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Crashed Boeing Planes Lacked Safety Features That Company Sold Only As Extras (apnews.com)

The recent Boeing 737 MAX crashes involving an Ethiopian Airlines flight and a Lion Air flight may have been a result of two missing safety features that Boeing charged airlines extra for (Warning: source may be paywalled; alternative source). The New York Times reports that many low-cost carriers like Indonesia's Lion Air opted not to buy them so they could save money, even though some of these systems are fundamental to the plane's operations. "Now, in the wake of the two deadly crashes involving the same jet model, Boeing will make one of those safety features standard as part of a fix to get the planes in the air again," the report says. From the report: It is not yet known what caused the crashes of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10 and Lion Air Flight 610 five months earlier, both after erratic takeoffs. But investigators are looking at whether a new software system added to avoid stalls in Boeing's 737 Max series may have been partly to blame. Faulty data from sensors on the Lion Air plane may have caused the system, known as MCAS, to malfunction, authorities investigating that crash suspect.

The jet's software system takes readings from one of two vanelike devices called angle of attack sensors that determine how much the plane's nose is pointing up or down relative to oncoming air. When MCAS detects that the plane is pointing up at a dangerous angle, it can automatically push down the nose of the plane in an effort to prevent the plane from stalling. Boeing's optional safety features, in part, could have helped the pilots detect any erroneous readings. One of the optional upgrades, the angle of attack indicator, displays the readings of the two sensors. The other, called a disagree light, is activated if those sensors are at odds with one another. The angle of attack indicator will remain an option that airlines can buy. Neither feature was mandated by the Federal Aviation Administration. All 737 Max jets have been grounded.
"Boeing will soon update the MCAS software, and will also make the disagree light standard on all new 737 Max planes," the report adds, citing a person familiar with the changes. "Boeing started moving on the software fix and the equipment change before the crash in Ethiopia."

Slashdot reader Futurepower(R) adds to the story: The FBI has joined the criminal investigation into the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX, lending its considerable resources to an inquiry already being conducted by U.S. Department of Transportation agents, according to people familiar with the matter. "The federal grand jury investigation, based in Washington, D.C., is looking into the certification process that approved the safety of the new Boeing plane, two of which have crashed since October.

254 of 486 comments (clear)

  1. A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    ... on plane manufacturing safety and design... say it isn't so.

    1. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 5, Insightful

      It's worse. The features were available, just turned off unless you coughed up more money for them.

      They literally nickel and dimed hundreds of people to death.

    2. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by JaredOfEuropa · · Score: 4, Insightful

      That's not unreasonable in itself: the fact that it is cheaper for the manufacturer to put optional features in all of its products at the time of manufacturing, doesn't mean that they are free to develop, nor that they ought to provide those features free of charge. In this case, I'd say Boeing's mistake wasn't that they had left those features as "sold separately", but that they (and the FAA!) failed to address potential issues during certification: what happens if this sensor fails, what are the remedial actions and how will the pilots know how to recognize and correct the problem. Training, lack of indicators, or perhaps design flaws that allowed this chain of events in the first place?

      It's true that the indicator might have prevented the crash, but at this time it's not at all certain that including this feature - which the manufacturer, the regulators and a bunch of airlines deemed optional - is sufficient to address the issues. It does make for a very juicy sensationalist headline, though.

      --
      If construction was anything like programming, an incorrectly fitted lock would bring down the entire building...
    3. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Boeing, in life support devices safety is part of the product, not a feature, is like selling a car without airbags or charging extra for the brakes.

    4. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by ilguido · · Score: 2

      Nonetheless, I'm dubious that those features can be actually useful. Those two aircraft crashed in a matter of minutes after take-off, that's a very short time to take action. Especially if the pilots are also trying to keep an uncontrolled aircraft flying. Boeing should just scrap the design.

    5. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      It's unlikely to have prevented the accident due to there being no safe response here. A system designed specifically to prevent pilots from stalling when it doesn't know what is happening and is giving the pilots the same information you're stuck between: Computer maybe crashing into the ground, and pilot maybe stalling and falling out of the sky.

      Preventing the accident involves one of the two faliable systems (the computer or the pilot) being right while at the same time taking control.

    6. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Actually it's more like selling a car without a tire pressure indicator.

      ... for F1 drivers whose life depends on that indicator.

    7. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

      This is what happens the US government constantly protects Boeing from having to compete on the free market by trying to kill off competitors like Bombardier with illegal protectionism.

      As soon as you take away the need to compete from a company, it can act in the most absurd of ways, exactly as Boeing has here.

      It doesn't matter how important the US government thinks Boeing is as an aircraft manufacturer, it has to be forced to compete against Airbus et. al. on even terms otherwise more people will die because Boeing has been turned into another "too big to fail", and "too big to compete" and given a free ride. The fact people have now died due to safety failings is precisely why protectionism pushed by the current US (and still to a lesser degree, previous governments) is bad; it means that unless you have sufficient competition in your protected home market, all it will do is reduce quality.

      Frankly I see it in cars too nowadays, every time I'm in the US as opposed to elsewhere, it's pretty clear that US cars are horribly behind the times, dated, and much poorer quality nowadays than thus coming out of the rest of the world like Asia and Europe. The more insular the US becomes, the more shit it's products become, and the less relevant it's products become on the world stage. As soon as you stop competing and start using protectionism it's an inevitable spiral towards game over. I agree that Huawei is a massive security risk, but simply banning them access to your market isn't suddenly going to make Cisco et. al. wake up and say "Okay, now let's figure out how they're getting ahead of us technologically and make better products", it's going to make Cisco go "lol, we don't even have to put any effort into competing now".

    8. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Kiuas · · Score: 5, Insightful

      So who is "they" in this context? Boeing or Lion Air/Ethiopian Airlines?
      Who was scrimping and saving?
      Hint: It wasn't Boeing...

      Boeing certainly wasn't scrimping, they were being greedy by selling critical safety features for a few more bucks, and it's now backfired on and cost not only hundreds of lives but hundreds of millions and likely billions in lost sales and upcoming legal costs (Norwegian has already said they're suing for the costs that the grounding will cause them, others will surely follow).

      The damage this kind of stuff will do to their brand is massive and it's already affected their sales, Garuda (an Indonesian airline) just cancelled their order of 48 planes. That alone will cost them over half a billion. And it gets worse: Only 381 planes have been delivered so far, less than 10 % of all existing orders. If more airlines start to follow suit as they probably will because the brand of the plane is now seriously damaged and people don't want to fly it (understandably) it might cause the entire plane to be unprofitable for them.

      From both a business and product design standpoint they could not have made a more moronic decision, this is a godsend to their competitors, and I can bet you that the sales and marketing department of Airbus are currently ecstatic over this.

      --
      "It is the business of the future to be dangerous" -Alfred North Whitehead
    9. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

      This is what happens the US government constantly protects Boeing from having to compete on the free market by trying to kill off competitors like Bombardier with illegal protectionism.

      This happened because of the competition from Airbus's A320neo.

      Boeing originally intended to replace the 737 with a completely new design. But that would have taken too much time, and so they decided to make the 737 MAX instead.

    10. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by umghhh · · Score: 2

      If the optional feature would have helped we do not know.
      That the basic automatic 'safety' feature does behave in an erratic way should have been known to B. and they should have taken precaution. I can imagine a meeting of engineers being told to stop discussing this particular issue. VW was dragged into Billions of fines for smaller things that did not (in reality and contrary to hysteric claims) kill anybody. Some of VW managers spend time trying to not drop the soap under the shower now. I wonder if the same happens here.

    11. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Type44Q · · Score: 2

      No, actually. It's like charging for Blind-Spot-Assist.

    12. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      It BECOMES safety critical when someone puts one on a plane and gives it the ability to silently override the autopilot and human pilots.

      How fucking difficult is that?

    13. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Opportunist · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Yeah, and if you don't have any in your Cessna I don't give a fuck if you stall and crash.

      In a commercial airliner I, as a customer, have to depend on the safety of the vehicle because I cannot audit it beforehand. Hell, 9 out of 10 times you don't even get to know for sure what kind of airplane, let alone what specific plane, you'll be flying on.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    14. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      No, actually it's like building a car that has a tendency to swerve, then installing a mandatory lane keeping assist system that frequently steers into other lanes against driver input, then telling people it's just a normal car instead of making sure that people know the system and how to turn it off, then charging extra for a warning light that tells people when the sensors malfunction and disagree whether the car is leaving its lane or not, causing the car to swerve.

    15. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      It's unlikely to have prevented the first accident because the pilots in that crash didn't even know about MCAS and would have had no reason to think that an AOA disagreement would cause the types of issues they were having.

      It's unlikely to have prevented the second crash because those pilots reportedly were familiar with MCAS and should immediately have known what was going on regardless of AOA indication. Which means that either the second crash was caused by an even bigger problem which we don't know about yet, or the pilots were completely incompetent. Either way the extra indication wouldn't have been particularly useful.

    16. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by stealth_finger · · Score: 1

      Surely optional extras should be comfort or bling things. Extra comfy pilot seats, chromed interior and all that shit not fucking safety features.

      This plane cost loads and loads of money but if you want it not to crash it's going to cost you a bit more.

      --
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    17. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by AmiMoJo · · Score: 1

      How much do they charge for what amounts to a small extra LCD display and a light bulb?

      --
      const int one = 65536; (Silvermoon, Texture.cs)
      SJW, n: "Someone I don't like, and by the way I'm a fuckwit" - AC
    18. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by LostMyAccount · · Score: 4, Insightful

      It's worse than that, the airlines willingly keep buying into each new iteration of a dated design because it keeps their costs down -- less pilot training, less mechanic training, and so on.

      Boeing makes those things optional not just because they can but because airlines want to fly the cheapest plane they can. Do you think the airlines don't have pilots, aerospace experts and so on involved in buying their planes? They absolutely go through these planes and their optional features and advise the airlines on how to drive down the price of new planes by keeping unnecessary stuff off them that's not necessary. Especially when its an extension of an existing design.

      What's ironic about all this Boeing outrage is that consumers do this stuff themselves EVERY DAY -- they choose cheaper car models/trim lines that don't have the same safety features as the top trim lines. Why? It saves money. It's been like this for years -- ABS, stability control, airbags, front collision detection, lane departure warnings, blind spot warnings, directional headlamps, all of these were optional at one point and some still are on many cars.

      Fuck, a former Delta executive just got nominated to run the FAA -- do you think the airlines aren't lobbying the FAA to make less safety shit mandatory so they can keep planes cheap?

      Did Boeing make an engineering fuckup? Who knows? I'm not a 737 pilot and honestly I think you have to be one to truly understand this issue. But the public outrage directed at Boeing alone is ridiculous and lets the airlines totally off the hook.

    19. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      The features. Plural. Redundant 2nd sensor, comparator, and indicator. It's a package deal.

      Well, sure, if you're willing to just pull "facts" out of your ass, then may as well claim that the wings were also optional. Package deal and all that.

      Over in the real world, the only bits that were optional out of all the shit you named is the indication; specifically an "AOA disagree" light and actual AOA indication on the display.

    20. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Pikoro · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I'll bite.

      When the only input to a system that can override the pilot is an AoA sensor, I would consider it mandatory to have an indicator, say, some kind of light, to let me know when that sensor isn't working properly, so Yes, a light coming on when the sensor was in disagreement with the rest of the aircraft's sensors, would have most likely clued the flight crew in on what the issue was. In this case, the MCAS system.

      Pilot: I wonder why the nose keeps pushing down on its own. Hmm, look, there's a light telling me that the AoA is in disagreement. Perhaps we should flip ahead in the QRH to the pages dealing with AoA issues.

      --
      "Freedom in the USA is not the ability to do what you want. It is the ability to stop others from doing what THEY want"
    21. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Pikoro · · Score: 1

      s/car/bus/

      --
      "Freedom in the USA is not the ability to do what you want. It is the ability to stop others from doing what THEY want"
    22. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by PeeAitchPee · · Score: 4, Informative

      Not really. Bombardier mostly makes regional jets whereas Boeing doesn't build any of them. However, they do make one line that directly competes with Boeing -- the CSeries, which competes directly with the Boeing 737 and Airbus 320. In October 2017 Airbus bought 50.01% of the C series production and the airplane is now being built in Alabama to avoid paying US tariffs. The deal was under-reported by the press for obvious reasons but the outcome is *exactly* why the 21% tariff was proposed in the first place. The airplane is still being built (only now in the US by US labor) and Boeing still has to compete with it.

    23. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Pikoro · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Actually, Steve Dickson, who I used to work for, is exactly what the FAA needs. He's a safety first kind of guy and an excellent leader. He's also a pilot and knows his shit. He'll be a good thing for the FAA.

      --
      "Freedom in the USA is not the ability to do what you want. It is the ability to stop others from doing what THEY want"
    24. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by jabuzz · · Score: 1

      Problem is there are only two sensors that feed the MCAS. The indicator is to say there is a sensor disagreement. The indication is that this will be added to all new 737Max free of charge.

      However the bigger issue is why are there only two sensors. where a single faulty sensor can cause an issue. There should have been three sensors so a single faulty sensor can be out voted by the remaining two good ones.

      How the hell this passed for flight certification is the issue. Far to cosy a relationship between Boeing and the FAA, for which heads need to roll.

    25. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Dunbal · · Score: 1

      More like selling a car without brakes.

      --
      Seven puppies were harmed during the making of this post.
    26. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Dunbal · · Score: 1

      >Plenty of aircraft fly around with no AOA indication other than a stick shaker or other type of stall warning. I think you misunderstand exactly what the problem is. This isn't a stick shaker which is just a warning. It's the plane going into a dive all by itself trying to correct for a problem that's not there. But if only you had purchased the additional option, you'd have been able to easily correct the problem caused by a software glitch.

      --
      Seven puppies were harmed during the making of this post.
    27. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1, Informative

      That's a worthy effort, but any pilot who was fighting against an out of control trim system and thought to himself "hem, let's look in the book to see what to do about my AOA indication" would be an utter retard. The correct way to deal with a malfunctioning trim system is to immediately disable electrical control of the trim system. Figuring out how to deal with faulty AOA indication wouldn't be anywhere near your top ten concerns at that point in time.

      Imagine that you're driving down the highway, and suddenly your car starts to accelerate out of control. You, of course, scan the dash, see that the check engine light is on, and think to yourself "let me check the manual and see what to do about a check engine light".

      That's the kind of thing you're suggesting here ....

    28. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by markdavis · · Score: 1

      >"Boeing makes those things optional not just because they can but because airlines want to fly the cheapest plane they can."

      True, but in this case, we are talking about an single indicator lamp and an already-developed-but-disabled software patch. The latter having essentially no cost, and the former being pretty minimal. It doesn't seem like these should be optional, especially because we are talking about primary safety of operation and not just convenience, capacity, design flair, security theater, or efficiency. If they didn't think it was important for safety, then why offer it at all?

    29. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      The tariffs where not imposed to force Bombardier to move their production in the US - they were imposed after a complaint by Boeing.

      Besides, using political measures to force competitors into producing their products on US soil can be considered as government protection. This is the same government that has spent the last 50 years or so trumpeting the benefits of free markets and globalization.

      So you are saying that Canada imposing a 300% tariff on Boeing unless it accepts to build it's airplanes in Canada would be fair competition ?

      What happens when other countries do the same ? Still free competition ?

    30. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by jabuzz · · Score: 1

      A redundant second sensor is not enough. How do you know which one is giving faulty readings? You need three sensors.

      The problem with the MCAS is that it only had two sensors and a single faulty one can cause it think the plane is stalling when it's not. The indicator is to let the pilots know that there is a sensor disagreement.

    31. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Because there have always only been two sensors. It isn't an issue normally because if the autopilot senses a disagreement it will usually just kick itself off and tell the pilots to fly the plane. The issue here isn't that there are only two sensors; it's that this system was designed to function without actually knowing whether the data it was getting was any good.

    32. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      The mystery is: why does it have two sensors, when only one is used for the MCAS system? https://qz.com/1575509/what-we...

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    33. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by markdavis · · Score: 1

      >"No, actually. It's like charging for Blind-Spot-Assist."

      No, because that feature requires the addition of multiple radar systems and indicators and software. There is a significant/tangible cost for it, especially compared to the cost of the car. In the case of the plane, we are talking about an single indicator lamp and an already-developed-but-disabled software patch. The latter having essentially no cost, and the former being very minimal... almost zero compared to the overall cost of the plane. So I don't think that is the best example, either.

    34. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Because it's always had two sensors. They're used by the autopilot. They may also be used to trigger a stall warning (not sure about the 737 specifically, it might have other ways of detecting stalls).

    35. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Opportunist · · Score: 1, Insightful

      Guess what, for the longest time we didn't know asbestos is bad to us. Still, we got rid of the stuff. Take a wild guess why. Hint: It wasn't the whining. More the coughing.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    36. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Boeing charges for brakes. They aren't free with purchase. To extend your analogy, car makers have optional collision warning systems. Since these are life safety, why are they optional? Did you purchase all the safety features available for your last car?

    37. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by wired_parrot · · Score: 1

      The two features that were mentioned in the article was an angle-of-attack disagree indicator and an angle-of-attack display in the cockpit. The disagree light should've been standard, given the severity of this failure mode. The angle-of-attack cockpit display? No other current commercial airplane has it - though from what I hear from pilots the old MD-11 had them in the cockpit as standard. It has been discussed in the wake of the AF447 accident and the Colgan Air 3407 accidents, but it's never been mandated by the FAA and there's no consensus in the aviation community on whether it would help, so I can't really fault Boeing for that one.

    38. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by houghi · · Score: 1

      Elevators are safer.

      --
      Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
    39. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      And you still don't know if lack of AOA indication "is bad to us". All you know is that the newspaper man told you that these airplanes didn't have it, and that sounded scary to you. You have absolutely no clue whether such indication would have made a difference in either of these accidents, or in any others. I've already presented an argument for why they would have made absolutely no difference in either of these crashes; I've yet to see anyone present anything resembling a well informed argument for the contrary position.

    40. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by jellomizer · · Score: 1

      If you are going to pay millions of dollars for an Aircraft it would make sense that you as the customer do some research on what features you will need.
      Really a company cannot win, if Boeing sold the plain at full cost with all the bells and whistles, there will be people angry because people paid money for features they do not want (For example read Slashdot comments about how Windows 10 automatic updates happen) and often will want it disabled. Because their government doesn't require it, and they figure the trade-off is more expensive then its benefit.
      So Boeing having a large customer base, in general makes its sales more flexible. Because you are not going to have a Sticker Price on a multi-million dollar aircraft, there is a complex business relationship that goes on, determine what they need what they don't. This isn't a last minute, oh by the way for an extra 100k we can enable this software feature, like a car sales man tries to add in rust protection to your car.

      --
      If something is so important that you feel the need to post it on the internet... It probably isn't that important.
    41. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by markdavis · · Score: 1

      >"... but you're not talking about failure modes that patch created."

      True, but the failure mode will exist anyway when the two sensors disagree (because one fails)... whether there is an indicator lamp or not, whether the software to handle it better is there or not. And the cost associated with a disaster due to the failure is very, very high. A simple cost/benefit analysis would have indicated how important it is. I am surprised that there aren't THREE sensors standard instead of just two.

    42. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by mrfaithful · · Score: 2

      I suspect it's more like the base model is one that meets or exceeds every mandated safety feature required by every aviation authority they sell to. R&D also made a bunch of extra safety features that run up the cost considerably. Sales know that trying to sell an expensive safe plane to poorer airlines is a non-starter, they'd just try and get cheaper end-of-life models from other companies, so they ask that these non-mandated safety features become optional. And it's all good because these features aren't mandated, right?

      Well now Boeing have a PR nightmare on their hands and they are about to get an additional list of features that are now mandated and air travel will be safer globally as a result even if prices have to rise and a few airlines go out of business. It's a shame that progress tends to come after lives lost.

    43. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      First intelligent response. Thank you.

    44. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1, Insightful

      It's not the media, it's most aviation authorities that have grounded this specific model.

      It's the media and uninformed laymen who are screaming about AOA indication being optional; the response from the experts/authorities is generally a shrug.

      Yes, there's a reason these aircraft were grounded. The fact that two crashes which both seem to have been related to trim control happened within less than a year of each other is plenty of reason to ground them while we investigate. It is not, however, a good reason to think that AOA indication would have made any difference, or to start claiming that AOA indication is a "safety critical system", let alone to start blaming Boeing for not including it as standard.

      You want to criticize Boeing for their legitimate fuckups, go right ahead. This isn't one of them.

    45. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by SWPadnos · · Score: 1

      s/car/bus/

      s/car//bus/g

      --
      - The Sigless Wonder
    46. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by thereddaikon · · Score: 1

      While its going to be bad for Boeing in the short term this isn't going to kill them or the 737 in the long run. These kinds of things have sadly happened before and inevitably fines will be levied, some people will go to jail and they are going to have bad financials for a few quarters. This isn't even the worst scandal about an airliner I've seen nor is it the worst one Boeing has been involved in.

    47. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by SlaveToTheGrind · · Score: 1

      When the only input to a system that can override the pilot is an AoA sensor, I would consider it mandatory to have an indicator, say, some kind of light, to let me know when that sensor isn't working properly

      A light that tells you the readings of the two AoA sensors disagree doesn't tell you whether the AoA sensor that acts as an input to MCAS is the correct or the incorrect one. So at best it's a way for the pilot to narrow down what the problem might be. But the pilots need to be trained on that troubleshooting path, and if they can be trained to check MCAS when the difference light comes on, they can just as readily be trained to check MCAS when the plane repeatedly and unexpectedly noses down all on its own.

      As I've said before, in my view the real issues here were (1) designing MCAS to only monitor one of the two available AoA sensors, and (2) not training pilots on how MCAS works and how to deactivate it if it starts going haywire. Particularly without the latter, the two features discussed in this article are unlikely to have changed the outcome.

    48. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Nidi62 · · Score: 2

      And you still don't know if lack of AOA indication "is bad to us". All you know is that the newspaper man told you that these airplanes didn't have it, and that sounded scary to you. You have absolutely no clue whether such indication would have made a difference in either of these accidents, or in any others. I've already presented an argument for why they would have made absolutely no difference in either of these crashes; I've yet to see anyone present anything resembling a well informed argument for the contrary position.

      If these aircraft had had the AOA disagree indicator and said indicator had activated in flight(the previous Lion Air flight), then when they landed the pilots would have written up that the indicator triggered and the AOA sensors would have been examined and probably replaced by the AMT overnight, thus preventing the crash of the Lion Air flight the following morning. Right now, reports are that the two AOA sensors were off by 20 degrees. That is a big deal, and not something that would probably be caught on a walkaround.

      --
      The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for it to be pitted against a slightly greater evil
    49. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Well, an AOA indicator warning of a stall that gets ignored is bad for me. An AOA indicator that doesn't warn of a stall plus a pilot that never got training to avoid it by himself is bad for me.

      Provided I'm in that plane and the ground is closer than stall recovery permits.

      I do know that much.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    50. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      If these aircraft had had the AOA disagree indicator and said indicator had activated in flight(the previous Lion Air flight), then when they landed the pilots would have written up that the indicator triggered and the AOA sensors would have been examined and probably replaced by the AMT overnight

      Hilarious. The AOA sensor issue was present for multiple flights. It WAS reported on the previus flight, and the sensor WAS replaced. And yet none of that required an AOA disagree light.

      Issues don't necessarily have to be reported by aircrew, BTW; modern aircraft have computers which record far more information than what is presented to pilots, and can be downloaded by maintenance after every flight. The 737 MAX specifically introduced a system called OMF which allows technicians to easily download all fault data each time the plane lands. I don't know if Lion Air has been doing that, but if they haven't then they should be. In my own experience working on different aircraft it is not at all uncommon for pilots to report "good plane, no issue", but for the download to show multiple problems which require repair.

    51. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by nasch · · Score: 1

      How many aircraft have an AOA sensor with no redundancy, and software that will automatically force the nose down if the sensor incorrectly reads a stall condition? If it's most of them, then maybe this was just bad luck. But I suspect it isn't.

    52. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 3, Insightful

      You, as the customer, are safer on aircraft than on any other form of transport available to you, and have likely been flying around on aircraft without this feature for most of your life.

      I was waiting for this bit of irrelevancy to pop up.

      It is kind of like odds of dying on the space shuttle seem a lot different if you look at them per passenger miles, or look at them per launch.

      I'm not sure why you think that being a customer qualifies you to dictate how aircraft are designed.

      If a company ignores the customer long enough, the customer stops bugging them, amirite? The customer controls matters with their wallet.

      Had the media not started blowing this out of proportion you would have gladly carried on being a dumb and happy lump of self-loading cargo in the back of the plane.

      Finally, you have identified the real source of the problem - the media! Seriously, we need to eliminate the media because y'all smart folks manage to show us how they are responsible for any and all problems.

      But now that you've read some click-bait headlines, ohmahgawd it's the end of the fucking world.

      While you seem to want everything suppressed, there are a lot of responsible people out there doing analysis. Unlike you, they don't just shrug off corpses and blame the press. They want the planes to fly safely. And when a new plane keeps dropping out of the sky, the plane fighting it's pilots all the way to the crash site, they want that to stop, not just write it of to "plane travel is the safest way to travel." Shit man - have you mixed purple drank with your Red Bull?

      You seem a bit angry that news of these planes is being reported, angry at the cause of all problems is the media, and just plain frickin' angry.

      Chillaxe homie, and keep the Red bull and drank use separate.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    53. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by bluefoxlucid · · Score: 1

      The Lion Air pilots couldn't figure out why the plane was fucking around on them, and a pilot riding along diagnosed the issue.

      The next day, a Lion Air plane crashed due to the same issue.

      An indicator that suggests a particular issue which looks like other issues but isn't would tell the pilots immediately that this particular issue is happening, thus they could take immediate action instead of flailing around confused.

    54. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 2

      Sure, but there are literally hundreds if not thousands of sensors on a modern aircraft. Once you start down the road of "why not three?" how do you justify which of those should be triplicated?

      This isn't even just an issue of adding another sensor for each system; you have to add wiring, you have to modify the boxes which read those sensors (and, hell, since the boxes are often duplicated, you'll probably want to triplicate them also), you have to add more circuit breakers ... it adds up fast. And the biggest concern isn't even cost; it's weight.

      At the end of the day the aerospace industry as a whole has decided that duplication is sufficient. There has been some movement away from that recently - some of the newer Airbus aircraft have far more sensors - but this is still a rare exception rather than the rule. As we move more and more towards aircraft designed to fly themselves it may actually be a good idea to have extra sensors so that the autopilot doesn't have to kick off when there's a problem, but for human pilots the existing sensors have thusfar been sufficient.

    55. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by bluefoxlucid · · Score: 1

      and have likely been flying around on aircraft without this feature for most of your life.

      Correct: the MCAS is a new feature in the 747 MAX, and is misbehaving.

    56. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Pentium100 · · Score: 1

      But why only one was used for MCAS? I mean OK if there is only one sensor anyway, but if there are two sensors already, why not compare the data from both? If it does not match, then alert the pilots.

    57. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Mspangler · · Score: 1

      And the MCAS is a new feature because the airplane is intrinsically unstable because of its oversized engines. The software is supposed to keep the plane from doing something stupid, and in fact does something else stupid all on its own.

    58. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      I wish I had the answer to that. It certainly seems like a pretty big screwup. I would love to be able to ask the engineers who worked on the system.

    59. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      It would have given a clue why the plane was erratic. You can't disable a system you don't know is running first of all (MCAS was not publicized prior). But at least knowing what input is driving that unknown system may give you a chance to correct for it or disable it.

    60. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Pascoea · · Score: 4, Insightful

      some people will go to jail

      This is corporate America, the only time people go to jail is when they steal from rich people. Killing plebs only gets you fined.

    61. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      Flying is relatively save vs. cars. But not vs. this model alone. The MCAS system was compensation for a bad physical design in the first place. This is not blown out of proportion. It's a design that goes against common sense and required an upcharge to mitigate. And a second sensor still isn't the way you deal with something like this. 3 sensors from 3 vendors and take the consensus input. The indicator is secondary to this, just to give pilots a clue. But they were so worried about word getting out about how bad their plane's design was they didn't even publish info on the MCAS system before the crashes.

    62. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      That indication is about the agreement with a second sensor. A second sensor that is disabled without the upgrade. A second sensor that is ignored by MCAS otherwise because you didn't pay for it but would have made it safer.

    63. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      There's still a car analogy. That car analogy is the Tesla that self-drove into a highway barrier because of bad input analysis.

    64. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 2

      the base model is one that meets or exceeds every mandated safety feature required by every aviation authority

      Except this new plane apparently needed a safety feature that wouldn't normally be needed. And aviation authorities are certainly going to add this to the list for planes like this one. And Boeing was aware of the need for it, but cut corners anyway. Aviation authorities base their standards on deadly crashes, while Boeing worked in the theoretical before even building the plane.

    65. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      what happens if this sensor fails

      You know how you detect if a sensor fails? By having a second sensor that is enabled and not disabled and seeing if they agree. Whether you have a light to indicate that they agree or not. Their mistake was selling this separately.

    66. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      To detect when the first one is faulty. You only need to use one - but you need to know when not to trust it. Light or no light.

    67. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Khyber · · Score: 1, Interesting

      "That's the kind of thing you're suggesting here ...."

      That'd be because, you fucking dumbass, that is the actual goddamned standard procedure for in-flight troubleshooting for large aircraft.

      Try again when you have a fucking pilot's license. I'm 5 solo hours away from mine.

      --
      Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
    68. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      "I'm not sure why you think that being a customer qualifies you to dictate how aircraft are designed."

      While I agree with most of your post, this absolutely bewildered me. This mindset boils down the fundamental problem I see with our "capitalistic" society.

      This is *exactly* how capitalism is supposed to work. We consumers *are* supposed to decide. I'm not saying consumers in general are qualified to design and build a plane (or even a kite for that matter), but we're supposed to choose what we want based on purchasing power and what we value.

      The consumer market decides which products and services survive and succeed based on our purchasing power. If I don't like the design, policies, or whatever, I don't buy it (a long with others) and the product design disappears or changes/adapts to fit consumer demands of the market--essentially financial based natural selection. This purchasing choice (demand) is supposed to shape products, services, and markets.

      It doesn't. We're not even pretending consumer demand controls markets anymore, it's a laughable joke, so the concept of competition (empowered by the concept of consumer purchasing choice) holds no merit as a check on monopolies or capital holders.

      I agree with you that consumers probably shouldn't make these sort of choices (plane design) because they're too easily and effectively manipulated and often incapable of making informed, educated decisions. The problem is, that idea undermines part of the fundamental theory that props up capitalism we seem to hold so dear.

      I openly reject this corrupt system we have, do you?

      I don't propose socialism or the likes as a fix, but it shows that a huge overhaul is needed to balance the power back to the citizens (largely the consumers) from the incestuous control between the very wealthy (the drive behind corporations) and government in our Corporate States of America (CSA).

    69. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      I'm 5 solo hours away from mine.

      That's adorable. Talk to me in a few thousand hours.

    70. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by mjwx · · Score: 1

      From both a business and product design standpoint they could not have made a more moronic decision, this is a godsend to their competitors, and I can bet you that the sales and marketing department of Airbus are currently ecstatic over this.

      Short-medium range narrow body aircraft in the 150-200 pax range are going gangbusters at the moment and Airbuses order books for the A320 family are already full. If it drags on, it might be worth Airbus opening another A320 production line. I think Boeing are eventually going to have to put different engines on the 737 MAX (possibly the same ones used in the NG series) until a new airframe can be produced that can accommodate the CFM LEAP engines. This would still give the advantage to Airbus as they are able offer the CFM LEAP engines in the A320 NEO but Boeing would retain customers who have standardised on a single type (most low cost carriers do this). I definately don't think a software patch or additional sensor will fix the fundamental problem of the engine's being in front of the wing (thus the thrust is going directly underneath the surface of the wing).

      --
      Calling someone a "hater" only means you can not rationally rebut their argument.
    71. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1, Funny

      For capitalism to function sanely it requires relatively sane consumers. Same as democracy requiring relatively sane voters. Either system can fail if those prerequisites aren't met.

      Anyway it's not much of a concern in this case because the people screaming about this really have no clue what's going on, no idea how to fix it, and no way of knowing whether or not their wishes were followed. This goofball might be up in arms about there not being AOA indication in the cockpit, but he really has no clue why, and certainly wouldn't recognize it if I put him in front of one. A year from now he'll have forgotten all about it and will go back to buying whatever tickets are cheapest. And that works; in the end people just want cheap flights and don't want to be bothered with the details.

      Communism is basically the same, except there's less competition and nobody pretends to care what the consumer wants.

    72. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by whoever57 · · Score: 1

      Nonetheless, I'm dubious that those features can be actually useful.

      The same plane in the Lion Air crash malfunctioned in the same way the day before, but because the had a pilot who was deadheading on board, who actually knew what to do, the plane did not crash.

      There was plenty of time to save the plane had the pilots known what to do.

      --
      The real "Libtards" are the Libertarians!
    73. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 2

      So you are saying that Canada imposing a 300% tariff on Boeing unless it accepts to build it's airplanes in Canada would be fair competition ?

      It would be if Boeing received massive subsidies from the US government and then sold their airplane in Canada for less than what it costs to manfucature them. You bet your ass the Canadian government would be slappign tariffs on them.

    74. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Ol+Olsoc · · Score: 2

      Finally, you have identified the real source of the problem - the media! Seriously, we need to eliminate the media because y'all smart folks manage to show us how they are responsible for any and all problems.

      No, we need to take the media with the same grain of salt this crowd is perfectly content to take them with in any other tech-heavy situation: a group of generally ill-informed people who through some combination of ignorance, incompetence, and recklessness write articles primarily designed to inflame a group of readers who on balance are even more ill-informed of the actual issues.

      And it all means what? The people who shit their pants blaming everything on the media are every bit as affected by the media as the people they are whining about. And you sound pretty inflamed yourself.

      It isn't that hard to figure out what is bullshit and what isn't. And the calmer heads who work to look into these things are just going to do their job, unaffected by what some guy in the stockroom at Wal-Mart, or the reporter pulled off the food column to write a story about a plane being grounded thinks.

      The planes obviously needed to be grounded. The media had nothing to do with that. The FBI is looking into reports of some shenanigans in the certification process. The media had nothing to do with that. The modifications to the plane made it more susceptible to stall issues. The media had nothing to do with that. The software and hardware might have had some issues, again, not the media.

      That some folks might be ill informed is pretty much irrelevant. That some writers might not know all that much is just about as irrelevant.

      The process of troubleshooting and fixing the problem - if there is a problem, which is almost certain - is not ruled by the media. Whining about the media is like the guy in the back of the room who wants the board of directors meeting cancelled because they didn't have as many jelly donuts as he thought was appropriate. Not related.

      About the only thing that the media has a real effect on is the response of the citizenry to the issue. You can't do much about that other than make certain you respond quickly, and not belittle the lost lives.

      Now, let's say that a person wants a more technically literate media. That is a worthy goal. Well, how does one accomplish this? Is blaming everything on the media going to fix this? Probably not, because blaming everything on the media is also a tool of people who don't want anything reported that they don't want to hear, and have no other input but that. People bitching is easy. Propose some solutions.

      So we have a lot of Slashdotters who know for a fact all of the technical details are and what the real truth is, amirite? As well, they belive that the present situation is purposely misleading people, perhaps some oddball agenda. Wanna fix it? Become a technical journalist.

      But then it is a lot easier just to bitch about the media being the problem.

      --
      The shepherds did so well protecting the flock that the sheep no longer believed that wolves existed.
    75. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by AbrasiveCat · · Score: 1

      Boeing, in life support devices safety is part of the product, not a feature, is like selling a car without airbags or charging extra for the brakes.

      Or school buses without seat belts

      Think of the children!

    76. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      A second sensor that is disabled without the upgrade.

      You do realize that repeating a lie multiple times doesn't actually make it true, right?

    77. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      Which is the lie?

    78. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      That's part of the flaw. However, you won't know if that sensor is giving bad data without comparison. And you wouldn't know why MCAS was activating.

    79. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by SlaveToTheGrind · · Score: 1

      You've certainly lined up a long row of straw men, friend, and perhaps you'll feel vindicated since I'm not going to specifically address them all. But underlying most or all of your points is the notion that I said or somehow implied that the media has meaningful input into the investigation and/or remediation of this situation. Of course it doesn't. But what it most certainly does have input into is how the public responds pending (and perhaps even despite the results of) the investigation/remediation, as directly evidenced by many irrational posts in this very discussion, along with mods who bubbled up those posts. Articles like this one that are based on bad information, leaps of logic, and devoid of anything resembling critical thinking simply fan the flames of an ever-more-eager mob mentality. That's irresponsible at best.

    80. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by bobby · · Score: 1

      How many aircraft have an AOA sensor with no redundancy, and software that will automatically force the nose down if the sensor incorrectly reads a stall condition? If it's most of them, then maybe this was just bad luck. But I suspect it isn't.

      That's a really good question. I believe AoA and MCAS are new for the 737 MAX only. I haven't heard of any other aircraft that does.

      I strongly hope that if ANY other aircraft have similar systems, that those aircraft are grounded until this is all sorted out.

    81. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      Probably for the same reason the light to indicate that there's a disagreement is optional. Money.

    82. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Nidi62 · · Score: 1

      Fuck, a former Delta executive just got nominated to run the FAA

      He's a much better nominee than the last person Trump wanted to nominate: Trump was going to nominate his personal pilot.

      --
      The only thing necessary for evil to triumph is for it to be pitted against a slightly greater evil
    83. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by bobby · · Score: 1

      I agree with you, but remember, Boeing is a for-profit corporation. Maximizing profit will always be the goal- people can't be trusted to do the right thing- greed will always be the stronger force. Well, with some people- not me, probably not you, and probably not most tech-oriented people. Trouble is, we tech-types are not in control.

      Anyway, that's why we can't have true unbridled capitalism- we need govt. oversight and regulation. NTSB is investigating why FAA and Boeing came up with the whole AoA + MCAS + pilots being unaware of its existence.

      I blame a dumbing-down culture of over-automation. We all come to accept things having a mind of their own. I hate it- over-automation is one of my soapbox rant topics.

    84. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by CaptainDork · · Score: 1

      I know how:

      I worked on huge dynamos at Texaco, Port Arthur, Texas. Those bastards were steam-driven and provided electricity that powered the entire plant.

      There were eight of them.

      Our biggest fear was that they would disintegrate when failures of any part happened. For that reason, we had two vibration sensors mounted on each one, feeding a vibration analyzer.

      The relevance to TFA is that when one sensor indicated excessive vibration, a warning ensued, but the turbine did not shut down.

      It was a "double-vote yes" system. BOTH vibration sensors had to agree that the machine was vibrating over a preset limit.

      --

      In the case of the two attack blades, the same simple technique applies:

      As long as both blades agree, we're good to go. When one blade goes wonky, it's a simple goddam motherfucking task to have a "disagree," light, and furthermore, it's simple shit to alert the pilots and announce that the angle of attack system is going to stop giving input, so "hold on to the seat of your pants," because we're going off autopilot (which is the recommended response).

      One day before the deadly crash of a Lion Air flight on Oct. 29 last year, pilots flying that Boeing 737 Max 8 plane lost control of the aircraft, Bloomberg reported.
      An off-duty pilot riding in the cockpit helped the crew identify the problem and guided them to disable the flight control system in order to save the plane, according to the report.

      --
      It little behooves the best of us to comment on the rest of us.
    85. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by thegreatbob · · Score: 1

      To extend the analogy to MCAS, it was like making aspects of the traction control system dependent on the tire pressure sensor(s), but only considering the input from one of the tires for certain operations. Suppose the wrong sensor went bad (e.g. suddenly reports an outlandish, but still possible, value, and adjusts a braking routine accordingly), TCS malfunctions, for no apparent reason, and locks up one or more tires while you're in the middle of a turn. Even if one was able to see the reported tire pressures, and even if the TCS threw a fault light, would the driver still have reason to react (given an imaginary circumstance where they would even have time to do so) to them in any specific way?

      Also, a real-world example of bad control routines affecting car handling would be Tesla's rapid-braking issues (presumed fixed with an update), where the first stop would be fine, but stopping distance increased on subsequent stops.

      --
      There is no XUL, only WebExtensions...
    86. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "It's unlikely to have prevented the first accident because the pilots in that crash didn't even know about MCAS"

      They didn't know about MCAS because they (supposedly) didn't have to. But if you put a new light on the console, you must train about this light and the correcting actions upon turning it on.

      So, yes, it's very likely having that light would have prevented this accident.

      "It's unlikely to have prevented the second crash because those pilots reportedly were familiar with MCAS and should immediately have known what was going on regardless of AOA indication."

      The knew about the existance of MCAS but they were not trained on its failing modes and recovery procedures -on purpose. Again, a light on the console would have meant associated training and procedures and the accident wouldn't have happened.

      Boing did a shit job so the 737MAX was certified on their schedule, and then it was sold as a non-recertification-rquired from the 737NG, which was a nice selling point -and it worked. Here are the results.

    87. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by wired_parrot · · Score: 3, Informative

      The autopilot wouldn't be using the vane angle-of-attack sensor, they would be using air data and the inertial reference system. The only system that I would expect to be using the vane angle-of-attack reading in aircraft that is not fly-by-wire is the stall protection system. The stall protection system normally takes either of the angle-of-attack readings to flag a stall, whichever of the two systems is giving a higher reading. It uses an either-or logic because an aircraft in a banked turn may have differing angle-of-attack readings between the two vanes. An incorrect reading might trigger a premature stick shaker/pusher activation, but as this can be overriden by the pilot it wouldn't be considered safety critical, hence only 2 vane angle-of-attack sensors are needed.

      Airbus aircraft, which have fly-by-wire, calculate angle-of-attack independently using the pressure readings from cross-coupled smart pitot tube sensors, which can then be verified against the vane angle-of-attack.

    88. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by turbidostato · · Score: 2

      "However the bigger issue is why are there only two sensors. where a single faulty sensor can cause an issue. There should have been three sensors so a single faulty sensor can be out voted by the remaining two good ones."

      No: the bigger problem was that a malfunction in this subsystem was catalogued as "hazardous" because that's how it was design to be and that's what it *should* have been.

      Then, the shitty, greed-mediated, certification process failed to discover the failure-mode design changed overnight (unadevertedly and undesiredly, I will suppose) from "hazardous" to "catastrophic" and so failed to provide proper support for that class -not only, nor probably mainly, on making it redundant but also on training procedures to cope with it.

    89. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by registrations_suck · · Score: 1

      Actually it's more like selling a car without a tire pressure indicator.

      ... for F1 drivers whose life depends on that indicator.

      If you felt your life depended on the indicator, then why didn't you buy the indicator?

    90. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Nehmo · · Score: 1

      None of the articles (that I've found) say *how much* more this disagreement indicator would cost. I can make one for under $100 USD. (I'm estimating, of course.)

      --
      (||) Nehmo (||)
    91. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Talderas · · Score: 1

      Hell, 9 out of 10 times you don't even get to know for sure what kind of airplane, let alone what specific plane, you'll be flying on.

      I don't know what airlines you fly on or where you buy your tickets but I can't think of a single time where I didn't know the model of aircraft I was flying on before I booked my tickets. The only time I've ever seen that was when using one of those discount sites like Expedia. They weren't able to provide any info on the plane being used for the flight but at the same time Expedia was able to and the air carriers themselves also had that when looking at the bookings on their reservation system. In fact, the most recent flight I booked said 737-800 as the model of the aircraft.

      --
      "Lack of speed can be overcome. In the worst case by patience." --Znork
    92. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "But why only one was used for MCAS?"

      Because, provided things were made just half-way sanely, one sensor would have been good enough.

      The MCAS system was there "just" so the new MAX looked like the old one and, since the MAX was more prone to high speed stall, MCAS was supposedly to "just" throw a hand in case the pilots sidetracked by "just" lower the plane's nose "just" a bit. In case of MCAS malfunction, you just turn it off and pay a little attention, that's all.

      But then, what it really happened is that MCAS, because of its reset after pilot acknowledging, gained in practice full authority over control surfaces. IF Boing -or FAA for that matter, had even suspected this "full authority" condition (and that it was indeed a design requirement, which it wasn't), you can be sure things would have been much different (2x or even 3x redundancy, specific training on remediation procedures, etc.)

      The question here is much less the accident itself but how in hell did things reach to that utterly fucking point as to allow the planes to flight on these circumstances -and the fact that we are aware of this specific issue... now, but how many more have not been discovered yet?

    93. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Can'tNot · · Score: 1

      Nonsense. Why would they do that? Canada doesn't have a competitor to Boeing, so they're free to benefit from that low cost without needing to deal with complaints from lobbyists.

    94. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      On the other hand, an indicator that one or both sensors are wrong is quite important when they are used by a system with authority to alter the flight of the plane.

    95. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      To be fair it's not "control surfaces", it's a single control surface. Granted it's a pretty important one.

      You're right though. They went from 0.6 degrees of movement on paper to a full 5 degrees in practice. That's insane.

    96. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      Also notable, in a healthy competitive market, manufacturers can't pull BS like charging extra to turn a built-in feature on.

    97. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Finally, you have identified the real source of the problem - the media!

      Incorrect; the real source of the problem is idiots who credulously believe everything they're told by a talking head with a microphone. The media wouldn't be an issue if you weren't simultaneously so gullible and so self-assured.

    98. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by thegarbz · · Score: 1

      That is well reasoned. Regardless of people's opinion of computer control vs pilot control, or whether or not an override is available, the pilot should always know the actions currently being undertaken and the basis for those actions by another system. There are two sensors, the pilot has additional sensory input to determine if the AOA sensor is faulty, the computer doesn't. Even if the computer is locked to never be disabled this information should be available and the sensor selection should be in control of the pilot.

      This is not even about aircraft, it is about information from systems that allow people to make informed decisions.

    99. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 3, Interesting

      This is a little different. Imagine a new model of an existing car. The engineers note that the new car has an odd tendency to turn to the left all on it's own. Rather than fix that or alert drivers to the oddity, they devise a system that will pull the steering wheel a bit to the right when it detects the surprise left steering. The warning light to tell you that the sensor for the steering correction system has failed is OPTIONAL. But since it's cheaper to build all of the cars with the indicator, the dealer is instructed to disable it with wire cutters unless you choose to pay for it.

    100. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      What's really surprising is that MCAS doesn't shut itself down AND indicate failure when the sensors disagree rather than fight the pilot for control of the trim.

      It's looking more and more like Boeing was playing dirty to avoid the MAX from being considered a new typr for the purposes of pilot training.

    101. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by darkmeridian · · Score: 3, Insightful

      The AOA disagreement light should be standard. However, there should be a MCAS activation light. When ABS goes on, my car signals it to me. Then I know that the automatic system has kicked in. The aircraft should tell me when a safety feature is kicking in. Then I can remember to turn it off.

      --
      A NYC lawyer blogs. http://www.chuangblog.com/
    102. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      I agree that the AOA indicator isn't necessary. The disagree light definately should be standard, and MCAS should have shut down when the sensors disagree.

    103. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by omnichad · · Score: 1

      Well then they'd have to update the flight manual to actually say what the MCAS is. As far as I can tell, it's not described there.

    104. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by bingoUV · · Score: 1

      You're an idiot.

      1. There are 2 "pilot"s - one can easily look into the manual when the other pulls up the nose repeatedly.
      2. Cars , at typical highway speeds, are surrounded by things into which it can crash in milliseconds. Aircraft after taking off - not so much.
      3. "Pilot"s, both of them, are trained to look into specific sections of the manual when the need arises. Car drivers, not so much. Partly because of reasons 1 and 2 above.
      4. If all else fails to convince you - you are just arguing against established, SOP. Which could have been established partly for reasons 1, 2 and 3 above.

      --
      Bingo Dictionary - Pragmatist, n. A myopic idealist.
    105. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      Both sensors are for stall warnings.
      But it seems only one is used for the MCAS system ... which sounds not plausible/logical.

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    106. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      The scary thing is: this could happen with every brand/vendor/type of plane.

      There was an Airbus accident where the pilot got killed because the plane did not brake good enough and crashed with the nose into a building at the airport, reason: because not all wheels had ground contact, the computer did not allow to use reverse engine power to brake the plane. A stupid engineering error ...

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    107. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "A redundant second sensor is not enough."

      It is.

      "How do you know which one is giving faulty readings?"

      Why do you want to know?

      "You need three sensors."

      For a non-required system, even with "catastrophic" failure mode, two sensors are good enough. You don't *need* to know which one is failing, in that case, you only *need* to know that one of the sensors is failing even if you don't know which one. In that case, you just turn off the system and let the pilot know of that fact... by means of an indicator.

      And even then, you may be able not to disengage the system, even with a failing sensor as long as you can check which one fails by another means, either cross-checking with another subsystem that may produce a related measure (i.e.: an hydraulic pressure sensor has gone nuts if it says there's no pressure on a system that moves a flight surface with a movement sensor that indicates it's still responding to commands), or you can check on a known scenario (i.e.: you know an angle of attack sensor has gone nuts if it tells your nose is strongly elevated when you are parked).

      "The problem with the MCAS is that it only had two sensor"

      No, it had just one. The problem was the subsystem depending on it wasn't behaving the way Boing and FAA thought it was behaving.

    108. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "The Lion Air pilots couldn't figure out why the plane was fucking around on them, and a pilot riding along diagnosed the issue."

      From what I read, both the previous day crew that survived and the ones that died diagnosed properly the problem: something is fucking moving the control surfaces. What neither did, was understanding the underlying cause was MCAS command.

      The difference is that the previous day's crew misunderstood the root cause and tried the wrong procedure that, by sheer luck, also happened to disengage MCAS.

      What I don't get is how in hell was that plane flying the following day after such an undiagnosed and/or undeclared incident, I mean, why the crashed crew didn't know what happened the previous day and how it was "solutioned" (even if wrongly) so they didn't try the same.

    109. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      The autopilot wouldn't be using the vane angle-of-attack sensor, they would be using air data and the inertial reference system

      I'm going to be generous and say it may depend on the aircraft type. I've worked on several aircraft which definitely have the AOA signal feeding into the autopilot. Maybe whatever aircraft you're familiar with don't. I don't have any experience on the 737 MAX and I presume you don't either, so I can't conclusively say whether it does or not.

    110. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by parkinglot777 · · Score: 1

      I don't know whether or not the pilot of the plane would the cause from the light indicator... However, I will let you judge the situation yourself. Here is the play by play of the situation from both Lion Air flights (successfully flew and the one after which failed). The file also contains credential of all operated crews.

    111. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "Imagine that you're driving down the highway, and suddenly your car starts to accelerate out of control. You, of course, scan the dash, see that the check engine light is on, and think to yourself "let me check the manual and see what to do about a check engine light".

      That's the kind of thing you're suggesting here ...."

      Imagine you are a certified commercial pilot instead of a random guy in his car.

      Then you don't imagine a shit, you just stick to the procedures which you check in the damn manuals.

      Of course, you probably have seen a commercial plane dashboard: you don't have a mere "engine error" light but dozens of them. If you have an "MCAS subsytem failure - contradictory measures from sensors" indicator, you damn sure go to the page of the manual that deals with that. And probably, if there just one and only one thing that can be done, like disabling it, the supporting systems would have already done so, and then you wouldn't have an "MCAS subsytem failure - contradictory measures from sensors" indicator but an "MCAS subsytem failure - subsystem disengaged" one that surely would also have a damn page in the manual to know what to do from them on.

    112. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "To be fair it's not "control surfaces", it's a single control surface. Granted it's a pretty important one."

      Well, I counted that my overall tone was a hint that I was not trying to be absolutely technically precise but trying to make my point through.

      But then, last I looked most planes used to have two elevators which makes them "control surface*s*" on my book.

    113. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      That's not an engineering error, it's a safety feature. The only way the plane knows it's on the ground is via WOW switches. If those are telling you that you're not on the ground, sure, you can't use reverse thrust, which means you might hit something, and that's bad. You know what's worse? Accidentally engaging reverse thrust while you're still in the air.

      One will do some damage to the plane, the other will probably kill everyone and leave a smoking crater.

    114. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by barc0001 · · Score: 1

      > is like selling a car without airbags or charging extra for the brakes.

      Well.. ya know... a few years back airbags were only on premium trim packages or models, and even today ABS is an option - as well as many of the lower end models of car are sold with drum brakes in the back as a cost savings measure, despite the proven shortcomings of drum brakes.

    115. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      They would be technically, yes :) but on the 737 the trim system moves the entire horizontal stab instead of the elevators, and I'm pretty sure that's just one surface .... though come to think of it I'm not even sure if that technically falls into the "control surfaces" category. It's certainly not one of the primaries.

    116. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      Yes, the manufacturers choose one of the two examples of a reasonable response suggested.

    117. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by theycallmeB · · Score: 1

      A number of folks here seem to be missing a very important point about this system: the MCAS on the 737 Max is NOT part of the autopilot. It is always there between the pilots and the control surfaces when the pilots are flying the plane and it does not stop itself. This is a fundamental break in system behavior compared to every previous Boeing airliner. Regardless of any lights or sensors or whatnot, the fact that a Boeing now has a computer that will fight the pilots all the way into the ground is not something that should have been buried in an iPad training module. This was a colossal fuck up from end to end on Boeing's part.

    118. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      In a healthy market, the manufacturer has to turn the feature on by default in order to make the sale.

      The development is a sunk cost. So is the hardware if it's always included enabled or not.

    119. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      This would be like buying the detectors + sprinkler system, then turning them all off because my guests wouldn't pony up a dime each.

    120. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      The reasoning is known. The MAX has larger engines that are mounted further forward to maintain ground clearance. This gives the plane a tendency to nose up under power. Boing didn't want to risk the FAA deciding that required specific pilot qualification for the MAX, so they added MCAS to correct the noseing up and allow pilots already qualified for the old 737 to fly the MAX without additional training. They didn't document MCAS, again to avoid the risk that the FAA might make an adverse decision.

      Then they just couldn't resist trying to squeeze a few more pennies out by making the sensor disagreement light an optional package.

    121. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by dunkelfalke · · Score: 1

      The previous day crew - actually a deadheading pilot - applied the exactly right procedure because while not knowing the actual root cause his reasoning was close enough.

      --
      "It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
    122. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by dunkelfalke · · Score: 1

      It wasn't the autopilot that was disabled, it was the trim motor, which is the proper response to a trim developing life on its own. The pilots had to crank the trim by hand afterwards and since the MCAS has no hands, it couldn't interfere anymore

      --
      "It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
    123. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by dunkelfalke · · Score: 1

      The classic stick pushers work that way. Unfortunately pilots tended to disbelieve and overpower them, which lead to several crashes.

      --
      "It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
    124. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      It's worse. The features were available, just turned off unless you coughed up more money for them.

      They're optional. Optional things add cost, and thus cost money to the customer.

      The summary claims: "even though some of these systems are fundamental to the plane's operations." The lie here is that they are fundamental to the operation of the aircraft. They obviously are not -- airplanes fly fine without them, and the pilots can control the aircraft just fine without them. Many airplanes don't have a single AOA sensor, much less an indicator to show the reading, and then clearly they won't have a "disagree" light. For something to be "fundamental" it really needs to be necessary.

      In the case of these flights that crashed, the disagree light would have been a distraction, and god knows they were not paying enough attention anyway. They would have seen a light that told them that the two AOA disagreed, but that would tell them nothing about how to stop the problem. They had all they needed: a direct observation that the trim system was repeatedly entering nose-down trim despite all attempts at returning it to normal. What do you do if the AOA disagree? Who knows. What do you do if your trim system is trying to kill you? DISABLE THE TRIM SYSTEM. Between a light telling you that two sensors disagree and a trim system trying to kill you, which is the most important problem to solve? How hard is that to grasp?

    125. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      This would be like buying the detectors + sprinkler system

      No, because the aircraft operators didn't BUY the AOA indicator or the AOA disagree light. Those are physical things that aren't installed if you don't buy them.

    126. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      making sure that people know the system and how to turn it off

      Pilots are quite aware of how to turn off a runaway electric trim system. It's in the POH. It's part of their training. It's part of their simulator time. It's not a mystery.

      But Boeing DID tell people how to turn it off, and the FAA told people how to turn it off, in the messages and the AD send out last November. And yet, a crash happened in March. Apparently "nobody told us" isn't an excuse for failing to fly the airplane.

    127. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      If you have an "MCAS subsytem failure - contradictory measures from sensors" indicator, you damn sure go to the page of the manual that deals with that.

      And what do you imagine that page might tell you do do? Who cares? It's irrelevant because the problem the pilots had to solve FIRST and FOREMOST was the repeated nose-down trim. THAT'S the critical issue. The fact that the two AOA sensors don't agree is nice to know, after you've solved the life-threatening issue first. Then you can complain that there isn't an "MCAS failure" page to help you diagnose the MCAS failure. Until you stop the runaway trim, you don't have the time to debug an MCAS system.

      Solving that life-threatening issue was already included in the POH under its own topic. The pilots didn't implement the emergency procedure that has been in the book for decades and is part of their immediate action drill for any runaway trim situation. The same emergency procedure that the FAA AD outlined as the corrective action for the MCAS failure.

    128. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      No, my response (being a nearly-licensed-to-fly-alone 'expert') is that you're a fucking moron,

      I'm really glad that you think you're an expert on flying. I hope I never run across you as a pilot.

      Does the airplane you are learning to fly in have an AOA sensor? None of the aircraft I've flown (long past "pre-solo") have had an AOA sensor, much less a display. Maybe the King Air did, but I don't recall. If your airplane doesn't have one in it, then you are a cheap-ass bastard who is going to kill someone because you're too cheap to buy a simple instrument. How's that sound? Goose, meet gander.

      AOA isn't required to fly. Period. There are other stall warning systems. There are other instruments that can tell you that you're flying in a stall attitude. As a pre-solo student, your CFI should be teaching you about that before he lets you be a danger to yourself and others by flying alone. Otherwise, you're going to get into the pattern on your first solo and try to overcorrect a late turn to final, and corkscrew into the ground when you enter a stall/spin at 100ft AGL. Hint: look up what happens to stall speed in a steep turn. And then remember that one wing is going slower than the other and slower than the indicated airspeed.

    129. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      And the MCAS is a new feature because the airplane is intrinsically unstable because of its oversized engines.

      Bullshit. The aircraft pitches up when thrust is applied because of where the engines are located. Guess what? This happens in many other aircraft, too. And in some aircraft the plane pitches DOWN when thrust is applied. And the opposite happens when thrust is reduced. Sometimes a plane that pitches up will pitch down for the same change in thrust, depending on the current configuration.

      Pilots learn these things. They have to deal with them. They are supposed to be paying attention when they are applying thrust because it means they are changing something, and their job is to supervise. MCAS is a crutch that shouldn't be necessary if the pilot is paying attention to the aircraft while flying. And stopping MCAS from actually doing anything is, indeed, documented in the POH and emergency procedures.

    130. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      AOA sensor on the fritz. Plane keeps trying to nose dive. Something is trying to cause it because it thinks we're at the wrong angle. What causes wrong angle? Let's disable automated systems that control angle.

      You are conveniently ignoring the fact that the nose-down trim is a better indicator that you need to disable "automated systems that control angle". You don't need a red light on the dash to tell you the nose has pitched down, and that every time you try to bring the trim back to normal it just starts running away again.

      Your "AOA disagree" light is just that. It can light up when the plane isn't trying to pitch down, too. Since there are other things that can cause uncommanded nose-down trim, that light may never illuminate.

      The fact that the airplane is pitching down is enough to know you need to fix something. At the end of the day, the way to stop the problem is the same no matter what causes the runaway trim. You don't need a light to tell you that.

    131. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      Boeing certainly wasn't scrimping, they were being greedy by selling critical safety features for a few more bucks,

      "Critical safety features" that most planes don't have even one of kind of hints that maybe it isn't as critical as you pretend. If it were such a critical safety feature, wouldn't you imagine that the aircraft that people learn to fly in might have them? I mean, novice pilots are more likely to need "critical safety features", and yet they don't have them. Why is that?

      It's because AOA is not critical. Knowing the AOA is not working is not critical. Knowing the AOA isn't working doesn't tell you how to prevent a runaway trim situation. You can't just reach out and tap on the sensor to see if you can unstick it. If it's broken, it's broken, and you wait until you land to get it replaced.

    132. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Potor · · Score: 1

      Why then did the pilots of two planes not do what you said they should know that they should do?

    133. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      These are a special case of optional. The hardware is installed in all cases, proving that the manufacturer makes a satisfactory profit after paying for those parts and without the extra payment from the customer (otherwise, they wouldn't offer that configuration). A healthy market (for any sort of profuct) would forve the manufacturer to enable those features at the base price in order to compete (that is, the market would force the inefficiency out).

      As for the usefulness, it would provide an unequivocal indication of the problem which should cause the pilot to take the appropriate action. MCAS has sensor trouble, turn it off and fly without it.

      In the case of the Lion Air flight, they managed to keep the plane flying for 11 minutes. Had they had a clear indication of exactly what was causing the plane to fight them for control, the pilots could have managed to shut off MCAS. In fact, the day before, the same plane (different pilots) had the same problem and a 3rd off-duty pilot diagnosed the problem while the pilots kept the plane flying. As a result, they turned MCAS off and continued safely to their destination.

      The lack of a clear fault indication has crashed 2 planes so far, that seems fairly fundamental to safe operation. A car without those expensive optional "brakes" goes just fine. It's the crashing that is a problem.

    134. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      No, they are physical things that are installed in all cases. They are enabled (a configuration setting) if you pay for them.

    135. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      No, they are physical things that are installed in all cases.

      They are optional. Do you not know what that word means?

      They are optional because they aren't critical. Or fundamental.

    136. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      As for the usefulness, it would provide an unequivocal indication of the problem which should cause the pilot to take the appropriate action.

      I've already covered this. An "AOA disagree" light doesn't tell you how to stop a runaway trim situation, nor does it even tell that you're going to experience one. It just means the sensors disagree. And then you'll waste time dealing with that instead of the real problem you need to stop.

      Had they had a clear indication of exactly what was causing the plane to fight them for control, the pilots could have managed to shut off MCAS.

      The thing that was causing them to fight for control was a runaway stabilizer trim. How to deal with this is well documented. What caused the runaway trim is a matter to be diagnosed after the plane is stable, not before.

      Yeah, AFTER they solved the trim problem it would have been convenient for them to be able to see a light that says the AOA disagree, and then maybe realize it was the MCAS that created the physical problem. But even if they did that, what would they do? They can't fix the MCAS, they can't replace the AOA. All they can do is report it later. Which happened in previous flights. Even lacking their report, the flight computers would report the fault to maintenance, who would have to come fix it anyway.

    137. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      Why then did the pilots of two planes not do what you said they should know that they should do?

      You can only lead the horse to water, you can't make him drink. Why they didn't diagnose a problem that they'd certainly seen in a lot of simulator rides is a mystery. Why do pilots fall asleep and fly past their destination? Why do pilots ignore approach minima and fly into the ground 100 feet short of the runway? Pilots make mistakes.

    138. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      And, lo and behold, if you deal with the sensors disagree light, there will be no runaway trim since you'll have turned it off.

      If instead, you'd like to argue that Boeing should program it so that the sensors disagree condition shuts down MCAS automatically, I would agree,

      In the pilot's mind, the sensors disagree light will become the turn off MCAS light, problem solved. It might even lead them to turn off MCAS before it even tries to mis-adjust the trim. It might even warn them before they take off.

    139. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Pikoro · · Score: 1

      I feel the need to address this particular part of your reply: " these pilots should have been following their diagnostic checklist (which they should know by heart). "

      That's just utter bullshit. The "Quick Reference Handbook" in the cockpit is upwards of 4 inches thick. They are taught to go to the relevant section of the QRH in the event of an emergency. There is a table of contents listing the ECAS or ECAM messages so they can find the relevant sections and they are typically ordered by ATA code. Generally you browse by section/ATA code for the affected system. For things like flight controls, there are multiple ATA codes that could be referenced. The training focuses on generalities, not specifics, since there is a manual in the cockpit. Generally one of the pilots takes the controls while the other looks up the relevant procedure. These QRHs are re-issued quarterly. There is no memorization.

      Disclaimer. I'm a Flight Training Device Engineer for a major airline. I work with the pilots, instructors, and fleet captains, and write/implement these training curriculums used every day, amongst my other duties.. They are not static things.

      --
      "Freedom in the USA is not the ability to do what you want. It is the ability to stop others from doing what THEY want"
    140. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      Reverse engine power is nothing you can engage by accident.
      So it should be (and is no, the code got changed) up to the pilot.
      In my opinion this was a case were "software engineers" believed they were smarter than the user (the pilot) ... and that is rarely true.

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    141. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "on the 737 the trim system moves the entire horizontal stab instead of the elevators"

      You are right, I forgot when answering this second time.

    142. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Oh it definitely can be. I'm guessing you're not a pilot. Different aircraft have different ways of deploying reverse thrust, but none of them make it particularly hard; it generally tends to be a continuation of the "down throttle" movement with the addition of some movement in a different direction at the point of transition.

      I find it extremely unlikely that "the code good changed", and now I am starting to question your entire description of the incident. What flight number was this? When did it occur? There seems to be no record of it.

      The only incident I'm familiar with which comes close to what you're talking about is an acceptance check of a brand new Airbus during which the personnel operating the aircraft intentionally overrode the WOW switch while doing what was supposed to be a stationary test of the engines. They apparently got tired of hearing an alarm and pulled the WOW breaker to fool the aircraft into thinking it was in the air, at which point the brakes immediately released and they went rocketing down the taxiway before crashing into a concrete wall.

      If that's the incident you're thinking of, then no, idiots disabling a system they didn't really understand is not an engineering error, and no, there was no "fix" for it other than to tell subsequent crews to not be retarded.

    143. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      Bingo

    144. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by c6gunner · · Score: 1

      But if you put a new light on the console, you must train about this light and the correcting actions upon turning it on.

      That's an incorrect assumption. The airlines which did order AOA indication and/or the disagree light didn't receive a different training package for it. If you look in NASAs ASRS database you can find anonymous reports from pilots complaining that several lights and knobs in the 737 MAX cockpit weren't covered in their training, and some of the knobs weren't even documented in the flight manual.

      An AOA disagree light in particular wouldn't inherently require any "correcting action". It can illuminate even when the system is functioning correctly, just due to aircraft orientation. But even assuming there were any extra training for it, I'm not sure why you assume that pilots who couldn't remember their runaway trim emergency procedures would have remembered what to do about an AOA light.

    145. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by angel'o'sphere · · Score: 1

      I find it extremely unlikely that "the code got changed", and now I am starting to question your entire description of the incident. What flight number was this? When did it occur? There seems to be no record of it.
      As far as I know the code got changed. The incident is probably 15 - 20 years back, happened either in Germany or in Poland, I only remember the pilot was German (probably the airline, too).

      Here I found it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... 1993, September 14th. The german version explains the software problem and change: https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/...

      It was Warsaw, Poland.

      --
      Cost free eBook I read (by iBook/Kobo/Amazon/ObookO/Gutenberg etc.): "The Green Odyssey" by Philip Jose Farmer.
    146. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      And it never happened that you suddenly wound up on a different plane, with exactly zero chance to insist in being transported by the "correct" plane?

      Yes, you're usually told what kind of plane they plan to stuff you into. No, you don't have any right to THIS plane, or even the type.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    147. Re: A corporation cutting corners... by bluefoxlucid · · Score: 1

      both the previous day crew that survived and the ones that died diagnosed properly the problem: something is fucking moving the control surfaces. What neither did, was understanding the underlying cause was MCAS command.

      Hey I diagnosed the problem: the plane fell out of the air. Future crews should keep the plane in the air. I am very smart.

    148. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      And, lo and behold, if you deal with the sensors disagree light, there will be no runaway trim since you'll have turned it off.

      If you deal with the fact that the trim is running away, you'll have stopped the problem without needing a "sensor disagree" light. The "sensor disagree" light doesn't mean you have to disable the electric trim system, it means the sensors disagree. It might have no effect on the MCAS at all.

      In the pilot's mind, the sensors disagree light will become the turn off MCAS light,

      Son, if "the trim is running away nose-down" doesn't mean "disable the electric trim system", then there is no hope that a more esoteric, less obviously dangerous "sensor disagree" light will result in any better outcome.

    149. Re:A corporation cutting corners... by sjames · · Score: 1

      It's funny how silly your arguments are getting, especially in light of the news that the disagree indicator light will now be made standard.

      By silly, I mean, how can MCAS possibly operate correctly when it has only two identical sensors to work with and they disagree. The system has no way to determine which one, if either, is right.

  2. Could you tell me in advance when booking by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

    Could you tell me in advance when booking a flight if the plane in question is missing any optional safety features that should obviously be standard so I can choose a provider that does not save money on no-brainer stuff like like this?

    I mean right now I have whole Boeing lineup set as "this plane may be missing obviously useful redundancies in safety systems that might mean it can crash, so I will not book a flight on this plane" and I know that is probably unfair to most of those planes. But without available information, that is the only option available to me.

    1. Re:Could you tell me in advance when booking by Swoopy · · Score: 4, Interesting

      I'd not judge Lion Air or Ethiopian until it's clear whether the safety certification for the 737 Max was obtained WITH or WITHOUT the "optional" features on board. If it was WITH, then Boeing essentially sold an uncertified / incomplete product to those two airlines, probably without clearly telling them so.

    2. Re:Could you tell me in advance when booking by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Can you? Or do you get told by the beancounters downstairs that this flight is cheaper and that you'll take it?

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    3. Re:Could you tell me in advance when booking by johannesg · · Score: 2

      I think there is space in the market for a website that lists, for each airline, what their safety status is: are they economizing on safety features? Is their training up to date? And then basically extort them into providing the information, i.e. clearly mark airlines unwilling to participate as "UNSAFE".

      Basically, the goal would be to make safety a fundamental competitive feature, rather than merely a cost center.

  3. Safety OPTIONAL? by Wizardess · · Score: 1

    That concept is a pile of brown goopy stinky material such as emanates from the South end of a North facing fertile male bovine!
    {O.O}

  4. Default behavior is to crash by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    Unless some additional paid options are bought. Was it in the brochure that hundreds would automatically die at some point without these options? It seems like just a matter of time before it happens to every 737-Max. I think Boeing lost some feathers in this whole debacle...

    1. Re: Default behavior is to crash by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      This is more like selling fuel to an airline with an added option to not randomly lose combustibility

    2. Re: Default behavior is to crash by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      It can be disabled by turning autopilot on, NOT off, and anyway the autopilot would disengage immediately because at least this subsystem checks for the consistency of the data coming from the AoA sensors.

    3. Re:Default behavior is to crash by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      Was it in the brochure that hundreds would automatically die at some point without these options?

      This is just one more example of the dishonest debate taking place here about this issue. Hundreds did not automatically die because there was no "AOA disagree" light on the panel. Hundreds died because four pilots (two in each airplane) could not diagnose a runaway trim situation and take the book-specified action to prevent it. A light on the dash saying the AOA sensors don't agree would add nothing to their ability to diagnose the actual problem, which was not that the sensors didn't agree, but that the trim was being forced nose-down incorrectly.

      The dead-heading pilot diagnosed the problem. He had the same training and saw the same things the other two pilots in his cockpit saw. The last two pilots even had the benefit of an FAA AD telling them what would cause that problem and how to solve it, and they still couldn't deal with it.

  5. Re:What could go wrong? by hcs_$reboot · · Score: 1

    Amateur could be a reason, but Muslim? Anyway, the pilots were not amateurs.

    --
    Slashdot, fix the reply notifications... You won't get away with it...
  6. sadly laughable on two levels: by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Interesting

    [1] We now know that the Lion Air 787 had the same issue on an earlier flight, but it was saved from disaster by the presence of a third pilot aboard who knew what to do, and then the airline chose not to fix the sensor before the fatal flight. Translation: the problem was avoidable if either of two things happened: the presence of a competent pilot, or the aircraft being properly maintained. People should prepare themselves for the very possible scenario that in perhaps a year when the NTSB finishes investigating (They're extremely diligent and objective) it will be determined that there's nothing wrong with the 787Max and that a combination of maintenance and pilot training and skill were the core issues (and I say that as a Boeing critic).

    [2] The over-regulation of aviation in the US by the FAA makes the development and deployment of things like avionics and engines particularly expensive. [stay with me for a moment for the payoff...] It's not enough to develop a new flight instrument and get it approved - you must get a "Type Certificate" to allow the instrument to be installed into each make and model of plane. As a result, if you are only going to have a few customers for your new instrument in a particular sort of aircraft, then there's no way you'll ever recover the regulatory costs of getting a TypeCert for it, so you won't bother, and that means owners of that type of plane cannot get your new instrument for their plane. It's THIS aspect of FAA regulation that has made it so that most private planes in the US do not have (and indeed cannot get) an Angle-of-Attack instrument - the very thing this article complains about being optional on these 787s!!!!! Many private aviation incidents in the USA occur on departure, and on approach, and that's where an AOA indicator would save lives, but where many private pilots are only served by a squawking stall indicator.

    1. Re:sadly laughable on two levels: by blind+biker · · Score: 1

      [2] The over-regulation of aviation in the US by the FAA makes the development and deployment of things like avionics and engines particularly expensive. [stay with me for a moment for the payoff...] It's not enough to develop a new flight instrument and get it approved - you must get a "Type Certificate" to allow the instrument to be installed into each make and model of plane. As a result, if you are only going to have a few customers for your new instrument in a particular sort of aircraft, then there's no way you'll ever recover the regulatory costs of getting a TypeCert for it, so you won't bother, and that means owners of that type of plane cannot get your new instrument for their plane. It's THIS aspect of FAA regulation that has made it so that most private planes in the US do not have (and indeed cannot get) an Angle-of-Attack instrument - the very thing this article complains about being optional on these 787s!!!!! Many private aviation incidents in the USA occur on departure, and on approach, and that's where an AOA indicator would save lives, but where many private pilots are only served by a squawking stall indicator.

      Wow. This boggles the mind.

      Thank you, sir, for sharing such interesting information!

      --
      "The agriculture ministry is not in charge of Gundam" - Japanese ministry official.
  7. The Joker would be proud by Kokuyo · · Score: 3, Informative

    The funny thing about this is that nobody responsible for this will actually suffer any real consequences.

    1. Re:The Joker would be proud by Krishnoid · · Score: 1

      Nope -- if Congress gets ahold of this and points to the ] 'optional airplane safety features in software' smoking gun, how long do you think it will be before they start adding regulations requiring software audits in the future? It will only affect the responsible people who haven't yet retired from the software industry, but could start affecting everyone in the field from that point on.

    2. Re:The Joker would be proud by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Have they ever in the aerospace industry? When was the last time you saw any airline C-Level fly sardine class?

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    3. Re:The Joker would be proud by markdavis · · Score: 1

      >"The funny thing about this is that nobody responsible for this will actually suffer any real consequences."

      Actually, part of the blame does rest on the two sets of pilots. And they did pay the ultimate price. Still, it would have been far better if these two extremely inexpensive addons (a lamp and an already-developed-but-disabled software patch) had been included as a base safety feature.

      And Boeing, as a company, will also pay a steep price on the market, because it will hurt their reputation and sales. They might also be open to law suits from the families of the passengers and flight staff. It will also hurt their investors and stock holders. If it costs them enough, many of their employees will suffer due to loss of jobs and/or wages due to decreased demand.

      The remaining thing to be seen is if any individuals from within Boeing will be liable for anything, either from internal or external entities.

      So yes, there are already real consequences for many, if not most, involved. Are they enough? Perhaps, perhaps not. But let's not pretend nothing will or has happened and that nothing has or will change.

  8. How is this a safety feature? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

    How is an indicator that vital sensors are malfunctioning a safety feature? The pilots may have known a little earlier that they were doomed, but a 737 with short legs and big engines won't fly safe without these sensors (the exact place of the engines is dictated by the ground, not by aerodynamics, but we'll fix it in software)

    1. Re: How is this a safety feature? by gweihir · · Score: 1

      It is not. It is what the actual experts tell everybody. Please shut up.

      --
      Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
    2. Re: How is this a safety feature? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Well, in the situation how it was being sold, this is pretty much the truth.

      Without the MCAS, the MAX handles fundamentally different in some pretty dangerous flight modes than the NG. This alone would require a new type rating. Type ratings for pilots are expensive and time consuming, Boeing wanted to avoid that, mostly as an economic argument. That's why they put in the MCAS. With a WORKING MCAS, the MAX handles sufficient close to the NG, that pilots with just the NG type rating can still fly "safely", until MCAS fails and potentially crashes the plane.

      Boeing and/or the FAA could have skipped MCAS and made type ratings for NG pilots mandatory. Then, at least every pilot would know about the tendency to pull the nose further up than the NG when going to full throttle. Most pilots fly with some automation still enabled, even if they're flying "manual", so auto-trim could've easily have corrected for this.

      This aspect of the MAX would have certainly not be one of its highlights, but if every pilot knew about those properties, it wouldn't be a safety problem, just part of normal procedures.

      The alternative would obviously have been designing a different airframe, allowing for a higher, but more balanced placement of the engines. Maybe higher legs would've been sufficient though, since the MAX 9 does already feature higher legs.

  9. Re:What could go wrong? by AC-x · · Score: 1

    While it's not explicitly stated...

    Lion Air captain: probably Hindu

    Ethiopian Airlines captain: probably Christian

  10. Three AOA vanes required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting

    The thing is, if you have only two AOA detectors and they disagree, there is no way for the computer to know which one is wrong. The 737 Max is really weird in that, with bigger engines posed forward, the airplane has different handling characteristics from the rest of the 737 family. But, instead of opting for the more expensive and slow option of retraining pilots to fly the new model, they wrote the software augmentation system that supposedly makes the airplane behave exactly like the classic 737. When the computer has good air data, that is.

    1. Re: Three AOA vanes required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      I don't understand why such a critical system was not designed to use 3 sensors for quorum.

    2. Re: Three AOA vanes required by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      Money?

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    3. Re: Three AOA vanes required by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1

      Rush to market. The system wasn't initially designed to be so strong, and that initial design is what the safety evaluation was based on. The amount that the automatic system could change the tail was increased from 0.6 to 2.5 degrees during flight testing (i.e. relatively late) and the safety evaluation was not updated due to the rush to market.

    4. Re: Three AOA vanes required by omnichad · · Score: 1

      They already had two sensors. But the MCAS doesn't check for a disagreement. And you don't know there's a disagreement when the sensor is disabled and there's no indicator. Even late in flight testing they could have enabled that second sensor across the board - and if they weren't adding a third sensor, they need the light.

    5. Re:Three AOA vanes required by PPH · · Score: 2

      The thing is, if you have only two AOA detectors and they disagree, there is no way for the computer to know which one is wrong.

      AoA sensors are typically used for systems like stall warning. That's the thing that shakes the control yoke (plus a few other lights and buzzers) when the angle of attack is too high for a particular flight mode. As part of a warning system, the consequences of a single sensor failure were not as dire. So the captain's stick shaker activates but the first officer's does not. The crew is in the loop to take appropriate action.

      Triple redundancy is typically used when a sensor provides an input to a system that can get the airplane into trouble all by itself (the criteria is a bit more complex). MCAS falls into this category. Initially, it was thought not to be so, due to it's maximum stabilizer adjustment of only half a degree. But two things happened: Flight testing revealed a need to increase this authority to 2.5 degrees. And it appears that nobody considered the case where an override command by the pilots would reset the system and allow it to bump the stabilizer down another 2.5 degrees. This should have been a 'back to the drawing board moment' in terms of testing and certification. It was not*.

      As to the "behave exactly like the classic 737": Not really. The classic 737 didn't have the 'nose up' problem that the MAX has due to it's new engine placement. Therefore there is no compensating bump the elevator down function needed. The old planes are inherently stable.

      *Typical problem at Boeing. I used to work there. They don't have the institutional skills needed to handle change properly. As long as things continue on as always, they are OK. But throw them a curve and the sh*t hits the fan. Schedule is God there.

      --
      Have gnu, will travel.
    6. Re:Three AOA vanes required by ceoyoyo · · Score: 2

      "The classic 737 didn't have the 'nose up' problem that the MAX has due to it's new engine placement."

      It did actually. Pretty much any aircraft with engines mounted beneath low wings is going to have the issue. Mounting the engines low means you're going to have off-axis thrust which will generally have a positive pitch contribution. Where that can get dangerous is if you're in a low speed stall, a situation in which you have less aerodynamic control authority and your instinct is to add power. If you do that, the increased thrust will push your nose up, making the stall worse, and you won't have the control authority to compensate. 737 pilots are specifically trained *not* to add power in a stall.

      The engine placement on the MAX makes the problem worse, to the point where Boeing decided the usual stall recovery procedure wasn't sufficient and some automatic software augmentation was required.

  11. Re:Corruption by gweihir · · Score: 1

    Beoing's CEO, the FAA chief, and others need to be fired.

    That is far too friendly. A long prison term would be more like it and appropriate to the damage they have done.

    --
    Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
  12. Re:Pilots not trained, planes not maintained by Chrisq · · Score: 1

    We don't want expert pilots. The people have had enough of experts

  13. Why would you need a seperate indicator anyway? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    What is this? The 60s, where we need a separate indicator for any given failure?

    Last time I looked, there are some big screens in there. If two of my most crucial sensors would disagree, I would expect a message on those screens, accompanied with a sound effect, making abundantly clear that something is wrong. No need for a pricey indicator in some corner, that can be easily overseen...

  14. Capitalism by kbg · · Score: 1, Flamebait

    Well what do you expect. That is just pure capitalism at work.

    1. Re:Capitalism by Opportunist · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Take a step back and you might notice that they become indistinguishable.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    2. Re:Capitalism by ravenscar · · Score: 1

      Is it though? Boeing's primary competitor is Airbus. The WTO has found that Airbus has received around $22B in illegal subsidies. I wonder how those subsidies impact the cost of doing business for Airbus vs Boeing and whether Boeing's irresponsible cost-cutting comes from expense pressures resulting from this difference. There are lots of examples of negative results of capitalism, but I don't really think the aerospace industry is one. Heck, its role in defense for major military powers is such that governments are constantly involved in operations.

      Note - This does not excuse Boeing or US regulators in any way.
      Also note - There are further contentions that the US does the same for Boeing. In which case, the expense pressures might not exist, but the argument that this isn't really "Capitalism at work" remains.

  15. Safety is optional? What about the security? by shanen · · Score: 2

    Really, if they want to make something optional, how about a low-security airline for people who are sick and tired of all that anti-terrorist BS? Only catch is your clothes travel separately.

    I just can't get over the sheer gall of it. Boeing was worried about it to the point that they developed two safety mechanisms. And then didn't enable them? How about making the safety features mandatory with an option to pay more to turn them off? You know, for the pilots and passengers who want the extra thrills.

    --
    Freedom = (Meaningful - Coerced) Choice != (Speech | Beer^2), and sad sock puppets' bad mods avail them naught.
  16. Who is worst? by Roger+W+Moore · · Score: 3, Interesting

    They literally nickel and dimed hundreds of people to death.

    I agree this is appalling but I'm struggling with whom I should be most appalled by: Boeing for their willingness to sell planes without all the safety features or the airlines that refused to pay for the safety features.

    1. Re: Who is worst? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

      When the airlines ordered the planes, it was not obvious at all for them that an AoA display/warning lamp would be anything but a distraction.

    2. Re:Who is worst? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      No, this is a corporate spin to blame the airlines for buying the planes without a feature. Unless the story has changed, the basic change in plane behaviour wasn't considered important enough to even mention to the pilots when training for this updated model, so i'd be surprised if anyone would splash out on new controls to show pilots things they don't even know exist on the plane.

    3. Re:Who is worst? by Pentium100 · · Score: 1

      I'd say Boeing. The airline managers may not understand such things about airplanes and only care about whether the airplane is certified, how much fuel it uses, how much training for the pilots etc. It should be the responsibility of the manufacturer to make their product safe and not disable additional safety features unless it gets an additional payment. Especially since those features most likely are software-only and do not require additional hardware etc.

    4. Re:Who is worst? by cahuenga · · Score: 4, Insightful

      I seriously doubt the airlines were aware that those decisions introduced a SPoF (single point of failure) in a critical avionics feature. Commercial aircraft must be built for high reliability, built with redundancies.. A system that wrests control from the pilot from the input of single sensor goes against decades of engineering convention in aircraft design and plain old common sense

    5. Re:Who is worst? by Roger+W+Moore · · Score: 1

      If we were talking about a regular consumer product that you or I might buy, I would completely agree since we cannot be expected to be experts in all the products we purchase. But airlines are not simple customers. They are, or at least I really hope they are, fully aware of all the safety issues involved in flying aircraft and so at some level they must have evaluated this feature themselves and decided that the extra safety it added for their customers was not worth the expense. This is in essence exactly what Boeing did too so I do find it hard to find much difference between the two.

    6. Re:Who is worst? by Roger+W+Moore · · Score: 1

      The airline managers may not understand such things

      Agreed, but airlines contain more than managers: they have experienced pilots and highly trained engineers as well. If you left the decision about features up to some random business manager you'd probably end up with a plane without engines because it's more fuel efficient! That's my dilemma: airlines are not simple customers they must have evaluated the benefits of this feature themselves and decided the extra safety it provided was not worth the cost which is, in essence, exactly what Boeing did too when they made the feature optional.

    7. Re:Who is worst? by Roger+W+Moore · · Score: 1

      I agree. But Boeing clearly did not realize how critical this system was to the safety of the plane. This is the same error that the airlines made when they evaluated it. The problem I see here is not that they made that mistake - everyone fucks up from time to time - it is that both Boeing and the airlines must have know that there was some improvement to safety by installing this feature and, despite that, they chose to put profit over safety. They grossly underestimated how much safety the feature added but, as I see it, the real problem here is that there is some sort of trade-off going on between safety and cost with the deciding factor being how cheap a particular airline wants to be. So while I might agree that Boeing is perhaps more to blame the airlines involved made the same error and should share some of the culpability.

    8. Re:Who is worst? by Can'tNot · · Score: 1

      Boeing. If a "disagree light" is both optional and expensive enough that it would make anyone hesitate, there's something wrong with how that product is being monetized.

    9. Re:Who is worst? by parkinglot777 · · Score: 2

      The surprise here, is that this hasn't happened sooner. Or it possibly has, just no one noticed, or it didn't make it to the public.

      It did happened in different times and have been saved in federal database. Though, the database is not indexed by any search engine, so almost all people have no idea about it. Besides, the search is not an easy-to-use interface, so go figure.

    10. Re:Who is worst? by Roger+W+Moore · · Score: 1

      Boeing knew what they were doing, or this system wouldn't have existed in the first place.

      Sorry but I simply do not believe that Boeing knew that this feature was absolutely critical to the safety of the plane and that, without it, planes would fall out of the sky and passengers would die. If they had known this then they would also know that the costs of not making it standard would vastly outweigh any extra money they make from making the feature optional so they would never have made the feature optional.

      Clearly, Boeing made a mistake in massively underestimating how critical this system was to safety. However, this mistake has exposed a completely unacceptable system whereby manufacturers can charge extra for features which add a little safety and airlines can decide whether the cost is worth the small increase in safety for their passengers. This underlying system relies on the complicity of both manufacturer and airlines to put a price on passenger safety and that is what is wrong but it is a system in which both participants have some share of the blame.

  17. Re: FFS: make software upgrades mandatory by Narcocide · · Score: 1

    Thank you. Sincerely, Thank you, for once not making me be the one who has to point out this is all somehow Microsoft's fault. Keep telling it like it is, AC.

  18. Your Automobile by Mr_Blank · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Do you have a car? Is it safe? Would it be safer if you paid more? Are there safety features available on the premium or luxury version of your car?

    This is the equivalent of putting a price on the value your family's safety. Safety costs extra. Pay up or die.

    If any car brands can be found to have more safety for a premium price, there will be lawsuits now that this concept of corporate greed has been made apparent to us by Boeing.

    1. Re:Your Automobile by Opportunist · · Score: 1

      The difference is that I can opt to not drive at 250mph and hence not need those additional airbags and crash safety because at 55mph the security features my car offers are adequate to give me ample chances to survive even a head-on crash.

      What you have here is the equivalent of not even having what's considered the standard level of security to survive a non-standard situation in everyday operation.

      --
      We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
    2. Re:Your Automobile by Waccoon · · Score: 1

      Thankfully, unlike passenger jets which are airborne laboratories that must maintain a minimum speed and may drop out of the sky at any moment, thus making autopilot a necessity, it's perfectly possible to drive a car manually.

      As such, my determination of how safe and reliable a car will be is how computerized is it. The more computers and the more electronic crap is on it, the more things that can go wrong, especially if the car makes (or promises to make) way too many decisions for me. I'll never feel safe letting a car drive itself. Practically every time a computer tries to do something for me, it screws up.

      It's also pretty well demonstrated that bigger, heavier, more luxurious, and more expensive doesn't make it safer. People insist SUVs are safer, just so they can justify spending huge amounts of dough on an over-glorified truck. Watch some Russian dashcams if you want to see how SUVs handle crashes. They still rollover and crumple like crazy, despite their heft.

      So, to complete your obligatory car analogy, I'd say that the more I pay, the worse it will be. My WRX is a furiously fast and powerful car, but I consider it safe and reliable, as it has excellent handling and crash ratings, and none of the nannying electronics (or even an automatic transmission) that other sport cars do. Money doesn't ensure safety -- understanding physics and marketing bullshit does.

  19. New Intercontinental Plane only $5 by prefec2 · · Score: 3, Informative

    Boeing: New Intercontinental Plane only $5
    Customer: There are no wings
    B: They are extra, it is like with your fees for essentials, like luggage, meals and seating.
    C: Oh [pause] And wheels?
    B: Extra
    C: Seats?
    B: Extra ...
    C: How much is it with all these extras?
    B: $ 121.6 for the basic configuration
    C: Huh?
    B: There is also a do not crash feature and avoid mountains features
    C: Too expensive. For that price we could by an Airbus

  20. Re:Pilots not trained, planes not maintained by Narcocide · · Score: 1

    People have had enough of paid shills pretending to be experts. Since they themselves are not experts, they can't tell the difference, unfortunately.

  21. Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by Moskit · · Score: 3, Informative

    Your translation of [1] is wrong.

    That flight was saved by the third pilot (non-flying) who was in a jump seat and could afford the luxury of observation from the side. The two flying pilots were busy with instruments and plane systems. It has nothing to do with experience.

    1. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by Solandri · · Score: 5, Informative

      No, the third pilot's disassociated viewpoint had nothing to do with it. He simply knew the plane's checklist. That's a bunch of standard procedures every pilot is supposed to know of what to do when they encounter a specific type of problem on that specific model plane. When you hear that a pilot has been trained on a certain plane model, that's what they're talking about - they're leaning all these checklists. If a pilot can't remember it exactly, the entire book of checklists is available aboard the plane for the pilots to reference in a Quick Reference Handbook. Any time the pilots face a situation aboard the plane which puzzles them and they don't recall the resolution from their training, they should reach for the QRH. One of them flys the plane, the other looks up the problem in the QRH.

      The third pilot knew the checklist for the 737 Max. He instructed the other pilots to perform the manufacturer's specified procedure to resolve the problem, and it did resolve the problem. The pilots in the two planes which crashed apparently did not know the checklist, and did not reference the QRH. (Speculating here a bit since we don't know yet what happened - maybe they performed the proper reset procedure and the problem didn't go away.)

      Contrary to the way most people here seem to be interpreting it, the third pilot's anecdote actually absolves Boeing and places blame for the crashes primarily upon the four pilots. This is looking like a pilot training problem. Boeing is still culpable for designing an automatic safety system which was prone to fail multiple times in just months of operation, and for making it so hard and non-obvious to override. But based on the third pilot's anecdote, primary culpability would be upon the pilots of the two other planes for not knowing the plane's checklists, and not bothering to crack open the QRH to double-check if they were addressing the problem properly.

      Planes are incredibly complicated and it's unreasonable to expect a pilot to understand how all of its systems interact. The checklists in the QRH are made by the engineers who designed the plane. They do understand all of the plane's systems and how they interact. They come up with every possible problem they can think of which a pilot might encounter, and write checklists to resolve every possible cause they can think of for those problems. The checklist procedure for this problem fixed it in the third pilot's case. If the four pilots did not follow that procedure, then the crashes were their fault, not Boeing's.

    2. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by houghi · · Score: 2

      This is looking like a pilot training problem.

      That does not mean it is the pilots fault.

      If they should have gotten the training, but didn't, it is the fault of those that did not gave them the training. If they got the training and did not understood it, then it is the fault of the person giving the training.

      In no way does it absolve Boeing for doing what it did.

      If I let you fly a plane and I tell you it is OK and you crash that plane because I withheld information from you, directly or indirectly, I am at fault. And that is what Boing did.

      --
      Don't fight for your country, if your country does not fight for you.
    3. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by timholman · · Score: 5, Interesting

      Contrary to the way most people here seem to be interpreting it, the third pilot's anecdote actually absolves Boeing and places blame for the crashes primarily upon the four pilots. This is looking like a pilot training problem.

      A friend of mine from college is a senior Delta pilot and has served as a flight instructor for many years, including the training of pilots from other countries. He has also flown the 737 MAX. His conclusion is the same as yours, and is an unfortunate reflection of the state of pilot training and aircraft maintenance in developing countries.

      That Lion Air plane should have been grounded the day before, after the first incident. And as many new stories have reported, that particular aircraft had a backlog of maintenance issues that Lion Air failed to address.

      His observation: "Everyone thinks that flying is "safe". It's not. It's difficult and dangerous. What makes it appear "safe" in the developed world is the constant routine of aircraft maintenance and pilot training that keeps the accident rate very, very low. But in other countries, that isn't the case."

    4. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by SlaveToTheGrind · · Score: 2

      This is the first time I've heard that the third pilot simply walked through a checklist. Have a cite for that? It seems like Boeing would want that checklist plastered on the front page of every newspaper.

    5. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by Moskit · · Score: 1

      It was likely more tha just his knowledge of checklist.
      As far as I understand the "runaway trim" checklist refers only to trim wheel turning continuously, while in MCAS case it turns a bit then stops, but restarts when reset by pilot. This misleads.
      Third pilot seems to have been the person under the least stress and had enough time to analyze symptom and associate it with "runaway trim" procedure that calls for disabling the trim system.

    6. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by Ecuador · · Score: 1

      That is factually incorrect. The MCAS system was not in the manual at all, nor were checklists for it.
      They went through a checklist for a DIFFERENT PROBLEM, a runaway stabilizer, that is a bit different in that it does not modify your stabilizer angle in the sort of pulses MCAS does, and many pilots would not confuse the runaway stabilizer with what was actually happening. It was luck that they went through a checklist for a problem they did not have, but that checklist also was applicable to their problem - which they could not possibly diagnose not being trained for it and not having it appear in any manuals.

      --
      Violence is the last refuge of the incompetent. Polar Scope Align for iOS
    7. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by omnichad · · Score: 1

      There's no question these crashes were probably both preventable. I still place the blame on Boeing. A bad design is a bad design and no amount of checklist will overcome that - you have to have that checklist fully memorized to have time to complete it before a crash. And its similarity to the 737 would make it hard to catch that one small difference in procedure.

    8. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by TheCastro1689 · · Score: 1

      Another article I read also says repair requests were made and ignored. So Boeing is even less likely at fault.

    9. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

      I don't think that's the case. Every report I've seen, including by pilots, has specified that disabling the MCAS system was *not* part of the standard procedures.

      There is an existing (and existing since the original 737) procedure for dealing with runaway trim. If something goes wrong and your electric trim starts spooling off, you flip a couple of switches and disable it. There are videos on YouTube. The thing is, that's not what MCAS does. It dials in a bit of trim, then stops. A bit later, if the problem isn't resolved, it dials in some more.

      Yes, it seems like a fairly small difference, but pilots are trained to deal quickly with specific problems using specific procedures. If the issue is a bit different, generally you don't want to be following a rote procedure that may not be appropriate. Boeing didn't update the training to specify that the solution to this new type of runaway trim was the same as the old one.

    10. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by thegreatbob · · Score: 1

      MCAS is mentioned in the glossary (giving only its non-abbreviated name) of an older MAX FCOM I have, not that it helps matters.

      --
      There is no XUL, only WebExtensions...
    11. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by Obfuscant · · Score: 1

      That flight was saved by the third pilot (non-flying) who was in a jump seat and could afford the luxury of observation from the side.

      So now it is a luxury to look at the flight instruments and indicators?

      The two flying pilots

      There is only one flying pilot. The other is the PNF (pilot not flying) and he had plenty of time to look and feel and think, just like the dead-heading pilot did.

      It has nothing to do with experience.

      It has everything to do with lack of experience and training. Not being able to detect a runaway trim situation when you can see the trim wheel spinning is a lack of experience and training. The question at the moment is not "what is causing the aircraft to trim nose-down", it is "how do I stop the aircraft from trimming nose-down?" The cause can wait; stopping the problem from killing you takes first priority. The PNF should have been making it his instead of "flying" or being "busy with instruments". That kind of CRM leads to airplanes flying into the swamp while every pilot on board is looking at a landing gear light bulb.

    12. Re:Third pilot on JUMP SEAT, not flying. by petermgreen · · Score: 1

      What makes it appear "safe" in the developed world is the constant routine of aircraft maintenance and pilot training that keeps the accident rate very, very low. But in other countries, that isn't the case."

      And yet major crashes are rare enough that when one happens, even to an airline from a third world shithole, it's world news. When *TWO* happen to the same nearly-new variant under similar circumstances that tends to point fingers towards a problem specific to that variant.

      --
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  22. Re:What could go wrong? by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    Could I get one that puts more emphasis on physics than metaphysics?

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  23. Re:Pilots not trained, planes not maintained by Opportunist · · Score: 1

    We have had enough of self proclaimed "experts" telling us blatant lies. We still like experts at the helm of stuff that actually affects us. Well, obviously not in politics, but at least where it actually matters.

    --
    We used to have a Bill of Rights. Now, with the rights gone, all we have left is the bill.
  24. On the right track by ishmaelflood · · Score: 1

    I doubt you'll get many upvotes, but that is a fairly accurate description.

  25. How about the truth??? by buck-yar · · Score: 1

    The New York Times reports that many low-cost carriers like Indonesia's Lion Air opted not to buy them so they could save money, even though some of these systems are fundamental to the plane's operations.

    How about being honest? There wasn't a single 737 Max delivered with the additional angle of attack sensor, low cost or not.

    Fucking media just lies lies lies.

    1. Re:How about the truth??? by scamper_22 · · Score: 1

      funny enough, I saw the news in Canada last night.
      They covered 3 airlines.

      There are two safety systems
      1. Disagree lights
      2. Angle of attack indicators

      Air Canada bought both for their entire fleet.
      West Jet just got the disagree light
      Sunwing didn't respond.

      I'd venture to say that many carriers bought at least one of the sensors, but I mean it's to question low cost airlines or developing countries might not have. That's how it played out in Canada. The main airlines bought the sensors. The low cost one did not respond.

  26. So let me get this straight by r2kordmaa · · Score: 1

    Boeing is selling airplanes where safety is optional?

  27. When in doubt, fly the plane. by Jarik+C-Bol · · Score: 1

    When your aircraft design precludes the option to turn off the auto pilot and fly the damn plane, you’ve got a bad aircraft design.

    --
    I've decided to Diversify my Holdings. I've divided my cash between my left and right pockets, instead of all in one.
  28. Failure of hazard Categorisation by ContextSwitch · · Score: 5, Informative

    The Seattle Times has a good article on this although it should be taken as preliminary data subject to change.

    To summarise

    Due to airframe changes from previous models Boeing introduced MCAS which automatically lowers the nose when approaching a stall.

    The MCAS was introduced to allow pilots with 737 experience to fly the 737 MAX with a minimal amount of conversion training thus saving airlines a lot of cost and making the MAX even more attractive to them.

    As initially designed a failure of MCAS was classed as a "Major" hazard in that it could cause passenger discomfort but not death. This was because MCAS was limited to a very small change to the flight control surfaces. For this category the use of a single sensor is allowed assuming the sensor reliability is sufficient.

    During the flight test phase the ability for MCAS was extended to unlimited repeat operations. These repeat operations have a cumulative effect on the flight control surfaces. The MCAS can now lead to a catastrophic failure.

    At this point the category of hazard should have been changed. This should have lead to a design change but because the category remained at "Major" and not "Catastrophic" no further changes were made.

    There could be any number of reasons why this categorisation change was missed, hopefully any future investigations will get to the root cause.

  29. Fundamental to the plane's operation?! by mandark1967 · · Score: 1

    I'm pretty sure neither Wilbur nor Orville Wright had either system and it didn't stop them from taking off and landing in a (for the time) safe manner.

    The airline knew these options existed. They knew they were "extras", in the same manner someone looking to buy a new Subaru knows the Eyesight system is an extra (or was when I bought my 2019 Legacy) yet they had meetings, debated the cost benefits, and ultimately chose NOT to buy the otpions which could have prevented the accident.

    --
    Sig Follows: "Suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself." -- Mark Twain
  30. OPTIONAL safety feature by aepervius · · Score: 2

    The keyword is optional, not safety feature. There is probably a huge catalogue of them, but from the sound of it this should never EVER has been made optional. This is an essential crashing-and-die feature and as such should not be OPTIONAL. And that does not even start on how it was presented to the airline : possibly as "do not matter much here is an optional feature" or was it "very important optional feature" my bet is on the first.

    ultimately only Boeing can know if a feature is essential or not. By making it optional they made it non essential. Do you really think from the crash that assessment is correct ? IMO not therefore boeing has the full responsibility.

    --
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    visit randi.org
    1. Re:OPTIONAL safety feature by scamper_22 · · Score: 1

      I think Boeing handling of the MCAS in both its publication and implementation was horrible. That is Boeing's fault. You can also blame the regulator here. I really don't think anything wonky was going on. I've been in regulated industries my whole life and certification is always kind of a shitty game. That's nothing specific to the US. I'm in Canada, it's the same garbage here. There's just no way for an external person not on the project to really get into this level of detail and keep up with the project and release. You might think, but airlines! They gotta have some super duper regulatory process! But you'd probably be wrong. They probably have more certifications and checkboxes, but at the end of the day, they basically rely on what's submitted to them by Boeing.

      You can kind of blame the regulators as it's their job to monitor such thing. Theoretically I blame them. Practically I don't. That's just Boeings job.

      But as to the inclusion of safety features. I personally think that's more on the fault of airlines and regulators. It's like cars. Cars today come with optional safety equipment. My car has rear/side vehicle detection for example. I can't count the number of times that has prevented a possible issue for me. My wife's car does not.

      Is read/side vehicle detection a mandatory feature? I don't know. I used to drive a car without it. I would say a well trained driver wouldn't need it. But I also wouldn't buy a car for myself today without it. No doubt Boeing positions it as a well trained pilot would not need one. Probably true.

      It really is up to airlines to properly decide those needs. And then, it's up to regulators to keep up and mandate certain features they want for ALL airlines. Just like cars had to have mandatory seatbelts eventually. None of these additional safety features seem specific to the way a boeing 737 would fly. something like an AOA display or disagree light would seem pretty applicable to every kind of airplane.

    2. Re:OPTIONAL safety feature by turbidostato · · Score: 1

      "My car has rear/side vehicle detection for example. I can't count the number of times that has prevented a possible issue for me. My wife's car does not."

      And then you can't count your wife's number of accidents on that car, or do you? And if you don't, will it be because the number is zero?

      I won't say as much as your vehicle sensor is valueless but if it *really* has saved you an uncountable number of times, that's a signal its design has failed miserably: it hasn't make your stance on the road safer, it has turned you into a shitty driver instead.

  31. Options at great additional cost by Uberbah · · Score: 1

    They knew they were "extras", in the same manner someone looking to buy a new Subaru knows the Eyesight system is an extra (or was when I bought my 2019 Legacy) yet they had meetings, debated the cost benefits, and ultimately chose NOT to buy the otpions which could have prevented the accident.

    Because Boeing charges a pretty penny for those options, same as car manufacturers do for higher trims. And the failures have been a bit more catastrophic than buying a Forrester without Eyesight. More like if Ford had offered a safer gas tank in the Pinto - if you bought what would be the Platinum trim today for an extra $8000.

    1. Re:Options at great additional cost by mandark1967 · · Score: 1

      Someone at the airlines came to the decision that it would be cheaper to pay out death benefits and buy a new, replacement airplane than pay for the "extras" which would have prevented the crash.

      --
      Sig Follows: "Suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself." -- Mark Twain
    2. Re:Options at great additional cost by Uberbah · · Score: 1

      Was that someone at the airlines told by Boeing "oh, yeah, you might wanna spring for this if you don't want to murder hundreds of your customers customers within five years". Probably not. First and foremost this is on Boeing for letting a defective product out the door, just as it was Ford's responsibility for selling gas tanks that exploded in low impact collisions. Comparing it a taxi company that turns down something minor, like lane departure alerts on new vehicles, doesn't cut it.

  32. Ford Pinto by Uberbah · · Score: 1

    Do you have a car? Is it safe? Would it be safer if you paid more? Are there safety features available on the premium or luxury version of your car?

    These Boeing failures have been a bit more catastrophic than buying a car that doesn't have lane departure warnings. More like if Ford had sold the Pinto with a better gas tank that wouldn't explode in low speed collisions - for a hefty premium. But the Pinto never should have shipped with a bad gas tank, and Boeing never should have sold critical safety features as expensive add-ons.

    1. Re:Ford Pinto by omnichad · · Score: 1

      These Boeing failures have been a bit more catastrophic than buying a car that doesn't have lane departure warnings

      Right, this is more like lane departure steering correction. And like Tesla, the car might steer you right into a wall.

  33. The angle of attack indicator missing? by internet-redstar · · Score: 1
    The angle of attack indicator was the only instrument used by the Wright Brothers with their first flights. It was as simple as attaching a little strip of cloth to the nose of the plane...

    So if one should pick one instrument to be critical for operating your plane, this would be it, ESPECIALLY if the plane is going to override human input based upon it...

    1. Re:The angle of attack indicator missing? by nevermindme · · Score: 3, Interesting

      That is an air stream indicator as seen in gliders to this day. It may indicated stall, high angle of attack, side slip, falling backwards, or be stuck by liquid water or ice in an incorrect position. Every sensor including windshield being frosted over is trained for, these crews for some reason could not find strait and level after the first stall and got themselves into the MCAS flight regime with power pitching them up in a deep stall (like every 737) and fighting a secondary system.

      No matter how much one wants to jam it to Boeing entering a stall condition outside of wind sheer is pilot operating error. Now lowering the nose immediately and slowly increasing power is all 737 basics. However this went on into deep stall we will soon see but the lack of understanding of a checklist in their hands is a major factor.

      I as a private pilot jump through 40 years of aviation history depending on what is ready to go at the place I rent from. It is my responsibility to be familiar and use all checklists. Every single plane I rent I stall and recover from at least 6 times, sometimes with a flight instructor. mostly without at altitude with huge safety margin. This is more than my 737 pilot friend has ever herd the stall horn during his 20 year commercial career. My three and only considerations on departure is clear ground obstacles, conflict with other aircraft and do not stall on departure. These 4 pilots had do not stall on departure task and all failed.

      Stalling a large commercial aircraft during departure is a bad thing. From day one in a piper cub the stall regime and recovery is trained in. Deep Stalling a commercial aircraft during departure without a mile of air under you is typically fatal. Both flights something more than a computer driven recovery went wrong. MCAS making only one attempt at cleaning up the pilot mistakes seems to be the fix that was going on before the second crash. Adding both sensors to the MCAS, clear indications MCAS is doing something seems reasonable and prudent additional aid but letting poor pilot standards off the hook will be fatal in the future.

    2. Re:The angle of attack indicator missing? by ceoyoyo · · Score: 3, Informative

      There was no stall. The MCAS system was engaged due to a malfunctioning angle of attack system.

  34. For an Extra... by Only+Time+Will+Tell · · Score: 1

    ...$100,000, we'll add this red button to the plane that says "Don't Crash".

  35. Boeing == EA? by Parker+Lewis · · Score: 1

    I mean, now airplanes are like modern games with paid DLC where the content is already on disc?

  36. That's horse crap by Kludge · · Score: 1, Interesting

    Who modded that comment to 5? It is all crap.
    The US has the biggest freest market in the world. It has cars from manufacturers all over the world. When you fly on a plane in the US there is a 50/50 chance that it is Boeing or Airbus.
    When I fly European airlines, what kind of planes are there? Airbus, Airbus, and Airbus. When I go to any other country the variety of autos is much smaller.
    I don't know who modded that up, but they have not been in the US.

    1. Re:That's horse crap by hcs_$reboot · · Score: 3, Informative

      Who modded that comment to 5? It is all crap

      Yours is better? Where does this 50/50 come from?
      Airbus is only 18.6% in the US (Boeing 43). And in the rest of the world, that you probably didn't visit much, it's not "Airbus, Airbus, and Airbus". It's roughly 50/50.

      --
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    2. Re:That's horse crap by Kludge · · Score: 1

      Airbus is only 18.6% in the US (Boeing 43).

      These numbers are for the entire US fleet, including cargo, which tend to be older. Passenger airlines tend to fly newer planes, and a greater fraction of Airbus. If you fly in the US you have much greater than 18% chance of being on Airbus.

      And in the rest of the world, that you probably didn't visit much, it's not "Airbus, Airbus, and Airbus". It's roughly 50/50.

      I did not write "rest of the world". I wrote "Europe", which is true. There are other countries in the world that only buy Boeing (like Japan) because parts are produced there, making a balance of Boeing and Airbus.
      The point is not which is bigger Boeing or Airbus. The point is there is competition in the US, unlike Europe, Japan, etc, which is contrary to the content of the original post.

    3. Re:That's horse crap by dunkelfalke · · Score: 1

      I wish that would be the case since Airbus makes better and safer aircraft, alas it isn't so. Ryanair - the largest European airline - is Boeing only, KLM is almost Boeing only, Norwegian too. Most other airlines have mixed fleets. But yes, the 737 is slowly retiring from service in Europe, while the Boeing long haul airplanes are still going strong. The reason why the US fleets are more mixed has something to do with cheap fuel and a lack of high speed rail keeping inefficient planes like MD-80 flying and a shitload of regional aircraft as well.

      --
      "It's such a fine line between stupid and clever" -- David St. Hubbins, Spinal Tap
  37. The not crashing DLC by anarcobra · · Score: 1

    Seems like boeing has learned a thing or two from EA.
    Soon there will be microtransactions.
    "pay 100 coins to lower the landing gear or wait 5 minutes"
    "pay 1000 coins to use redundant sensors for more reliable readings"

  38. choices by Tom · · Score: 1

    Well, you have a choice. You can fly somewhere for $50, or you can be reasonably sure to arrive alive.

    Air travel has become cheap, but so much more crappy in every aspect, from the nickel-and-diming where you pay extra for the smallest service (such as picking your own seat during check-in, I mean seriously?) to saving on safety.

    As long as price is the dominating reason for decisions, it will continue to go this way.

    When we stop being cheap assholes and ready to pay the price that things cost, it will change.

    --
    Assorted stuff I do sometimes: Lemuria.org
  39. Re:Don't give me a "disagree" light by omnichad · · Score: 1

    Don't give me a "disagree" light, which may as well be a "you're about to die" light.

    It's cheaper than a third sensor, which is what something this critical really needed.

  40. Yes, a complete re-design of the new components. by Futurepower(R) · · Score: 2

    "Boeing should just scrap the design."

    The 2 comments above this one disagreed. I think you are correct. I've done electronic design and computer programming. The entire 737 MAX-8 new system components need re-consideration.

    Others agree. For example: Boeing 737 MAX-8 Scandal Grows: Doomed Lion Air Flight Should Never Have Flown. (Yesterday, Mar. 21, 2019)

    FBI joining criminal investigation into certification of Boeing 737 MAX . (Mar. 20, 2019)

    Pentagon to probe if Shanahan used office to help Boeing. (Mar. 20, 2019) "Shanahan, 56, joined Boeing in 1986, rose through its ranks and is credited with rescuing the troubled Dreamliner 787 program."

    Boeing has a history of flawed management: A flawed missile defense system generates $2 billion in bonuses for Boeing (Sept. 2, 2016)

  41. Re:Corruption by ceoyoyo · · Score: 1

    The incidents happened in Indonesia and Ethiopia, with Indonesia having first crack.

  42. Re:Optional exrtra safty stuff is just that. by thegreatbob · · Score: 1

    Having driven a few cards with backup cameras, I find them useful primarily for checking the area immediately behind the car before reversing otherwise normally. Secondarily, they're handy for when you must back up against a wall or car, and you want to get very close. They often display a warning along the lines of "check your surroundings before moving the car!". I suspect many people have stared into the screen while dragging their bumper across the car next to them.

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  43. Re:Optional exrtra safty stuff is just that. by thegreatbob · · Score: 1

    cars, even. Never driven a card.

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  44. That's not really a valid analogy by rsilvergun · · Score: 1

    even the cheapest car on the market right now has a raft of safety features. Once you get to the level of a Nissan Sentra or Toyota Corolla there's not much difference between that and a BMW. The advanced features of the BMW can easily be compensated for with more careful driving.

    In this case it's more like if a Tesla's auto pilot engaged and sent you careening off a cliff.

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  45. Mwha ha ha ha ha ha ha. by rsilvergun · · Score: 1

    No.

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  46. Not really by rsilvergun · · Score: 1

    if I paid more my car wouldn't be any safer. More of the fancy safety features are things like lane assist and automatic breaking. I can do both of those things without a computer telling me, and having them is likely to lull me into a false sense of security.

    One of the most maddeningly dangerous drivers I've ever met drives modern Lexuses with all the bells and whistles. Gets a new one about every 3-5 years after he wrecks the old one. He's not any better off in the crashes because of the Lexus (even my 2014 Sentra has airbags up the wazoo) and he crashes just as often as he did before he had those features.

    Finally, Airlines != Car Companies. The Airlines and plane manufactures are quasi-public companies. They have to be. If you're letting several tons of metal fly over cities 365 days a year you can't leave that up to private citizens. We just tried actually, and this is the result.

    We're just lucky this didn't happen over a populated area. Keep this up and it will.

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  47. Nature cannot be fooled by strangedays · · Score: 1

    "For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled."

    Richard Feynman's famous conclusion to his report on the shuttle Challenger accident, similar management issues occurring again in the Columbia accident.
    And now, I think, in the MAX 8 preventable tragedies.

    As with most software engineering failures, it's necessary to look a few levels "upstream" for the root cause.
    There is a natural tendency among technical people (such as the denizens of Slashdot) to assume all the blame (y2k is another clear example).
    However, in this case, I want to point the finger directly at Boeing Management and Marketing, plus the FAA, which is where I think most of the blame for these tragic deaths belong. Shame on you!

    As I understand it, Boeing had to introduce changes to handle Max 8's new flight characteristics - fair enough...
    Sales and Marketing wanted to avoid forcing pilot re-training, to remove it as a cost barrier to sales...
    So they hid complex and risky details in obscure automation, with minimal documentation, while implementing a massive and fatal design failure.
    Then convinced the FAA to let them do the testing certification, a clear due-diligence failure by the FAA...

    Then they half-assed the actual testing, because no-one is looking, and it the system will only ever get called to do a trim adjustment once, right?!... it would never be cumulative right... Naive clueless dumbasses... stupid does not even begin to cover it...

    Then when nature is not fooled, and the crashes kill hundreds of innocents, move into full-on PR cover-up mode... effectively preventing the first set of deaths, being used to diagnose the issues and thus prevent the second crash...

    IMHO, we need to look even further upstream, past the small-minded, and tragically predictable failures of Boeing and FAA management.

    The core issue that falls on the software engineering profession is that we have collectively failed to insist that Software Engineering must become a real Engineering discipline, as say Civil Engineering, with unavoidable legal and regulated sign-off authority.
    Safety-critical software designs are done in secret by businesses and do not require the signature of a registered Software Engineer, as for example buildings and bridges do...

    We can all see the tragic result of that short-sighted, profit-seeking policy failure.

    Sadly, I think that issue is at least partly on us, not stating the problem clearly enough, and loudly enough, and repeatedly.
    It's a failure that falls on computer science, and software engineers, all of us.
    Plus of course, the government policymakers that prevented the obvious from being recognized, twisted by the usual industry lobbyists.

    Makes me sad, I wish I had personally pushed much harder for this in the past...

    Hence this post... Too little for sure, way too late to help the MAX 8 victims, but together perhaps we can help others...

    Call to action: It's time for the government to enforce a proper software engineering design review of all human safety-critical software,
    by qualified and registered Software Engineers, this needs to be forced against any and all opposition of big tech and business, it is a public safety issue, plain and simple.

    Otherwise, this tragedy will inevitably repeat itself again, in a few months or years,
    whenever this current tragedy gets forgotten, and the same lethal and degraded management practices and processes re-surface.

    We have the best government money can buy! so bribe your congress critters and senators, maybe we can prevent this from happening again?

    --
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  48. Re:If they're needed for safety by LostMyAccount · · Score: 1

    Seatbelts aren't optional now, but they were at one time! Volvo got their start as a safety-oriented brand by making shoulder belts standard.

  49. "Only" is a misnomer. They were sold period. by klashn · · Score: 1

    The market wanted to cut corners and they got it, now you blame the provider?

  50. Capitalism, fuck yeah by hermi · · Score: 1

    Capitalism, fuck yeah!