Congressman: Court Order To Decrypt iPhone Has Far-Reaching Implications (dailydot.com)

Patrick O'Neill writes: Hours after Apple was ordered to help the FBI access the San Bernardino Shooters' iPhone, Rep. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.), a Stanford University computer-science graduate, wondered where the use of the All Writs Act—on which the magistrate judge based her ruling—might lead. "Can courts compel Facebook to provide analytics of who might be a criminal?" Lieu said in an email to the Daily Dot. "Or Google to give a list of names of people who searched for the term ISIS? At what point does this stop?"
Apple, so far, has vowed to fight the order that it decrypt the phone of San Bernadino shooter Syed Rizwan Farook, in no uncertain terms.

Comments

Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

If you go through the legal process and get a court order that is the system working as intended. It's when they want backdoors and unregulated access to your information that it's a problem.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Errol backfiring]

And if you read the article, you see that Apple states that this is a backdoor.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

the correct action would be to cooperate fully right now, and patch the back door. That way current case proceeds, and future similar situations are not feasible because the backdoor doesn't exist.

they'll have to open up a very public case "forcing" Apple to put in a back door, where apple would have a lot firmer leg to stand on as opposed to not cooperating with this investigation.

Re:Don't see the problem

[bytesex]

It's a phone. State actors already have that capability. (although, in this case, the US apparently doesn't, or they're trying the easy way first). It all hinges on that 4-digit PIN. If this is some sort of smartcard, then Apple can't help you either. If this is software based, you can help yourself: just copy the contents of the phone to another medium, have an implementation of the crypto, and run your brute-force from there. With 10000 combinations, it should take about a minute.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Holi]

Cooperating fully would mean implementing a backdoor, not patching one that already exists. Kind of kills your line of reasoning.

Re:Don't see the problem

[gtall]

Gee, and the FBI didn't think of this? You should tell them, I'm sure they'd be pleased to get this information.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

Technically they have. They've asked for a system to remove the passcode limitations to allow brute force attacks.

This screams backdoor...

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

You can't do the latter. The encryption key is split into fragments, baked into silicon in multiple chips, and the exponential timeout and wipe features are enforced by hardware.

iOS may be a walled garden, but damn, the walls go down to the bedrock.

See apple's own ios 9 security whitepaper or this fellow's succinct summary buried deep in the comments on techdirt.

Re:Don't see the problem

[DaHat]

However the law (as well as the judge) compels Apple to assist with law enforcement investigations.

While Apple has designed things so far in a way that makes it rather hard for the government to unlock a phone after it's been seized, one has to wonder at what point they attempt to compel Apple to deploy a modified version of the OS (without all of the safeguards) to subjects who are under investigation... and with a warrant in hand.

Re:Don't see the problem

[stealth_finger]

the correct action would be to cooperate fully right now, and patch the back door. That way current case proceeds, and future similar situations are not feasible because the backdoor doesn't exist.

they'll have to open up a very public case "forcing" Apple to put in a back door, where apple would have a lot firmer leg to stand on as opposed to not cooperating with this investigation.

The problem is the FBI then have this version of iOS with stripped out security that they can then theoretically install on any iphone they want to grab all the data. They say it will only be used this one time for this one thing but if you believe that there's a lovely bridge I have for sale.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Anonymous Coward]

There's no need to talk about slippery slopes. This is already it. This is the government asking for a fully back doored version of iOS to exist. Once that happens, it's only a matter of time before some set of bad guys (be that overzealous gvmnt employees without a court order, or criminals wanting to break into any iPhone they pick up off the street) gets hold of the back doored version, and exploits it.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Asgard]

Being pedantic, but there is no 'sufficiently complex' about a one-time pad. Either the pad is actually random or it is not, and either it is used properly (ie never reused), or it is not.

If it is actually random and never reused, the cipherhtext is beyond virtually unbreakable -- it absolutely unbreakable. The message can be decoded with equal probability into anything.

seed from 8 bytes to 24 bytes to be reasonably secure.

This is not a OTP, it is something else. Your seed is the input to a pseudorandom number generator which is creates the encryption key. Since it is a PRNG it does not achieve the perfect security of a true random OTP. http://crypto.stackexchange.co... describes the issue with trying to generate a OTP with a PRNG.

Given your statement about seed strength but not knowing what tool it is, I'd be very concerned that your effective key strength is significantly less than commodity GPG offers.

Re:Don't see the problem

[MachineShedFred]

It's hardware based encryption, where half of the key comes out of a value burned into the CPU during manufacturing (and not recorded anywhere) combined with a value burned into the "Secure Enclave" during manufacturing (and not recorded anywhere). You take the storage image off the device, you lose half the key and you're fucked. You attempt to crack the PIN on device, you get 10 tries before the secure enclave overwrites the key with a new one, and you're fucked. If the auto-wipe was disabled by the user (it's on by default), then you get an ever-increasing time delay enforced by the hardware in between PIN attempts. It would take upwards of a year to brute-force a 4-digit PIN unless you get very lucky.

Oh, and the setting for the automatic wipe as well as the half of the key generated from sensor entropy is cryptographically stored in the Secure Enclave, which you cannot image or change values of. The crypto key for that is the user's PIN / password.

Is this impossible to break? Given near infinite resources, no. Is it hard enough that you could use the Theory of Limits from calculus to make it equal to impossible? Probably.

Re:Don't see the problem

[bitingduck]

Knowing that a former Secretary of State operated their own email server in a manner that a fairly knowledgeable system administrator would recognize as vulnerable to the known capabilities of state-sponsored attempts to compromise it and extract the contents, it's almost disingenuous for the government to claim security is both essential and working at the highest levels, when they knew or should have known that a Cabinet officer was subverting that security. They just were. Reasonable people and those skilled in the art cannot avoid coming to that conclusion baaed on the publicly known evidence.

Our government isn't very good at protecting our rights, nor at its own operations. Good enough reason to limit our government to essential activities only.

And I pray Apple actually tries to break their own encryption and fails. Security shouldn't be reserved to the few. In a nominally free society we will not have perfect security, but we will have, hopefully, more freedom than not.

Don't overlook the Office of Personnel Management data breach, in which the OPM had such bad security that they effectively released to hackers the entire collection of background check information for all government personnel and contractors who need access to gov't facilities for everyone who filled out the forms from about 2000 to 2015. It wasn't just the form data (name, SSN, lists of associates to use for references, foreign travel history) - it was all the follow up data, too. Including responses from references, clearance interview details. It even included images of fingerprints if you went through the process since the PIV-II cards came into use. All of that information is now basically free on the internet. Forever. It's a phisher's (and foreign extortionist's) wet dream-- a complete set of collated, validated data, including associations and relationships, as well as potential dirt, on everyone who has worked for the US gov't (including many many contractors) for the past 15 years.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Archangel Michael]

The last bastion of liberty is the defiant citizen saying "no" to government overreach. However, when sufficient numbers of people become compliant to the whims of the ruling elite, tyranny is at hand.

Regardless of the circumstances of the case, I admire Tim Cook's stance. My only hope is that he remains standing firm on those convictions.

Re:Don't see the problem

[bkr1_2k]

It's a precedent they're trying to set. Of course they have the tools to do this themselves with a brute force attack, that's not the point. If they can force companies to provide the backdoor then they no longer need to use the appropriate channels to get the information. They'll have the ease of use that anyone at the FBI who wants access to the data can easily get that access, without drawing any unwanted scrutiny. They're trying to backdoor the process as much as the hardware/software.

Re:Don't see the problem

[codeAlDente]

'Slippery slope' cannot be a logical fallacy because it is not a logical proposition.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Thundercleets]

It would be nice to think that Apple was somehow concerned with users privacy but the evidence is to the contrary as Snowden showed they are in it for the money. The information and access the feds are looking for is something they want to be reimbursed for. Usage data and access is seen as the next big thing by everyone in tech which is why they are all getting into the act.

Re:Don't see the problem

[Sloppy]

It is not clear to me that this is going to be done with trojan firmware merely uploaded. It's conceivable that Apple might have to fab a custom IC for this, scrape epoxy off of the existing IC and board to replace the IC, etc. If the FBI's problem can be "fixed" with mere software, then Apple's product wasn't any good anyway, and it was already waiting for any and all attackers to come "fix" it. Somehow I suspect that's not the case.

One of the reasons they might be complaining about the order, is that it's going to cost them so much money. And if the order stands, it could be seen as intimidation. ("My my my, this is an expensive process we made you go through. It sure would be a shame if it happened to you thousands of times per year, now that we have discovered a magic power to force you to do things for us. You know, if you just made future phones a little easier to subvert, you wouldn't have to worry about each of them turning into tens of thousands of dollars of labor later..."

Re:Don't see the problem

[Feyshtey]

The device was not created to defeat law enforcement. It was designed to defeat thieves. That's why people buy phones that can be secured. Ironically the features the government is demanding by circumvented are features the government also demands be on federally issued mobile devices, depending on the type of use. Requiring the creation of a method to break these features actually reduces the security of federal systems and data.

That aside, you're still missing the underlying distinction. While I agree that the court may certainly order a landlord to provide the keys to an establishment in which a tenant was a suspected criminal, it would be ridiculous to suggest that if that tenant had changed the locks and installed high security features that the landlord would be required to dismantle the building so that law enforcement could gain entry. Hell, even if the landlord installed the high security features and as part of the lease agreement forfeited all keys, he STILL shouldnt be held accountable for the methods, let alone costs, of gaining access.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

However, iOS is different. The Secure Enclave (SE) chip holds the key (literally), and no one, not even Apple, can cause the SE to disgorge said key.

This is an iPhone 5c. The secure enclave wasn't added until the iPhone 5s. Even if it existed, as I understand it, it is possible to read both the secure enclave's NAND flash and its hardware ID using electron microscopy.

Note, however, that obtaining that data would likely involve completely destroying the secure enclave (uncapping the chip and removing layers of wiring), which will render the device permanently unusable. This means that you would have to scrape the encrypted data off the external flash chips directly and use a separate computer for doing the actual decryption. More importantly, it means that the device would be a brick afterwards. For post-crime forensic purposes on a device that doesn't need to be returned to its owner, that's not necessarily a show-stopper, but it is probably impossible/infeasible to do this surreptitiously to a confiscated phone and then return the phone (functioning) to its owner.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

That's true on the iPhone 5s and later. This is an iPhone 5c, which lacks a secure enclave. AFAIK, the key is stored on the external flash part, and I think the passcode is entangled with a hardware ID, but that can be obtained by the OS (by definition) without knowing the passcode. So all that is necessary to crack one of these is to remove the code that wipes the key upon a certain number of failed attempts, along with the code that progressively increases the time between failed attempts.

And really, you don't even need those changes, as long as you're willing to unsolder the flash parts, clone them, and resolder them, then repeat this process in the reverse direction every time it wipes the key or the delay gets longer than the time it takes to unsolder, reflash, and resolder the chips.

Re:Don't see the problem

[dgatwood]

That analysis would be correct if this were an iPhone 5s or later. It isn't. It's an iPhone 5c, which doesn't have a secure enclave, making the entire analysis incorrect.

They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[hawkeyeMI]

This is the only good explanation I've seen of what the order is about: https://www.techdirt.com/artic... As long as Apple can install a signed update on the device without decrypting it first, this will be possible. They need to remedy that quickly.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[bigpat]

This is the only good explanation I've seen of what the order is about:

https://www.techdirt.com/artic...

As long as Apple can install a signed update on the device without decrypting it first, this will be possible. They need to remedy that quickly.

Yes, Apple has all along insisted that they can't break the encryption on the phone. But the FBI apparently knows they can and wants them to do it. That means there is already effectively a back door and they just need Apple to sign the software update. So Apple has been lying.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[ausekilis]

My first thought is that the owner should be compelled to unlock their phone. They have reasonable evidence that these folks are guilty of something, so I don't think the 5th amendment would slide here... Anything they find not directly correlated to the crimes they are charged are inadmissible, after all. The owners refusal to cooperate should just levy additional charges, like obstruction of justice or whatever.

For Apple to do this would open up a whole new can of worms. Similar orders would rise up for Android phones, for any encrypted drive manufacturers, or other security vendors that make any sort of privacy guarantee. I am curious if this new backdoor install could bring about a class action lawsuit against Apple for "bait and switch", since they advertise user privacy and this would certainly break that.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[moronoxyd]

The owner of the phone is dead. Reading TFA does, indeed, sometime reveal relevant information.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[TheCastro1689]

Well, the owners are dead, so they can't. And it does go against a recent court ruling stating that unlocking your phone, even under court order means it's inadmissible. Even if everyone "knows" your guilty, you still don't have to incriminate yourself.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Lumpy]

Then they should try waterboarding the body.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[c]

But the FBI apparently knows they can and wants them to do it.

... and the FBI has provided proof of this to the court? I'm fairly certain that if the FBI had proven that Apple actually had a known backdoor the news spin would be very, very different.

I think Apple *could* crack one of their own devices given enough time and motivation. No system is 100% secure. Apple has all the design details and source code, plenty of examples to test against, and the people or means to hire the people who could come up with a crack. But I suspect they don't already have suck a backdoor outside of developer devices and I'd be surprised if they can legally be compelled to produce one. It'll have to go to the Supreme Court for that verdict, though.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Dixie_Flatline]

It's worth noting that this wouldn't work on any device that has a Secure Enclave and TouchID. The Secure Enclave can't be updated or tampered with without it erasing its keys, leaving the phone permanently encrypted. If the SE isn't modified, it imposes delays on responding to passcode requests so that after the 9th request, there's a delay of 1hr before you can try again.

This article goes into more detail: http://blog.trailofbits.com/20...

The phone in question is a 5c, so yes, Apple could theoretically do what is being asked of them. But the phones after that--no.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[MachineShedFred]

It is built in, now. The iPhone 5C is the last model without the "Secure Enclave" which stores the key, arbitrates all access to it, and wipes it after 10 attempts unless told not to.

Re:They aren't ordering Apple to decrypt it

[Archangel Michael]

It'll have to go to the Supreme Court for that verdict, though.

I have no faith in either the (R) (Trump/Cruz/Rubio/Bush ..) or Obama to appoint someone that would rule in favor of privacy/security over government intrusion.

Quite frankly, people who say there is a difference between the two parties, need to wake up and smell the coffee.

Some of your questions may already have answers.

[xxxJonBoyxxx]

>> "Can courts compel Facebook to provide analytics of who might be a criminal?...Or Google to give a list of names of people who searched for the term ISIS?

Facebook already publishes a guide for law enforcement: https://www.facebook.com/safet...
Google does too: https://www.google.com/transpa...

All Writs Act of 1789

[lazarus]

'The All Writs Act is a United States federal statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. 1651, which authorizes the United States federal courts to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.'

"On October 31, 2014, the act was used by the U.S. Attorney's Office in New York to compel an unnamed smartphone manufacturer to bypass the lock screen of a smartphone allegedly involved in a credit card fraud."

Looks like there is a precedent. Mind you Apple has lots of money for lawyers to make sure this doesn't happen.

Re:Throughout history...

[Impy the Impiuos Imp]

If they stuck to specific warrants like they were supposed to, people would have less problem.

As for your idea, there are billions around the world who do not share your joy at government officials being able to read their stuff, limited only to their self-decided limits of appropriateness, like Russia, China, and the Mid East.

We must forbid building the 1984-like tools of tyrrany.

Thanks Apple

[Anonymous Coward]

I'm not an iPhone user but I appreciate you standing up for people's privacy. I have a better chance of winning the lottery than dieing at the hands of a terrorist. Why would I want to lose my privacy over those odds.

Re:Thanks Apple

[firewood]

I have a better chance of winning the lottery than dieing at the hands of a terrorist. Why would I want to lose my privacy over those odds.

One of those odds is an individual risk. The other is a systemic risk that can also end up in the death of many of your family, friends, coworkers and bystanders. So relating the two odds sounds statistically intelligent, but is really a form of systemic risk blindness.

Re:Thanks Apple

[Dixie_Flatline]

In that case, the risk of you or your family dying in a motor vehicle accident--the same kind of systemic risk that you're talking about--is orders of magnitude higher than the risk of dying in a terrorist attack. Similarly with dying from domestic gun violence. That's with laws in place to mitigate those risks. The reality is that terrorism is a really marginal cause of death, and to spend too much time and money worrying about it (certainly any time and money beyond the enormous amounts we're already spending) is madness.

No uncertain terms?

[Anonymous Coward]

If I read Apple's "customer letter" correctly, they very well have the ability to create the software that is demanded of them, and decrypt that phone. Whether that software already exists or not is immaterial. If it is possible to create the software and use it on existing devices, then for all intents and purposes the backdoor is already there. Apple just doesn't want to open it, because they rightly fear losing the trust of their customers - trust which, following this interpretation, is unfounded.

Re:No uncertain terms?

[TheCastro1689]

You can't force a company to spend money and man hours making something that doesn't exist so that you can use their product they way you want to,

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

The court isn't asking for Apple to decrypt the phone, but for them to provide a special signed firmware that disables certain features meant to protect the encrypted data against brute-forcing.

If the crypto is up to snuff and a strong key was used then brute force will fail anyway, so I don't understand why this is such a big deal to Apple.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anonymous Coward]

You obviously didn't bother to read Apple's response to this. They are not asked to decrypt the phone, they have been asked to 1.) remove firmware protection that wipes the device after 10 unsuccessful access attempts, if enabled, and 2.) provide firmware that somehow circumvents the built-in progressive delays so that brute forcing the password is possible by hooking up some device to the phone.

Basically, they are asking Apple for custom firmware/OS that renders security features useless that would make attacks on the PIN codes or passphrase impractical. It is Apple's position that once Apple has created this custom firmware/OS combo, then they are virtually guaranteed that they will be forced to provide it again and again, thereby essentially creating a government backdoor.

Re:Shielding murderers and the accomplices

[moronoxyd]

This isn't just about two terrorists.
Once Apple complied and build the tools necessary, the tool can and will be used elsewhere.

And what the LEOs don't understand or willfully ignore, is that if a backdoor exists, pretty much everybody can use it. If Apple creates this modified firmware for the US government, other governments around the world will demand access, too. And sooner or later, this firmware will get in the hand of non-government actors with criminal intend, too.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[ugen]

It's a big deal because complying with *any* request to modify software for use of LEA now will mean that they (and other manufacturers) will have to comply with *all* requests to modify software in the future. In the eyes of the law there is no difference in what technical capability is being implemented, only that some sort of technical capability can be implemented at the direction of LEA. Once open, this door cannot be closed.

Is what the FBI ask Apple feasible, or not ?

[fgrieu]

There is something that does not add up in Apple's discourse at http://www.apple.com/customer-...

Specifically, the FBI wants us to make a new version of the iPhone operating system, circumventing several important security features, and install it on an iPhone recovered during the investigation. In the wrong hands, this software — which does not exist today — would have the potential to unlock any iPhone in someone’s physical possession.

The FBI may use different words to describe this tool, but make no mistake: Building a version of iOS that bypasses security in this way would undeniably create a backdoor.

I read what the FBI asks as: install a piece of code that allows the phone's content to be examined. I see no middle ground between

1) running such piece of code (probably: after getting it signed by Apple) is possible without the owner's passcode; the iPhone is in fact already backdoored, with Apple holding the key, the FBI wants Apple to exploit the vulnerability/open the backdoor, and Apple does not want to bow, because that's against their policy.

2) running a piece of code signed by Apple also requires he owner's passcode; then the solution pushed by the FBI just can't work.

If the facts where 2, Apple could just state this to the FBI, showing the source code as proof. The FBI would have no choice but take it as fact (perhaps they would ask a change in the future, but it would not help immediately for this iPhone). I conclude the true story is 1, and Apple slightly misrepresents things stating the FBI wants the creation of a backdoor, when there's already one, only well locked and never previously used for nefarious purposes.

Because politicians believe in magic...

[gestalt_n_pepper]

There Is No Such Thing as Magic. If there is a known backdoor, it will be found and exploited. This can't be prevented, and honestly (Take not, politicians)...

That means that the content on anyone's phone can be stolen. Not just anyone's phone, but the phone of every politician in the world.

Be careful what you wish for.

Re:Because politicians believe in magic...

[Thelasko]

That means that the content on anyone's phone can be stolen. Not just anyone's phone, but the phone of every politician in the world.

If politicians want to put a back door on our phones, those politicians need to use those same phones.

Which brings up another point. The US Federal Government can hack the German Chancellor's Iphone, but not the Iphone of some nut in California?

Re:Because politicians believe in magic...

[Kjella]

Which brings up another point. The US Federal Government can hack the German Chancellor's Iphone, but not the Iphone of some nut in California?

Presumably the Chancellor's phone was hacked while it was running. Just like using full disk encryption doesn't protect you from getting a trojan while surfing, but if your laptop is turned off and gets stolen it will. It's only a strong lock on the door, it doesn't prevent nasty things from slipping in when it's open.

Preaching to the choir

[bangular]

Head over to NY Times and Washington Post websites and look at the comments. You joke, but many people there are actually saying things like this. I see comments calling for Tim Cook to be charged with treason, saying Apple shouldn't be able to do business in the U.S., etc. The reason shit like this flies in the U.S. is not because of slashdoters, it's people like that who vote congress critters into office.

Re:Preaching to the choir

[halivar]

You joke, but many people there are actually saying things like this. I see comments calling for Tim Cook to be charged with treason, saying Apple shouldn't be able to do business in the U.S., etc.

To be fair, you see these same exact comments on Slashdot; just for different reasons.

Another analogy

[bangular]

Government to Apple: "Develop the atom bomb. It will only be used just this once and then you can throw away the technology. Also, develop it on your dime."

Re:Another analogy

[Actually, I do RTFA]

Also, develop it on your dime

Bullshit. Apple is allowed to charge reasonable rates to comply with the Writ. And reasonable rates can be determined by something as simple as cost of the employees' time and any materials required, plus overhead. They'll even recoup their electricity for the computers. They'll probably make a nominal profit on the work.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[torkus]

And just to pound the point home, both are true:

Once the legal door has been opened (it becomes OK to require companies build back doors)...
Once the technical door has been opened (backdoor to firmware)...

Open either door and there's no closing them. What's truly ironic is there was a huge uproar a year or so about backdoors in network gear coming out of china ... and now the US is literally asking for the same thing to be created for them.

"Bad cases make good law" (sometimes)

[DutchUncle]

This particular phone's owner deserves no mercy. But that's not the point, or at least not the whole point. If Apple can do this to one phone, they can do it to any phone; and if the government can make Apple do it to the phone of a dead murderer who doesn't deserve legal protection, then the government can make Apple do it do it to the phone of a live whistleblower who DOES deserve legal protection. My title comes from an era of free speech rights debates inspired by porn cases; the fact that a particular image is disgusting, like the fact that a particular case involves a murderer, does not justify changing our checks and balances for "just this case", because the precedent will be used to justify many more cases.

Re:"Bad cases make good law" (sometimes)

[david_thornley]

They can't do it to my iPhone, or any iPhone Apple is currently selling. Mine is the version after the one in the case, and is not vulnerable to that attack. It's probably vulnerable to something else, being a complex piece of technology, but that's how life works.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[Anubis IV]

No, they claimed that they cannot decrypt their current phones (i.e. ones with TouchID + Secure Enclave running iOS 8 or 9). This model is an iPhone 5c (i.e. three generations old) that lacks the protections of their current phones and thus is susceptible to the sort of attack being proposed by the FBI. Apple has pointed out that complying with this order would jeopardize their business by making it seem as if they're lying about the security of their current phones, since the public won't understand the distinction. Your comment is evidence in support of their concern.

Re:Old southern saying

[Bob the Super Hamste]

Can't put the shit back in the horse

Sounds like you haven't done much surfing on the net.

Find myself in a moment of Apple Admiration

[BrendaEM]

Well, one Apple-Hater hates a little less.

What this (probably) means to you!

[cfalcon]

The order implies that Apple is capable of delivering a remote update, or that forcing an update locally is possible if you have physical access. It also implies that portions of the security models are enforced by software that is vulnerable to "update", such as the wipe-after-ten-tries (presumably that code will be replaced with a no-op) and the code entry delay in excess of that which is enforced by hardware.

Whether Apple is compelled to do this or not, the natural concern is "well how much of my data is shielded by math, how much by hardware, and how much by software"?

You can't bargain with math, you have a devil of a time working out hardware, and software along is meaningless as a defense.

It appears that your best bet for security is either:

1)- A multi-character password that is easy to enter (and you'll remember it if its your phone password, lol), but reasonably short. This is if you trust that the 80ms hardware delay can't be broken. This precludes the use of 4 and 6 digit PINs, as a 4 digit PIN will usually fall after a few minutes of this treatment, and a 6 digit PIN after around half a day. An 8 digit password consisting of a completely random set of just the visible lowercase letters (aka, no actual english words) at this rate is hundreds of years, and adding stuff that's harder to enter quickly (capitals, numbers, special characters) makes it much more secure, as does lengthening the password slightly. The challenge here is that passwords are usually chosen to be words, greatly reducing the entropy. And again, this assumes that the 80ms hardware delay is not defeatable.

2)- A fully secure crypto passhprase. This is the level of drama you would go through to password protect a drive or something you take very seriously, and as such it would be a lot more than 8 characters. Your passphrase is long, contains several unpredictable parts, and makes use of more than just a statistically predictable subset of words and characters. You can set this on the iphone, of course, but this kind of protection is not trivial to type in. In this case, you are trusting the math only, however, and assuming that the software will be compelled by the government, and the hardware will be owned by a team skilled in this matter.

Going forward, Apple should probably move the "erase after 10 tries" into the secure portion of the phone, such that it has a protected portion that can't be overwritten without access to the PIN. This will also make them immune to this sort of order in the future.

Re:What this (probably) means to you!

[eth1]

or

3) A two-level system. A simple PIN that unlocks the phone enough to make calls, send texts, take pictures, etc., and provide access to the last X hours of call/text/pic/etc. history. Going back any further in time would require a more complex passphrase. Apps could be grouped into ones usable with PIN, and ones only usable with the passphrase. A panic button on the lock screen would flush all data to the more protected area, and require the more complex passphrase to unlock anything.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[gstoddart]

And, the US (and US made products) will irrevocably cease to be trustworthy.

Once the US does this, everyone in the world MUST assume these companies have built this in, that the US government can access it, and that Apple will be forced to roll over for any other government.

I'm not sure people understand just how much of a global clusterfuck of undermining rights and freedoms the US is doing here -- it's time to stop pretending to be champions of freedom and liberty when you have actively decided to do the opposite.

If Apple caves on this, every piss-pot dictator will insist on the same access.

What the FBI is demanding is full Big Brother status.

But "reasonable" is a nebulous term.

[Chas]

What the court (and the idiot sitting in the big chair) see as "reasonable" may not be reasonable to Apple, or anyone else.

Additionally, such a nebulous term is horribly susceptible to "moving goalposts". Apple decides to cave, gets so far, and doesn't think it reasonable to go any further. But now that they've caved, the government and the idiot in the big chair come back with "Well, you've gotten THIS far, you may as well see it through!"

The appropriate answer to this is "There is no technical way to do this." And when asked or told to devise one on their own dime, they should be told "There is no legitimate business use for this, if it is even possible." and fight it to the bitter end.

No such thing as a one time back door

[sjbe]

But for this specific case only.

There is no such thing as a single case back door. Either the software is secure for all or it isn't secure at all. There is no middle ground here.

I don't understand why this can't be in a temporary fashion, specific to this particular iphone, and only for this specific case.

Because once you develop the software you can't un-develop it and it WILL be used again. The government is ordering Apple to develop what amounts to a backdoor. Apple is (very sensibly) fighting against this because it is a terrible idea with far reaching consequences. Once they develop the software then you can be certain as the sun rising tomorrow that the government would order it to be used in the future. Furthermore 2/3 of Apple's sales come from outside the US and if other countries governments/citizens believe Apple to be beholden to the US government it could very easily hurt their sales very badly.

Basically there is no upside for this for anyone except the investigators in this case. That is not sufficient justification for Apple to demolish everyone's privacy.

Everyone should have Apple's back on this!

[KlomDark]

Apple is in the right and Google and Microsoft should be backing Apple on this one.

And I say this as a long time hater of all things Apple. I own nothing from Apple. Never have. I fucking detest Apple. Look at any post of mine here on /. for almost 20 years and you will see that this is the very first post I have ever made here saying ANYTHING positive about Apple.

But they are so in the right on this one. Our devices are our own personal data archives on a level way beyond our houses or safes. It is an extension of our brains. While we may not have the technology just yet, imagine if a court ordered you to have your personal memories residing in your physical brain extracted. This is the same thing. People put info on their phones with a full expectation of privacy, regardless of if that expectation is realistic. If you think it's acceptable for the government to demand access to your most personal inner sanctum of being (your brain), then a brain extension like a personal phone or computer should also be inviolate.

This is so completely disgustingly wrong of anyone in government to expect such a thing, for any reason. Even for this reason. Extra ludicrosity because this is an after-the-fact demand, no matter what happens this will not bring one person back from the dead.

If you are about freedom in any way, then you should be completely against this horrid precedent ever being set. Your thoughts are your own, always.

It's realy nice they're letting Apple fight it

[HeckRuler]

I presume that some congressman pushed the FBI to make this request out in the open just for the purpose of fighting it in court. All in all it's a good thing. Defending civil rights and all that.

But if the FBI ACTUALLY wanted this information they would have simply given Apple a gag order along with it. Or asked the NSA to do that for them. It's even their purpose, fighting terrorism, right? This falls SQUARELY under the domain of shit they've strong-armed and gagged companys into helping them with. The fact that we're even hearing about it has to be some sort of process manipulation.

All locks can be picked eventually

[sjbe]

So by your very logic the software is already not secure - if it were, Apple wouldn't be able to retrofit a backdoor.

If the software does not currently exist to backdoor the device then it IS secure - for now. The fact that it might be possible to change that is a separate issue.

It's inherently insecure already and Apple are merely being asked to hack it.

This presumes that Apple can hack the device. It has not been conclusively established that this is possible. But let's presume that it is possible for argument's sake since if Apple can't do it then it isn't worthy of discussion. If Apple is able to hack into the device to retrieve the data then in theory the device is insecure in the same sense that a lock that can be picked is insecure. However the tools to hack the device (allegedly) do not currently exist so as things stand the device IS secure. If it wasn't then the FBI would not have any need to ask Apple to hack the device.

If it's secure then Apple can't introduce a backdoor, as the secure software prevents this.

That's like arguing that a lock is insecure because the technology exists to develop lock picks for it. Security is never absolute particularly when a party has physical access to the device. Apple should in principle have the best idea how to go about picking this particular "lock" just like one would expect the maker of a safe to have the best idea how to circumvent the security features of their own product.

I'm sorry but your assumptions precipitate a paradox.

Hardly. A device can be entirely secure today with full knowledge of how it can be made insecure tomorrow. The point is that asking Apple to facilitate this action would have the knock on effect of making ALL devices immediately insecure today instead of theoretically insecure tomorrow.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[david_thornley]

The technical door has been closed. This trick won't work on an iPhone 5S or later. There are doubtless other vulnerabilities, but the hardware security improvements on the more recent iPhones are impressive.

Now, my privacy technique is partly to be so boring no FBI agent will look through all my private stuff anyway, but that's not for everyone.

Re:Unless Apple Lied

[david_thornley]

The law says "reasonable", and asking for perfect code that's actually useful is unreasonable. Moreover, since Apple doesn't have to do it on their own dime, and getting near-perfect code requires NASA levels of expense, even the FBI is likely to get discouraged.

In this case, it's easy to see whether the code works: if the FBI runs through the possible PINs, and can do so in reasonable time without the encryption key getting wiped, the software worked.

In general, the court system doesn't produce stupid or ignorant rulings, and most of those can be dealt with with an appeal. It does produce what I believe to be wrong rulings sometimes, but not from lack of understanding the issues.