanently compromised.

    5. Re:Experts? by delt0r · · Score: 1

      [Big Teleco] is force to apologize today after 10 million "backdoor" passwords where potentially leaked after someone lost a laptop at starbucks. Such laptop are not suppose to contain sensitive data, but the developer was late on a deadline and needed to work from home. Access is restricted due to security protocols even from a VPN, the unnamed employee made a copy of a subset of the database for testing reasons. It is not clear why the said employee did not password protect his laptop.

      It really doesn't matter how you do it. The more copies of the keys lying around, and the more people have access to those keys/backdoors whatever. The weaker the security.

      --
      If information wants to be free, why does my internet connection cost so much?
    6. Re:Experts? by ancientt · · Score: 1

      A spokesperson for [Big Telco] said that even though they broke the law law pertaining to maintaining government security by putting the keys into network connected system, that no phones could actually be compromised because every piece of data [Big Telco] stores is useless without the corresponding PKI private keys secured by the [Three Letter Government Agency]. The spokesperson went on to say that replacement keys had already been automatically pushed to every online phone anyway as an extra security precaution. We spoke with the lawyers of the defendants accused of breaching national security and two of them confirmed their clients were considering plea deals to avoid longer jail sentences.

      I wouldn't disagree that dual key systems make security weaker, but how much weaker the security is depends an awful lot on how you do it.

      I don't know if you missed the PKI component in my previous post or just aren't familiar with it, but for the sake of other readers here's the essentials of Public Key Infrastructure:
      A) Anyone can encrypt a message using a public key
      B) Nobody can decrypt that message except the holder of the corresponding private key
      C) No, not even you, the person who encrypted the message, not even you can decrypt it
      D) Because math

      The thing about the process I described is that it would be impossible for the [Big Telco] to cause the actual passwords to be breached, because they would never have them. It would be impossible for the government agency to cause the actual passwords to be breached because they wouldn't have them either. Both would have to fail dramatically, and at the same time, in order to prevent corrective measures from being effective.

      --
      B) Eliminate all the stupid users. This is frowned upon by society.
    7. Re:Experts? by delt0r · · Score: 1

      I am very familiar with PKI. But your clearly not familiar with how large companies do things, or even what a BACKDOOR is. If such a event happened, you bet your arse all the keys will be on the same laptop. How else will the said dev be able to test.

      Also Nobody has proposed some 2 key system. One where i can use it with my private key, and the government with a 2nd private key. If its the same key, then no that is not PKI, because i just lost the ability to revoke and renew a key without 3rd party intervention. And well its not a private key is i have to give a copy to someone else. And even then you still use a symmetric key for the real data. And this is where the proposed backdoors are suppose to go.

      private/public keys are not what is proposed here and CANNOT give the access the government wants.

      --
      If information wants to be free, why does my internet connection cost so much?
    8. Re:Experts? by ancientt · · Score: 1

      But your clearly not familiar with how large companies do things, or even what a BACKDOOR is.

      I'm familiar with both.

      Also Nobody has proposed some 2 key system.

      You're absolutely right. Even I'm not proposing it. I'm simply outlining how secure second party access can be managed. You and I both know that politicians don't want to go through a secure process, or have only limited access controlled by subpoenas.

      If its the same key, then no that is not PKI, because i just lost the ability to revoke and renew a key without 3rd party intervention.

      You're mostly right. What I described is PKI protected symmetric encryption, which isn't as secure as pure PKI, but that's what systems use now, just (hopefully) without second party access. (That's why you can change the password on your android phone or bitlocker container or truecrypt drive without it taking the time to do a full re-encryption. It can be as almost as secure, but not like I described it.) The example I gave wasn't representative of what politicians want... again, it's just one way dual access could be set up securely.

      It's not wrong to say that any sort of backdoors are a bad idea, no matter how they're implemented. And you can absolutely bet that serious criminals and even geeks like me will re-encrypt with non-shared keys, so it's only effective for the kind of terrorists who don't train to fly planes into buildings.

      I'm having a hard time defending even a process that could be relatively secure, because (like you) I have zero trust in the politicians calling for an end to privacy.

      --
      B) Eliminate all the stupid users. This is frowned upon by society.
  5. Master key by comet63 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Who would buy a lock from a company that made a master key that was good in all of their locks? Of course, they would promise to only release that key to authorized people. However, it is certain that eventually it will get into criminal hands. At that point, there is lots of money to be made from selling the key. Of course, lock companies could make lots of money off this proposal, but not the one who made the master key. The government might as well give up on a web based economy and go back to paper banking if they start giving out keys to all of the transactions.

    1. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative
    2. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Maybe their plan isn't to mandate a single master key, but rather a second key which is a function of the lock. Low-level people like local police would have to give the serial number of the lock they want to open to the Backdoor Department, and they would receive a key that can only open that lock.

    3. Re:Master key by nine-times · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Who would buy a lock from a company that made a master key that was good in all of their locks?

      It's probably not the best example. I would hire a locksmith knowing full well that they could pick the lock that they're installing. That doesn't bother me. However, that's because I'm resigned to the idea that locks only keep out casual thieves, and that any lock I'm likely to put on my door can be picked. I'm not inclined to say the same sort of thing about my encryption.

    4. Re:Master key by BBCWatcher · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Everybody who buys suitcases. https://www.tsa.gov/traveler-i...

    5. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Then, there is the problem with that. How securely is the master key used to carve keys that open individual locks stored?

      Air-gapping? Stuxnet and boots on the ground showed that isn't as secure as people think [1].
      Key in a secured hardware module? Ask a certain Linux maker about a SSH RPM signed with their key when someone could access credentials they shouldn't. Even if the key was in a secured module and couldn't be accessed, it would be a target for physical theft or destruction.
      Key shared among people, similar to the "dot" DNS key? Capture each person at the same time, and use the old XKCD technique to get the PIN for the card, rebuild the key. Timed attacks are hard to do... but doable. AQ did this with less than a few thousand C-notes, and Occupy was turfed for good by an operation in every major city at the same time. Remember... this key is worth -trillions-, just for blackmail, extortion, and theft possibilities.

      If one reads the old toad.com archive of cypherpunks back in 1993, the same exact stuff was said by cipher giants like Tim May. 20+ years later, same old crap, same attacks against it.

      [1]: Lets be real here, a master key that opens up any and all US secrets will have some people with VERY deep pockets gunning for it. Like people with billions of dollars of cash, and willing to spend what it takes (even if it is commando operation) to get that info. These are people who will be ready, willing, and able to make family members of sysadmins... people with access to that key disappear for a time... or permanently... depending on how cooperative the sysadmin is with the organization. Unlike Fort Knox where it will be obvious if gold disappears, a key can get copied and handed over without the in use copy getting deleted.

      Finding admins who have access to this key? Piece of cake... especially with OPM compromised, not to mention the documents Snowden sold to the Russians/Chinese showing who knows what.

    6. Re:Master key by mlts · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Cryptography and physical security are often similar, but in other areas, they differ. Encryption algorithms are either extremely secure, or not worth the time in using them because every few years, CPU power doubles to attack them.

      Plus, with physical security, there is "good enough". I use an el cheapo Master warded lock on a chicken coop door... because it is nuisance protection. Same reason I use a six pin American lock on the gate. If it resists bumping or quick attack, good enough. Even with high security locks, their main function is mainly to work as a "seal", to show that if there is a break-in, there is physical evidence to show it is the case. A kicked in door, insurance will pay a claim. A picked lock? The claim almost certainly will be denied.

      Encryption isn't like that. Either it keeps everyone out, or it keeps nobody out.

    7. Re:Master key by RabidReindeer · · Score: 1

      Maybe their plan isn't to mandate a single master key, but rather a second key which is a function of the lock. Low-level people like local police would have to give the serial number of the lock they want to open to the Backdoor Department, and they would receive a key that can only open that lock.

      Well, you could give the master keys to the NSA, who certainly has the storage capacity. But not everyone who works there is as selfless as Snowden, so expect them to be clandestinely for sale.

      We all know the Government Can't Do Anything Right anyway. How about instead giving custody to a professional security company. How about these guys? http://it.slashdot.org/story/1...

    8. Re:Master key by Qzukk · · Score: 1

      Sort of like how Hacking Team had a separate watermark/backdoor into each tool they sold to governments.

      I'm sure the government's solution will be to outlaw backdoors in stuff they buy while mandating backdoors for everyone else. Not being a flaming hypocrite has never been any politician's strong suit.

      --
      If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
    9. Re:Master key by bondsbw · · Score: 1

      Further, encryption protects information that is useful online. Online theft is much faster, easier to perform in bulk, and harder to trace (due to... *gasp*... encryption and other privacy mechanisms).

      And generally it has higher reward with less risk. You likely won't get shot for decrypting someone's online banking communication... breaking into a home, different story.

      --
      All my liberal friends think I'm a conservative, all my conservative friends think I'm a liberal.
    10. Re:Master key by Kevin+by+the+Beach · · Score: 1

      My thoughts exactly... It's funny that one of their favorite toys is no longer available because of the risk of a digital fingerprint and a wide open back door.

      Karma

    11. Re:Master key by steelfood · · Score: 1

      There's a reason you don't put valuables in your check-in luggage.

      You don't either, do you?

      --
      "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be."
    12. Re:Master key by lgw · · Score: 1

      True, but not for serious physical security. Combination locks in general are not high-security products, and Master locks usually have a number printed on the back that a lock smith can use to just look up the combination, simple as that. It's a fine solution for a locker room. (Heck, most keyed Master locks have a number printed on them that a locksmith can use to make a key.)

      So, sure people still buy them, but physical security experts know the deal, and use something else where it matters. Computer security experts know the deal with crypto with backdoors, and know it's not appropriate anywhere it really matters.

      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    13. Re:Master key by Sique · · Score: 3, Informative
      I have one issue: Edward Snowden never sold any documents to the Russians/Chinese. Yes, he has been repeatedly accused of doing so, but so far, no document is known that was sold to them.

      Thus, claiming Edward Snowden sold documents to the Russians/Chinese amounts to a blatant lie.

      --
      .sig: Sique *sigh*
    14. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Well nearly everyone. If you look a bit into current lockpicking knowledge, you know nearly all consumer locks are a bit of security theater. And there definately exist skelleton keys for most brands/types.

      Some locks you have to destroy to open, so nice try.

    15. Re:Master key by Sique · · Score: 1

      And with locks, you have a layered security. You can have the lock of the front door designed by someone different from the designer of your vault. Thus even if your locksmith turns bad onto you, he might get into your front door, but not into your vault, and vice verse the vault designer would not make it through your front door to even get to your vault.

      --
      .sig: Sique *sigh*
    16. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      That method doesn't work. It's a popular myth. You should have cited TSA luggage locks as an example.

    17. Re:Master key by nine-times · · Score: 1

      I don't have a vault. You have a vault?

    18. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      There's nothing wrong with the example. A master key is different from a locksmith, yet you have equated the two. Why?

      A locksmith does not work for the company that made the lock, and even the locksmith does not have a master key. What they have is a set of tools and skills that allow them to get into locks, at the request of the lawful owner.

      There's a clear benefit to society having a way to get into locked objects, via a locksmith. The government keeps telling us that them riffling though private data, as they wish and with no notification to anyone, is also a societal benefit. Many disagree.

    19. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Who would buy a lock from a company that made a master key that was good in all of their locks?

      Lots of people. They sure buy lockable suitcases that can be opened with some sort of master key that the U.S. customs is supposed to have. (And surely, luggage thieves will eventually get that key off some bribable customs official . . .)

    20. Re:Master key by jonwil · · Score: 1

      Or if you are in a situation where doing so is possible you buy/travel with a starter pistol or something else legally classified as a "firearm" by the TSA and can then legally lock your case with a big fat non-TSA lock.

      Plenty of people who aren't gun people who use this "trick" to protect expensive camera gear, tech or whatever else.

    21. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Far more people than you think. Have a key labelled CH751? Congratulations, you have access to the baggage compartments (many of which would give someone access to inside) of most all RVs. Don't worry, CH751 keys are used in many other things as well.

      Is there a letter on your RV's door lock? Congrats, your door lock has a master key that every RV dealer on earth has.

      The car industry is affected as well. Repo men can (and do) buy entire keysets for popular car brands (though at least in this case there's dozens, not one or two).

    22. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually, the TSA requires you to declare any "weapons". The lists of what qualifies is rather long, so you don't really need a firearm; a knife, or maybe even a slingshot, would be enough.

    23. Re:Master key by weilawei · · Score: 1

      You realize you can download software (used to be books) which lists the key bittings for blind codes for basically every manufacturer, except the ones that require you to mail in an ID card issued with the lock (and those are expensive)? This blind code is usually printed somewhere easily accessible.

      Right?

      Physical security is generally a joke. I place more stock in cryptography properly implemented than any pin tumbler, wafer tumbler, disc, or combination lock (safe or otherwise). Hands down. (That said, my trust in the security of computational hardware is pretty low, and properly implemented has a very high bar.)

      Also, when you set up a master keying system, you inadvertently create keys out of the system that still function to open locks, because you need to break up the existing pins into a stack with multiple shear lines.

      Want it done right? Do it in depth. Locks are there to keep honest people honest and slow criminals down a bit.

    24. Re:Master key by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      It was a stupid newspaper called the Sunday Times a typical Murdoch rag; whoever believes anything that comes out of News Corp (sic) deserves to be misled.

  6. Re:government wants to dumb everything down furthe by CurryCamel · · Score: 1

    And "War is Peace"? Check. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
    "Freedom is Slavery": working on it.

  7. Its deja vu all over again by WorldWarPi · · Score: 2
    In 1994 the NSA proposed a "Clipper Chip" which would "escrow" encryption keys for their inspection.

    When Phrack republished the NSA Employee Security Manual to demonstrate how porous NSA was for its own security, it backed off.

    This is just the same old crap with Edward Snowden or the OPM caper as a counter-example, rather than Phrack.

  8. Law Enforcement Backdoors by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Security Now #506 "Law Enforcement Backdoors"
    Delves into the subject in detail and even covers the recent session of congress in which the idea was proposed and debated.

    I thought it was funny (Also kind of sad) that the FBI rep to Congress basicly just kept repeating: "Yeah but we HAVE to have it!"

  9. The Demons spent billions breaking Truecrypt rep by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The operation of the Demons behind the NSA and GCHQ was never better revealed than when they used their friends that own media outlets like this one (ie., DICE) to ruin the reputation of TRUECRYPT in the eyes of the beta sheeple. Good encryption is EASY. The maths and coding methods have been known for the longest time now. But good solutions are meaningless if the vast majority of people only have access to broken-by-design pseudo-encryption.

    While every Alpha who cares knows Truecrypt is as perfect as ever on older versions of Windows, the success of the co-ordinated NSA/GCHQ attack on Truecrypt and its core developers is that first-class general straightforward encryption methods are missing on Windows 8 and Windows 10. The SYNTHETIC push to move to 'new' low function, black-box ridden OSes is 100% designed to remove all forms of control users have over their own computers.

    Windows users, for instance, simply wanted a BETTER XP- one built with the expectation that the computer would have resources including 4-core CPUs, gigs of RAM and accelerated rendering. They did not want nor need the hyper-dumbed-down approach typified by Windows 8 and Windows 10- but the demons ensured their propagandists brainwashed BETA SHEEPLE into howling their hatred of anyone attempting to hang onto computing with the practicality of XP programs.

    Clean elegant coding and applications allows for clean, elegant encryption. The DIRTY black-box coding represented by 'modern apps' (be they on Win 8, Android or iOS) makes sane encryption IMPOSSIBLE by-design. But sheeple have to be convinced to WANT this terrible state of affairs, so Slashdot spends more time demonising Iran and Russia than ever it spends discussing ways to defeat Apple, Microsoft and Google.

    And remember, kids, no so-called 'encryption' provided by ANY commercial entity has any value at all. Worse, these same entities will sell your PRIVATE DATA to the most disgusting criminals for maximum exploitation. The British Government even has this as official government IT policy. Bill Gates and Rupert Murdoch tried to do the same with their inBloom (named after a term Victorian pedophiles used to describe their child targets) database that records all life information on every American child (and is now a core function under the general umbrella of NSA total surveillance).

  10. Re:government wants to dumb everything down furthe by lesincompetent · · Score: 1

    No sir, perhaps it is bliss but certainly not strength.

  11. Everyone not reading this. by waspleg · · Score: 0

    fillerfillerfillerfillerticktockticktocktick

  12. yup, because if by FudRucker · · Score: 1

    the government can get a backdoor built in to encryption then criminals will find it and exploit it, and besides that how can consumers be assured that the government employees accessing your encrypted data isn't corrupt too and going to exploit it too

    --
    Politics is Treachery, Religion is Brainwashing
  13. Stating the obvious... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Either the UK government is dangerously incompetent, or fatally stupid. Resignation time, either way. Do you want to be ruled by incompetent or stupid fools?

  14. backdoor versus sidedoor. by goombah99 · · Score: 2

    Discussing this as a "backdoor" conflates this with the usual hidden backdoor which is a bad thing. Putting in a backdoor that is freely accessible and leaves no trace of its accession is ill advised. But I fail to see why there are no technological means to secure keys for multiple parties. you can even have crypto so multiple parties must agree so for example like my safe deposit box the bank and I both have to agree that I am me.

    Now that's a different question of whether
    1) I might encrypt the data on my own or use a thrird party client that uses googles services but keeps things encrypted in passage. That defeats the abililty to side door googles encryption.

    2) I might off shore my data to someplace outside such laws (do I trust them is another matter).

    3) the dent this might cause in googles popularity outside the US--I actually doubt this since de facto it has been the case in the past that the NSA had free range of google and no one cared deeply. But Will china also demand that google also let it have side door access as a condition of doing bussiness there? Still while a mess it's not technologically difficult.

    4) an even stickier issue might be who all has to agree to unlock the data. Google+NSA. Google+China. those are doable. but Google+NSA+China is a problem. China might not want the NSA peeking at chinese national accounts without it's permission. Nor perhaps North Korean or any number of disputed places the NSA is interested in.

    So there's a political mess here and some ways consumers can defeat it, but I fail to see why someone like Bruce Schneir would say there's no technical means to do this at the level of google or apple or major sites when there plainly is.

    --
    Some drink at the fountain of knowledge. Others just gargle.
    1. Re:backdoor versus sidedoor. by suutar · · Score: 2

      Oh, sure, there's ways to require multiple keys. I would be surprised, though, if they seriously considered a plan that involved more than 2 keys (two keys is approximately equivalent to getting a warrant - keyholder 1 wants to do it and keyholder 2 says okay).

      However, at a purely technical level, there's going to be something that does the decryption, and it takes the keys. There is no way to guarantee that it cannot be hacked to either work without the keys or leak the keys when they're used, and if either of those happen, eventually you have folks using the decrypter who shouldn't be.

      There's also the fact that there's no technical way for this plan to prevent corruption/collusion amongst keyholders. More keys requires a bigger conspiracy or more social engineering, but enough keys to make that really infeasible also makes the decryption itself unwieldy, at which point it'll get bypassed somehow (shared keys, decrypting bigger chunks to avoid having to do more individual operations, etc).

    2. Re:backdoor versus sidedoor. by Asgard · · Score: 2

      Your safe deposit box is vulnerable to one person with a good drill.

      Any system that hobbles wide-spread encryption tools with a backdoor key will eventually be subverted by loss / discovery of the key(s), rendering the entire system worse then useless. Multiple keys is also difficult as the NSA/FBI is going to regularly use this facility, so the keys have to be online / available. Not so much the 'break glass in case of fire' but more of 'press button to open door'.

      Keys that subvert an entire countries infrastructure would be one of the worlds most sought-after secrets. Thats a lot of resources to bring to bear to defeat a small number of keys.

    3. Re:backdoor versus sidedoor. by currently_awake · · Score: 1

      How to do this: run all communications through a government run server at the ISP, where everything is decoded then re-encoded and sent on its way. It gives the gov access, handles the key exchange issues, and there is no way around you other than setting up your own network.

    4. Re:backdoor versus sidedoor. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      >There is no way to guarantee that it cannot be hacked to either work without the keys[...]

      It's not a pin-tumbler lock that you can pick. The keys end up as variables used to decode the ciphertext. You can't just patch a jump in the executable and end up with cleartext.

    5. Re:backdoor versus sidedoor. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      So... Man-In-The-Middle?

    6. Re:backdoor versus sidedoor. by Altrag · · Score: 1

      My safe deposit box (well, if I had one..) is most certainly not vulnerable to one person with a good drill.

      Its vulnerable to one person with a good drill, who can bypass bank security, can get into the cage, and drill the box out all without anyone noticing (and/or faster than anyone can respond.)

      Your average internet-enabled computer is more along the lines of the safe sitting in the middle of nowhere where nobody can hear the drill, nobody is likely to respond, and no other security measures are in place beyond the lock on the box itself.

      While from a mathematical point of view, encryption is the strongest security we've ever developed, we're still pretty sloppy on the human side of the equation (ie: not putting the keys somewhere they can be found, which includes everywhere except being a secret known to exactly one person) while we've been figuring that shit out with respect to banks for hundreds if not thousands of years.

      There's also the downside that a bank lock is (essentially) unique while an encryption protocol tends to be used everywhere. If someone gets a key to your lockbox, you grumble about whatever got taken and replace the lock. If someone gets a hold of an encryption master key then every device everywhere using that protocol needs to be replaced (PS3 anyone?) Firmware isn't sufficient due to the obvious downside of being able to overwrite it, so its minimally a chip replacement (and even that's questionable.. black blob is more likely if you need it to be actually secure, which generally means entire board replacement.)

    7. Re:backdoor versus sidedoor. by suutar · · Score: 1

      You're right, the method where there's a function that takes the keys and returns a boolean is unlikely. (I would not quite be willing to declare that it will not get used, given the fondness legislators have for meddling, but I do agree with unlikely). Which leaves the key leakage attacks.

    8. Re:backdoor versus sidedoor. by lucien86 · · Score: 1

      One of the big problems with government holding all these keys is the potential for them being lost or stolen. - Stolen by hackers or physically stolen by criminals or by corrupt employees. ~ The worst case scenario though is a large scale theft by a foreign government or terrorist group, which then uses the keys for large scale cyber attacks, for large scale theft from bank accounts and savings, for blackmail and political manipulation... Imagine a *Snowden* working in the NSA for a political enemy like North Korea or ISIS who wants to fight a clandestine war against the US or Europe.. .

      --
      Below the speed of light Special Relativity is one of the most accurate theories in physics - above the speed of light..
  15. Re:government wants to dumb everything down furthe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Hey, congratulations, today you're one of today's lucky 10,000!

    The "ignorance is strength" quote comes from the book 1984 by George Orwell. It is a brilliant and very readable work of fiction that depicts a future in which the trends of corruption in government have run unchecked. Many elements of it have proven to be quite prophetic of the modern day, making it a very relevant warning of things to come.

    Read it. You will enjoy it and be smarter for it too.
     

  16. Re:government wants to dumb everything down furthe by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    !@#$^%#@^$ I screwed the lucky 10,000 link up in the post and hit submit too quickly. grrrrrrr

  17. Easy to implement by crow · · Score: 1

    Adding a backdoor that is secure is very easy to implement. The government just needs to publish a public key. You then encrypt your private key using that public key and include it with whatever you encrypted. This would be much like the lock box on a house that holds the front-door key that only real estate agents showing the house are supposed to be able to access. And there's no reason it would be limited to just one. Opening a connection to a server in Turkey? Better include lock boxes for both your own government and the Turkish authorities.

    The only big hole is the security of the government's private key (or more likely, keys).

    The tricky part is that this government lock box has to be added to the common protocols. And how many different protocols would have to be updated? TLS, ssh, PGP, etc. What are the odds of introducing flaws that allow for new attack vectors when introducing the back door? For example, could you trick a victim's computer into thinking it needed to include the lock box for some jurisdiction that you control?

    Now while the technical side of this could be made to work, as a public policy, it's a horrible idea. Let's not just say it can't be done and forget about it. We need to fight this as bad policy.

    1. Re:Easy to implement by ewibble · · Score: 1

      The problem assuming the government can keep your its key safe, (Big assumption) is that the government has published its public key. While I can reasonably assume no one is willing to spend billions of dollars working out my private key from my public key I am happy to assume it is safe, however hacking the governments public key is a very rewarding exercise and I am in no doubt that there are organizations out there that are willing to invest the resources to do it.

    2. Re:Easy to implement by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Ages ago, there was a some "crystal box" software that did exactly this. When encrypting a document, it would encrypt using a key owned by an escrow service, and a key or two for Federal agencies. It was compared to putting copies of the key to a safe on a rail car in different lock boxes for inspectors.

      We already went through this song and dance in the 1990s with many, many implementations of GAK (government access to keys.)

      Of course, a push to outlaw crypto will just have the opposite effect: The gun nuts will immediately become knowledgeable in encryption. If the tree gets shaken too much and more restrictions are demanded, even Joe Coal Roller will be using a VPN, dead drops, PaperBak, PGP, running Tails Linux, and hosting keysigning parties.

    3. Re:Easy to implement by Agripa · · Score: 1

      Adding a backdoor that is secure is very easy to implement. The government just needs to publish a public key. You then encrypt your private key using that public key and include it with whatever you encrypted. This would be much like the lock box on a house that holds the front-door key that only real estate agents showing the house are supposed to be able to access. And there's no reason it would be limited to just one. Opening a connection to a server in Turkey? Better include lock boxes for both your own government and the Turkish authorities.

      The only big hole is the security of the government's private key (or more likely, keys).

      Clipper worked like that but it encrypted the session key for key recovery. If the private key is encrypted, then key recovery allows forging authentication so all signatures using that private key become suspect. If the session key is encrypted for key recovery, then perfect forward secrecy is no longer possible.

    4. Re:Easy to implement by david_thornley · · Score: 1

      Why bother trying to crack the key? Much easier to find somebody with access to it and coerce that person. Credible threats to kidnap somebody's entire family and rape and torture them to death over a long period of time can be great motivation. Just make it clear that reporting this threat to the authorities will trigger the same thing. If the first person doesn't deliver, the second will find the threat a lot more believable.

      --
      "When you have eliminated the unacceptable, whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truthiness" - Holmes
  18. OPM by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    If the government cannot keep it's list of spies secret, what makes anyone think they can manage to keep a permanent backdoor quiet? Every malevelont actor in the world will try to find it, pay for it, etc. Such an opening would potentially be worth Dr. Evil kind of money.

    It's just as stupid as that jackass Hatch from Utah wanting to blow up PCs that download music. Legislators are fools. And worse, most are old fools.

  19. "Mr. Potato head! by X86BSD · · Score: 2

    MR. POTATO HEAD! Backdoors are not secrets!"

  20. Only one type of backdoor interests me by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    The only kind of backdoor I'm interested in is the one on a nubile girl's bottom.

  21. Let Me Be Your FRONT DOOR Man by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Not backdoor. Comey wants you from the front, all the better to see you writhe and squirm.

  22. Gov't Excuse is Disingenuous at Best by Danilushka · · Score: 1

    If one ways to damage from the two groups: terrorists and criminals having secure encryption or governments having a backdoor to all encryption, hands down far more damage is done to civil rights and liberty by governments worldwide. I'd rather find other ways to curtail terrorism and crime than let governments have tools for oppression of civil rights and liberties.