FAA Says Boeing 737 MAX Planes Are Still Airworthy (cnbc.com)

An anonymous reader quotes a report from CNBC: The Boeing 737 MAX, the type of plane involved in a deadly crash in Ethiopia over the weekend, is still airworthy and the Federal Aviation Administration plans to issue a notice to the international aviation community later Monday, a person familiar with the matter said. "The FAA continuously assesses and oversees the safety performance of U.S. commercial aircraft," the FAA said in a statement. "If we identify an issue that affects safety, the FAA will take immediate and appropriate action."

Aviation officials in China and Indonesia ordered domestic airlines to ground their fleets of the popular Boeing single-aisle planes after the deadly crash of one operated by Ethiopian Airlines on Sunday. The 149 passengers and eight crew members on board were killed when the plane crashed shortly after takeoff. The incident was the second deadly crash of the new Boeing planes in less than five months. A Lion Air Boeing 737 MAX 8 plunged into the Java Sea shortly after taking off from Jakarta in October, killing all 189 people on board.

Comments

Southwest still uses 'em

[SuperKendall]

Southwest, and I think American have both said they don't think anything is fundamentally wrong with the plane. Possibly this is some kind of training issue.

Given there have been no issues here, I don't think it's unreasonable for other carriers to keep flying them even while they figure out what happened.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

If pilots who have had all of the currently required training per Boeing are flying these jets into the ground, well it doesn't fucking matter if additional training might solve the fucking problem now does it?

Right, because fully trained pilots never ever crash any other plane.

What are you, 12?

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

Well you've got the multiple nested IF statements thing handled. What you're missing is all the ELSE bits. Try again?

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ceoyoyo]

The Indonesian flight seems to have been due to a training issue: Boeing elected not to include the required procedures for disabling a failing anti-stall system into the variant difference training course because they didn't want to confuse the average pilot.

So hopefully all 737 max pilots have gotten the message now, and will respond quickly and appropriately when their aircraft exhibit a determined effort to dive into the ground.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

Swing and a miss. Ah well.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

System interactions are complex, there is a way to do it but it may not be obvious.

Pulling back on the stick is pretty fucking obvious. Adjusting your trim is slightly less obvious; you would first have to look at the trim indication and realize that it's out of whack. Still well within the abilities of any decent pilot though. Manual trim override is even less obvious, but is the default action once you determine that the trim system is faulty; something all pilots are trained in.

You don't know what happened and are guessing based on having zero information

Zero information other than reading up on how the Boeing MCAS functions, and having experience maintaining and operating multi-engine aircraft, yes.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[amorsen]

So hopefully all 737 max pilots have gotten the message now, and will respond quickly and appropriately when their aircraft exhibit a determined effort to dive into the ground.

A better option would seem to be to fix the aircraft so that it does not exhibit a determined effort to dive into the ground.

Modern aircraft are a UI disaster.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[crgrace]

You seem to be misinformed:

1. Even with trim maxed out, pulling back on the yoke/stick will still bring the nose back up.

However, according to the New York Times:

Older 737s had another way of addressing certain problems with the stabilizers: Pulling back on the yoke, or control column, one of which sits immediately in front of both the captain and the first officer, would cut off electronic control of the stabilizers, allowing the pilots to control them manually.

That feature was disabled on the Max when M.C.A.S. was activated â" another change that pilots were unlikely to have been aware of. After the crash, Boeing told airlines that when M.C.A.S. is activated, as it appeared to have been on the Lion Air flight, pulling back on the control column will not stop so-called stabilizer runaway.

Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/world/asia/lion-air-plane-crash-pilots.html/

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

That's a pretty shit article, but it did correct one misconception I had, so thank you for that! I had figured the 737 would accomplish trim via tabs on the elevator, but after checking it looks like the entire horizontal stab is trimmable. Cool.

Doesn't change things too much. I didn't say that pulling back on the yoke would override the trim; I said it would still bring the nose up. Trimmable stabs might be a bit more of a problem than elevator trim, but it would still be possible to maintain altitude.

Boeing's comments on the issue seems to indicate as much; they've stated that failing to override the trim would "make the aircraft difficult to control" which is certainly true, but nobody has suggested that it would be impossible to bring the nose up.

Also here is a video of 737 runaway stab trim training from 2015:

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=...

You will see that the procedure is the same as what would be required on the 737 MAX; in the video the copilot pulls back on the yoke, while the pilot manually adjusts trim. That's what aircrew should be doing with or without MCAS.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[darkmeridian]

To be fair, the MCAS system that contributed to the Lion Air crash was receiving bad information from a defective angle of attack sensor that had been marked down for repair after the flight right before the fatal one. The ground maintenance crew did not service the AOA sensor, so the MCAS thought the plane was stalling, and then kept on pushing the nose down. The chances of another AOA sensor failing, and then triggering the MCAS system would be astronomically small, but also catastrophic for Boeing if true.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[darkmeridian]

The aircraft aren't just diving towards the ground as a default behavior. The Lion Air 737 crashed because the angle of attack sensor was defective, giving bad information to the MCAS. As a result, the system thought that the aircraft was nose-up and about to stall when it was actually in level flight.

The AOA sensor gave bad info in the penultimate flight, causing a runaway trim problem. However, the ground crew did not fix the AOA sensor, and did not tell the new flight crew about the AOA problem and runaway trim.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[ceoyoyo]

There have been some discussions by actual Boeing 737 pilots. Yes, given time you might realize that the plane is screwing with your trim. But consider:

1) You don't know that it can do that because Boeing elected not to tell you
2) The autopilot is off
3) You've just taken off, are low, and in one of the most dangerous phases of flight
4) The cockpit is full of alarms that are telling you you're stalling, and other alarms telling you your angle of attack, air speed and stall warnings are unreliable
5) You keep pulling back, but every ten seconds the computer dials in more trim and you have to pull back more, and the haptic feedback system dials in more opposing force, so you have to pull even harder

Pilots in emergency situations are human. They rely on memorized safety procedures to follow in situations like that. Apparently "turn off the MCAS" is now one of those procedural items. It wasn't before.

It's curious that the pilots on the *previous* Indonesian flight didn't notice the trim acting up, since it sounds like they probably flew most of the flight with it doing so. Or maybe they did notice, and the disengage wasn't working properly.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[LemonFire]

I, for one will opt out from this Boeing 737 version while they "figure out" what is wrong with the 737 Max.
To quote Chesley Sullenberger: "If we only blame the pilots we will not have changed any of the underlying fundamental conditions. We'd not done our best to prevent this from happening again".

-- This sig sagged

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[hcs_$reboot]

There were 2 experienced pilots. None of them having a clue how to fix such a dangerous situation is suspicious...

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[Hognoxious]

Now we know where Gnome usability specialists go to when they fancy a change.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ceoyoyo]

Not so small if the sensor design is faulty. The sensor may not have actually been at fault, or maybe the Ethiopian crash was caused by something completely different. It would seem like a good idea to make the MCAS give a warning and disengage if the two AOA sensors don't agree though. And maybe cross check against some other flight data as a backup. Having the MCAS aware of the altitude and not initiate a dive when the plane was near the ground might be a good idea.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[Hognoxious]

The pilots on the plane which crashed DID pull the nose up numerous times, but they - for whatever reason - never turned off automatic trim.

Because they expected that to happen automatically when they pulled the nose up, as it had done on previous versions of the aircraft.

It's right there in the article that crgrace ( 220738 ) posted.

So they pull the nose up, go "phew, that was close!" but the Mad Crazy Ass Suicide mechanism is still active and pitches forward again...

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

Because they expected that to happen automatically when they pulled the nose up, as it had done on previous versions of the aircraft.

Except it didn't. Go check the video I posted. That's from 2015. They manually turn off the automatic trim system. The camera even zooms in on the switches.

My understanding is that on older models pulling on the yoke temporarily disable the electrical trim system. It didn't completely shut it off. The difference between older 737s and the MAX, then, would be that the MAX would be somewhat harder to control until you actually flipped those switches, but on both versions of the 737 you still have to follow the same procedures.

So they pull the nose up, go "phew, that was close!" but the Mad Crazy Ass Suicide mechanism is still active and pitches forward again...

Again, same thing would have happened on the older aircraft. But, for the sake of the argument, let's say I'm wrong about that; it still doesn't change the fact that (as demonstrated in the video) the procedures have always called for switching to manual control. Nor does it change the fact that the previous aircrew on the same aircraft did the correct thing in the exact same circumstances.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

1) You don't know that it can do that because Boeing elected not to tell you

That's a fair criticism of Boeing, but also not all that relevant. The symptom here would be the same as any other runaway trim situation, and would be dealt with the same way.

2) The autopilot is off

It would have to be; MCAS doesn't function with the autopilot on.

3) You've just taken off, are low, and in one of the most dangerous phases of flight

You can't be that low or early; MCAS also doesn't function with the flaps down.

4)
5)

I could make some objections to these, but nothing of much consequence so I'll agree it's a shitty situation.

Pilots in emergency situations are human. They rely on memorized safety procedures to follow in situations like that. Apparently "turn off the MCAS" is now one of those procedural items. It wasn't before.

There is no "turn off the MCAS". There's a "turn off electrical trim system", which has always been there. If you look further up you'll see a video I posted of pilots doing it on an older 737 back in 2015.

It's curious that the pilots on the *previous* Indonesian flight didn't notice the trim acting up, since it sounds like they probably flew most of the flight with it doing so. Or maybe they did notice, and the disengage wasn't working properly.

Pilots on the previous flight DID have the same problem:

"Boeing has asserted the pilots on the next-to-last flight of the same Lion Air aircraft that crashed encountered a similar, if less severe, nose-down problem. They addressed it by flipping off the stabilizer cutout switches, in keeping with the emergency checklist."

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/0...

They correctly followed the checklist and lived. The pilots on the final flight did not.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[Humbubba]

SuperKendall said

Southwest, and I think American have both said they don't think anything is fundamentally wrong with the plane. Possibly this is some kind of training issue.

Given there have been no issues here, I don't think it's unreasonable for other carriers to keep flying them even while they figure out what happened.

Boeing must be embarrassed they sold the 737 Max as being so similar to the other 737s, pilots won't have to go back to school in order to fly it.

Updating pilot manuals to handle a known hardware failure sounds like a good idea. Calling accidents that arise from said hardware failure 'pilot error' doesn't.

News reports are pointing to an airflow sensor, called the "Angle of Attack" sensor as the possible problem. It's false readings (bad data) tricks the plane's computer into issuing a 'nose down' command to keep the plane flying. This is the problem the pilots are trying to deal with as the plane heads 'nose down' to the ground.

This more than just a training issue. There's no question the pilots on the Ethiopian flight to Kenya were battling with the plane as it issued a steep dive command moments into the flight. All 157 on board died 6 minutes after takeoff. 189 people died 13 minutes into the October flight from Jakarta to Pangkal Pinang in Indonesia. Here too, there's no doubt the pilots were fighting for their lives.

Either fix the plane, the computer, the sensor - or replace human pilots with AI. This is killing people.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[CRC'99]

What I found strange, climb, level out, climb, level out, climb, level out, rapid descent, then recovery, profile climb.

At the first identification of levelling out, the crew should cut off all automatic control and take manual actions to rectify the flight path. You first action should never be "Oh, the autopilot is going something funny, how can we fix it?"

There's a great video that's over 20 years old that is still as relevant today as it was then.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?...

Flight aerodynamics hasn't changed in that time - but how we train / respond in both training and procedures have.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[dcw3]

Adjusting your trim is slightly less obvious; you would first have to look at the trim indication and realize that it's out of whack

Trim is normally set so that you don't have to push or pull on the yoke to maintain your path. You don't look at a "trim indication".

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[WaffleMonster]

The Indonesian flight seems to have been due to a training issue: Boeing elected not to include the required procedures for disabling a failing anti-stall system into the variant difference training course because they didn't want to confuse the average pilot.

So hopefully all 737 max pilots have gotten the message now, and will respond quickly and appropriately when their aircraft exhibit a determined effort to dive into the ground.

Y'all have stock in Boeing?

What flights are serviced by 737 max? I what to fly on an aircraft where the pilot must remember what button to push to bypass random attempts of the aircraft to kill everyone. Knowing the "training" problem has been fixed is very reassuring.

Many expletives and ad homenim insults cried out in terror and were suddenly silenced during the production of this message.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[Aighearach]

Adjusting your trim is slightly less obvious; you would first have to look at the trim indication and realize that it's out of whack

Trim is normally set so that you don't have to push or pull on the yoke to maintain your path. You don't look at a "trim indication".

But I can haz trim adjustment in sim? I never have problem like this. If I did, it would be so easy that Ceiling Cat would save me!

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[Aighearach]

Y'all

It is bad enough when people pronounce that abomination, but why would you go on the internet and use it? Just to warn everybody you're from the South and might be horrible inside?

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[amorsen]

It is ridiculous to have the safety of the aircraft depend on one single sensor with no clear indication of the state of that sensor. Especially if you then don't tell the crew about it because doing so would mean they would have to actually be trained on the aircraft they're flying, not on a somewhat similar model without the automatic trim system.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[Joce640k]

The fleet should be grounded, but money talks

If it was Airbus the FAA would have grounded them after the first/i> incident.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

The MCAS system will CONTINUE to make control inputs which force the aircraft to pitch down, and thus can over ride the control inputs made by the crew.

Pure nonsense. The MCAS system doesn't act directly on the controls, it controls trim. Even maximum trim can be overcome by the pilots to level out the plane and then figure out what's going on. Based on their flight path we know that they were, in fact, able to overcome it multiple times.

It will over time become apparent that the aircraft which have crashed were crewed by pilots who did NOT receive complete training in the use of the MCAS system.

There is no "use of the MCAS". It's an automatic system. You don't use it, you let it do it's thing. If your mechanics are retarded and their negligence causes your MCAS to kick in when it shouldn't, you treat it the same way as you would any other runaway trim situation. Had the aircrew on the Lion Air flight followed the same checklist which has been in use for decades, they and their passengers would have lived.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ceoyoyo]

Apparently sarcasm is too subtle for Slashdot. What part of "so hopefully all 737 max pilots have gotten the message now, and will respond quickly and appropriately when their aircraft exhibit a determined effort to dive into the ground" makes you think I have stock in Boeing?

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ZZZaphod]

No. The software is at fault. With proper training the poor pilots could have overridden or disabled the software, but it was a fault in the software that caused the plane to repeatedly point is nose to the ground. That software was designed by people, written by people, the system designed and built by people, and tested by people who either missed or ignored a fault that has now killed hundreds of people. Just to be patently clear, the answer to a design or implementation flaw is not better training to avoid or circumvent the flaw. That action clearly saved the lives of the people onboard the flight just prior to the first disaster, but for us here still the answer is not 'how to work around the flaws.bugs/quirks/failures in the system' it is to design a system free of those or find another solution.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ZZZaphod]

To split a hair, in this case, it did exactly that. As a default behavior on _this_ flight. Without notice, provocation or warning to its operators, the machine pointed its own nose to the ground. By default. That that new 'default' was caused by a system failure somewhere up the line, is immaterial. For the operators of that machine, that day, it on its own, by default, repeatedly pointed its own nose to the ground.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ZZZaphod]

I'm sure you've seen now, Captain Getachew had 8,000 hours. Curious, if a model of car develops, an issue where they sporadically spontaneously steer hard left, would we still think of the resolution as an operator training issue?

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[Chriscypher]

Everyone is soooo overthinking this.

Maybe the pilot let a friend fly who reversed his Z axis settings.

That's forced me to quit out, reset, and respawn many a time. /s

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ceoyoyo]

when their aircraft exhibit a determined effort to dive into the ground

Just in case you missed it.

At least on on the Indonesian flight, it appears that a hardware sensor failed, causing the software system to act inappropriately and a backup manual override procedure wasn't part of the training course. There's lots of failure to go around, at the hardware, software, and training levels.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[ceoyoyo]

There definitely seems to be more to it. The MAX series is apparently unstable at high angles of attack due to the change in placement of the engines, which is why the MCAS was added in the first place. Perhaps the system is able to produce a pitch excursion large enough to put the plane into the unstable regime.

Anyway, the MAX has suddenly acquired a pretty bad safety record. It might be really bad luck, but probably not.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[Plumpaquatsch]

Southwest, and I think American have both said they don't think anything is fundamentally wrong with the plane.

Well, they say the same about their service, so ...

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[Plumpaquatsch]

Possibly this is some kind of bombing issue.

FTFY

Yeah, supposedly some guy yelled "Sex to the Incels!" while touching a sex bomb.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[Obfuscant]

Trim is normally set so that you don't have to push or pull on the yoke to maintain your path. You don't look at a "trim indication".

And when the aircraft you are flying suddenly tries to climb or descend when you've changed nothing and the thrust has not changed, one of the first things you would look at is the trim indicator to see if that is causing the problem.

Runaway trim is an age old problem taught to every pilot who deals with "George" -- an autopilot.

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[Hognoxious]

The fact that on one occasion they did it manually doesn't disprove what I said.

How much Boeing stock do you own?

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[kaatochacha]

No, it's not.
Let me rephrase that: it "ain't".

Re: Southwest still uses 'em

[c6gunner]

50 billion units.

What you said was pretty fucking pointless, as usual. I was being generous and assuming you actually had a point.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[dcw3]

Please cite where the FAA has taken preference for US vs. foreign built aircraft. You made the claim...back it up.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ZZZaphod]

Yes, that's all true. The thing that pushed the nose down was a software program. It relies on sensors. Its sensor was bad and the software program didn't know it, it didn't tell the crew, it instead pushed the nose toward the ground. If a make and model of car, occasionally, unprovoked, pull the car firmly to the left, would we think the solution was training? A stopgap measure for the pilots to get one that happens to still be in the air today safely back to earth - yes, Training. Then we land all the planes still in the air. Fix the software, fix the sensors, make it impossible for this failure mode to occur. If we can't, then we implement a better system, that does.

Re:Southwest still uses 'em

[ceoyoyo]

Absolutely. To be clear, my post was sarcastic. A plane that tries to fly itself into the ground needs to be fixed. There is a "training issue," but that issue is Boeing purposely omitting information about what turned out to be a critical backup safety procedure.

Waiting a couple of days for some initial information from the Ethiopian crash before taking drastic action was probably a wise decision, but announcements that "the plane is safe" weren't. The FAA's international reputation is taking the hit now, as it probably should.

political donations

[Anonymous Coward]

My faith in the government is such that I believe the FAA's statement has more to do with political donations than the aircraft in question.

Re:political donations

[HiThere]

IIUC, the investigation into the accident has barely started. So the only reasonable decisions would be on some variant of "the precautionary principle". If the FAA is making a decision now, then one needs to wonder just who or what their use of "the precautionary principle" is protecting.

In fact!

[fuzzyfuzzyfungus]

It is surely only common sense that having the crash-prone 737s weeded out of the fleet makes the remainder not just safe, but safer, on average. Science.

Breaking news...

[bosef1]

Today, [company], the only one that manufactures [thing], says that in spite of [recent deaths / maulings / spontaneous combustions (strike unneeded)] attributed to [thing], [thing] is still suitable for general use, and the public should feel safe continuing to use [thing], preferably [in / at (strike unneeded)] a greater [quantity / rate (strike unneeded)] than before.

In other news, experts are still baffled as reports of [missing / de-limbed / immolated (strike unneeded)] personnel continue to come in. The [chief of police / head zookeeper / fire marshal] (strike unneeded)] advises the citizenry to remain calm as the reports are investigated by [his / her (strike unneeded)] top people.

Re:Breaking news...

[yodleboy]

still safer to fly than drive a Tesla on autopilot. I'll trust Boeing's word over Elon's, thanks.

The FAA is known to avoid change

[jd]

They do nothing without clear and compelling evidence. And even then have been known to delay.

There were cases in an earlier Boeing aircraft of metallic particles in hydraulic fluid causing crashes, but the FAA and NTSB held off on action because they couldn't prove that was the cause of the accidents in the lab.

Turned out their lab tests were faulty.

Once upon a time, they were too proactive, demanding changes without proper testing or evaluation. That also caused crashes, which is why they prefer to do nothing over doing too much.

The second aircraft was in flames prior to the flight terminating abruptly on the ground. It has been suggested that overworked controls fighting with an overly aggressive antistall device may have caused that.

Moreover, we must remember the 777. It suffered multiple near-disasters with battery packs in flames in the first few flights. This would suggest poor testing procedures.

Conditions for both crashes are very, very different from those in America, so if it's an environmental factor that triggered the fault, the FAA are likely correct.

If it's a design flaw triggered, as with the 777, by unusual system loads, then it could happen at any time.

If the accident reports are indeterminate and crashes remain in one part of the world, it's environmental.

Remember, unsafe designs don't explode on first use. The DC9 and original 737 were incredibly bad designs. But they only failed occasionally. Even the Comet completed more flights than not.

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[chispito]

Moreover, we must remember the 777. It suffered multiple near-disasters with battery packs in flames in the first few flights. This would suggest poor testing procedures.

Your post is insightful, but I believe here you are thinking of the 787.

Re: The FAA is known to avoid change

[Solandri]

Probably not in this case. Right now, the likely culprit seems to be pilots being inadequately trained on the automated flight control systems. Airbus has had similar systems in their planes for decades (which can override pilot inputs, and require the pilots to turn them off if they decide it's malfunctioning). The FAA had no problem approving those, so this isn't a resistance to change on the part of the FAA.

Boeing stuck to the "pilot should always be in control" philosophy, and is only now adding automated safety systems which can override the pilots' inputs. It would appear they're going through some of the same early teething problems Airbus went through with such automated systems in the 1980s and 1990s. Where pilots don't know or don't understand why the plane won't do what they're trying to make it do, resulting in a crash.

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[hcs_$reboot]

The question you might ask is: what would do the FAA if the "problem" was affecting the Airbus fleet?

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[Brett Buck]

The second aircraft was in flames prior to the flight terminating abruptly on the ground. It has been suggested that overworked controls fighting with an overly aggressive antistall device may have caused that.

          "Overworking the controls" does not cause a fire! That's utterly absurd, no amount of "working the controls" will cause a fire, absent some other almost inconceivable design error.

    That's like asking a computer to "compute pi to the last digit", then have sproinging noises and smoke come out.

       

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[Anonymous Coward]

They would be the first to ground them. Whether it is a technical or training issue the problem needs to be urgently resolved and they have grounded planes for far less.

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[Aighearach]

While I understand not everybody believes the eye witness reports of noise, smoke, and a trail of falling luggage, it does seem especially odd to me to believe just the smoke/fire part.

Although in your comparison, if I tell my computer to do more math than it can finish quickly, it does indeed make some sproinging noises; it could use a new fan. It's normally quiet at regular speeds but it rattles and chirps over 3500 RPM.

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[ZZZaphod]

Insightful thoughts. I might add this seems to represent a slight but significant difference in how we process risk. What you've summarized is that the standards and safety agency is willing to risk a certain level of issues/casualties/failures in the interest of keeping the much larger system running. Where we, largely uninterested in 'the system', have much lower tolerance for that risk if we believe it would directly affect us. I think its a little like the difference between the statements "Some people in this room my get hurt" and "You, may get hurt" .

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[chispito]

The question you might ask is: what would do the FAA if the "problem" was affecting the Airbus fleet?

No, the question is, What is the safest response for this model of aircraft, in this situation? And perhaps that is grounding and perhaps it is not. Otherwise you are implying you are satisfied as long as the FAA responds to potential Airbus incidents in an equally unsafe manner (again assuming inaction is less safe than grounding).

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[kaatochacha]

You are incorrect.
Source: multiple Star Trek Episodes.

Re:The FAA is known to avoid change

[Brett Buck]

Those things may well have happened, but they are certainly NOT the result of "overworking the controls".

Re: The FAA is known to avoid change

[dunkelfalke]

In the 1988 crash the automation saved lifes preventing the aircraft from stalling and falling down like a stone and killing all of the passengers instead of gliding on the top of the trees cushioning the impact.
As for the reverse thrust and autospoiler thing, that is not an unusual problem. Even a a Tupolev once crashed that way.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=...
If I remember correctly, it happened on a barely automated MD-80 once as well, and on a 757 too. Almost all airplanes have to detect that they are on the ground before thrust reversers can be deployed and sometimes this sensor fails.

not enough data yet

[supernova87a]

I think this decision is controversial because there is not enough evidence either way to say that grounding the fleet is right or wrong. China/Indonesia could be right, or the US could be right.

If the FAA believes that the AOA sensor issue was properly addressed with clarified training, then this incident adds no information at present to change that status. If the plane went down because of the same issue, they have resolved the issue in their judgement.

If though, something emerges from this investigation that provides new causal factors then we're in new territory. It is worrying though that without this new active training, this plane seems to confuse pilots. That alone should give carriers pause who do not emphasize or train enough on the new procedures.

Re: not enough data yet

[Anonymous Coward]

Ask yourself this: if Airbus or Bombardier had the same problem, how fast would the FAA ban them? Would it be 2 hours or 20 minutes? Boeing is now a branch of the US government. Public marketing and rules bending, private profits.

Re:not enough data yet

[bobbied]

The "confuse pilots" is a natural results of what this system does when it's getting bad information from the AOA sensor.

Where I understand why you want to mess with the control forces to avoid an inadvertent stall where the point is to provide force feedback to keep the aircraft within the normal flight envelope, it provides a subconscious feed back to the pilot that says, don't go there, you are puling to hard... When the sensor goes bad and the system starts providing feed back that doesn't make any sense, the pilots are going to easily get confused. The touch and feel, the forces in the seat of your pants, the attitude of the aircraft don't match so your "skills and coordination" of flying are now a determent to flying.

But the issue for the FAA right now is as follows. Are pilots properly trained in this system? Are the aircraft being properly maintained? After the Indonesian accident it's clear that neither of these conditions where true. Boeing updated their pilot's manuals and updated their maintenance procedures in August to account for this. The FAA only regulates the USA's skies (and by agreement some other countries) and if you have updated your pilot training and maintenance procedures in relation to this issue, it would seem the aircraft is still safe to fly. New information may change that, but for now it's been dealt with.

Re: not enough data yet

[bobbied]

I would assume the FAA, in the absence of clear evidence that there was an airworthyness issue with an Airbus aircraft, would let them fly just the same.

I would also assume that the FAA wouldn't be making this decision anyway, but the EU analog of the FAA, EASA would. Airbus is in the EU, certify their aircraft under EU rules and Airbus operates under EU's oversight.

Right. A more accurate statement

[presidenteloco]

from the FAA, right now, before the black box analysis, would be to say that:

  The Boeing 737 Max 8 is "probably, most of the time" still airworthy, as far as we know.

[cynicism]But that doesn't keep the sales flowing in, so what's the harm in a little time-shifting of the truth? [end cynicism]

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[c6gunner]

That would be the only statement they could make about literally every aircraft ever flown, except for the ones which are known to have been insanely dangerous.

Their statement says the aircraft is still airworthy. That's an accurate statement. If an issue is identified which makes the aircraft unsafe to fly, THEN it will no longer be airworthy. What you're asking them to do is take an aircraft which went through years of certification flights and is being safely operated around the world, and tell everyone that it is no longer safe to fly because two of them crashed for yet to be determined reasons. That's idiotic.

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[ceoyoyo]

A crash rate of a bit over 1/350 / year isn't exactly great.

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[c6gunner]

I see you're even more stupid than I thought.

As shown on that page, the 727 had 3 fatal crashes in a span of 4 months, all in 1965, at a time when only some 200 aircraft had been delivered to customers.

Since we've established that you're completely incompetent, I'll spell it out for you further: a high initial crash rate on new airframes is not particularly unusual, is definitely not unique, and is certainly not an indication that the aircraft is unsafe to operate.

Re:Right. A more accurate statement

[reboot246]

It is airworthy, at least for a few minutes!

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[c6gunner]

These 8max crashes have exhibited the exact same failure point

Sure they have. And you're not just a rabbid troll making up bullshit to soothe your butthurt over getting fired from your job at Burger King.

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[amorsen]

In 1965 that kind of thing was inevitable. In 2019, we should do better.

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[Hognoxious]

1965 is quite some time ago. It's closer to WW2 than it is to now.

Heck, it's closer to WW1 than it is to now. I'd hope the state-of-the art might have progressed somewhat since then.

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[amorsen]

The year we live in has an effect on how good we are at air safety. The modelling tools are simply incomparably better today, our understanding of everything related to aircrafts has vastly improved.

There is no excuse to make a plane that can't fly straight.

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[c6gunner]

Characterizing the 737 MAX as "an airplane that can't flu straight" is beyond idiotic.

Almost as idiotic as statements like "we are so much better in $year that $random_thing should never go wrong".

Re: Right. A more accurate statement

[amorsen]

We ARE that much better. This kind of "plane drops out of the sky for no good reason" basically doesn't happen anymore. It used to, we got better.

The closest thing is probably the Air France Airbus where the crew got so confused that they spent several minutes believing they were overspeeding while the reality was that they have practically zero airspeed. Still, that only happened once, and the plane wasn't actively trying to crash, merely trying to confuse the crew.

No. Because

[presidenteloco]

you just weeded out the ones that are prone to fail early.

You're now flying in one that's statistically more prone to failing slightly later. And it's now slightly later.

Re:Shorts

[bobbied]

This is all made up by the shorts, Airbus and the big train lobby.

Right... Where you may be right that the shorts are playing this up, I figure this is a buying opportunity myself. Boeing lost 7% today? That's nuts.

Buy on bad news.... It works more often than not.

Re:Shanna,

[bws111]

Ok, Jack

Re:Shanna,

[Hentai007]

Surely you can't be serious.

Facts, who has 'em

[SuperKendall]

There are only like 150~ of them made, I think SW has like 20 of them.

I personally prefer to know rather than guess.

Summary: SW has 34 (with lots more ordered), AA has 24.

If they are the newer SW planes I've flown on recently, I will say one thing about them - I can't know how the controls are to operate, but I can say they've thinned up the seat cushioning a bit and they are not quite as comfortable as the older SW planes.

Another fact is that neither AA nor SW has had any reported incidences or close calls, despite many flights with these planes...

Re:Facts, who has 'em

[Obfuscant]

Another fact is that neither AA nor SW has had any reported incidences or close calls, despite many flights with these planes...

Perhaps FAA oversight requires an aircraft with a faulty AOA sensor be fixed before it is allowed to fly again, and Ethiopian regulators do not? The first people to notice the faulty sensor did not crash and they reported it as a squawk. The fact that it was not considered important enough to fix speaks volumes about the maintenance services and regulatory controls.

Re:Dollars to Donuts it's Control Law

[darkmeridian]

Nah, you just made that all up to further your hateful agenda. The Lion Air 737 never actually stalled, the control computer never lowered the throttle, and the autopilot was never engaged (which we know because the pilots repeatedly pulled up on the stick). What ACTUALLY happened was that the angle of attack sensor was broken, telling the MCAS that the aircraft was nose-up and about to stall. MCAS lowers the nose to prevent the stall. The flight crew didn't fix the runaway trim problem, and instead spent their time pulling up on the stick.

Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before crash

[caseih]

Several eyewitnesses reported seeing flames before the plane crashed, but it's not clear whether those were coming from the engines or from somewhere else on the aircraft. It's possible that witnesses are mistaken about the flames before the crash. It could be that the excitement and trauma of seeing the crash happen, and the subsequent fireball, caused them to incorrectly remember seeing flames before the crash.

According to the news article I read, however witnesses did say that the plane was pitching up and down and eventually nose-dived into the ground and caused a fireball. If it weren't for the reports of earlier fire, I could believe this was an MCAS problem and pilots were, perhaps in a panic, fighting the MCAS without remembering to disable the trim motors (there are switches right behind the trim wheels to deactivate the motors). You can bet that 737 MAX pilots from today on will keep those switches in the back of their minds. And Boeing will no doubt be making some changes if MCAS is implicated in any way.

In the meantime, I think with heightened awareness on the part of pilots after these two tragedies, the MAX 8 is still safe to fly on.

Re:Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cra

[hcs_$reboot]

Well, let see what the black boxes have to say before jumping into conclusion.

Re:Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cra

[caseih]

Precisely my point.

Re:Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cra

[bobby]

Yeah, but it's likely to take a year before they issue final analysis / report. Not sure I want them flying around until we know for sure. Might be good for FAA, Boeing, etc., to fast-track this analysis.

Re:Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cra

[dunkelfalke]

I've watched enough Mayday episodes to know that for every crash that was witnessed there are always several people who report seeing flames and they are almost always wrong.

Re:Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cra

[sonamchauhan]

"I think with heightened awareness on the part of pilots after these N tragedies, the MAX 8 is still safe to fly on."

Earlier N was 1. Now it is two.

Re:Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cra

[Aighearach]

Most 1st World countries, airlines order it with the optional AOA indicator. So if the AOA sensor is faulty, there is a related indicator that will show what is wrong.

The problems are if you don't have that option, and also don't know the new procedures for the AOA sensor.

So it doesn't seem like an extreme mitigation is even useful from an FAA perspective; the version flying here isn't likely to confuse pilots in the same way. It is also less likely for planes to keep flying with a faulty sensor here; precisely because we have the FAA.

Re:Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cra

[hcs_$reboot]

The FAA is not the only party taking part in the investigation. 1) it happened abroad (not the US) 2) many nationalities have been affected. The FAA will have no way to tamper with the BB data (though I don't think they would do that if the crash was in the US anyway). And since many countries have been grounding these planes, the FAA (...) will be pushed into investigating in a quicker manner.

They are 100% safe

[Zemran]

They are totally safe when they do not fall out of the sky which only happens occasionally.

Re:Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cra

[Zemran]

Yeah, fuck safety. No point in playing safe when there is a good profit to make.

FAA Says Boeing 737 MAX Planes Are Still Airworthy

[maroberts]

Rest of world doesn't believe it

Re:World indeedy asks most dangerous aircraft stil

[kaatochacha]

I'm not exactly sure what you tried to say. Are you AI?

Re: Eyewitnesses on ground report flames before cr

[dunkelfalke]

OMG no. I don't hold shares at all and will take Airbus over Boeing any day. Especially when the Boeing in question is that pig with a ton of lipstick 737.

Re:Why no redundant sensors?

[kaatochacha]

I am also not an Airplane nerd, but if the issue causing sensors to fail is environmental ( Ice, water, etc) it is possible that multiple sensors could fail identically, resulting int he pilot being More sure that it's not a sensor failure.
Of course, I could be totally wrong.