Demonstrating an inconsistent formal system on a computer is dependent on you programming the meaning of symbols in a way that contradicts our interpretation of them. It is a semiotic trick. Your theorem prover does not distinguish "peanut butter sandwich" from "false".
From an ontological perspective, it is still a consistent system. For example, suppose we were to discover such a formal system in nature; if we were to conclude it was inconsistent it would be based on a misinterpretation of the axioms in the system based on preconceived notions of the symbols involved. In the end, the formal system will be consistent and will always provide you with the same output given the same input.
One can very well program a broken version of Peano arithmetic that would be inconsistent or incomplete. (The usefulness of that particular arithmetic not considered).
I don't know what Peano arithmetic is, but i would assume that a "broken version" of it is technically not a version of it at all (from a formal system perspective). Instead, it would be some other consistent formal system that resembled Peano arithmetic.
You can very well create an inconsistent system within consistent framework.
Huh? Whether we percieve the system as being inconsistent is irrelevant. The important part is that it will always operate consistently underneath the covers.
I have to disagree with you. I'm not sure what you expect. Watching the Matrix may not be as deep as reading Aristotle, Descartes, or Wittgenstein, but it is a friken science fiction action thriller. The philosophical themes in the Matrix is what separates it from poor science fiction. Good science fiction is hard to come by these days, and the metaphysical themes that the Matrix directly addresses is what propels it above plain old action scifi's. Consider these topics:
. Plato's Alegory of the Cave
. Fate vs. Freewill
. Is the human mind a computer
. Is suffering connected to our concept of real
I believe it is because of the W. brothers' appreciation of these topics that makes it an excellent movie.
I am left to believe that you do not appreciate metaphysics, and you only consider ethics, politics and linguistics to be interesting philosophy.
No western philosophy discusses in too great of detail whether this world is real or not.
If Neitzche is the only western philosopher you are familiar with, then you have a truly narrow view of western philosophy. Have you ever heard of idealism? Is that not part of western philosophy?
Heck, one of the most well known pieces by Plato is the allegory of the cave, which clearly resembles Neo's experience and the question of what is real.
Also, I miss your analogy of how "Morals and Tradition" relate to enslavement of the mind and how the matrix relates to enslavement of the mind. Please explain, because it is not clear to me. What in the world of the Matrix is analogous to the slave morality that Neitzche discusses?
Some people say a computer can't think, but a computer can simulate atoms and quantum mechanics
I have two problems with this assertion:
A conventional computer can simulate quantum systems, but it can't interact with real quantum systems. If our mind is dependent on non-local aspects of quantum mechanics, your computer is SOL. Unless you plan on simulating the entire Universe that is.
We can only simulate aspects of matter that can be observed. Why would you think that every quality and attribute belonging to atomic particles can be observed?
I believe most supporters of strong-AI overlook some of the philosophical implications of a conscious machine. To me it is less alarming that a computer would insist on having rights, and more alarming that we would have demonstrated the human mind is a deterministic machine. This would have serious consequences in our concept of ethics and justice. Our current freedom is contingent on the assumption we have freewill. Demonstrating the brain is simply a biological computer would drive us away from punishment for crimes and towards rehabilitation and brainwashing. Our Goverments, in turn, would evolve to be more deterministic and controlling.
It is not the computers having their rights elevated to ours that worries me. It is our rights being lowered to that of a computer's that worries me.
You seem to be referring only to the implications of Godel's first incompleteness theorem. It's his second theorem that I am primarily concerned about. This is the theorem that really undermined Hilbert's work. It states that a complex formal system cannot prove it's own consistency. Let me try to explain why this is important.
First, let's start with your proposal that all of the laws of physics represent the set of axioms that define the formal system known as our Universe. In the complete set of all possible truths, only a subset of them can be proven within this Universe, as you have pointed out with Godel's first theorem.
The notion that there exist truths beyond the grasp of this Universe begs the question, why does this Universe exist and not some other? We can conclude from Godel's second theorem that the axioms which define this Universe cannot necessitate their own existence. There is no logical reason why this Universe should exist. The implication is that this logical construct known as the Universe rests on an illogical foundation.
I have read similar arguments regarding Godel and AI (such as the Penrose argument), and I would agree that they do not conclusively prove that the human mind is not computational. The point I was trying to make was a little bit different.
Many science-minded individuals have the compulsion to believe all things in reality can be placed into a nice logical container. At the roots, they believe, all things must follow a logical order. You have made the assertion that because the brain is a complex chunk of matter, it could be accurately emulated. Your assertion is compatible with this belief.
However, one thing that Godel does show is that there is no universal formal system. There is no logical container from which all things mechanically live in harmony. The likes of David Hilbert were bent on discovering a set of primary axioms from which all mathematical truths could be derived. Godel showed this was not possible.
If we look at physical systems at the so-called macro-scale, they certainly do exhibit logical mechanisms that can be mathematically modeled. At some scale, however, it seems necessary that this logical consistency must be abandoned. Otherwise, we would have a Universal formal system from which all truths are derived.
So the question is, at what scale does our consciousness permeate? Are our minds purely the result of macro-processes, much like a computer?
I do not believe so and here is why. Our consciousness is conceptually non-reductive. What I mean by that is that a conscious experience cannot be broken into smaller constituents that define the whole. This is in contrast to functional behavior, which is conceptually reducible. Things that are reducible, such as a functional behavior, can be computed.
For example, when I see a red stoplight, I hit the brake in my car. If we analyze this behavior, we can decompose it into a bunch of smaller processes having to do with memory recollection, trained reaction, etc. Now, what about the conscious sensation of seeing the color "red"? Can that sensation be decomposed into sub-concepts? Take a look at something that is red nearby. Can that sensation of seeing red be logically decomposed?
Suppose the sensation of the color red could be decomposed and thereby emulated using a computational system. It could then be represented with language. As humans are very capable of comprehending logically structured language, this would imply a color-blind person could understand the sensation of seeing the color red by analyzing this logical structure. Without being cured of their color-blindness, they could know what red feels like by sufficiently understanding the mechanical nature of the color construction component of our brain. This clearly does not seem to be the case. Thus, this is an example of a non-computational process in the mind.
A Universal Modeling Device? That perception assumes everything can be modeled computationally. The point of those against strong AI is that the human mind is not a computational process.
I suggest you read a little about Godel. He was a logician in the early 20th century that shook the foundation of philosophical and mathematical thought. His 2nd theorem demonstrated any formal system (such as a computer program), must be either incomplete or inconsistent. It shows that everything in reality cannot be packaged into a nice logical structure. Hence, not everything can be emulated with a computer program.
You don't see any philosophical difference between contacts/glasses and hardwired interfaces with our brains?
There is certainly a technological difference. The "hardwired interface" is much more impressive from a technology standpoint.
Philosophically, I do not see a difference. The input mechanisms for the eyes/ears may not have any more to do with our consciousness than our eyeglasses, or our tennis shoes. It is conceptually possible that the input mechanisms for sight and hearing could be purely reductive. I have no problem with machines being able to emulate reductive processes.
Consciousness, on the other hand, is conceptually not a reductive process. You seem to believe that if we could interface the neurons using physical processes we control demonstrates that neurons, and the "gray matter" they compose, are physical entities that are entirely within our comprehension. My point is that we may be able to understand neurons at a macro-level, and even interface with them at the macro-level, but there may be intrinsic qualities to them that cannot be physically observed or measured. These intrinsic qualities may have nothing to do with the optical nerve's capability to send signals to the brain.
I know that's a personal attack, but can't your imagination spread itself a little farther than that?
I wouldn't assume anyone who sees the world differently than you do just lacks imagination. In any case, if you are going to refute my statements, it would be much more stimulating if you would actually address my points.
It's like this mental image of you, waving your hands around frantically, calling on consciousness and 'integral processes' as if it was some kind of voodoo or witchcraft only understandable in a single state.
Heh, I can appreciate that image. In reality, I am a software developer-- programming has been a passion for me since I was a kid. I first read about the concept of downloading a person's mind into a computer back in high school (back in the 80's). At first, I embraced the concept whole-heartedly, but since then I have put a lot of thought into whether it is something that is possible or not. I have concluded that there are aspects of our consciousness that are beyond computational representations.
You are correct in the sense that there have not been any products that make a serious contention for the Turing Test. This is because the levels of sophistication required with algorithms geared around language comprehension and abstract conceptualization are not even close to where they need to be. The only products that have been entered into Turing Tests are merely gimmicks that attempt to trick the human observer.
Your statements seem to make the assertion that the Turing Test could be passed if only a few bright computer scientists were willing to "seriously" pursue it.
Do you really question whether or not there has been serious work towards language comprehension and other aspects of machine intelligence necessary to pass the Turing Test? Do you really believe the only thing that is keeping us from creating a computer capable of passing the test is someone willing to put the serious work into it?
That's stupid, you're talking about using words as the basis for trying to describe something our language is not capable of describing.
My assertion is that there is an inescapable difference between syntax and semantics. We can use words to describe abstract concepts, but the meaning of those abstract concepts themselves cannot be absolutely defined with more language. If you are interested in investigating this further, I would recommend reading some of Wittgenstein's later works.
Right now we are making strong inroads regarding input into the brain--truly artificial eyes and ears hardwired straight into our nervous system.
I'm not sure how this is philosophically different from the invention of glasses or contact lenses. Unless you believe our consciousness resides in our eyeballs.
Is consciousness such an etherial state that it is disconnected from the wiring of our grey matter?
Consciousness is obviously not disconnected from our "grey matter". Rather, it is an intimate part of our "grey matter". The point I am trying to get across is that there are integral processes in our "grey matter" that are not physically observable and/or logically representable.
If not, it *will* eventually be possible to share a feeling, to share a sensation, as the cumulative mental a physiological response we have to input. It could be the last step computers take before they decide whether individuality has value, or whether we should be exterminated.
So, based on the following assumptions:
The human mind is capable of completely comprehending formal structures represented with language.
Consciousness is entirely reducible and can be programmed on a computer.
In theory, it should be possible for a color-blind person to understand what "red" feels like, without being cured of their color blindness. If they were given a sufficient description of the conscious feeling of red using language, they would understand what red feels like. In otherwords, if everything in our grey matter is comprehendible, including our feelings, then someone ought to be able to understand the conscious experience of those feelings through the logical evaluation of them. I find this absurd.
Actually, the assumption that human cognition and consciousness can NOT be logically reduced takes an extreme leap in faith, I have tended to believe. It is already very much possible to reduce behaviors and concepts. The human brain is nothing but a series of complex synapes running parallel with each other.
The first problem with your statements is that you are looking at the mind purely as a behavioural model. Functional behavior does not necessitate consciousness. It is logically possible for an entity to exhibit behaviors and yet have no consciousness at all. For example, explaining the behavior of what happens after you drop an unsuspecting person into a vat of cold water, and explaining what that experience feels like to the person are two different challenges.
Secondly, you seem to be suffering from Hilbert-syndrome, as many science-minded people today suffer from. David Hilbert was a mathematician that was driven to reduce all of mathematics onto a single set of axioms from which all mathematical truths could be proven. It seems that you, like many others, like to believe that everything in reality can be placed into a rich, logical formal system. Kurt Godel, upon releasing his second theory, demonstrated that no such formal system could exist, and that every formal system must be either incomplete, or contradictory. Godel's theory crushed Hilbert's work.
This idea is similar to saying that, if all of reality can be composed in a big formal structure, it is not possible for that formal structure to assert it's own existence. Therefore, such a system cannot exist out of logical necessity. In otherwords, all things cannot ultimately be logical. This argument gains further strength when regarding appearent paradoxes within quantum physics.
Logical structures, like computer programs, are very useful tools-- but by no means should we believe that they can ultimately represent reality.
I don't think any serious AI work has gone into trying to win the Turing test.
Heh... there has been a tremendous amount of "serious" work that has gone into winning the Turing test over the past 30-40 years. In the last decade, however, the seemingly impossible obstructions in doing so have motivated those in the AI field to pursue more obtainable goals.
It may end up that at some point machines will be able to emulate nerve mechanisms and behaviors...
Most pro-AI people claim that creating a conscious machine is just a matter of sufficiently emulating nerve mechanisms, as you suggest. I find this opinion short-sighted, as it assumes that the underlying processes in our "nerve mechanisms" are both observable and logically reducible. As aspects of our consciousness are not logically reducible, this seems to be a tremendous leap in faith.
Machine consciosness will never happen. Kurzweil and his ilk are fantasizing about the impossible.
Consciousness experience cannot be absolutely defined or measured. How can you describe the experience of the color "red" and what it feels like? It's not possible. Just like it is not possible to write a computer program that constructs that sensation. The sensation, or conscious feeling of something is not reductive (as would be necessary in a computational model).
Strong AI supporters are too wrapped around the functional and behavioral aspects of the mind and overlook the more subtle aspects of it. It is easy to see why someone would think the functional model of the brain could be emulated using a computational "turing machine", but conscious experience is a whole other thing.
Inventing true computer intelligence (what is often referred to as strong AI), has often been compared to inventing a flying machines by many AI supporters. They claim there were just as many nay-sayers at the end of the 19th century regarding whether we could physically build a flying machine.
I don't remember who, but someone published a great article in Scientific American that claimed the Turing Test has mis-guided the goals of artificial intelligence. He said, instead of trying to build a bird, let's try and build an airplane. Building AI that was truly human-like would be as useless as building a flying machine that was truly bird-like.
I personally am attracted to quantum theories of the mind because they offer an explanation to consciousness that adds a holistic aspect that is non-reductive. They appeal to my intuition.
For example, I find it hard to believe that conscious feelings can be reductive in the manner necessary to be computational. Take the color red for example. It seems plausible that we could compute the behavior associated with seeing the color red -- like when we see a red traffic light, we stop. But can we actually compute what the color red "feels" like? If so, wouldn't it be possible for a colorblind person to be able to objectively understand what it is like to see red?
You have brought up an interesting paradox. Although that research was not actually conducted at Arizona, it was only presented at an Arizona sponsored conference.
Personally, I am not willing to buy into it unless it is an experiment that has been independently verified by other researchers.
The issue you bring up is very much of interest to those doing quantum consciousness research. There are a number of theories as to how quantum mechanics could impact macro-processes in the brain. Has it been proven? No. But there are some very compelling reasons to believe there is a link.
Besides, AI research has not given a reason to believe otherwise.
Although I am encouraged that someone with your background perceives that realism is popular among scientists today, I find it hard to believe that most realists would support a complete theory of physics... at least one that could be articulated completely using language. Both Godel and Wittgenstein have presented robust arguments as to why an absolute model for the Universe can never be completely formalized. How does a realist side-step these arguments? It was my impression that most realists support a platonic view of reality, which seems to disagree with many-worlds.
The logical positivist and the instrumentalist, however, are obligated to believe in a purely materialist interpretation. Despite its origins, the Copenhagen interpretation has somehow evolved into a "mind-over-matter" sort of interpretation, where physical reality does not exist until it is observed (eigen states). The logical positivist insistence on rejecting any form of knowledge outside of knowledge obtained through sensory perception would need to support a theory in which physics proceeds consciousness. The Everett interpretation offers this precedence.
The Everett interpretation is the one most commonly used by quantum cosmologists
This is partly because academia is dominated by logical positivists and the Everett interpretation is more agreeable with the positivist worldview. The many-worlds interpretation does a good job eliminating any sort of cosmic mysticism. There is tremendous pressure in the academic community to not be swayed by religion or idealism, as it might be considered an embarrassment to the program. One might argue that this is purely because postulations that cannot be empirically verified are often considered unscientific. Ironically, however, there is no theoretical way of verifying any parallel Universes exist. I believe the dominance of positivism is also due to philosophical peer pressure and an overwhelming pride in human reasoning.
and with good reason, as it does actually allow for a quantum state vector to be applied to the universe
Has it ever been shown that it is necessary for the Universe to allow quantum state vectors? Stating that one interpretation is more valid than another because it jives with how you think the Universe ought to be is not going to be a convincing argument to someone who feels a different interpretation jives with how they think the Universe ought to be.
Slashdot Mirror
Demonstrating an inconsistent formal system on a computer is dependent on you programming the meaning of symbols in a way that contradicts our interpretation of them. It is a semiotic trick. Your theorem prover does not distinguish "peanut butter sandwich" from "false".
From an ontological perspective, it is still a consistent system. For example, suppose we were to discover such a formal system in nature; if we were to conclude it was inconsistent it would be based on a misinterpretation of the axioms in the system based on preconceived notions of the symbols involved. In the end, the formal system will be consistent and will always provide you with the same output given the same input.
If it is ridiculously easy to create a computer program that is an inconsistent formal system, please share one with me.
Any perceived inconsistency in a computer program will be due to a misinterpretation of the axioms within the system.
How do you propose we build an inconsistent machine? Computers are absolutely dependent on the consistent processing of logical rules.
I have to disagree with you. I'm not sure what you expect. Watching the Matrix may not be as deep as reading Aristotle, Descartes, or Wittgenstein, but it is a friken science fiction action thriller. The philosophical themes in the Matrix is what separates it from poor science fiction. Good science fiction is hard to come by these days, and the metaphysical themes that the Matrix directly addresses is what propels it above plain old action scifi's. Consider these topics:
. Plato's Alegory of the Cave
. Fate vs. Freewill
. Is the human mind a computer
. Is suffering connected to our concept of real
I believe it is because of the W. brothers' appreciation of these topics that makes it an excellent movie.
I am left to believe that you do not appreciate metaphysics, and you only consider ethics, politics and linguistics to be interesting philosophy.
Heck, one of the most well known pieces by Plato is the allegory of the cave, which clearly resembles Neo's experience and the question of what is real.
Also, I miss your analogy of how "Morals and Tradition" relate to enslavement of the mind and how the matrix relates to enslavement of the mind. Please explain, because it is not clear to me. What in the world of the Matrix is analogous to the slave morality that Neitzche discusses?
I have two problems with this assertion:
I believe most supporters of strong-AI overlook some of the philosophical implications of a conscious machine. To me it is less alarming that a computer would insist on having rights, and more alarming that we would have demonstrated the human mind is a deterministic machine. This would have serious consequences in our concept of ethics and justice. Our current freedom is contingent on the assumption we have freewill. Demonstrating the brain is simply a biological computer would drive us away from punishment for crimes and towards rehabilitation and brainwashing. Our Goverments, in turn, would evolve to be more deterministic and controlling.
It is not the computers having their rights elevated to ours that worries me. It is our rights being lowered to that of a computer's that worries me.
You seem to be referring only to the implications of Godel's first incompleteness theorem. It's his second theorem that I am primarily concerned about. This is the theorem that really undermined Hilbert's work. It states that a complex formal system cannot prove it's own consistency. Let me try to explain why this is important.
First, let's start with your proposal that all of the laws of physics represent the set of axioms that define the formal system known as our Universe. In the complete set of all possible truths, only a subset of them can be proven within this Universe, as you have pointed out with Godel's first theorem.
The notion that there exist truths beyond the grasp of this Universe begs the question, why does this Universe exist and not some other? We can conclude from Godel's second theorem that the axioms which define this Universe cannot necessitate their own existence. There is no logical reason why this Universe should exist. The implication is that this logical construct known as the Universe rests on an illogical foundation.
I have read similar arguments regarding Godel and AI (such as the Penrose argument), and I would agree that they do not conclusively prove that the human mind is not computational. The point I was trying to make was a little bit different.
Many science-minded individuals have the compulsion to believe all things in reality can be placed into a nice logical container. At the roots, they believe, all things must follow a logical order. You have made the assertion that because the brain is a complex chunk of matter, it could be accurately emulated. Your assertion is compatible with this belief.
However, one thing that Godel does show is that there is no universal formal system. There is no logical container from which all things mechanically live in harmony. The likes of David Hilbert were bent on discovering a set of primary axioms from which all mathematical truths could be derived. Godel showed this was not possible.
If we look at physical systems at the so-called macro-scale, they certainly do exhibit logical mechanisms that can be mathematically modeled. At some scale, however, it seems necessary that this logical consistency must be abandoned. Otherwise, we would have a Universal formal system from which all truths are derived.
So the question is, at what scale does our consciousness permeate? Are our minds purely the result of macro-processes, much like a computer?
I do not believe so and here is why. Our consciousness is conceptually non-reductive. What I mean by that is that a conscious experience cannot be broken into smaller constituents that define the whole. This is in contrast to functional behavior, which is conceptually reducible. Things that are reducible, such as a functional behavior, can be computed.
For example, when I see a red stoplight, I hit the brake in my car. If we analyze this behavior, we can decompose it into a bunch of smaller processes having to do with memory recollection, trained reaction, etc. Now, what about the conscious sensation of seeing the color "red"? Can that sensation be decomposed into sub-concepts? Take a look at something that is red nearby. Can that sensation of seeing red be logically decomposed?
Suppose the sensation of the color red could be decomposed and thereby emulated using a computational system. It could then be represented with language. As humans are very capable of comprehending logically structured language, this would imply a color-blind person could understand the sensation of seeing the color red by analyzing this logical structure. Without being cured of their color-blindness, they could know what red feels like by sufficiently understanding the mechanical nature of the color construction component of our brain. This clearly does not seem to be the case. Thus, this is an example of a non-computational process in the mind.
A Universal Modeling Device? That perception assumes everything can be modeled computationally. The point of those against strong AI is that the human mind is not a computational process.
I suggest you read a little about Godel. He was a logician in the early 20th century that shook the foundation of philosophical and mathematical thought. His 2nd theorem demonstrated any formal system (such as a computer program), must be either incomplete or inconsistent. It shows that everything in reality cannot be packaged into a nice logical structure. Hence, not everything can be emulated with a computer program.
There is certainly a technological difference. The "hardwired interface" is much more impressive from a technology standpoint. Philosophically, I do not see a difference. The input mechanisms for the eyes/ears may not have any more to do with our consciousness than our eyeglasses, or our tennis shoes. It is conceptually possible that the input mechanisms for sight and hearing could be purely reductive. I have no problem with machines being able to emulate reductive processes.
Consciousness, on the other hand, is conceptually not a reductive process. You seem to believe that if we could interface the neurons using physical processes we control demonstrates that neurons, and the "gray matter" they compose, are physical entities that are entirely within our comprehension. My point is that we may be able to understand neurons at a macro-level, and even interface with them at the macro-level, but there may be intrinsic qualities to them that cannot be physically observed or measured. These intrinsic qualities may have nothing to do with the optical nerve's capability to send signals to the brain. I wouldn't assume anyone who sees the world differently than you do just lacks imagination. In any case, if you are going to refute my statements, it would be much more stimulating if you would actually address my points. Heh, I can appreciate that image. In reality, I am a software developer-- programming has been a passion for me since I was a kid. I first read about the concept of downloading a person's mind into a computer back in high school (back in the 80's). At first, I embraced the concept whole-heartedly, but since then I have put a lot of thought into whether it is something that is possible or not. I have concluded that there are aspects of our consciousness that are beyond computational representations.
You are correct in the sense that there have not been any products that make a serious contention for the Turing Test. This is because the levels of sophistication required with algorithms geared around language comprehension and abstract conceptualization are not even close to where they need to be. The only products that have been entered into Turing Tests are merely gimmicks that attempt to trick the human observer.
Your statements seem to make the assertion that the Turing Test could be passed if only a few bright computer scientists were willing to "seriously" pursue it.
Do you really question whether or not there has been serious work towards language comprehension and other aspects of machine intelligence necessary to pass the Turing Test? Do you really believe the only thing that is keeping us from creating a computer capable of passing the test is someone willing to put the serious work into it?
My assertion is that there is an inescapable difference between syntax and semantics. We can use words to describe abstract concepts, but the meaning of those abstract concepts themselves cannot be absolutely defined with more language. If you are interested in investigating this further, I would recommend reading some of Wittgenstein's later works. I'm not sure how this is philosophically different from the invention of glasses or contact lenses. Unless you believe our consciousness resides in our eyeballs. Consciousness is obviously not disconnected from our "grey matter". Rather, it is an intimate part of our "grey matter". The point I am trying to get across is that there are integral processes in our "grey matter" that are not physically observable and/or logically representable. So, based on the following assumptions:
- The human mind is capable of completely comprehending formal structures represented with language.
- Consciousness is entirely reducible and can be programmed on a computer.
In theory, it should be possible for a color-blind person to understand what "red" feels like, without being cured of their color blindness. If they were given a sufficient description of the conscious feeling of red using language, they would understand what red feels like. In otherwords, if everything in our grey matter is comprehendible, including our feelings, then someone ought to be able to understand the conscious experience of those feelings through the logical evaluation of them. I find this absurd.The first problem with your statements is that you are looking at the mind purely as a behavioural model. Functional behavior does not necessitate consciousness. It is logically possible for an entity to exhibit behaviors and yet have no consciousness at all. For example, explaining the behavior of what happens after you drop an unsuspecting person into a vat of cold water, and explaining what that experience feels like to the person are two different challenges.
Secondly, you seem to be suffering from Hilbert-syndrome, as many science-minded people today suffer from. David Hilbert was a mathematician that was driven to reduce all of mathematics onto a single set of axioms from which all mathematical truths could be proven. It seems that you, like many others, like to believe that everything in reality can be placed into a rich, logical formal system. Kurt Godel, upon releasing his second theory, demonstrated that no such formal system could exist, and that every formal system must be either incomplete, or contradictory. Godel's theory crushed Hilbert's work.
This idea is similar to saying that, if all of reality can be composed in a big formal structure, it is not possible for that formal structure to assert it's own existence. Therefore, such a system cannot exist out of logical necessity. In otherwords, all things cannot ultimately be logical. This argument gains further strength when regarding appearent paradoxes within quantum physics.
Logical structures, like computer programs, are very useful tools-- but by no means should we believe that they can ultimately represent reality.
Heh... there has been a tremendous amount of "serious" work that has gone into winning the Turing test over the past 30-40 years. In the last decade, however, the seemingly impossible obstructions in doing so have motivated those in the AI field to pursue more obtainable goals.
Most pro-AI people claim that creating a conscious machine is just a matter of sufficiently emulating nerve mechanisms, as you suggest. I find this opinion short-sighted, as it assumes that the underlying processes in our "nerve mechanisms" are both observable and logically reducible. As aspects of our consciousness are not logically reducible, this seems to be a tremendous leap in faith.
Machine consciosness will never happen. Kurzweil and his ilk are fantasizing about the impossible.
Consciousness experience cannot be absolutely defined or measured. How can you describe the experience of the color "red" and what it feels like? It's not possible. Just like it is not possible to write a computer program that constructs that sensation. The sensation, or conscious feeling of something is not reductive (as would be necessary in a computational model).
Strong AI supporters are too wrapped around the functional and behavioral aspects of the mind and overlook the more subtle aspects of it. It is easy to see why someone would think the functional model of the brain could be emulated using a computational "turing machine", but conscious experience is a whole other thing.
Inventing true computer intelligence (what is often referred to as strong AI), has often been compared to inventing a flying machines by many AI supporters. They claim there were just as many nay-sayers at the end of the 19th century regarding whether we could physically build a flying machine.
I don't remember who, but someone published a great article in Scientific American that claimed the Turing Test has mis-guided the goals of artificial intelligence. He said, instead of trying to build a bird, let's try and build an airplane. Building AI that was truly human-like would be as useless as building a flying machine that was truly bird-like.
I personally am attracted to quantum theories of the mind because they offer an explanation to consciousness that adds a holistic aspect that is non-reductive. They appeal to my intuition.
For example, I find it hard to believe that conscious feelings can be reductive in the manner necessary to be computational. Take the color red for example. It seems plausible that we could compute the behavior associated with seeing the color red -- like when we see a red traffic light, we stop. But can we actually compute what the color red "feels" like? If so, wouldn't it be possible for a colorblind person to be able to objectively understand what it is like to see red?
You have brought up an interesting paradox. Although that research was not actually conducted at Arizona, it was only presented at an Arizona sponsored conference.
Personally, I am not willing to buy into it unless it is an experiment that has been independently verified by other researchers.
The issue you bring up is very much of interest to those doing quantum consciousness research. There are a number of theories as to how quantum mechanics could impact macro-processes in the brain. Has it been proven? No. But there are some very compelling reasons to believe there is a link.
Besides, AI research has not given a reason to believe otherwise.
Although I am encouraged that someone with your background perceives that realism is popular among scientists today, I find it hard to believe that most realists would support a complete theory of physics... at least one that could be articulated completely using language. Both Godel and Wittgenstein have presented robust arguments as to why an absolute model for the Universe can never be completely formalized. How does a realist side-step these arguments? It was my impression that most realists support a platonic view of reality, which seems to disagree with many-worlds.
The logical positivist and the instrumentalist, however, are obligated to believe in a purely materialist interpretation. Despite its origins, the Copenhagen interpretation has somehow evolved into a "mind-over-matter" sort of interpretation, where physical reality does not exist until it is observed (eigen states). The logical positivist insistence on rejecting any form of knowledge outside of knowledge obtained through sensory perception would need to support a theory in which physics proceeds consciousness. The Everett interpretation offers this precedence.
This is partly because academia is dominated by logical positivists and the Everett interpretation is more agreeable with the positivist worldview. The many-worlds interpretation does a good job eliminating any sort of cosmic mysticism. There is tremendous pressure in the academic community to not be swayed by religion or idealism, as it might be considered an embarrassment to the program. One might argue that this is purely because postulations that cannot be empirically verified are often considered unscientific. Ironically, however, there is no theoretical way of verifying any parallel Universes exist. I believe the dominance of positivism is also due to philosophical peer pressure and an overwhelming pride in human reasoning.
Has it ever been shown that it is necessary for the Universe to allow quantum state vectors? Stating that one interpretation is more valid than another because it jives with how you think the Universe ought to be is not going to be a convincing argument to someone who feels a different interpretation jives with how they think the Universe ought to be.