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Crashed Boeing Planes Lacked Safety Features That Company Sold Only As Extras (apnews.com)
The recent Boeing 737 MAX crashes involving an Ethiopian Airlines flight and a Lion Air flight may have been a result of two missing safety features that Boeing charged airlines extra for (Warning: source may be paywalled; alternative source). The New York Times reports that many low-cost carriers like Indonesia's Lion Air opted not to buy them so they could save money, even though some of these systems are fundamental to the plane's operations. "Now, in the wake of the two deadly crashes involving the same jet model, Boeing will make one of those safety features standard as part of a fix to get the planes in the air again," the report says. From the report: It is not yet known what caused the crashes of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10 and Lion Air Flight 610 five months earlier, both after erratic takeoffs. But investigators are looking at whether a new software system added to avoid stalls in Boeing's 737 Max series may have been partly to blame. Faulty data from sensors on the Lion Air plane may have caused the system, known as MCAS, to malfunction, authorities investigating that crash suspect.
The jet's software system takes readings from one of two vanelike devices called angle of attack sensors that determine how much the plane's nose is pointing up or down relative to oncoming air. When MCAS detects that the plane is pointing up at a dangerous angle, it can automatically push down the nose of the plane in an effort to prevent the plane from stalling. Boeing's optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another. The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy. Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded. "Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes," the report adds, citing a person familiar with the changes. "Boeing started moving on the software fix and the equipment change before the crash in Ethiopia."
Slashdot reader Futurepower(R) adds to the story: The FBI has joined the criminal investigation into the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX, lending its considerable resources to an inquiry already being conducted by U.S. Department of Transportation agents, according to people familiar with the matter. "The federal grand jury investigation, based in Washington, D.C., is looking into the certification process that approved the safety of the new Boeing plane, two of which have crashed since October.
The jet's software system takes readings from one of two vanelike devices called angle of attack sensors that determine how much the plane's nose is pointing up or down relative to oncoming air. When MCAS detects that the plane is pointing up at a dangerous angle, it can automatically push down the nose of the plane in an effort to prevent the plane from stalling. Boeing's optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another. The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy. Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded. "Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes," the report adds, citing a person familiar with the changes. "Boeing started moving on the software fix and the equipment change before the crash in Ethiopia."
Slashdot reader Futurepower(R) adds to the story: The FBI has joined the criminal investigation into the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX, lending its considerable resources to an inquiry already being conducted by U.S. Department of Transportation agents, according to people familiar with the matter. "The federal grand jury investigation, based in Washington, D.C., is looking into the certification process that approved the safety of the new Boeing plane, two of which have crashed since October.
... on plane manufacturing safety and design... say it isn't so.
Could you tell me in advance when booking a flight if the plane in question is missing any optional safety features that should obviously be standard so I can choose a provider that does not save money on no-brainer stuff like like this?
I mean right now I have whole Boeing lineup set as "this plane may be missing obviously useful redundancies in safety systems that might mean it can crash, so I will not book a flight on this plane" and I know that is probably unfair to most of those planes. But without available information, that is the only option available to me.
[1] We now know that the Lion Air 787 had the same issue on an earlier flight, but it was saved from disaster by the presence of a third pilot aboard who knew what to do, and then the airline chose not to fix the sensor before the fatal flight. Translation: the problem was avoidable if either of two things happened: the presence of a competent pilot, or the aircraft being properly maintained. People should prepare themselves for the very possible scenario that in perhaps a year when the NTSB finishes investigating (They're extremely diligent and objective) it will be determined that there's nothing wrong with the 787Max and that a combination of maintenance and pilot training and skill were the core issues (and I say that as a Boeing critic).
[2] The over-regulation of aviation in the US by the FAA makes the development and deployment of things like avionics and engines particularly expensive. [stay with me for a moment for the payoff...] It's not enough to develop a new flight instrument and get it approved - you must get a "Type Certificate" to allow the instrument to be installed into each make and model of plane. As a result, if you are only going to have a few customers for your new instrument in a particular sort of aircraft, then there's no way you'll ever recover the regulatory costs of getting a TypeCert for it, so you won't bother, and that means owners of that type of plane cannot get your new instrument for their plane. It's THIS aspect of FAA regulation that has made it so that most private planes in the US do not have (and indeed cannot get) an Angle-of-Attack instrument - the very thing this article complains about being optional on these 787s!!!!! Many private aviation incidents in the USA occur on departure, and on approach, and that's where an AOA indicator would save lives, but where many private pilots are only served by a squawking stall indicator.
The funny thing about this is that nobody responsible for this will actually suffer any real consequences.
It can be disabled by turning autopilot on, NOT off, and anyway the autopilot would disengage immediately because at least this subsystem checks for the consistency of the data coming from the AoA sensors.
The thing is, if you have only two AOA detectors and they disagree, there is no way for the computer to know which one is wrong. The 737 Max is really weird in that, with bigger engines posed forward, the airplane has different handling characteristics from the rest of the 737 family. But, instead of opting for the more expensive and slow option of retraining pilots to fly the new model, they wrote the software augmentation system that supposedly makes the airplane behave exactly like the classic 737. When the computer has good air data, that is.
Well, in the situation how it was being sold, this is pretty much the truth.
Without the MCAS, the MAX handles fundamentally different in some pretty dangerous flight modes than the NG. This alone would require a new type rating. Type ratings for pilots are expensive and time consuming, Boeing wanted to avoid that, mostly as an economic argument. That's why they put in the MCAS. With a WORKING MCAS, the MAX handles sufficient close to the NG, that pilots with just the NG type rating can still fly "safely", until MCAS fails and potentially crashes the plane.
Boeing and/or the FAA could have skipped MCAS and made type ratings for NG pilots mandatory. Then, at least every pilot would know about the tendency to pull the nose further up than the NG when going to full throttle. Most pilots fly with some automation still enabled, even if they're flying "manual", so auto-trim could've easily have corrected for this.
This aspect of the MAX would have certainly not be one of its highlights, but if every pilot knew about those properties, it wouldn't be a safety problem, just part of normal procedures.
The alternative would obviously have been designing a different airframe, allowing for a higher, but more balanced placement of the engines. Maybe higher legs would've been sufficient though, since the MAX 9 does already feature higher legs.
Really, if they want to make something optional, how about a low-security airline for people who are sick and tired of all that anti-terrorist BS? Only catch is your clothes travel separately.
I just can't get over the sheer gall of it. Boeing was worried about it to the point that they developed two safety mechanisms. And then didn't enable them? How about making the safety features mandatory with an option to pay more to turn them off? You know, for the pilots and passengers who want the extra thrills.
Freedom = (Meaningful - Coerced) Choice != (Speech | Beer^2), and sad sock puppets' bad mods avail them naught.
They literally nickel and dimed hundreds of people to death.
I agree this is appalling but I'm struggling with whom I should be most appalled by: Boeing for their willingness to sell planes without all the safety features or the airlines that refused to pay for the safety features.
Do you have a car? Is it safe? Would it be safer if you paid more? Are there safety features available on the premium or luxury version of your car?
This is the equivalent of putting a price on the value your family's safety. Safety costs extra. Pay up or die.
If any car brands can be found to have more safety for a premium price, there will be lawsuits now that this concept of corporate greed has been made apparent to us by Boeing.
Boeing: New Intercontinental Plane only $5 ...
Customer: There are no wings
B: They are extra, it is like with your fees for essentials, like luggage, meals and seating.
C: Oh [pause] And wheels?
B: Extra
C: Seats?
B: Extra
C: How much is it with all these extras?
B: $ 121.6 for the basic configuration
C: Huh?
B: There is also a do not crash feature and avoid mountains features
C: Too expensive. For that price we could by an Airbus
Your translation of [1] is wrong.
That flight was saved by the third pilot (non-flying) who was in a jump seat and could afford the luxury of observation from the side. The two flying pilots were busy with instruments and plane systems. It has nothing to do with experience.
Take a step back and you might notice that they become indistinguishable.
We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
The Seattle Times has a good article on this although it should be taken as preliminary data subject to change.
To summarise
Due to airframe changes from previous models Boeing introduced MCAS which automatically lowers the nose when approaching a stall.
The MCAS was introduced to allow pilots with 737 experience to fly the 737 MAX with a minimal amount of conversion training thus saving airlines a lot of cost and making the MAX even more attractive to them.
As initially designed a failure of MCAS was classed as a "Major" hazard in that it could cause passenger discomfort but not death. This was because MCAS was limited to a very small change to the flight control surfaces. For this category the use of a single sensor is allowed assuming the sensor reliability is sufficient.
During the flight test phase the ability for MCAS was extended to unlimited repeat operations. These repeat operations have a cumulative effect on the flight control surfaces. The MCAS can now lead to a catastrophic failure.
At this point the category of hazard should have been changed. This should have lead to a design change but because the category remained at "Major" and not "Catastrophic" no further changes were made.
There could be any number of reasons why this categorisation change was missed, hopefully any future investigations will get to the root cause.
The keyword is optional, not safety feature. There is probably a huge catalogue of them, but from the sound of it this should never EVER has been made optional. This is an essential crashing-and-die feature and as such should not be OPTIONAL. And that does not even start on how it was presented to the airline : possibly as "do not matter much here is an optional feature" or was it "very important optional feature" my bet is on the first.
ultimately only Boeing can know if a feature is essential or not. By making it optional they made it non essential. Do you really think from the crash that assessment is correct ? IMO not therefore boeing has the full responsibility.
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That is an air stream indicator as seen in gliders to this day. It may indicated stall, high angle of attack, side slip, falling backwards, or be stuck by liquid water or ice in an incorrect position. Every sensor including windshield being frosted over is trained for, these crews for some reason could not find strait and level after the first stall and got themselves into the MCAS flight regime with power pitching them up in a deep stall (like every 737) and fighting a secondary system.
No matter how much one wants to jam it to Boeing entering a stall condition outside of wind sheer is pilot operating error. Now lowering the nose immediately and slowly increasing power is all 737 basics. However this went on into deep stall we will soon see but the lack of understanding of a checklist in their hands is a major factor.
I as a private pilot jump through 40 years of aviation history depending on what is ready to go at the place I rent from. It is my responsibility to be familiar and use all checklists. Every single plane I rent I stall and recover from at least 6 times, sometimes with a flight instructor. mostly without at altitude with huge safety margin. This is more than my 737 pilot friend has ever herd the stall horn during his 20 year commercial career. My three and only considerations on departure is clear ground obstacles, conflict with other aircraft and do not stall on departure. These 4 pilots had do not stall on departure task and all failed.
Stalling a large commercial aircraft during departure is a bad thing. From day one in a piper cub the stall regime and recovery is trained in. Deep Stalling a commercial aircraft during departure without a mile of air under you is typically fatal. Both flights something more than a computer driven recovery went wrong. MCAS making only one attempt at cleaning up the pilot mistakes seems to be the fix that was going on before the second crash. Adding both sensors to the MCAS, clear indications MCAS is doing something seems reasonable and prudent additional aid but letting poor pilot standards off the hook will be fatal in the future.
Who modded that comment to 5? It is all crap
Yours is better? Where does this 50/50 come from?
Airbus is only 18.6% in the US (Boeing 43). And in the rest of the world, that you probably didn't visit much, it's not "Airbus, Airbus, and Airbus". It's roughly 50/50.
Slashdot, fix the reply notifications... You won't get away with it...
"Boeing should just scrap the design."
. (Mar. 20, 2019)
The 2 comments above this one disagreed. I think you are correct. I've done electronic design and computer programming. The entire 737 MAX-8 new system components need re-consideration.
Others agree. For example: Boeing 737 MAX-8 Scandal Grows: Doomed Lion Air Flight Should Never Have Flown. (Yesterday, Mar. 21, 2019)
FBI joining criminal investigation into certification of Boeing 737 MAX
Pentagon to probe if Shanahan used office to help Boeing. (Mar. 20, 2019) "Shanahan, 56, joined Boeing in 1986, rose through its ranks and is credited with rescuing the troubled Dreamliner 787 program."
Boeing has a history of flawed management: A flawed missile defense system generates $2 billion in bonuses for Boeing (Sept. 2, 2016)
There was no stall. The MCAS system was engaged due to a malfunctioning angle of attack system.