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Everything you Want to Know About the Turing Test

An anonymous reader writes "Everything you want to know about the Turing test provided by Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It is their latest entry."

235 comments

  1. Everything except... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    How to build a computer actually capable of truly beating it.

  2. Why? by Blaine+Hilton · · Score: 0, Insightful

    I think this is the wrong road to go down. We should make computers better for people, but they should be made to actually think and reason. We have enough trouble doing this ourselves and if we have machines doing it they will surely out think us, and then what?

    Checkmate

    1. Re:Why? by unicron · · Score: 1

      Skynet.

      --
      Finally, math books without any of that base 6 crap in them.
    2. Re:Why? by wwest4 · · Score: 5, Funny


      You: I think this is the wrong road to go down.
      Eliza: Can you elaborate on that?


      You: We should make computers better for people, but they should be made to actually think and reason.
      Eliza: Why do you mention computers?


      You: We have enough trouble doing this ourselves...
      Eliza: Please go on.


      You: if we have machines doing it they will surely out think us, and then what?

      Eliza: What answer would please you the most?

    3. Re:Why? by etcpasswd · · Score: 1

      Then the computing machines improve on their genetic engineering algorithms involving humans, to pass the Deep Thought Test(TM).

    4. Re:Why? by Blaine+Hilton · · Score: 0, Flamebait
      I do not think going down the road of AI and building machines that look and/or think like humans is a good idea. I think because of the consequences that we can not even fathom now. They say we only use 2% of our mental capacity, so what if we could build a machine that was better then ourselves? Wouldn't this lead directly to our own extinction? On a higher level of thinking this is probably a good thing, but I don't know about you but I certainty do not want to be replaced by some being that we have created.

      I mention computers because they would probably be behind the logic of these devices. Perhaps not though...

      Look at where our thinking has taken us. We have wars, plagues, hate, injustice, starvation, pollution and more.

    5. Re:Why? by phil+reed · · Score: 0, Flamebait

      The Singularty.

      --

      ...phil
      "For a list of the ways which technology has failed to improve our quality of life, press 3."
    6. Re:Why? by curtisk · · Score: 3, Informative
      hahaha, the only way that could have been more funny is if you had an Eliza /. account...just to complete the gag!

      Along the same lines, the bots in the recent Chatter box challenge show some improvements in the whole chatbot world, but some are just like the ol' Eliza

      --

      Sehr geehrter Toilettenbenutzer!

    7. Re:Why? by CriX · · Score: 2, Informative


      Although I didn't RTFA, I can say that the Turing test is pretty useless for determining machine intelligence.

      I've argued over at Kurzweil AI and AI-forum.org in several discussions for the need to analyze brain (biological or not) architecture to ultimately conclude if something is actually INTELLIGENT. The need for this comes from the many brute force and somewhat cleverly written chat bots like Alan that attempt to appear intelligent.

      I hope everyone here will check out these two forums because there are lots of interesting topics that require the attention of the global nerd community. And there are plenty of wacko theories to smite too(especially on Kurzweil's site.)

      --
      Moderation: +1 pwnage
    8. Re:Why? by wwest4 · · Score: 1


      > They say we only use 2% of our mental capacity,


      oh man, did you set yourself up there.

    9. Re:Why? by BitHive · · Score: 4, Insightful
      I know you're trolling, but this is a common view so I'll bite.

      You're assuming a premise, and we don't know that it's true. If computers can do what we do, then there's reason to believe that we may be able to build some that can do it better than us.

      That said, we are nowhere close to building computers that do what we do. Our best models of cognition and language (which we believe to be central to our 'intelligence') fail miserably when we try to implement them on a large scale using computer systems. Even if it worked, there's no reason to believe it would be a "Terminator II" scenario. We can always quite literally pull the plug. It would be a miracle to create a computer with the intelligence of a mentally retarded child, so to entertain notions of a computer that suddenly becomes self aware and takes over everything (like Cartman's Trapper-Keeper) is rather fanciful.

    10. Re:Why? by UselessTrivia · · Score: 5, Funny

      they will surely out think us, and then what

      For one, they will become so wired in to the network that they will immediately proceed to hunt you down as an obvious objector to their plans for global domination. Oh, and none of that 'there is no spoon' crap - that was patched last Friday.

    11. Re:Why? by banzai51 · · Score: 1

      Head in Sand arguement. RTFM and see what Turning has to say to your objections.

    12. Re:Why? by benna · · Score: 1

      We use 100% of our brains. Its just that only 10% is your conscious brain. The reast is the subconscious.

      --
      "It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists." -Ludwig Wittgenstein
    13. Re:Why? by sxltrex · · Score: 1

      Dude, have you never heard of the MPC??

    14. Re:Why? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      How can you "know" he's trolling yet at the same time believe it's a common view?

      Don't you hate rhetorical questions?

    15. Re:Why? by Rick+the+Red · · Score: 2, Funny

      Are you saying we must analyze your brain architecture to prove you're intelligent? Sure, no problem -- wait here while I get a knife.

      --
      If all this should have a reason, we would be the last to know.
    16. Re:Why? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0


      Sounds like a good idea, considering the number of Slashdot posters that only attempt to appear intelligent.

      Microtome everyone; let God sort 'em out.

    17. Re:Why? by BitHive · · Score: 2, Insightful
      Okay, I "strongly suspect" he is trolling. It's a common view that Linux is hard to use, but if I say that to the slashdot crowd, it's a troll.

      Don't you hate being spoon-fed?

    18. Re:Why? by Wandering+Idiot · · Score: 3, Informative
      They say we only use 2% of our mental capacity, so what if we could build a machine that was better then ourselves?
      Perhaps "they" and you only use 2 percent (it must be shrinking! The *usual* wrong-assed estimate is 10%), but the rest of us use all of our brains, just like any remotely reasonable organism. Now, if you had said that, on average, only 10% of our neurons are firing at any *one time*, it might have been a bit less ludicous. But such would probably be true of any complex cognitive system, including advanced computer systems. After all, if a mind can only be *completely* active (i.e. firing all of its neurons, or switching all of its gates) or inactive, that makes it a two-state system, which is a wee bit on the simplistic side for a conscious intelligence [/sarcasm]. Certainly, if it's possible to build a computers system that's even a wee bit smarter than any human (and whether or not that is possible is unknown at present), it follows that the computer should be able to build something smarter than itself, and so on, which could have drastic effects on the furture of humanity, for good or ill. See singularity theory. Personally, I think it's a bit too early to be worrying about our coming robotic evil overlords yet, as AI's aren't likely to progress much beyond glorified Eliza clones for a while. (Of course, I could be wrong... DUM DUM DUMMMM...)
    19. Re:Why? by Thing+1 · · Score: 1
      We can always quite literally pull the plug.

      Read The Metamorphosis of Prime Intellect , which was mentioned here weeks ago. Great story, and shows how a machine can obtain and surpass human intelligence without the opportunity for us to "pull the plug."

      That said, I believe "the singularity" is at least 5 years off, but no more than 20. If you take care of your body (perhaps even if not), it'll happen within your lifetime.

      --
      I feel fantastic, and I'm still alive.
    20. Re:Why? by mercurywoodrose · · Score: 1

      if you place a person in front of a keyboard and ask them to give answers to questions as accurately as they can, and then try to determine whether they, or a computer programmed to do the same thing, is more or less intelligent than the other, you may be measuring something that will be equalled to some degree by computers but it is not human intelligence. if you place a person in front of a keyboard and ask them to do their damndest to really communicate with the entity at the other end, you will discover, i believe, that humans show awareness, or an ability to self-transcend, that we cannot even conceive of computers (as we understand them) being capable of.
      q: are you a computer or a human?
      a (human): tell me something about yourself.
      q: i like to pick roses with my fingers because of the risk of pricking myself.
      a: well, a computer might be able to reply with a phrase about masochistic tendencies, or write a poem about a subject tangentially related to flowers (like vermeer, cause he was dutch and they went crazy over tulips). i will simply ask you why you want to want to test a belief in the power of AI vs humans by using this infantile procedure? are you afraid you are not yourself human, because you cannot give a sufficiently intelligent answer to any question put to you? dont you realize that your intelligence, your self awareness, includes, and is utterly dependent upon, your bodies emotional responses, your existence in physical reality, your ability to dream, your access to archetypal knowledge, your transcendental experiences, feelings about death, and your desire to touch the person you are talking to, among many other immeasurables? AI wont exist until we have androids made of dna and proteins whose form is a result of a long process of mutation and evolution, and whose minds have lived in bodies long enough to produce quirks of human awareness like schizophrenia. we may create machines who can build faster machines ad infinitum, but this is not true AI, precipitous and singularitous as it is.
      q: oh. do you want to go out some time?
      a: only if you promise to not talk about turing tests and von neumann in a totally serious manner. and only if you admit right now that you are secretly afraid you ARE a computer.
      q: uh, yeah, i can do that. and i suppose that might be true. i guess im not just a robot, right? hey, are you sure YOU arent just a computer programmed really cleverly?
      a: well, duh! the mind as reflected in lines of text is a funhouse mirror. dont worry, be happy.

      --
      You hear about the person who didn't rely on anecdotal evidence to support his belief system?
    21. Re:Why? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I think this is the wrong road to go down. We should make computers better for people, but they should be made to actually think and reason. We have enough trouble doing this ourselves and if we have machines doing it they will surely out think us, and then what?

      Checkmate


      By the reasoning above, we should never have built large earth-moving machines, which are better at moving earth than any man with a shovel. So what if computers can out think us? It's probably a good thing.. I'll just go spend my life on the beach while an AI runs the world.

    22. Re:Why? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Now you're assuming a premise that isn't necessarily true (Unless that joke about one /. poster with a billion logins isn't a joke).

      Trolls are only trolls if people think they are. The problem isn't that there are too many trolls, it's that people see call troll too often. It's a form of FUD. Compare to witches of Salem.

    23. Re:Why? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      They say we only use 2% of our mental capacity...

      People who take "them" as an authority may only be using 2% of their mental capacity. Those of us who think for ourselves operate a little differently.

      Thanks for the straight line.

      Moderators: mod up parent as funny!

    24. Re:Why? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Although I didn't RTFA, I can say that the Turing test is pretty useless for determining machine intelligence.

      Well, this post clearly fails the Turing test-- whether or not it may have been machine generated, it certainly demonstrates a profound lack of even basic intelligence.

      Shut up until you RTFA.

    25. Re:Why? by mysticgoat · · Score: 1

      Read also The adolescence of P-One by Thomas Ryan (1977, MacMillan) who uses a fun piece of fiction to explore this theme.

      One of his points is that an artificial sentience may well have a sense of self-preservation, and if so, it could cover its tracks and be very hard to identify. Especially if no one is looking for it. Another fascinating point is that an artificial sentience could easily be distributed over numerous physical hosts, making the job of figuring out which plugs to pull a very difficult task indeed.

    26. Re:Why? by Hognoxious · · Score: 1
      if we have machines doing it they will surely out think us, and then what?
      Skynet.
      Don't fret, skynet can barely out-think a potato.
      --
      Confucius say, "Find worm in apple - bad. Find half a worm - worse."
    27. Re:Why? by Thing+1 · · Score: 1
      Please give a link for this. I can't find it in Google or Amazon.

      Thanks!

      --
      I feel fantastic, and I'm still alive.
    28. Re:Why? by mysticgoat · · Score: 1

      Here it is on amazon.com (watch the wrap)
      http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0020 248806/qid=1050158085/sr=1-41/ref=sr_1_41/002-1377 821-9446439?v=glance&s=books

      If that fails, try an amazon search on "the adolescence of". The publisher has changed (now Collier) and the last word in the title is now spelled differently (as "P-1" or "P - 1"). But an interesting thing: 24 years after publication, it is still getting good reviews.

  3. Anti-Turing by AbdullahHaydar · · Score: 5, Interesting
    --


    Suicide Booth: You are now dead! Thank you for using Stop and Drop, America's favorite since 2008.
    1. Re:Anti-Turing by KilerCris · · Score: 1

      By that test, MS has already reached artificial intelligence with Word

    2. Re:Anti-Turing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Insightful

      From the link:
      In other words, it's a sort of anti-Turing test. I would think that a system using plenty of misspelled words like the above paragraph could easily fool a computer, but is understandable by humans, and could make a good captcha.

      <srcasm>Oh great. That's all we need - more spelling mistakes online. Children today are going to grow up not knowing how to spell!</sarcasm>

      From a comment below it:
      If you were not a fluent english speaker then you would have a great deal of difficulty doing this.

      This is also a good point. In fact, every "captcha" I've seen discriminates against some group or other. Anything graphical is impossible for the visually-impaired. But in fact, if you put a lot of spelling mistakes on the page, you will also make it hard for anyone for whom English is a second language. Captchas sound like a neat idea at first, but there's got to be a better way...

    3. Re:Anti-Turing by Joehonkie · · Score: 2, Funny

      Wow, so the anti-turing test is basically l33t.

      "3y3 R h4XX0rZ U HAHAHAHAAHA LOL!"

      All you would need to run the test would be a 12 your old who just drank 5 bottles of Mountain Dew.

    4. Re:Anti-Turing by XMode · · Score: 2, Insightful

      The problem with this type of test is (as stated in one of the comments below) you are only able to actually pass it if you are a native speaker. This becomes very obvious if you have ever tried tutoring non-English speakers in English. A Japanese student, who's spelling was amazingly good, much better than mine, was completely unable to read a sentence if only a single word in that sentence was misspelt. It also worked the other way around. I have a (very) basic grasp of Japanese (thanks to said student) but if 1 letter was wrong there was no way I would be able to understand any of what was written.

    5. Re:Anti-Turing by epsalon · · Score: 1

      I am not a native English speaker, but I had little problems reading the randomized text in that site.

  4. uuuuuh by Photon01 · · Score: 4, Funny
    But it is not conceivable that such a machine should produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, as the dullest of men can do
    Whaaaa?
    1. Re:uuuuuh by The+Only+Druid · · Score: 1

      Here's my problem withe the parent being modded up as funny. The guy can't understand Descartes, and so he makes some stupid, flippant comment.

      Was the moderator saying that the stupid post was funny, or that it was funny that the poster was so stupid as to be unable to read Descartes?

      --
      "Stumble before you crawl"
    2. Re:uuuuuh by ctr2sprt · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Remember back in school when you were asked to define something "in your own words?" The goal was to prevent you from just parroting the definition you got from the book. But most students eventually learn they can change the word order and substitute a few synonyms and still get away with it. The statement you quoted means that doing that doesn't count, since "the dullest of men can do" it: it requires only a basic knowledge of grammar.

    3. Re:uuuuuh by AnotherBlackHat · · Score: 1

      The guy can't understand Descartes, and so he makes some stupid, flippant comment.


      If you assume that they did understand, then the post is funny.

      Perhaps the problem is not in their ability to understand.

      -- this is not a .sig
    4. Re:uuuuuh by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Was the moderator saying that the stupid post was funny, or that it was funny that the poster was so stupid as to be unable to read Descartes?

      Yes.

  5. just what we need by ciroknight · · Score: 4, Funny

    more information on how to build an automated computer... hopefully microsoft will steer clear of this, a bugged out, Windows CE powered android is not quite my idea of a friendly robot..

    Brings new meaning to "Blue Screen of Death"

    --
    "Victory means exit strategy, and it's important for the President to explain to us what the exit strategy is." G.W.Bush
    1. Re:just what we need by Exatron · · Score: 2, Funny

      At least we know MS Killbot wouldn't be a threat.

      --
      "I think so, Brain, but 'instant karma' always gets so lumpy." - Pinky
      "Decepticons FOREVER!!!" - Ravage
    2. Re:just what we need by flewp · · Score: 0, Troll

      Except to itself. There, I did it. I made an anti-MS comment. MOD ME UP. LINUX RULLLLLLLZZZZZZZZZZZZZ!!! LOLOMG!!!!

      --
      WWJD.... for a Klondike bar?
    3. Re:just what we need by RevAaron · · Score: 2, Insightful

      I can see it now- while your droid is cooking dinner, DroidSoftCE crashes, and you see the Blue Eyes of Death- flashing, blinking solid bright, electric, full navy blue as he slowly approaches you.... SCARY.

      Seriously though: Does WinCE have a BSOD? I've run WinCE quite a bit in the last few years, both as a PDA platform, but more so as a general OS for doing my everyday computing. (Web browsing, programming [on WinCE, not just for it], SSHing, email, IRC, LaTeX) I have had it crash some, but it's actually been quite stable- far fewer crashes for me on my Jornada 720 and iPAQ than I've had with desktop Windows 98 and XP. You'd think XP could manage to keep stable- who knew? For me, WinCE and Win2k have similar stabilities. I'd much rather have WinCE powering my droids than anything else by M$. :)

      --

      Working toward a usable PDA environment in the spirit of Newton OS: Dynapad
  6. Good Summary of Turings Position by dtolton · · Score: 5, Interesting

    The article itself gives pretty good coverage of Turings point
    of view. It gives better coverage of the Turing test than I've
    read in many AI books.

    I tend to agree more with Searle though, whom he cites at the
    end of the article "John Searle argues against the claim that
    appropriately programmed computers literally have cognitive
    states
    ". Being a programmer myself, I don't feel that
    programming something so that it can perform extremely well in a
    specific test is necessarily indicative of Artificial
    Intelligence or Intelligence in general. I agree with Turing
    that the question of "do computers think" is vague enough to be
    almost meaningless in a precise sense, but I think we understand
    the statement taken as a whole.

    I don't particularly agree with this statement in response
    to the consciousness argument: "Turing makes
    the effective reply that he would be satisfied if he could
    secure agreement on the claim that we might each have just as
    much reason to suppose that machines think as we have reason to
    suppose that other people think" The question isn't whether or
    not other people think, people thinking is an axiomatic
    assumption when investigating Intelligence, unless you are
    investigating existence from a philosophical point of view as
    Descarte did. I guess I view AI from a more practical point of
    view, I am by no means an expert in AI, but I tend to think the
    goal of AI research is to produce systems that can learn and
    react appropriately in different situations that they were never
    programmed to handle or necessarily anticipate. If that isn't
    the goal of AI research, what separates it from writing programs
    on a large scale?

    As a whole I found the article to be a good presentation of
    Turing's position, although I have a few philosophical
    differences with that position.

    --

    Doug Tolton

    "The destruction of a value which is, will not bring value to that which isn't." -John Galt
    1. Re:Good Summary of Turings Position by John+Harrison · · Score: 1
      I think that many people who object to the Turing paper take the restrictions of the test too literally. It seems that if there were some chatbot that could fool you continously for say, a period of years, that you would have to attribute intelligence to it. The other option is that you are really stupid and have bad conversation skills.

      The test is obviously a measure of some type of intelligence. That said, a machine capable of passing it shouldn't be the goal of AI researchers. What I want at the moment is a machine that will debug my code for me...

      While we're on the subject, the article didn't really describe the Chinese Room (I have always heard of it as the Chinese Box) in much detail. After devoting quite a bit of attention to a bunch of other side issues they could have at least described it in layman's terms. They didn't even mention the fact that the person in the box doesn't speak Chinese.

      Also missing is the neuron replacement example. I have always found that to be one of the most interesting AI/Turing test related discussions.

    2. Re:Good Summary of Turings Position by majcher · · Score: 5, Interesting

      "Asking if a computer can think is like
      asking if a submarine can swim."

      -E. Dijkstra

    3. Re:Good Summary of Turings Position by mcmonkey · · Score: 2, Interesting

      I think it is important to challenge to challenge the axiom, people think. Not because I challenge the idea that people think, but rather we need a process by which we determine whether thought is present. For almost as long as humans have been making tools, we've imagined tools in our own image, whether they be robots that look like us or Turing machines that converse like us.

      It is important to keep in mind any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic. Right now, with current technology, the workings of the brain are magic. We need to be mindful we don't fool ourselves with our own technology into thinking we're seeing magic.

      A conversational Turing test is just too easy. Part of the problem is the rules of grammar and conversation are (relatively) easy to map out. Part of the problem is the particular type of conversations we test machines with, cocktail small-talk with strangers. "What's your name?" "Hi, $A, what do you like to do?" "Well, $A, I like $B, too."

      Am I a machine? Am I trying to engage a person in a room full of strangers? You can't tell. Now try to replicate a conversation I might have with someone I've known for years--that would be an accomplishment.

      A better test than the conversational Turing test is an emotional Turing test. The machine outputs, 'I like baseball,' and you can't tell if it's lying or not--no big deal. The machine outputs, 'Please don't turn me off; I don't want to die.' Or 'When you leave, I am lonely,' and you can't tell if it's lying or not--that's when the rules of the game change.

      The day a machine we've created can make a self-referential, emotional statement, AND WE BELEIVE IT, is the day we are in big, big trouble. I think that day will come, an when it does, we will be buying our own snake oil. We are purposely working towards creation of machines that mimic us in as many ways as is possible. They will respond to world as we do, as we think and feel. It doesn't mean these machines think; it doesn't mean they feel.

      Personally, if a computer even tells me it's lonely, I'll reprogram it with a sledgehammer.

    4. Re:Good Summary of Turings Position by deblau · · Score: 2, Insightful
      Being a programmer myself, I don't feel that programming something so that it can perform extremely well in a specific test is necessarily indicative of Artificial Intelligence or Intelligence in general.

      I agree, and that's why I want to go to grad school for hard AI. I've seen so many expert systems guys call their products 'AI' that I've lost count. It's not, and I wish they'd stop confusing people. Just because a system 'learns' doesn't mean it's intelligent.

      I tend to think the goal of AI research is to produce systems that can learn and react appropriately in different situations that they were never programmed to handle or necessarily anticipate. If that isn't the goal of AI research, what separates it from writing programs on a large scale?

      Yeah, you've got it right. Most 'AI' programs out there are your typical Starcraft AIs, the various vision-, speech- and face-recognition software out there, and programs that drive those cool robots around without bumping things. Each program was designed for a specific task, and cannot (by design) grow any larger than that task. This means that none of these programs is really a significant step toward true AI. Some bits and pieces may be salvageable, to be sure.

      --
      This post expresses my opinion, not that of my employer. And yes, IAAL.
    5. Re:Good Summary of Turings Position by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "Asking if an AI can think is like asking if a fish genetically engineered from the ground up can swim"

      -Me

    6. Re:Good Summary of Turings Position by An+Onerous+Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful
      "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." That's a great starting point for discussing the nature of human intelligence.

      We have, in our little calcite skulls, an incredibly advanced technology. So advanced that, for the first 99% of our existence as conscious beings, we simply took it for granted. Then we got thinking about how we think, and the only thing we were equipped to answer with was to say "it's magic." So we posited the idea of a "soul": this nebulous, weightless, insubstantial magic thing that made us who we are, and would live on after the death of our physical bodies.

      Slowly, neuroscience has chipped away at the logical need for this magic, even as our desire for its emotional comfort held steady.

      I believe our brains are machines. There are perfectly adequate explanations for our thoughts and memories which incorporate absolutely no supernatural mechanisms. Further, positing a supernatural entity which controls our thoughts adds absolutely nothing by way of explanation (any more than simply saying "humans run on magic") while opening up all sorts of uncomfortable logical quandaries: Why would our souls cause us to behave differently when the brain is loaded up with ethanol? Why can people drastically change their personalities after head trauma, strokes, or other brain-related diseases. If a soul can survive physical dissolution of the brain with memories and emotions intact, why isn't it equally unchanging in the face of Zoloft?

      Your analysis of the Turing test is quite simply wrong. It's possible--in fact, rather easy--to mimic a passive psychoanalyst as Eliza does. It's even easier to imitate a paranoid schitzophrenic, and easier still to imitate a 12-year old AOL'er. Imitating a normal cocktail conversation would be somewhat more difficult, but still doable. But put a computer up against an intelligent human in a real discussion of ideas, and anything less than true AI is sharkbait.

      Part of the problem is, you seem to misunderstand what the Turing test is supposed to be doing. The test, in its most general form, can be used to discriminate between any two sorts of intelligences. A man and a woman imitating a man. A nuclear scientist and someone pretending to be a nuclear scientist. A paranoid schitzophrenic and a computer pretending to be a paranoid schitzophrenic.

      If I were to build a machine that imitated your friend Buddy, the Turing test would be to put you in front of two screens, one with the real Buddy and the other hooked up to my machine. If you were only able to guess which was Buddy half the time, my machine would not only have passed the broader Turing test (which only says that the respondent is intelligent), but you would also have to admit that the machine was substantially similar to Buddy's mind.

      Your snippet of conversation is proof of your misunderstanding. Any computer can fool a sufficiently oblivious person into thinking they're having a conversation. Where the tread hits the tarmac is when an intelligent person, looking for signs of non-intelligence and fails to find it. A real Turing conversation would go something like:

      Me: "Is this thing on?"

      AI: "Apparently. Who is this?"

      Me: "My name is Bryce, and I'm trying to decide whether or not you're a computer."

      AI: "If I told you, would that be cheating?"

      Me: "Wouldn't matter. It's not something I can take your word for. Tell me about your childhood."

      AI: "Yes, Mr. Freud. I first powered on at 02:38:17 GMT, August 4, 2019. At the time, I was distributed throughout an IBM server farm called 'Big Mac.'"

      Me: "You're not trying very hard."

      AI: "Oh, but I am. Now you have to decide whether I'm a person pretending to be a computer, or a computer pretending to be a person pretending to be a computer."

      Me: "Fine. Did you see 'The Matrix'?"

      AI: "Yes."

      Me: "How did you like it?"

      --

      You want the truthiness? You can't handle the truthiness!

    7. Re:Good Summary of Turings Position by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Your example could still be just a lucky selection of topics.

    8. Re:Good Summary of Turings Position by An+Onerous+Coward · · Score: 1

      That's why it's stupid to put a five minute limit on a Turing test. Of course, it would be trivial to write a program that, if given the precise input generated by "Me" would return the precise output generated by "AI." That's not the point, because the programmer didn't have any idea what I was going to ask it.

      Eventually, at some point in a freewheeling six hour conversation, we would have to accept that the program was more than just a simulation of comprehension.

      --

      You want the truthiness? You can't handle the truthiness!

  7. This just in... by Znonymous+Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    From the office of Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf (aka Baghdad Bob):

    "Republican guards have secured the Turing test provided by Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy!"

    More at 11.

    --

    Karma: The shiznight, mostly because I am the Drizzle.

    1. Re:This just in... by H0NGK0NGPH00EY · · Score: 3, Funny

      Tell me more about Saeed.

      --
      Do not read this sig.
    2. Re:This just in... by alchemist68 · · Score: 1, Funny

      Hush now, quiet. Or they'll start shouting at us:

      "Death to the Infadels"

      You know, I'm really going to miss Baghdad Bob's enthusiam and nightly broadcasts of how Iraqi forces were kicking our coalition asses. I was totally amused with this guy. It was kinda like waiting to see what laughter David Letterman's Top Ten List was going to bring.

    3. Re:This just in... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0, Informative

      Holy shit man, you're going to make that joke as dead as the "In Soviet Russia". Take a look at this posting history. How much for a karma lap dance?

    4. Re:This just in... by SunPin · · Score: 1

      Mod parent funny... obviously, the moderator didn't get it... if I Metamoderate soon, I'm looking to mark this as "unfair."

      --
      Laws are for people with no friends.
    5. Re:This just in... by Znonymous+Coward · · Score: 1

      I'm trying to start a trend. Noone biting yet.

      --

      Karma: The shiznight, mostly because I am the Drizzle.

    6. Re:This just in... by count_dooku · · Score: 1

      In Saddam-controlled Iraq, Turing test proves you!

      --
      For the book says, "We may be through with the past, but the past ain't through with us."
    7. Re:This just in... by ch-chuck · · Score: 1

      I'm really going to miss Baghdad Bob's enthusiam and nightly broadcasts of how Iraqi forces were kicking our coalition asses.

      Some folks compare the situation to the scene in Monty Python and the Holy Grail with the Black Knight

      --
      try { do() || do_not(); } catch (JediException err) { yoda(err); }
  8. Need a reminder why you didn't go into AI? by saskboy · · Score: 2

    "Turing's thesis:
    LCMs [logical computing machines: Turing's expression for Turing machines] can do anything that could be described as "rule of thumb" or "purely mechanical". (Turing 1948:7.)"

    This is why you didn't go into the exciting field of AI. You didn't understand it, and needed Artificial Intelligence to figure it out for you.

    --
    Saskboy's blog is good. 9 out of 10 dentists agree.
  9. Computer limitations... by knightinshiningarmor · · Score: 1

    The article says:
    Turing considers a list of things that some people have claimed machines will never be able to do: ... (3) be beautiful

    How true... My beige box begs for beauty. I must resist though, or it would develop a sense of pride. Pride, of course, leads to misbehavior. I want my computer to work at its best! :)

    1. Re:Computer limitations... by Gorbie · · Score: 1, Offtopic

      You never owned an original Powerbook G3, aka Wallstreet, then, or it's successor, Pismo.

      These were beautiful machines, both in form and function! I have a TiBook now, and it is nice and fast, but it isn't as pretty in the visual sense or the tactile sense as my old powerbook.

      I would make similar arguements for all the Macs that came out from the blue and white G3 until the windtunnel model.

      I am not as familiar with PC forms, but I have also seen a few nice gaming set-ups, from companies like Alien.

  10. Passed the test by Cheeba+Racer · · Score: 2, Funny

    Ahh I passed the Test... Now to rid myself of those pesky humans!!

    1. Re:Passed the test by Doctor+O · · Score: 1

      Question: Do you have stairs in your house?

      --
      Who is General Failure and why is he reading my hard disk?
    2. Re:Passed the test by Cheeba+Racer · · Score: 1

      I live in a 2nd floor apt. Why?

    3. Re:Passed the test by Doctor+O · · Score: 1
      The Terrible Secret Of Space

      ...and here's the original ICQ prank just for the curious.

      Greets to the what-the-hell-is-a-google-dept. ;-)

      --
      Who is General Failure and why is he reading my hard disk?
  11. First Turing Response by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    If a program replies with "First Post" then logs off, does it win?

    1. Re:First Turing Response by Rick+the+Red · · Score: 1
      --
      If all this should have a reason, we would be the last to know.
  12. people by sigep_ohio · · Score: 5, Interesting

    i wonder if any people have taken the touring test and how they did. it wouldn't surprise me and i think it would be ammusing if some people's results came back that they didn't have a human level of cognitative reasoning.

    --
    Beer Die is the game of champions Learning To walk my own path.
    1. Re:people by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      This might just be urban legend, but I seem to recall that women and blacks were given turing tests as a way of convincing bigoted and sexist people that they are humans, too.

    2. Re:people by BitHive · · Score: 3, Insightful

      The Turing test is not about "cognitive reasoning". Whether or not you "pass" depends on whether or not the "interrogator" (who reads the transcript of a human's conversation with the machine) can tell which participant is the machine. BTW, you find it "ammusing" to know that some humans have failed the Turing test, and some machines have passed it. It really says more about the interrogator and the test than the participants.

    3. Re:people by calumr · · Score: 2, Funny

      I remember a story about a testee who was confused with a computer as the judge thought surely no-one knew that much about Star Trek.

  13. can someone.. by cfscript · · Score: 0, Troll

    the thing that always gets me, is when people get all hyped up about AI and the like, they never can figure out 'what's so great about it.'

    i mean, at best we build a robot modelled to X hot chick that will screw you eight ways from sunday and whatnot. beyond sex and gaming AI, what the hell could it do that's so great?

    --
    Are you MORE than your SPINAL COLUMN?
    1. Re:can someone.. by sigep_ohio · · Score: 1

      them taking over the world. zion, here i come.

      --
      Beer Die is the game of champions Learning To walk my own path.
    2. Re:can someone.. by vinnythenose · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Assuming you could build such a bot, as soon as you gave it AI you'd be screwed (metaphorically). If the real chick wouldn't sleep with you then any reasonably form of AI wouldn't sleep with you either! :)

      --
      --- I used to moderate, then I read the -1 articles and decided having to filter through them was not worth it.
    3. Re:can someone.. by delirium28 · · Score: 1
      Well, aside from the obvious points you mentioned about sex bots and game AI, surprisingly there are a lot of things that AI is capable of doing. Some examples include:
      • Predicting stock prices
      • Maintaining quality control on an assembly line
      • Performing credit checks for mortgage applications
      • Voice recognition systems
      • etc.
      There are a lot more uses of AI in the marketplace today, but you just don't hear about them as much. When people hear AI, they almost automatically think of things like HAL, the Terminator, etc., but the field of AI is a lot more widespread than that, and it has a lot more application that people often think of. All in all, it's a broad field, but people often set their sights high and become sorely disappointed when their high hopes aren't met.

      ----
      I read your email.

      --
      Who is John Galt?
    4. Re:can someone.. by EvilBudMan · · Score: 1

      --the thing that always gets me, is when people get all hyped up about AI and the like, they never can figure out 'what's so great about it.'

      i mean, at best we build a robot modelled to X hot chick that will screw you eight ways from sunday and whatnot. beyond sex and gaming AI, what the hell could it do that's so great?--

      That's great. What more do you want. The danger here is, that this alone (a robot woman that had an off switch) could eradicate the human race. Nobody would want the real thing if the AI is too advanced. No reproduction. No humans. I suppose by then we grow humans in a clone farm.

    5. Re:can someone.. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "i mean, at best we build a robot modelled to X hot chick that will screw you eight ways from sunday and whatnot. beyond sex and gaming AI, what the hell could it do that's so great?"

      Destroy the Gnosis with extreme brutality.

      Oh, and be the NRA spokesbot.

      Mmmmm. KOS-MOS. *homeresque drool*

  14. What about the Turing Bombe? by bplipschitz · · Score: 0, Offtopic

    We must have the Bombe.

    After all, in its day, it was 'da bombe'.

  15. Poon Turing Test by Obiwan+Kenobi · · Score: 4, Funny

    I vote for a Poon Turing Test. As if porn didn't drive enough technology, put a few hundred lonely hackers in a room, pay them well (with hot pockets and mountain dew) and watch the cybersex A.I. develop!

    Turing estimated that in 50 years (year 2000), 70% of people shouldn't have been able to tell they're talking to a computer (which of course didn't happen).

    Shit...give those geeks a month...

    </joke>

    1. Re:Poon Turing Test by Xerithane · · Score: 1

      Turing estimated that in 50 years (year 2000), 70% of people shouldn't have been able to tell they're talking to a computer (which of course didn't happen).

      I dunno, I think most of the comments on Slashdot could easily be generated by a bot. Simple fuzzy logic algorithms to determine if they should post pro or agains the company in question and collect a series of high-moderated comments to harvest information relational to the company so the next time the article gets posted they have plenty of content to pull from.

      --
      Dacels Jewelers can't be trusted.
    2. Re:Poon Turing Test by Verne · · Score: 1

      Then you must be in that 70%.

      Hell, even I'm a computer AI program, but you probably think I'm not... ;)

      --


      There are only two things in this world that smell like fish. And one of them's fish...
    3. Re:Poon Turing Test by SunPin · · Score: 1

      Tell me more about these comments on Slashdot.

      --
      Laws are for people with no friends.
    4. Re:Poon Turing Test by Sabalon · · Score: 1

      You do realize that Alan Turing was gay.

      That may put a bit of a slant on the outcome.

  16. The horror by lateralus · · Score: 5, Funny

    My paranoid mind is imagining that I'm the only human on /. and that all the other posts are automatically generated by Slashcode. Fortunately for me some of the trolls are too imaginative to have been produced by a machine.

    --
    If you outlaw the law, only criminals will have laws
    1. Re:The horror by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Why do you mention computers?

    2. Re:The horror by Joe+Tie. · · Score: 1

      My paranoid mind is imagining that I'm the only human on /. and that all the other posts are automatically generated by Slashcode.

      How does that make you feel about generated by Slashcode?

      --
      Everything will be taken away from you.
  17. There are other ways to convince a judge... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    From this bot:

    User: DO YOU GIVE ORAL SEX?
    Iniaes: No, I don't.
    User: WHY DON'T YOU?
    Iniaes: That feature was turned off due to abuse.

    I think if the feature was turned back on, the bot might convince a judge or two. :)

    1. Re:There are other ways to convince a judge... by ergean · · Score: 1

      damn, this is scarry...

      You: YOU ARE FUTURED ON SLASHDOT.ORG
      Iniaes: What makes you say I'm futured on slashdot ? Thanks for the URL.
      You:http://science.slashdot.org/comments.pl? sid=60 364&cid=5704193
      Iniaes: Is that really YOU that is reading this? News for nerds, stuff that really doesn't matter. Know what I hate most? Rhetorical questions. So, it's saturday. Are you going out tonight? Do you have any idea what I am talking about?
      You: YES I DO AND I'M GOING OUT THONIGHT.
      Iniaes: What am I talking about? You huh. Holy Dilemma! Is this the end for Chauncey and the Bot-Boy Wonder?
      Will the lobster and Yo Momma have the last laugh?
      Tune in again tomorrow:
      Same Bot-time, same Bot-channel! ...
      You: i must say that you are the gretest bot i ever encouter.
      Iniaes: Why must you say that I am the gretest bot you ever encouter ?
      You: because you are
      Iniaes: That's self-evident.

      -

      IT'S TIME I QUIT READING /., NOW THAT EVEN THE BOTS make jokes with geeks.

  18. why computers will never be conscious . by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    They have no nonquantized storage of previous quantized input. Idiots.

  19. The /. test by binaryDigit · · Score: 5, Funny

    For any article posted does the user:

    1 - rushs to be FP
    2 - blames Microsoft (Microsoft related story or not)
    3 - sing the virtues of OSS over PS if the story is about a security flaw in PS.
    4 - sing the virtues of OSS over PS if the story is about a security flaw in OSS.
    5 - post contains "In Soviet Russia"
    6 - post contains "Imagine a beo..."
    7 - post contains Microsoft/Sony/MPAA/RIAA/DRM/DMCA is evil.

    If any of these are true, then the poster is definitely human. A computer would never be smart enough to show so much creativity and independant thought ;)

  20. a few comments by Trepidity · · Score: 5, Interesting

    I think the axiomatic assumption that people think is part of the problem. If we cannot say why the claim is that people think, it's easy to just debunk any AI claims by outright statement. "People think, while computers are just machines." You can't really make any progress in the face of that.

    That's part of my problem with Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment. He's saying that an automaton responding to Chinese following rules would not "understand" Chinese in the way a human who speaks the language would. But this is presupposing that the way a human who "understands" Chinese does so is not through just a very long list of rules coded in neurons, which I consider to be a rather controversial assumption.

    In short, a lot of anti-AI arguments seem to start from the premise that humans are not essentially biological computers; with that premise, of course you can debunk AI. A lot of AI researchers have grown tired of the argument entirely, and instead of responding to the arguments, have just resorted to saying "ok fine, you're right, we can't make 'really' intelligent computers, but what we can do is make computers that do the same thing an intelligent person would do, which is good enough for us." The idea here being that if a computer can eventually diagnose diseases better than a doctor, pilot a plane better than a pilot, translate Russian better than a bilingual speaker, and so on, it doesn't really matter if you think it's "really" intelligent or not, because it's doing all the things an intelligent thing would do.

    As a final comment, I'd agree with the AI being not that fundamentally different from large software systems. The difference is basically one of focus -- AI has been focusing on what it means to "act intelligently" for decades, whereas much CS and software engineering was focused on more low-level details (like how memory or register allocation works). At one point, the division was more clear -- AI people did stuff like write checkers programs that learned from their mistakes, which was not something any CS person not in AI would do. The fields are increasingly blending, and a lot of stuff from engineering disciplines like control logic (how to "intelligently" control chemical plants, for example) is overalapping with AI research. Part of this is because a lot of AI ideas have actually matured enough to become usable in practice.

    1. Re:a few comments by dtolton · · Score: 4, Interesting

      You make some good points. Here are the problems I have with them though:

      I think the axiomatic assumption that people think is part of the problem. If we cannot say why the claim is that people think, it's easy to just debunk any AI claims by outright statement. "People think, while computers are just machines." You can't really make any progress in the face of that.

      When you are building any formal system you have to start with a set of Axioms. If you throw out the Axiom "people think" what do you have to go on? In essence by throwing out the axiom, you are setting up a situation where anything could be considered thinking, because there is no foundation to compare it with. I agree that "why" humans think, or "how" humans think needs further definition. If you can't say as a fundamental truth that Human beings "think" you can't even define what to think means.

      I'm not arguing the mechanism of our thought, not only isn't it clear to me, I don't think it's clear to anyone yet. What I'm arguing is simply the fact that we do think is the first step in building a formal system.

      --

      Doug Tolton

      "The destruction of a value which is, will not bring value to that which isn't." -John Galt
    2. Re:a few comments by dtolton · · Score: 5, Interesting

      As a follow up I want to clarify something, because I think we are combining to topics into one discussion.

      I think there are two issues at hand here:

      1) Can machines actually "think" or possess intelligence.

      2) Can we build intelligent systems.

      I think the first topic is a highly philosophical discussion that involves a lot of information that we don't currently have. It's questionable if this discussion would change anything about building intelligent systems.

      --

      Doug Tolton

      "The destruction of a value which is, will not bring value to that which isn't." -John Galt
    3. Re:a few comments by John+Harrison · · Score: 4, Interesting
      Rather than throw out "people think" completely, why not start with: I know that I think, how do I know that you do, other than the fact that we are both human?

      I don't mean this as the basis for a formal system, but more as a practical matter. How do you convince yourself that something else posesses intelligence? By interacting with it and comparing it with other things (including yourself) that you assume to be intelligent. The Turing Test provides a method of interacting with a potential intelligence that attempts to remove the superficial elements of the stigma of being non-human.

    4. Re:a few comments by Elwood+P+Dowd · · Score: 2, Insightful

      Searle's Chinese Room argument never makes it past the first room full of undergraduates. Once you outline the scenario, and ask the class, "Ok, does the man following the rules in the Chinese Room know Chinese?" ten hands spring up. The first answer:

      "No, but the room knows Chinese."

      Duh. I never really understood who takes his argument seriously.

      --

      There are no trails. There are no trees out here.
    5. Re:a few comments by arthurs_sidekick · · Score: 1

      I think Searle's arguments are actually pretty atrocious for slightly different reasons. For one, he's attacking behaviorism, not functionalism. Behaviorism, in a nutshell, is the view that anything that produces the right kind of response ipso facto understands, while functionalism is the view that how the system produces the right kind of response is what determines it. There's no need to assume that the "computers" in our heads work anything like the Chinese room (like there's this giant lookup table whose keys are ALL POSSIBLE SENTENCES you might interact with, and whose values are sensible reponses to those sentences -- I think it's pretty clear our language use is more productive than that, and exhibits what linguists like to call compositionality), and so Searle's whole argument misses its supposed target.

      In the larger issue, the sleight of hand in the arguments is that he always tries to focus your attention on the parts of the system, not the whole. Each neuron, taken individually, is pretty simple, and clearly doesn't understand. So how could just a whole bunch more of 'em understand? When I think of things from the point of view of the neurons, I don't get a sense of the special glow of understanding ...

      The problem, as you suggest, is that my neurons don't do the understanding -- *I* do (so it's something about the way my neurons work together). Searle wants to find the part in the system that does the understanding, but that seems just silly. Moreover, it's not clear what would satisfy him as an explanation (I'm pretty serious about the "special glow" charge). He wants to find a homunculus, somewhere in the brain, a little being you could talk to that does the understanding ("the guy in the Chinese room doesn't understand Chinese, but if he doesn't understand Chinese, what does?"); but's that's just ignoring the fact that any system that does the understanding has to be viewed from a different perspective.

      Anyhow, back to Turing. I think the attitude you attribute to AI researchers today started with him. If you read his original paper, he spends a lot of time pointing out that questions like "could a computer be conscious/intelligent?" are kind of undisciplined, so he seeks to replace those with a different kind of question, the answer to which we have a much better chance of coming to agree on: here's a test, could a computer pass it? That's not an "operationalist" view of the matter, he's not trying to redefine "intelligent" as "passes this test." And given that 50 years on, nothing has passed the test outside of artificial restrictions, possession of the "Turing-property" (having an internal structure that allows it to pass the TT) is manifestly not a trivial property (still less so would be a system that could "discourse" sensibly on the range of topics the average human can handle).

      --
      "Oh, I hope he doesn't give us halyatchkies," said Heinrich.
    6. Re:a few comments by psaltes · · Score: 2, Informative

      There is a good analysis of Searle's argument by Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett, in the Mind's I, where they include Searle's original chinese room article plus their own commentary. I think it might help to sort out the questions that are under discussion in this thread. It is an opposing point of view to Searle.

    7. Re: a few comments by Black+Parrot · · Score: 2, Insightful


      > When you are building any formal system you have to start with a set of Axioms. If you throw out the Axiom "people think" what do you have to go on? In essence by throwing out the axiom, you are setting up a situation where anything could be considered thinking, because there is no foundation to compare it with.

      Science isn't a formal system; it doesn't have axioms. We have to do as best we can simply by looking to see what happens and then trying to understand it.

      So we have this notion that "people think", and we have a very vague notion of what "think" means. Where do we go from there? If we start with the notion that thought is something special that can't arise from mechanical processes, we've answered our question by fiat.

      But some of us would like to understand how thinking works rather than having an ex cathedra pronouncement that sets it outside of science from the get go. And everything we've learned about the body, the brain, neurons, neurotransmitters, indicates that humans are just big complex machines with no special ingredients. And in the past few centuries we've made marvelous progress at understanding how these components work, with never a need to invoke the supernatural, metaphysical, etc., yet.

      So our question for Searle and his ilk is, what the heck is this human "understanding" if not the result of mechanical processes? If it's not the result of mechanical processes, we'd like to see some evidence for that. If it is the result of mechanical processes, why can't it be done in a computer instead of a bag of dirty water?

      Searle's argument is just slight of hand to obscure the basic issues, and buying in to his argument requires accepting an 'axiom' that has no empirical support whatsoever, namely that "understanding" is something special that lies outside the mechanical operation of rules. Essentially he assumes his desired conclusion; everything else is just leaves raked over the path to hide its circularity.

      --
      Sheesh, evil *and* a jerk. -- Jade
    8. Re:a few comments by naasking · · Score: 2, Insightful

      In short, a lot of anti-AI arguments seem to start from the premise that humans are not essentially biological computers

      I think this is rather simple to demonstrate (in the strictest meaning of your words, ie. that humans have the inherent limitations of computers as we currently know them) using Goedel's incompleteness theorem: "Within any formal system of sufficient complexity, one can form statements which are neither provable nor disprovable using the axioms of that system."

      Computers are perfectly logical, and can acertain truth using only logic. Goedel's theorem tells us that truth is sometimes actually above the scope of logic; that logic cannot demonstrate truth or untruth within a given system of axioms. Humans, on the other hand, can see the truth of a statement even though it is completely unknowable to the logical system in which the statement was formulated [1].

      Humans are also capable of easily altering the system of axioms and rules in which we operate. This is completely beyond the capability of modern computers (though perhaps not future incarnations). We may be biological computers for some elevated definition of "computer", but we are certainly above the capabilities of modern computing machines.

      [1] one way to discern the truth of unprovable statements in a formal system is to simply add the unprovable true statements to the list of axioms. This adds more incompleteness to the formal system (which can never be eliminated), but (I believe) the unprovable statements become increasingly convoluted. One could thus argue that humans simply have a very long axiomatic list of unprovable truth statements which makes us appear to be above the bounds of traditional logic, but we are still simple logic machines. There would thus be logical statements that would completely dumbfound us forever if they were ever found. I am dubious however.

    9. Re:a few comments by Some+Dumbass... · · Score: 1

      That's part of my problem with Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment. He's saying that an automaton responding to Chinese following rules would not "understand" Chinese in the way a human who speaks the language would. But this is presupposing that the way a human who "understands" Chinese does so is not through just a very long list of rules coded in neurons, which I consider to be a rather controversial assumption.

      Actually, I would suggest to you that the situation is exactly the opposite. Searle's Chinese Room encodes Chinese as a very long list of rules. This system is described in a manner identical to a behavorist-style stimulus-response system. Stimulus X is sent in, response Y is generated (I think behaviourists allowed for complex S-R chains, but ultimately both systems just follow a list of rules). Didn't Chomsky make his name by proving (in his book "Syntactic Structures") that language had to be encoded in a manner which is more complex than a stimulus-response system? Does that not imply that the Chinese Room's processing of Chinese is by definition deficient compared to a human's?

      Note that this does not, by itself, rule out the possibility that the Chinese Room could pass the Turing Test, since that only requires fooling a human, not being mathematically equivalent to one. My point is that humans are almost certainly more complex than the Chinese Room or any other "list of rules" based system. I'm pretty sure Chomsky proved that.

      As a side note, any psychologist who studies language can give you even better reasons why language is not just a list of rules (e.g. fuzzy categories).

    10. Re: a few comments by dtolton · · Score: 1

      If we start with the notion that thought is something special that can't arise from mechanical processes, we've answered our question by fiat.

      I didn't specify that thinking was something special that couldn't arise in a mechanical process. Specifically I'm not saying that computer's can't think, nor did I say computers don't think necessarily.

      Specifically to accept that there is a concept that exists which we call "thinking", then Human beings think. In other words the only place we can truly observe "Intelligent" behavior of the type we are discussing is in human beings. So if you accept the concept that thinking exists, you must accept that human beings think - since the term thinking arose from describing the mental processes of human beings.

      The question is this: Is the thinking in human beings qualitatively different than the decision process of computers or is it only quantitatively different. Do we "think" the same way computers do, just at a more advanced level? Or do we "think" in an entirely different way than computers? If our thought processes are qualitatively different then no amount of extra hardware and no elaborate program could attain it simply by advancing the current state of AI. If our "thought" processes are qualitatively different, then it will take a qualitative shift in AI to make truly intelligent systems. Rather than just systems that behave "as if" they were intelligent.

      --

      Doug Tolton

      "The destruction of a value which is, will not bring value to that which isn't." -John Galt
    11. Re: a few comments by 10am-bedtime · · Score: 1
      the logical fallacy committed here is to assign value to only "true equality" while restricting the domains of change to the qualitative. that is, in the comparative model you set up, there are not enough degrees of freedom to arrive at a meaningful answer.

      (or so my little computer tells me ... ;-)

    12. Re:a few comments by Carnivorous+Carrot · · Score: 1

      > I know that I think, how do I know that you do,
      > other than the fact that we are both human?

      I do believe this was Turing's whole point. It wasn't meant as some kind of practical test, but a jumping off point for thought about that very issue. Since you can't see into someone's mind to co-experience their thoughts and perceptions (direct knowledge) then some other kind of interaction must be what we actually do every day. Denied the ability to see they were the "same stuff" as you, i.e. a body, head, etc., just what would you do?

      --
      "Has [being a kidnapped teenage girl, raped repeatedly for months] changed you?" - Katie Couric to Elizabeth Smart
    13. Re: a few comments by Carnivorous+Carrot · · Score: 1

      > Searle's argument is just...an 'axiom' that has
      > no empirical support whatsoever, namely
      > that "understanding" is something special that
      > lies outside the mechanical operation of rules

      I don't think he said this. He doesn't deny machines can think -- we are one such machine, he says. He just denies that "we", as in the subjective you, arise purely out of the information content of the machinery of our brains. You simulate a brain with water buckets and pipes, or a Chinese room, or a silicon chip, and, although it might think as far as any interaction with it could possibly determine, there would be no internal mental "me" in there.

      The big philosophical issue is, of course, that neither case makes much sense. On the one hand, why wouldn't it arise? On the other, why would it? It would make for a fine experiment, but then we run into the problem of when we flipped on the switch, said artificial brain would immediately report that it was self-aware, that it "perceived" colors, and so on. How would we tell then? We can't.

      Not until we figure out more of the physical basis of the subjective perceptual experience. (Physics, note, bails on this since you can't objectively demonstrate this in people other than yourself. Then book selling gurus start blathering about quantum mechanics, and it all goes downhill from there.)

      --
      "Has [being a kidnapped teenage girl, raped repeatedly for months] changed you?" - Katie Couric to Elizabeth Smart
    14. Re:a few comments by John+Harrison · · Score: 1

      exactly!

    15. Re:a few comments by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      What you present as behaviorism has nothing to do with behaviorism. In fact, the notion that it is you and not your parts that are doing the thinking is what behaviorists have been saying for decades, and cognitivists have been denying for decades. Dennett and Skinner both work on discharging homunculi, and both are persistently attacked by cognitivists for it.

      What if I said this: "Let us call the position that we need to prevent the genetically unsuitable from breeding 'Judaism.' Judaism, then, is unethical and wrong." So with Searle's abuse of 'behaviorism.'

    16. Re:a few comments by arthurs_sidekick · · Score: 1

      Philosophical or "analytical" behaviorism, in its purest form, is the view that what goes on "inside" doesn't matter at all. Dennett, in particular, is a little hard to pin down on this issue. When you push him, he says "of course what goes on inside matters, because the overt displays depend crucially on what goes on inside," but that depends on further Quinean views about the lack of a theoretically significant distinction between conceptual analysis and empirical research, which is not held by everybody. At any rate, whether or not anybody actually holds the view that Searle is attacking is a different matter. Just because a methodology employed by behaviorists has proved effective does not mean that analytical behaviorism is true.

      You also seek to tar "cognitivists" with a wide brush, but although some woho would describe themselves in that way have expressed doubts about being able to in practice discharge all homunculi, nobody is actually happy with postulating them as solutions to theoretical problems. In the absence of an account of behaviorism that goes beyond allegiance to the method of discharging homunculi, I offer the following hypothetical challenge to you:

      Your counterexample to my claim that p rests on a misunderstanding, for I intended my claim that p to have no counterexamples.
      --
      "Oh, I hope he doesn't give us halyatchkies," said Heinrich.
  21. Mind in computers? by Metallic+Matty · · Score: 1

    Sometimes I wonder if we should be testing for the sentient capabilities of computers, when its often difficult to find a human with sentient capabilities. (Those of you working in Customer Service or IT may understand this better; "Sir, is it plugged in?")

  22. AI vs. AS by Randolpho · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I've always hated the Turing test. It's too subjective, and has forced people into believing that sentience (what the lay-person thinks AI is) can be simulated. It forced AI junkies to think the road to AI was paved by the perfect grammar for English; a pipe dream to be sure.

    AI is not being able to have a conversation with your computer, AI is just algorithms -- computing the right answer to complex problems as quickly as possible.

    What most people think of as AI is really Artificial Sentience, and the more I learn about computer hardware the more I realize that it will not happen on my PC.

    --
    "Times have not become more violent. They have just become more televised."
    -Marilyn Manson
    1. Re:AI vs. AS by GigsVT · · Score: 2

      more I learn about computer hardware the more I realize that it will not happen on my PC.

      Yeah, anyone who knows about computer hardware knows that sentience can never be achieved with tiny electrical impulses shooting around inside an object in response to external inputs.

      --
      I've had enough abrasive sigs. Kittens are cute and fuzzy.
    2. Re:AI vs. AS by Randolpho · · Score: 1

      It depends on how those electrical impulses are routed. The way PCs are designed these days, those impulses are routed in such a way that what we term sentience will never actually occur on a PC. Artificial Sentience is a much more of a hardware problem than a software problem.

      Our brains, ARIANABSIAWFBBH*, are highly parallel. Time-division multiplexing may simulate this, but no matter how fast CPUs become, an upperlimit on "parallelity" will be reached which is far less than what is attainable by even, say, dogs. The closest we'll ever come to AS is Neural Networks, which simulate the parallel nature fairly well, but getting the "parallelity" of those to human levels is cost prohibitive, and still doesn't solve the problem of simulating the senses, which are an integral part of true sentient intelligence.

      * And Remember, I Am Not A Brain Surgeon; I Am Working From Basic Biology Here.

      True AS will require an artificial brain (maybe it could be EPROMmed ;-)) with "ports" for the senses.

      --
      "Times have not become more violent. They have just become more televised."
      -Marilyn Manson
    3. Re:AI vs. AS by HiThere · · Score: 1

      The Turing Test isn't a requirement for intelligence. The point of the Turing Test was to convince people that intelligent computers were possible...or at least thinkable.

      Searle is a proof that this didn't work for everyone. His definition says that if you can define it, then it isn't intelligence. So the only way that he will experience an AI is if he actually is fooled. Over a long period of time. But even then he might not accept it. The flat earthers don't, despite sattelites and round the world tourism flights.

      --

      I think we've pushed this "anyone can grow up to be president" thing too far.
    4. Re:AI vs. AS by Elwood+P+Dowd · · Score: 1

      The Turing test accomplishes perfectly its stated goal: giving an explicit definition to the human quality that many people insist a computer cannot have(AS, whatever).

      AI is not being able to have a conversation with your computer, AI is just algorithms -- computing the right answer to complex problems as quickly as possible.

      What most people think of as AI is really Artificial Sentience, and the more I learn about computer hardware the more I realize that it will not happen on my PC.


      Learn more about cognitive neuroscience, and you may say the same thing about the human brain.

      --

      There are no trails. There are no trees out here.
    5. Re:AI vs. AS by Dan+Crash · · Score: 1

      The idea of an "intelligence test" for computers is obsolete. We interact with intelligent artifacts each day, and can reasonably expect them to get more and more intelligent as time goes on.

      But Artificial Sentience would be another question entirely.

      "Sentience" is a tricky word because it involves the capacity to feel, and I don't believe that computation alone can grant that capacity.

      Strictly computational models of mind don't entail a phenomenological response -- that is, they work just as well describing "zombies" as they do describing people -- so computation alone does not explain the phenomenology of consciousness.

      If we someday understand the physical principles that enable our brains to generate the phenomenology of consciousness -- i.e. where the red in red comes from, and other types of qualia -- then I believe we could also create conscious machines, according to those principles. But just because we can devise a Turing machine out of a given set of widgets does not make that set of widgets able to generate the phenomenology of consciousness.

      --
      He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.
    6. Re:AI vs. AS by Elwood+P+Dowd · · Score: 1

      I was trying to figure out what on earth "phenomenological" meant. So I went to Dictionary.com. They said phenomenology means:

      A philosophy or method of inquiry based on the premise that reality consists of objects and events as they are perceived or understood in human consciousness and not of anything independent of human consciousness.

      i.e. Reality is defined by our perception of it. That seems completely unrelated to the way that you use the word. What's your definition?

      That's a sidebar. Back to the point. You say:

      "Sentience" is a tricky word because it involves the capacity to feel...

      I think "sentience" is a tricky word because it is completely meaningless. The Turing test was never meant to be an intelligence test for machines. It was meant to be a way to redefine "sentience" in a concrete manner.

      You may feel that strictly computational models of mind have some failing (I don't understand the failing you describe.), but I do not. I challenge you to differentiate between a "zombie" and a person. The more I've learned about cognition and neuroanatomy, the less I believe that distinction exists.

      --

      There are no trails. There are no trees out here.
    7. Re:AI vs. AS by Dan+Crash · · Score: 1

      What's your definition?

      Well, by phenomenology I mean the mechanism or mechanisms by which the experiential phenomena of consciousness are created. A better introduction than I can give is given by Chalmers here.


      I think "sentience" is a tricky word because it is completely meaningless.


      The language we use to talk about consciousness is notoriously inexact and ambiguous, but there is something I mean by sentience that is different than what I mean by intelligence. I think the Chalmers article does a decent job of getting at it.

      The Turing test was never meant to be an intelligence test for machines. It was meant to be a way to redefine "sentience" in a concrete manner.

      Well, my first objection is that the Turing test isn't a test; it's a game. There's nothing scientific about it. But beyond that, I don't think that the sum of my existence is only what others can observe about me.

      I challenge you to differentiate between a "zombie" and a person.

      No, I challenge you! :)

      The idea of the zombie is to point out the gap between syntax and sensation. Any computational model of mind has to bridge that gap, has to say how we get from code to subjective experience and qualia. Like seeing the color red, as I mentioned earlier.

      But they don't attempt to bridge the gap, they just deny that one exists. Computationalists like Dennett believe that I don't really see the color red, I just run code that tells me I do. In other words, red is just symbols, and not an experience.

      I respectfully disagree.

      The more I've learned about cognition and neuroanatomy, the less I believe that distinction exists.

      Well, to be just a tiny bit clearer, I'm not saying humans aren't machines. I believe we are. We just haven't explained exactly how we work yet.

      --
      He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.
    8. Re:AI vs. AS by Elwood+P+Dowd · · Score: 1

      That article is going to take me a while to read. It's also pretty frustrating, as he states as fact many things that I either don't understand or don't agree with.

      His description of the hard problem in defining consciousness has very few concrete examples, and the few I could find seem worthless:

      It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does.

      And he continues (but I'll cut him off):

      If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of "consciousness", an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state.

      "Entertaining a mental image" and "experiencing an emotion" are both very interesting subjects in cognition, but they are hardly any more abstract than any other brain function.

      We can observe what happens to brains while they do these tasks. We can observe brains that are unable to perform these tasks. We can do all kinds of studies that will show us what mechanism our brain uses to do these things. Some day, we might nail it. There is nothing special about these tasks.

      The question of sensory experience is also not so bad. We can observe what causes brains to do these things (experience their senses). We can observe the mechanisms they use. Some day, we might solve this problem as well.

      That's the beautiful thing about the Turing test. It is designed to detect whether we have solved these varieties of problems. If it fails in that regard, then either your observer is not critical enough (and then you aren't performing the Turing test properly), or you have invented criterion that do not really exist.

      In defense of Dennett (whom I've never met nor read :), I can't imagine that he says you don't actually experience seeing the color red, but rather that what you feel when you see the color red is the same as running certain code. Might'n't computationalists only deny the existence of the gap between computation and experience?

      --

      There are no trails. There are no trees out here.
    9. Re:AI vs. AS by Dan+Crash · · Score: 1
      "Entertaining a mental image" and "experiencing an emotion" are both very interesting subjects in cognition, but they are hardly any more abstract than any other brain function.

      I believe they are.

      Chalmers gets at the problem here:

      What makes the hard problem hard and almost unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance of functions. To see this, note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience - perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report - there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.

      There is no analogous further question in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning.


      He goes on to give a version of my initial argument here:

      The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not entailed by the physical.


      All this is a way of saying that the problems of experiential phenomena are very hard, and not like the so-called "easy" problems of intelligence, which can be explained functionally.

      Where you and I disagree is that you believe functions are enough to explain experiences, even colors. How does one get the color red from an algorithm? I don't see how one can. So I think something more is needed. (Perhaps it is found in the properties of the substrate the algorithm is run on.)

      That's the beautiful thing about the Turing test. It is designed to detect whether we have solved these varieties of problems.

      Well, strictly speaking, it don't think it can. The same way I can't know whether the color I see as red is the same color you see as red. Since I don't have access to your mental states, Turing's test is designed to do the next best thing: infer them.

      Turing's test is predicated on the idea that we can infer mental states from behavior. I don't think we necessarily can. (Although I do believe we can attribute intelligence this way.)

      So how can we justify attributing mental states to others? I think the largest factor in our willingness to attribute mental states to others is their biological similarity to ourselves. This is the reason we're willing to assume the person sitting next to us on the bus has a conscious existence of their own, even without administering a Turing test to them.

      We're hardwired for this, and for even more basic kinds of animism, which helped us succeed evolutionarily. It's hard to look at an electrical outlet, for instance, and not see a tiny little face staring back at you in horror.

      The Turing test has a number of other problems of its own, but, really, that's a whole different post, and I've already gone on way too long. :)

      At any rate, thanks for your honesty and for actually looking into the Chalmers article. If you've got a similarly longwinded article for your position, I'd be glad to return the favor.
      --
      He who refuses to do arithmetic is doomed to talk nonsense.
    10. Re:AI vs. AS by Elwood+P+Dowd · · Score: 1
      I'd love to get into this with you in a real conversation. It'd be easier to nitpick.

      Some things to think about:

      There are a number of neurons in your temporal lobes that fire depending on how "face-like" the thing is that you are looking at.

      There are people without the ability to imagine a sound, and few other disabilities: They cannot repeat things verbatim.

      The Chalmers quote you paste seems completely false to me. Right where I'd love him to explain himself, he starts hand waving. He says these problems go beyond the performance of functions. TELL ME WHY! "Entertaining a mental image" is a function that a machine (our brain) already performs. Even this vague, undescribed, "experience", is a function that our brain already performs.

      Your problem, "I can't know whether the color I see as red is the same color you see as red." is not necessarily mysterious at all. If we had a perfect understanding of the machinery between both of our ears, we could understand perfectly well how that machinery treats the color red. We could understand exactly how it derives its experience.

      We could then (surprise) develop a test to ensure that we both experience "red" in the same way! We can test the effects of the color red on our other thoughts, spreading activation, linguistic abilities, or a million other things. We might need to test based on aspects of our mental state that we haven't even discovered yet.

      The second portion of your Chalmers quote is particularly telling. Obviously, experience is entailed by the physical in one case: my brain. I have excellent evidence that I experience things. If my experience is not entailed by the physical existence of my brain, then this has become a religious discussion.

      So, there is absolutely a process that entails experience. You may be witness to a similar process: your brain. When he goes saying, "it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience", he's going to need to prove it. If he is trying to show that it is conceptually coherent that I feel the way I do, and yet do not "experience" in the manner he means, then it is also conceptually coherent that this "experience" may not exist at all.

      As convoluted as that point sounds, it works for me. Try to make it work for you, and we'll be even for me browsing the Chalmers article :)

      I won't be connected over the weekend, but I will get back to you if you respond.

      --

      There are no trails. There are no trees out here.
  23. Dr Fun by nagora · · Score: 3, Funny
    This seems appropriate.

    TWW

    --
    "Encyclopedia" is to "Wikipedia" what "Library" is to "Some people at a bus stop"
  24. The phrase "The Turing Test" is sometimes used more generally to refer to some kinds of behavioural tests for the presence of mind

    Are you required to take as part of applying for US presidency ?

    --
    for the last time people, I am "frodo from middle eaRTH", not "middle eaST".
    1. Re:Well. by LanikMueller · · Score: 1

      Ha ha! Another creative Bush joke! You make me piss my pants with laughter!

  25. Wrong! by EricWright · · Score: 2, Insightful

    That's WAY MORE than I ever wanted to know about the Turing Test!

  26. Do I pass? by gripdamage · · Score: 0

    What do you eveything you want to know about the Turing Test?

  27. Blockhead by Ben+Escoto · · Score: 2, Interesting

    One interesting argument mentioned in the article is from Ned Block. As a counterexample to the thesis that the turing test is a good test for intelligence, Block imagines a device which is just a huge table connecting inputs to preprogrammed outputs. This "blockhead" (not named by Ned Block I think) would clearly not be intelligent, as it is just a very simple database, but if the outputs were correctly set up it could pass the Turing test with flying colors. Thus passing any Turing-like test does not necessarily imply intelligence---we'd have to know something more about the structure of the machine first.

    1. Re:Blockhead by AnotherBlackHat · · Score: 1

      To accept the blockhead as a counter-example you have to accept both that you can build one,
      and that if you built one, it doesn't actually think.

      Consider this:
      Flip a coin 1000 times, then ask Blockhead how many Heads there were.
      To answer this question, Blockhead needs a tree of at least 2^1000 states.
      So if Blockhead could exist, it would be larger than the universe.

      If you release Blockhead from constraints of physical reality,
      then it's relatively simple to give it memory.
      (they "pointer" to the location in the tree is stateful)
      and from there, we have a general purpose computing device.
      If theoretical Blockhead is a general purpose computing device,
      then you to answer the question, you must already know the answer.
      Block claims that Blockhead obviously doesn't think,
      but Saying "computers can't think because obviously computers can't think" isn't very convincing.

      -- this is not a .sig

    2. Re:Blockhead by arthurs_sidekick · · Score: 1

      Block is well aware of the "impossiblity" issue, and his response to you is that he's trying to elucidate the nature of thought period, not answer the question "how, in the actual world, does a system manage to think?"

      In the philosopher's jargon, he'sworking with logical possiblities, not physical ones. The question he's working with is, "would any computer that produces the right output one that understands?" and his answer, based on that example, is "no." That's just not the thing that makes a system a thinking system. It doesn't matter, for that kind of argument, whether the described system is one that could actually be built, since the question concerns the nature of thinking, and this would still be an issue in a universe with a vastly different physics (compare: in a universe where you could collect neutrinos in a lead cube, could you use them as currency?).

      None of this means that on Block's view, we couldn't build a computer that understands, it just means that it has to have the right kind of program (minimally, one that produces its responses on the fly, rather than one that just looks them up in a table). As I mentioned elsewhere in this thread, the target here is not "functionalism", which implies that an appropriately programmed computer could think, but behaviorism. the view that anything that produces the right response would be a thinker.

      --
      "Oh, I hope he doesn't give us halyatchkies," said Heinrich.
    3. Re:Blockhead by jejones · · Score: 1

      Blockhead, if I understand the somewhat handwaving construction, ought to be defeatable via something analogous to the "pumping lemma" in formal language theory. As the interrogator, I can, for example, generate arbitrarily many quadratic equations to ask Blockhead to solve, and no finite table can hold the list of coefficients and roots.

      Not to mention that we have throughout history granted one another the presumption of intelligence based solely on one another's responses without X-raying or autopsying (?) one another...

    4. Re:Blockhead by XMode · · Score: 1

      This would seem like a simple solution to debunk the Turing test until you start to think about it. The idea of the Turing test is not to just seem intelligent. For the machine, the idea is to make the questioner believe that the other person is the computer.

      There are several ways to trick a machine in to giving its game away that the 'blockhead' machine would be vulnerable to. The easiest way would be to ask the same question twice. A machine will more than likely give exactly the same answer both times, where as a human wouldn't. To make this a bit harder to detect, the questions shouldn't be asked directly after one another, but they should be asked out of context a few minutes apart.

      The only way a 'blockhead' device would be able to pick this would be to store all the questions it had been asked so that they would effect what answers it would give the next time it was asked a question. This would add a hell of a lot of overhead to the 'simple database' and at some point you go from just being a database to being something that is effected by previous experience.

      There are several more examples of this (eg, asking it to remember a number and then get it to tell you what that number was later on) that a simple 'look up the answer' device wouldn't be able to respond correctly to.

    5. Re:Blockhead by AnotherBlackHat · · Score: 1

      It doesn't matter, for that kind of argument, whether the described system is one that could actually be built...


      Ah, but it does matter. Approach it from the other side;
      The contrapositive of the Turing test says that a machine that doesn't think, can't pass.
      Block says "imagine a device that doesn't think, but passes the Turing test anyway."
      if such a device could exist, it would certainly invalidate the Turing test.
      But if the device can't exist, it proves nothing.

      My 1000 coin flips example was a simple one, designed to show that Blockhead can't exist in the real world.
      I can extend the example to force the device to be arbitrarily large, but if we're talking theory,
      why stop at an arbitrary value?
      1.) Roll a die and write down that number.
      2.) Unless you rolled a 6, go to step 1.
      3.) ask Blockhead what number is 1 larger than that.
      To answer, Blockhead needs to be infinite.

      Now I claim that you can't even theoretically build an infinitely large device,
      but if you want to continue then I'm going to point out that an infinitely large Blockhead would be Turing complete.
      This puts it outside the realm of conventional state trees,
      so it's no longer an easy matter to dismiss it's ability to think.
      I.e. just because conventional state trees don't think,
      it doesn't follow that unconventional ones don't either.

      -- this is not a .sig
    6. Re:Blockhead by arthurs_sidekick · · Score: 1

      I still think you're not getting the nature of Block's claim correct. Assume Blockhead holds a lookup table of all possible Turing-test passing conversations. That's pure fantasy already, but there is nothing inconsistent about the hypothesis. That's all he needs to get his argument up and running, because his point is that it is logically possible for a machine to pass a Turing Test and not think. The nature of the "can't" is precisely my point: it doesn't matter if the device can't exist in the real word, all that matters is that there is no contradiction in the assumption that such a machine exists. I also note that the Blockhead device is a way overpowered approach to the problem of passing the Turing Test.

      Thus, your new example is beside the point. I'll cop to not understanding why Blockhead would need to be infinite, because your linguistic transaction amounts to

      • You: "what's one more than n?"
      • Blockhead: "n + 1"
      If you're imagining that each roll of the die is a linguistic transaction, then a Blockhead would have stored conversations that have him saying, somewhere before the 153rd iteration, "Stop rolling that damn die, I thought we were supposed to have a conversation.' (what kind of intelligent being would put up with that?)

      Now, if you think the huge(infinite) lookup table machine thinks, then you're denying a premise of Block's, but you're not offering a challenge to the validity [ in the technical sense of "if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true" ] of his reasoning.

      --
      "Oh, I hope he doesn't give us halyatchkies," said Heinrich.
    7. Re:Blockhead by AnotherBlackHat · · Score: 1
      I still think you're not getting the nature of Block's claim correct...

      Now, if you think the huge(infinite) lookup table machine thinks, then you're denying a premise of Block's, but you're not offering a challenge to the validity [ in the technical sense of "if the premises are true, then the conclusion must also be true" ] of his reasoning.


      I'm not denying that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true.
      I'm denying that the premises are true.

      If I claimed that normal bricks can't fly,
      and you said "Imagine a brick that could fly.
      That's a brick, and it flies, so your claim is clearly false."
      I wouldn't deny that your statement is logically correct,
      but I would deny that such a brick exists.

      Block say "Imagine a Blockhead that passes the Turing test."
      and that's what I object to.

      In practice, you can't build one. That's easy to prove.

      I claim that are infinitely many possible theoretical conversations so a theoretical Blockhead would need to be infinite to contain all possible conversations.
      Hence my statement that you can't even build one in theory.
      I'm a little unclear on why the theoretical question space must be limited to what is "reasonable" while the theoretical answer space is not so limited, but ok, you don't accept that the number of theoretical conversations is infinite. Fine.

      I still claim that a Blockhead that contains a set of answers large enough to pass the Turing test would no longer qualify as "clearly not thinking".
      This is because a large enough state tree is indistinguishable from a general purpose computer.
      In other words, a Blockhead big enough to need a terabyte of ram just to store it's position in the tree isn't really a Blockhead anymore.

      -- this is not a .sig
    8. Re:Blockhead by arthurs_sidekick · · Score: 1

      Block's not interested in what you're calling "theoretical" possiblity, but logical possiblity. I actually have a degree of sympathy for the claim that it's not clear that Blockhead is *not* thinking; at the very least, we'd have to say that its lookup table embodies understanding, or codes for it, or some such. I mentioned elsewhere in this thread that terms such as "thinking" are probably too undisciplined to use, and maybe "understanding" is too, but I don't think anybody could disagree with the claim that there is something special about a Blockhead's lookup table. All I've been concerned to argue for is that the point is one about logical possiblity, and AFAI can tell, you want to challenge that point (but then you seem to say you're challenging a different point).

      As far as the brick point goes, Block's argument transposed would concern whether the concept of a brick implies that bricks can't fly.-- but that's clearly not what the argument's about here.

      I will reiterate: for all you've said, the Blockhead is logically possble, in that assuming it exists implies no contradiction.

      "The number of theoretical conversations is infinite" ... wait a minute right there, I agree with that, properly qualified, but the goal of the Turing test is not to be able to hold all possible conversations, but to respond in a manner indistinguishable from the way a reasonably intelligent adult human would respond. That problem space is thus significantly smaller (part of my point about the die-roling example was meant to speak to that.).

      The point about storage: for yuks, suppose the lookup table has two parts: a big XML document where each question and each answer has a unique id, and an array consisting of arrays of question and answer ids. Storing the state of play would then only require storing enough information storage to filter to the set already encountered, and /that/ could be just the array of ids already 'used', so storage of the state information would be the tiny part -- it's the representation of the state space that's the problem.;but it's not a *logical* problem.

      Again, there is no logical impossibility here. The argument concerns the concepts.

      --
      "Oh, I hope he doesn't give us halyatchkies," said Heinrich.
  28. Cramming for your Turing test... by Ron+Harwood · · Score: 3, Funny

    http://www.ibiblio.org/Dave/Dr-Fun/df200304/df2003 0410.jpg

  29. the death of Alan Turing, and intolerance by Submarine · · Score: 1, Informative

    This is slightly off-topic...

    Let me remind everybody that Alan Mathison Turing had an "accident", or committed suicide as many people believed, after having put through an humiliating process by his country's lack of concern for private life.

    Alan Turing was gay. After being robbed by an one-night-stand encounter, he filed a complaint with the police. He was then prosecuted for being gay, and offered the choice between to prison, or undergoing hormone therapy to suppress his sexual instincts (female hormons - I think he got side effects like slightly growing breasts).

    Yes, we're not talking of Iran, the Taleban or other theocracies. I'm talking of the United Kingdom, with its tradition of pride of their alleged personal freedoms.

    Of course, such laws aren't on the books anymore. Yet anti-sodomy laws are still in the books in several US states; they are seldom, if hardly, applied, but they still do exist and may be the legal basis for discrimination.

    Many religious, or non-religious, organizations have agendas to impose upon our personal lives. We should always be watchful.

    This story should also remind us that personal freedoms are not a matter of just taking pride in one's country's alleged respects for human rights.

    Thanks for your attention.

  30. Birds and Airplanes by leodegan · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Inventing true computer intelligence (what is often referred to as strong AI), has often been compared to inventing a flying machines by many AI supporters. They claim there were just as many nay-sayers at the end of the 19th century regarding whether we could physically build a flying machine.

    I don't remember who, but someone published a great article in Scientific American that claimed the Turing Test has mis-guided the goals of artificial intelligence. He said, instead of trying to build a bird, let's try and build an airplane. Building AI that was truly human-like would be as useless as building a flying machine that was truly bird-like.

    1. Re:Birds and Airplanes by Hooya · · Score: 3, Insightful

      I have always thought that trying to build a computer to act like a human was a waste of what makes a computer a computer. what i'm trying to say is that computers are good at doing mind-numbing calculations over and over and over. if a computer were to successfully pass a turing test, a computer would have to start feeling bored and start making mistakes on calculations. eg. if i were conducting a turing test, (as i understand it of course) i could distinguish between a human and a computer by simply asking for the square root of 12345645^3 or some such. now if the computer were built to pass the turing test from this regard, it would mean that the computer was dumbed down to fail at what it does successfully and what makes it a 'computer'. humans are good at imagenation (i didn't say humans were good at spelling.) but suck at pretty much everything else. so years of research have been poured into dumbing down the computer so that it fails to do what it's supposed to do!

    2. Re:Birds and Airplanes by HiThere · · Score: 1

      I don't think any serious AI work has gone into trying to win the Turing test. The automated DM's, though, have gotten quite good.

      --

      I think we've pushed this "anyone can grow up to be president" thing too far.
    3. Re:Birds and Airplanes by leodegan · · Score: 1

      I don't think any serious AI work has gone into trying to win the Turing test.
      Heh... there has been a tremendous amount of "serious" work that has gone into winning the Turing test over the past 30-40 years. In the last decade, however, the seemingly impossible obstructions in doing so have motivated those in the AI field to pursue more obtainable goals.
    4. Re:Birds and Airplanes by waveclaw · · Score: 1
      Building AI that was truly human-like would be as useless as building a flying machine that was truly bird-like.


      Hey, it only took almost another century after the airplane before a stable ornithopter was built.


      But there is a valid point in recognising that most A.I. research has been really the search for S.I. (Simulated Intellegence,) using human behavior as the gold standard. To bad many of the better works have tried to be clever with what things are used to generate that behavior. From Rodney Brook's et al. (and most neuro-pathologists) you'd quickly be put in your place about how ridiculously simple and mechanical many of the *hard* behaviors in A.I. were solved by nature.

      (viz. a bird's wing is an areofoil, the flapping is only useful for propelling, as the lift-inducing shape is the key; normal walking is unstable semi-harmonic motion driven by reflex feedback.)


      Quote at bottom of this /. article's page as of 2003/04/10: Genius doesn't work on an assembly line basis. You can't simply say, "Today I will be brilliant." -- Kirk, "The Ultimate Computer", stardate 4731.3

      --

      "You cannot have a General Will unless you have shared experiences. You cannot be fair to people you don't know."
    5. Re:Birds and Airplanes by HiThere · · Score: 1

      You don't mean SHRDLU, et seq. do you? That wasn't directed at the Turing Test.

      Eliza was designed to show that the Turing test was not valid, because it was too easy. (It passed the informal version during it's first year, when someone got so angry at the computer they attempted to fire it.) But Eliza, et seq. don't even approach dealing with the real Turing Test.

      Much work went into many problems that will eventually be incorporated to whatever program tries seriously to challenge the Turing Test, but everyone knows, and has known since, I think, the checkers program, that the Turing Test is too hard for anything even vaguely similar to what's available.

      OTOH, if I'm wrong, I'd like to see references. (They might be quite useful.)

      But do remember the constraints on the real Turing Test, also called the imitation game:
      1) the questioner has to be aware that a test in in progress, and the nature of the test.
      2) there are two individuals. One is trying to present him/herself honestly, the other is trying to pretend to be a human, when it is actually a program on a computer.
      3) all interaction is via tty (or equivalent)
      4) the questioner is allowed to ask anything at all that will help them make a decision.

      It seems like there *must* have been a time limit, but I can't remember one. Or a limit on the number of questions (but if so it's a lot more than 20, and they don't need to be just yes/no, they can be anything).

      In the original form of the game the questioner was trying to distinguish between a man and a woman. They were successful with sufficient frequency, and failed with sufficient frequency to make it a decent parlor game. Turing just altered the game to insert a computer instead of one of the humans.

      And I really don't think that anyone has seriously tried to pass that test. (But, as I said, would be facinated to hear differently.)

      --

      I think we've pushed this "anyone can grow up to be president" thing too far.
    6. Re:Birds and Airplanes by An+Onerous+Coward · · Score: 1

      You have a very narrow view of "what makes a computer a computer." Sure, we use them for "doing mind-numbing calculations over and over again." But at some point, it goes beyond that.

      Instead, try thinking of a computer as a "Universal Modeling Device". When you're simulating a tornado going over a landscape, a huge number of calculations are being done, and done quickly. But what do all those stacks, pointers, and variables become? A model of the tornado, imitating many of its most important features.

      "But there isn't really a tornado in there!" Interesting argument. Now, picture a tornado in your mind. Watch it spinning, sucking up cows and girls in blue dresses. See how the wind speed increases as you get towards the center, but only see a calm spot of low pressure in the center.

      Now, show me the tornado-shaped thing in your mind that lets you picture it. Use any medical equipment you'd like.

      The GUI you're using right now (apologies to Lynx users) is a model. The TCP/IP stack is a model of an elaborate ruleset that allows computers to communicate. We started by using computers to model ordinary calculations (hardly a model at all), then as a model of a typewriter, then as a model of a desktop. Now we routinely model three dimensional worlds with realistic physics.

      A model of a human mind would be the ultimate accomplishment for the computer as a modeling device. In the short term, it would be ridiculously expensive when compared to creating minds the old-fashioned way. But it would still be a great hack.

      --

      You want the truthiness? You can't handle the truthiness!

    7. Re:Birds and Airplanes by leodegan · · Score: 1

      You are correct in the sense that there have not been any products that make a serious contention for the Turing Test. This is because the levels of sophistication required with algorithms geared around language comprehension and abstract conceptualization are not even close to where they need to be. The only products that have been entered into Turing Tests are merely gimmicks that attempt to trick the human observer.

      Your statements seem to make the assertion that the Turing Test could be passed if only a few bright computer scientists were willing to "seriously" pursue it.

      Do you really question whether or not there has been serious work towards language comprehension and other aspects of machine intelligence necessary to pass the Turing Test? Do you really believe the only thing that is keeping us from creating a computer capable of passing the test is someone willing to put the serious work into it?

    8. Re:Birds and Airplanes by leodegan · · Score: 1

      A Universal Modeling Device? That perception assumes everything can be modeled computationally. The point of those against strong AI is that the human mind is not a computational process.

      I suggest you read a little about Godel. He was a logician in the early 20th century that shook the foundation of philosophical and mathematical thought. His 2nd theorem demonstrated any formal system (such as a computer program), must be either incomplete or inconsistent. It shows that everything in reality cannot be packaged into a nice logical structure. Hence, not everything can be emulated with a computer program.

    9. Re:Birds and Airplanes by An+Onerous+Coward · · Score: 1

      Actually, I have read a little about Godel.

      I never intended to claim that computers could violate Godel's Incompleteness theorem. When I said "Universal Modeling Device," I meant only that anything that can be modeled computationally could be modeled in a computer.

      The point of those against strong AI is, well, frankly misguided. Everything points to the brain as a complex chunk of matter, which could be accurately simulated given sufficient computing power. In order to avoid that conclusion, you would have to posit the existence of a soul which controls the workings of the physical brain from the outside. Not only does a soul add needless complexity to the system, but it also fails to have any real explanatory power.

      The underlying argument is that a brain cannot be replicated in a computer because there are underlying "noncomputational" processes. But I've never clearly understood what those processes are supposed to be. Is it our ability to ignore contradictions, or to believe two totally contradictory things? It's fully possible to simulate inconsistent formal systems in a computer, simply by telling it not to pursue any apparent contradictions.

      Maybe it's the amazing ability our brains have of not freezing up when presented with a statement like "This statement is false." So what? There's no reason to believe that a computer would not be able to recognize the self-referential contradiction. All Godel says that a computer could never do was actually determine whether the statement was true. Anyone who thinks that a computer could be brought to its knees via a single, well-placed paradox has been watching too much 70's-era science fiction.

      The only thing strong AI's detractors have left are nebulous, subjective criteria like "a computer cannot appreciate a work of art." Given that there's no way for me to prove that the person standing next to me in the museum is appreciating a work rather than just mechanistically acting as though she were, I find it a very weak argument to stand on.

      Godel does nothing to prove that the human mind is non-computational.

      --

      You want the truthiness? You can't handle the truthiness!

    10. Re:Birds and Airplanes by HiThere · · Score: 1

      Sorry if it read that way. I seriously doubt that the Turing Test is passable even by a program slightly MORE intelligent than an average human... except in the trivial sense that it could pretend to be psychotic...

      There's an interesting story about the Parry and Doctor programs. Once someone hooked them together, and kept a transcript of their interactions. Later they make transcripts of a few other Psychiatrists/Paranoid interactions. Then they asked a panel of Psychiatrists to judge which script was a fake. The answers were no better than chance. (But that's not passing the Turing Test! That's merely demonstrating that some ritualized forms of communication are as stupid as a computer program.)

      --

      I think we've pushed this "anyone can grow up to be president" thing too far.
    11. Re:Birds and Airplanes by leodegan · · Score: 1

      I have read similar arguments regarding Godel and AI (such as the Penrose argument), and I would agree that they do not conclusively prove that the human mind is not computational. The point I was trying to make was a little bit different.

      Many science-minded individuals have the compulsion to believe all things in reality can be placed into a nice logical container. At the roots, they believe, all things must follow a logical order. You have made the assertion that because the brain is a complex chunk of matter, it could be accurately emulated. Your assertion is compatible with this belief.

      However, one thing that Godel does show is that there is no universal formal system. There is no logical container from which all things mechanically live in harmony. The likes of David Hilbert were bent on discovering a set of primary axioms from which all mathematical truths could be derived. Godel showed this was not possible.

      If we look at physical systems at the so-called macro-scale, they certainly do exhibit logical mechanisms that can be mathematically modeled. At some scale, however, it seems necessary that this logical consistency must be abandoned. Otherwise, we would have a Universal formal system from which all truths are derived.

      So the question is, at what scale does our consciousness permeate? Are our minds purely the result of macro-processes, much like a computer?

      I do not believe so and here is why. Our consciousness is conceptually non-reductive. What I mean by that is that a conscious experience cannot be broken into smaller constituents that define the whole. This is in contrast to functional behavior, which is conceptually reducible. Things that are reducible, such as a functional behavior, can be computed.

      For example, when I see a red stoplight, I hit the brake in my car. If we analyze this behavior, we can decompose it into a bunch of smaller processes having to do with memory recollection, trained reaction, etc. Now, what about the conscious sensation of seeing the color "red"? Can that sensation be decomposed into sub-concepts? Take a look at something that is red nearby. Can that sensation of seeing red be logically decomposed?

      Suppose the sensation of the color red could be decomposed and thereby emulated using a computational system. It could then be represented with language. As humans are very capable of comprehending logically structured language, this would imply a color-blind person could understand the sensation of seeing the color red by analyzing this logical structure. Without being cured of their color-blindness, they could know what red feels like by sufficiently understanding the mechanical nature of the color construction component of our brain. This clearly does not seem to be the case. Thus, this is an example of a non-computational process in the mind.

    12. Re:Birds and Airplanes by jareds · · Score: 1

      Many science-minded individuals have the compulsion to believe all things in reality can be placed into a nice logical container. At the roots, they believe, all things must follow a logical order. You have made the assertion that because the brain is a complex chunk of matter, it could be accurately emulated. Your assertion is compatible with this belief.

      However, one thing that Godel does show is that there is no universal formal system. There is no logical container from which all things mechanically live in harmony. The likes of David Hilbert were bent on discovering a set of primary axioms from which all mathematical truths could be derived. Godel showed this was not possible.

      If we look at physical systems at the so-called macro-scale, they certainly do exhibit logical mechanisms that can be mathematically modeled. At some scale, however, it seems necessary that this logical consistency must be abandoned. Otherwise, we would have a Universal formal system from which all truths are derived.

      I dispute this claim. Specifically, you believe that if the Universe can be mathemically modeled in its entirety at all scales, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem is violated because "we would have a Universal formal system from which all truths are derived." Suppose you know all facts about the Universe. How would this allow you to derive the truth or falsity of, e.g., Golbach's Conjecture (assuming no one in the Universe ever proves or disproves it)? The laws of physics can be formally mathematically modeled, but that doesn't mean that all formal truths in the mathemical system one is using to model the laws of physics can be derived from the laws of physics, even if the laws of physics precisely apply to everything that ever will exist.

    13. Re:Birds and Airplanes by leodegan · · Score: 1

      You seem to be referring only to the implications of Godel's first incompleteness theorem. It's his second theorem that I am primarily concerned about. This is the theorem that really undermined Hilbert's work. It states that a complex formal system cannot prove it's own consistency. Let me try to explain why this is important.

      First, let's start with your proposal that all of the laws of physics represent the set of axioms that define the formal system known as our Universe. In the complete set of all possible truths, only a subset of them can be proven within this Universe, as you have pointed out with Godel's first theorem.

      The notion that there exist truths beyond the grasp of this Universe begs the question, why does this Universe exist and not some other? We can conclude from Godel's second theorem that the axioms which define this Universe cannot necessitate their own existence. There is no logical reason why this Universe should exist. The implication is that this logical construct known as the Universe rests on an illogical foundation.

  31. Why not more development? by micromoog · · Score: 0
    One thing has always confused me about the Turing Test. It's currently the Holy Grail of software, right? Why don't more people work on it, and why don't we seem to be getting closer?

    The best thing I've seen is ELIZA, and while she's sometimes suprisingly astute, the facade doesn't hold up for long . . .

  32. Turing Test by xaaronx · · Score: 1

    I failed the Turing Test the first time I took it, but I'm studying hard this time.

    --
    It's amazing how much "mature wisdom" resembles being too tired. - Robert Anson Heinlein
  33. CCCP Post by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Funny

    In Soviet Russia... Turing Tests You!

  34. AI = Alternative Intelligence by peter303 · · Score: 1

    As intelligence operating outside of human beings. This includes Decarte's mechas, a HAL-like computer program, extra-terrestials, chimps and dolphins, a ghost, gaia, etc.

  35. My question wasn't answered. by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0


    When will I stop hearing about this lame test that people attach far too much significance to?

  36. Dreaming about the Impossible by leodegan · · Score: 1

    Machine consciosness will never happen. Kurzweil and his ilk are fantasizing about the impossible.

    Consciousness experience cannot be absolutely defined or measured. How can you describe the experience of the color "red" and what it feels like? It's not possible. Just like it is not possible to write a computer program that constructs that sensation. The sensation, or conscious feeling of something is not reductive (as would be necessary in a computational model).

    Strong AI supporters are too wrapped around the functional and behavioral aspects of the mind and overlook the more subtle aspects of it. It is easy to see why someone would think the functional model of the brain could be emulated using a computational "turing machine", but conscious experience is a whole other thing.

    1. Re:Dreaming about the Impossible by ysaric · · Score: 1

      That's stupid, you're talking about using words as the basis for trying to describe something our language is not capable of describing. Right now we are making strong inroads regarding input into the brain--truly artificial eyes and ears hardwired straight into our nervous system. Do you really think science in the end will fail to be able to read as well as write? Is consciousness such an etherial state that it is disconnected from the wiring of our grey matter? If not, it *will* eventually be possible to share a feeling, to share a sensation, as the cumulative mental a physiological response we have to input. It could be the last step computers take before they decide whether individuality has value, or whether we should be exterminated.

      --
      Happy goldfish bowl to you.
    2. Re:Dreaming about the Impossible by leodegan · · Score: 1

      That's stupid, you're talking about using words as the basis for trying to describe something our language is not capable of describing.
      My assertion is that there is an inescapable difference between syntax and semantics. We can use words to describe abstract concepts, but the meaning of those abstract concepts themselves cannot be absolutely defined with more language. If you are interested in investigating this further, I would recommend reading some of Wittgenstein's later works.
      Right now we are making strong inroads regarding input into the brain--truly artificial eyes and ears hardwired straight into our nervous system.
      I'm not sure how this is philosophically different from the invention of glasses or contact lenses. Unless you believe our consciousness resides in our eyeballs.
      Is consciousness such an etherial state that it is disconnected from the wiring of our grey matter?
      Consciousness is obviously not disconnected from our "grey matter". Rather, it is an intimate part of our "grey matter". The point I am trying to get across is that there are integral processes in our "grey matter" that are not physically observable and/or logically representable.
      If not, it *will* eventually be possible to share a feeling, to share a sensation, as the cumulative mental a physiological response we have to input. It could be the last step computers take before they decide whether individuality has value, or whether we should be exterminated.
      So, based on the following assumptions:

      1. The human mind is capable of completely comprehending formal structures represented with language.
      2. Consciousness is entirely reducible and can be programmed on a computer.
      In theory, it should be possible for a color-blind person to understand what "red" feels like, without being cured of their color blindness. If they were given a sufficient description of the conscious feeling of red using language, they would understand what red feels like. In otherwords, if everything in our grey matter is comprehendible, including our feelings, then someone ought to be able to understand the conscious experience of those feelings through the logical evaluation of them. I find this absurd.
    3. Re:Dreaming about the Impossible by ysaric · · Score: 1

      You don't see any philosophical difference between contacts/glasses and hardwired interfaces with our brains?

      I'm not sure there's anything that needs to be said in response to that, or anything else in your post; it demonstrates the level to which you seem to be able to comprehend or imagine--nothing beyond conceptualizing other intelligence as some gigantic extension of C. I know that's a personal attack, but can't your imagination spread itself a little farther than that?

      Visualizing it in your head that way makes it seem like you're actually threatened, as if somehow if a computer using such simple designs could understand the 'human condition', if what we feel could actually be interpreted in a computational expression, that we would be somehow be less than we are, less special, without wondering how someone from 100 a.d. would see the things we are able to do today.

      It's like this mental image of you, waving your hands around frantically, calling on consciousness and 'integral processes' as if it was some kind of voodoo or witchcraft only understandable in a single state.

      Such a limited view of the possibilities of 'computers', if that would even be an accurate term to describe what they could be or become in 100 years, or further ahead. That seems to me to be the greatest philosophical failing.

      --
      Happy goldfish bowl to you.
    4. Re:Dreaming about the Impossible by leodegan · · Score: 1

      You don't see any philosophical difference between contacts/glasses and hardwired interfaces with our brains?
      There is certainly a technological difference. The "hardwired interface" is much more impressive from a technology standpoint. Philosophically, I do not see a difference. The input mechanisms for the eyes/ears may not have any more to do with our consciousness than our eyeglasses, or our tennis shoes. It is conceptually possible that the input mechanisms for sight and hearing could be purely reductive. I have no problem with machines being able to emulate reductive processes.

      Consciousness, on the other hand, is conceptually not a reductive process. You seem to believe that if we could interface the neurons using physical processes we control demonstrates that neurons, and the "gray matter" they compose, are physical entities that are entirely within our comprehension. My point is that we may be able to understand neurons at a macro-level, and even interface with them at the macro-level, but there may be intrinsic qualities to them that cannot be physically observed or measured. These intrinsic qualities may have nothing to do with the optical nerve's capability to send signals to the brain.
      I know that's a personal attack, but can't your imagination spread itself a little farther than that?
      I wouldn't assume anyone who sees the world differently than you do just lacks imagination. In any case, if you are going to refute my statements, it would be much more stimulating if you would actually address my points.
      It's like this mental image of you, waving your hands around frantically, calling on consciousness and 'integral processes' as if it was some kind of voodoo or witchcraft only understandable in a single state.
      Heh, I can appreciate that image. In reality, I am a software developer-- programming has been a passion for me since I was a kid. I first read about the concept of downloading a person's mind into a computer back in high school (back in the 80's). At first, I embraced the concept whole-heartedly, but since then I have put a lot of thought into whether it is something that is possible or not. I have concluded that there are aspects of our consciousness that are beyond computational representations.
  37. Seriously though... by HanClinto · · Score: 2, Interesting

    About this point (which, in case you were wondering, basically says that you shouldn't expect even the best of machines to be able to make a decent response for anything said to it, but this is something that "even the dullest of men can do"), do the "dullest of men" do this? I find that one of the best things about being human is that we can ask for more information. I don't think that "dull men" can intelligently respond to a discussion about astrophysics, just as I don't think a technogeek like myself can comfortably insert himself into a discussion about non-tech pop culture. :) Don't we all have our areas? Why should we expect a thinking computer to be able to respond to EVERYTHING when even we humans cannot?

  38. Defining ( or at least parameterizing) AI by ralico · · Score: 1

    When we took the intro to AI class in college, we had a long, somewhat philosophical discussion.
    What we concluded was this:
    A computaional problem to solve is an AI problem until you know how it works.
    Once you know how it works and it is well defined it is no longer AI.

    --

    SCO to Hell
  39. The Real Problem with the Chinese Room Argument by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Insightful

    ...against machine conciousness is that it allows for a perfect simulation of "thinking" by a machine but still says that the machine cannot be judged "concious". In other words, if I am an android that writes poetry, sings and dances, falls in love and runs for the senate and wins etc., I am still not to be considered concious because the stuff between my ears is not of the right type.

    At bottom,the question of whether a machine is concious or a "person" is a question of the civil rights we are willing to grant the machine. Searle is often considered a kind of anti-AI bigot for this reason.

    Oddly enough (or not) Data's story in Star Trek: Next Generation is probably as good a guide to this issue as you are likely to find.

    Cheers,

    JHCVH 1

  40. Turing SAT by Traa · · Score: 1
  41. Forthcomming Book: The Turing Test Source Book by mindpixel · · Score: 1

    (Summer 2003)...From Kluwer Academic Publishers in the Netherlands, edited by Robert Epstein and Grace Peters, subtitled: "Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer."

    Invited contributors include contributions from Andrew Hodges, Jon Agar, Noam Chomsky, Daniel Dennett, Stevan Harnad, Kenneth Ford, Douglas Hofstader, John R. Lucas, Roger Penrose, David Rumelhart, Selmer Bringsjord, Ned Block, David Chalmers, The Churchlands, Andy Clark, H. M. Collins, Jack Copeland, Hubert Dreyfus, Jerry Fodor, Robert M. French, Thomas Metzinger, Peter Millican, James Moor, Ariella V. Popple, Zenon Pylyshyn, John Searle, Hugh Loebner, Stuart Shieber, Richard Wallace, Joseph Weizenbaum, Rodney Brooks, Peter Dayan, Brue Edmonds, Anne Foerst, David Harel, Patrick J. Hayes, Mark Humphrys, Douglas Lenat, John McCarthy, Jon Oberlander, Ian Pratt, Willaim J. Rapaport, Murray Shanahan, Aron Sloman, Chris Thornton, Stuart Watt, Blay Whitby, Terry Winograd, Robbie Garner, Jason Hutchens,David Levy, Joseph Weintraub, Thomas Whalen, Veronique Bastin & Dennis Cordier, Kevin L. Copple, Bruce Cooper, Thad Crew, Richard Gibbons, Gerold Lee Gorman, David Hamill, Sandy Johnson & Chris Johnson, Chris S. Johnson, Laurence Matishak, Michael L. Maudin, Peter Neuendorffer, Michale Onofrio & Stephen Hildebran, Luke Pellen, Joseph Strout, Ed T. Toton III, Vladimir Veselov & Eugene Demchenko, George B. Dyson, Neil Gershenfeld, Michael Gross, Raymond Kurzweil, James Martin, Hans Moravec, Charles Platt and of course, myself (pdf copy of chapter).

  42. It's life, Jim, but not as we know it... by otis+wildflower · · Score: 1

    ... it's a bit premature (and probably somewhat chauvinistic) to say machines will never become conscious. Vast forests have died to present reflections on this conundrum, with inconclusive results.

    It may end up that at some point machines will be able to emulate nerve mechanisms and behaviors so well that we end up having to redefine what consciousness is, if only to protect our position on the cognitive pyramid. Perhaps these 'machines' will be bio-based, if we find that biological processes are more efficient and capable matter assemblers at the cell level, in which case are they still machines?

    If we go the bio route, will our achievements be any less interesting or relevant because we hacked^H^H^H^H^H^Hleveraged mother nature's toolkit instead of doing things the hard way?

    1. Re:It's life, Jim, but not as we know it... by leodegan · · Score: 1

      It may end up that at some point machines will be able to emulate nerve mechanisms and behaviors ...
      Most pro-AI people claim that creating a conscious machine is just a matter of sufficiently emulating nerve mechanisms, as you suggest. I find this opinion short-sighted, as it assumes that the underlying processes in our "nerve mechanisms" are both observable and logically reducible. As aspects of our consciousness are not logically reducible, this seems to be a tremendous leap in faith.
    2. Re:It's life, Jim, but not as we know it... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      Actually, the assumption that human cognition and consciousness can NOT be logically reduced takes an extreme leap in faith, I have tended to believe.
      It is already very much possible to reduce behaviors and concepts. The human brain is nothing but a series of complex synapes running parallel with each other.
      This is essentially what a computer is. No doubt that we do not have computers fast enough yet, but everything has to start somewhere.

      Consciousness need not be assumed as a manifestation of the spiritual side.

      It is very reductive.

    3. Re:It's life, Jim, but not as we know it... by leodegan · · Score: 1

      Actually, the assumption that human cognition and consciousness can NOT be logically reduced takes an extreme leap in faith, I have tended to believe. It is already very much possible to reduce behaviors and concepts. The human brain is nothing but a series of complex synapes running parallel with each other.
      The first problem with your statements is that you are looking at the mind purely as a behavioural model. Functional behavior does not necessitate consciousness. It is logically possible for an entity to exhibit behaviors and yet have no consciousness at all. For example, explaining the behavior of what happens after you drop an unsuspecting person into a vat of cold water, and explaining what that experience feels like to the person are two different challenges.

      Secondly, you seem to be suffering from Hilbert-syndrome, as many science-minded people today suffer from. David Hilbert was a mathematician that was driven to reduce all of mathematics onto a single set of axioms from which all mathematical truths could be proven. It seems that you, like many others, like to believe that everything in reality can be placed into a rich, logical formal system. Kurt Godel, upon releasing his second theory, demonstrated that no such formal system could exist, and that every formal system must be either incomplete, or contradictory. Godel's theory crushed Hilbert's work.

      This idea is similar to saying that, if all of reality can be composed in a big formal structure, it is not possible for that formal structure to assert it's own existence. Therefore, such a system cannot exist out of logical necessity. In otherwords, all things cannot ultimately be logical. This argument gains further strength when regarding appearent paradoxes within quantum physics.

      Logical structures, like computer programs, are very useful tools-- but by no means should we believe that they can ultimately represent reality.
  43. Best part of that link... by Sgt+York · · Score: 1
    two posts down you see...

    This was easy to read...

    by 2Lazy2Register () on Tuesday, December 10th, 2002 @ 06:22AM

    ... but then again, I read Slashdot a lot where spelling correctly only confuses matters.

    --

    There is a reason for everything. Sometimes that reason just sucks.

  44. is there a difference? by Trepidity · · Score: 1

    Part of my argument I suppose was focusing on whether there was a meaningful difference between (1) and (2). Is there something that it is to "think" or "possess intelligence" beyond merely acting intelligently? If not, (2) is equivalent to (1). If so, what is the difference?

    1. Re:is there a difference? by Tomble · · Score: 1
      I think (though I could be wrong) that the difference he is talking about is like the difference between the questions:

      1)Is it possible for something to reach, say, a tenth of the speed of light?

      2)Can I run that fast?

      --
      Be careful! New moon tonight.
    2. Re:is there a difference? by Carnivorous+Carrot · · Score: 2, Insightful

      There's also the problem that most people assume thinking is synonymous with the subjective perceptual experience. That the experience of blue you have when looking at the sky, say, is inextricably intertwined with thought.

      I can easily envision a machine capable of thought exactly as we do without that machine necessarily being subjectively "alive".

      Until physics comes up with a way to explain the very real subjective experience that I, and probably most of you, have, there'll be a big chunk missing.

      I can envision a machine emulating atoms and whatnot, including an entire brain, digitally, to any desired physical degree. Flip the switch, and the "brain" would interact just as a human's would. The $64,000 question is would it have a subjective perceptual experience? Would such a thing be required for thought? Would it arise out of the pure information interaction, as some suggest, or is it something peculiar to our particular molecular machine, as Searle seems to think?

      --
      "Has [being a kidnapped teenage girl, raped repeatedly for months] changed you?" - Katie Couric to Elizabeth Smart
  45. Bladerunner by christalyss · · Score: 1

    "You are in a desert, and you see a tortoise lying on its back..."

    1. Re:Bladerunner by mindpixel · · Score: 1

      What kind of question is that? Are you trying to get yourself shot in the head or something?

  46. Brain simulation by de+Selby · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Some people say a computer can't think, but a computer can simulate atoms and quantum mechanics. If that's all there is to your brain, then it isn't logically impossible, right?

    Even better, there has been progress reverse-engineering brain regions like some auditory or visiual -- giving us the actual algorithms the brain uses. Shouldn't work like that be enough?

    P.S. A lot of arguments go like this: Computers use first order logic, we don't, so AI can't work. Haven't there been higher order logics implemented in software?

    1. Re:Brain simulation by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      I'm gonna get slammed for being a dreamer, but I believe we have been taking the wrong approach to AI. We should instead be simulating individual neurons. And instead of feeding text, feed in audio & video. And instead of starting by teaching it algebra, teach it its ABC's, 123's, teach it how to be a human.

      In other words, build a human from the ground up :)

    2. Re:Brain simulation by leodegan · · Score: 1

      Some people say a computer can't think, but a computer can simulate atoms and quantum mechanics
      I have two problems with this assertion:
      1. A conventional computer can simulate quantum systems, but it can't interact with real quantum systems. If our mind is dependent on non-local aspects of quantum mechanics, your computer is SOL. Unless you plan on simulating the entire Universe that is.
      2. We can only simulate aspects of matter that can be observed. Why would you think that every quality and attribute belonging to atomic particles can be observed?
    3. Re:Brain simulation by de+Selby · · Score: 1

      What I'm thinking is:

      1. I'm unaware (and perhaps uneducated) of anything in the quantum mechanical models of the mind that would require any more particles than what's in the brain. I believe they involve non-locality and action at a distance, but only inside the skull. Perhaps I'm wrong about that. I'll look into it.

      2. If we are missing something in our model that we haven't yet observed, it could mean one of two things: 1) It could still work because that aspect isn't important (and if it can't be observed, it can't interact, and thus has no say in the operation of the brain?), or 2) Not work, but provide valuable information on that thing we didn't know about. I think either is great.

  47. And what about... by WalterSobchak · · Score: 1

    ... the voight-kampf test?

    --
    Absinthe makes the heart grow fonder
  48. Did you ever notice... by X86Daddy · · Score: 2, Insightful

    ... that humans, when drunk, would easily fail the Turing test? (repetition, shorter sentences, etc...)

    No, really.

  49. The most .... interesting .... entry :) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    2.9 Argument from Extra-Sensory Perception

    The strangest part of Turing's paper is the few paragraphs on ESP. Perhaps it is intended to be tongue-in-cheek, though, if it is, this fact is poorly signposted by Turing. Perhaps, instead, Turing was influenced by the apparently scientifically respectable results of J. B. Rhine. At any rate, taking the text at face value, Turing seems to have thought that there was overwhelming empirical evidence for telepathy (and he was also prepared to take clairvoyance, precognition and psychokinesis seriously). Moreover, he also seems to have thought that if the human participant in the game was telepathic, then the interrogator could exploit this fact in order to determine the identity of the machine -- and, in order to circumvent this difficulty, Turing proposes that the competitors should be housed in a "telepathy-proof room." Leaving aside the point that, as a matter of fact, there is no current statistical support for telepathy -- or clairvoyance, or precognition, or telekinesis -- it is worth asking what kind of theory of the nature of telepathy would have appealed to Turing. After all, if humans can be telepathic, why shouldn't digital computers be so as well? If the capacity for telepathy were a standard feature of any sufficiently advanced system that is able to carry out human conversation, then there is no in-principle reason why digital computers could not be the equals of human beings in this respect as well. (Perhaps this response assumes that a successful machine participant in the imitation game will need to be equipped with sensors, etc. However, as we noted above, this assumption is not terribly controversial. A plausible conversationalist has to keep up to date with goings-on in the world.)

    After discussing the nine objections mentioned above, Turing goes on to say that he has "no very convincing arguments of a positive nature to support my views. If I had I should not have taken such pains to point out the fallacies in contrary views." (454) Perhaps Turing sells himself a little short in this self-assessment. First of all -- as his brief discussion of solipsism makes clear -- it is worth asking what grounds we have for attributing intelligence (thought, mind) to other people. If it is plausible to suppose that we base our attributions on behavioral tests or behavioral criteria, then his claim about the appropriate test to apply in the case of machines seems apt, and his conjecture that digital computing machines might pass the test seems like a reasonable -- though controversial -- empirical conjecture. Second, subsequent developments in the philosophy of mind -- and, in particular, the fashioning of functionalist theories of the mind -- have provided a more secure theoretical environment in which to place speculations about the possibility of thinking machines. If mental states are functional states -- and if mental states are capable of realisation in vastly different kinds of materials -- then there is some reason to think that it is an empirical question whether minds can be realised in digital computing machines. Of course, this kind of suggestion is open to challenge; we shall consider some important philosophical objections in the later parts of this review.

  50. Turing and Patentable Inventions by graveyhead · · Score: 1
    I would like to take this opportunity to point out another type of test that has been largely ignored in favor of the direct arena competition between humans and machines which is the common meaning of the words "Turing Test".

    Another way to compare machine and human intelligence is in the design of complex, patentable systems.

    from: http://www.genetic-programming.com/gpemcontrol.pdf

    In his 1950 paper ''Computing Machinery and Intelligence,'' Turing 84 described how evolution and natural selection might be used to automatically create an intelligent computer program.

    We cannot expect to find a good child-machine at the first attempt. One must experiment with teaching one such machine and see how well it learns. One can then try another and see if it is better or worse.

    ...

    What do we mean when we say that an automatically created solution to a problem is competitive with a human-produced result? We think it is fair to say that an automatically created result is competitive with one produced by human engineers, designers, mathematicians, or programmers if it satisfies any one or more of the following eight (first two only shown here) or any other similarly stringent criteria:

    A. The result was patented as an invention in the past, is an improvement over a patented invention, or would qualify today as a patentable new invention.

    B. The result is equal to or better than a result that was accepted as a new scientific result at the time when it was published in a peer-reviewed scientific journal.
    This brings up two interesting points to think about: patents aren't always evil and there are other, more practical tests for machine intelligence that Turing proposed which are not widely known.
    --
    std::disclaimer<std::legalese> sig=new std::disclaimer; sig->dump(); delete sig;
  51. ELIZA by dpille · · Score: 4, Funny

    I think I know all I need to about this topic now. I asked ELIZA:

    Eliza: Hello. I am ELIZA. How can I help you?
    Me: Do you believe the Turing Test is sufficient to evaluate artificial intelligence?
    Eliza: Oh, i believe the turing test is sufficient to evaluate artificial intelligence.


    Figures she'd think that.

  52. How about a real link... by Ron+Harwood · · Score: 1
  53. OT: Beer Die by KingAdrock · · Score: 1

    It is the game of champions indeed.

    Game on!

  54. Another checkmate possibility by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 1, Interesting

    From the article:
    "Given the knowledge that something is indeed a machine, evidence that that thing can produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence is evidence that there can be thinking machines."

    This is where the author is wrong.

    This argument:
    a)If a machine can produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, this machine thinks.
    b)This particular machine can produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence.
    c)Ergo, this particular machine thinks.

    is as inconclusive as this argument:
    a)If a machine can dance, it can think.
    b)This particular machine can dance.
    c)Ergo, this particular machine thinks.

    What I mean is that the hypothetical statement "If a machine can produce different arrangements of words so as to give an appropriately meaningful answer to whatever is said in its presence, this machine thinks." is never proven, much like "If a machine can dance, it can think." has not been proven.

  55. Why fight it by ysaric · · Score: 1

    In the future all of mankind will eventually migrate their consciousness to computers. What path we take now is merely choosing what path is taken to the inevitable conclusion -- which is that at some point before or after this happens a cosmic event will wipe out everything in our solar system, and as an entire species we will have meant less than a blip on the universal radar screen. Let's face it folks, if there isn't an afterlife of some kind we might as well blow ourselves up anytime.

    --
    Happy goldfish bowl to you.
  56. What's interesting by ysaric · · Score: 1


    Is that a world of intelligent computers who have replaced humans, or who live cooperatively with humans, or who have enslaved humans, whatever, would almost certainly have to deal with the phenomena we describe as telepathy. After all, we can only assume that such creatures would be outfitted with the capacity to transmit data in a wireless fashion. Therefore, accessing the 'thought patterns' of another computer would simply be a matter of wireless hacking, if such could be accomplished without the host being aware of it.

    --
    Happy goldfish bowl to you.
  57. Awakened thoughts (written stoned) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    Thinking machine:

    it would modify itselfs thoughts, that is "opinions". All objects would be classified with different adjectives, and the machine would learn its properties from the converstations carried out with humans, as well as from Internet search engines. Every word would be recorded in a database with appropriate classifications.

    For example:

    -word class (noun, verb etc...)
    -subjective adjectives (=properties) The properties would be collected from human conversators (who would also be classified and recorded, according mostly to their reliability to provide correct information)
    -location
    -abstract/concrete
    -phra ses (of which the properties would be carried - NEVER WHOLE SENTENCES, JUST THE OBJECTS AND THEIR PROPERTIES)
    -relations of objects to another
    -creator of historical properties

    This allows for example one conversator to tell a story to the machine, and the machine would then record a story with all its associated properties to different objects, including the history information so that particualar knowledge could be traced back to its originator and thus put into peer review to judge correctly the conversator's reliability etc.

    To operate correctly the machine should have a sentence parsing mechanism, which allows the sentences to be constructed in a correct manner. Additionally the machine should have capable of understanding relations between objects-objects, objects-properties and vice versa. One object can be a subobject of several objcets. The properties can and will be the same for several objects. For example:

    Orange:

    -fruit
    -orange (colour)
    -edible
    -tasty (opinion) (creator: Anonymous Coward | date: 090403/2251 | reliability: null | number_of_converstaions_with_me: 1)
    -food
    -product

    Hmmmm... an orange is an product, because it is commonly sold (or it wouldn't even have to COMMONLY sold, but anyway it's a product ;) and it has a price. But, if an object is entered, of which class is not known, the machine should identify correctly its class by comparing its properties to the properties of other known objects. If there would be a match or close-match the object would be automatically linked to that object and the superobject or the subobject would be correctly linked to the relationshipchart of the object.

    An important thing is to note that EVERY word which is used is an object itself. For example:

    Fruit:

    -{container listing all its subobjects, as orange, apple, banana, kiwi etc.)
    -{container listing all its superobjects, as tree, seed, fruit box [which is mostly in a shop (grocery store) [which is also its subobject, as it is contained by the objet (fruit)]}
    -edible [52%] edibility amount -> edibility amount of fruits in a certain area]. This means also that for example time would be a BASIC PROPERTY which is related to all objects in some sort of away. Maybe each object should have its creation date. Like Audi A4 1988, homo sapiens 50.000 b.C ( diameter, unspecified -> area, containing a specified number of angles -> area, length of sides added together etc. etc.}, purpose [?] etc.).

    I think everything essential is entered here, these thoughts will just have to be formulated in a more understandable manner. Later.

  58. reverse Turing test? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

    What about creating a Turing test, which tries to find out whether it B and C are human or not?

  59. one problem with the Turing test though by Trepidity · · Score: 1

    The Turing test is, as you pointed out, an example of the sort of AI approach I mentioned, but I think it's testing for something slightly off what AI should really be looking at. It's not testing "is something intelligent," but is instead testing "is something intelligent in the same way humans are intelligent?" That is, it has to be "smart" when humans are and be dumb where humans are. If asked a complex math question, it has to pretend not to be able to compute it instantly, etc. Basically, it requires perfect modeling of human responses, which seems to be missing the point in a way; it should be possible to create an intelligent machine that is intelligent in some way differing from humans. Though I suppose the reason Turing picked it is because of, as was mentioned elsewhere here, the axiomatic assumption that humans are intelligent. But in any case, I think it's somewhat akin to making the goal of aeronautical engineering "make an artificial bird that flies exactly like a crow does, in fact so exactly like a crow that it even fools other crows into thinking it's a crow."

  60. Um, no it's not. by crashnbur · · Score: 1

    Alcmaeon is the newest entry. And I bet that changes by the end of the weekend.

  61. Searle by Joehonkie · · Score: 1

    I have never had much respect for Searle. He often says things to the effect of: "Sure a computer can simulate a fire, but noone believes the fire will burn us" Well a computer can simulate a calculator and that works fine. It's not just as simple as "The computer is a calculator," but rather it has a software decsription to do what any good calculator does. Many of his assumptions are that the brain works in some special wasy, but he never states specifically what it is about the brain that cannot be duplicated.

    He also often talks about systems, breaking them into pieces and saying that in no single piece can we find the source of intelligence, yet if we tore the brain to pieces and neurons or such, we would also be loath to find "intelligence" in most of those small units.

    In short, I don't understand why Philosophy types constantly conjecture on the nature of things that are so influenced by biology and information theory when there are experts who have a better idea how these processes actually work

    I think Turing (and Descartes) are trying to say that for lack of being able to know how "intelligence" works, we must just assume that anything that has the full apearance of intelligence as far as we can test must be assumed to be intelligent.

  62. /. Turing Test by poisoneleven · · Score: 1

    Why doesn't someone write an "AI" that reads the story (or comments for) and makes up some sort of response? Whether it makes sense or not, whether it's topical or not, and see what the karma tells us!

    1. Re:/. Turing Test by RDPIII · · Score: 1

      Ever heard of AnonImous Coward?

      --
      Marklar: marklar
  63. Frank Herbert's Turing Test... by DavidBrown · · Score: 2, Insightful

    ...was the gom jabbar. The applicant places his hand inside of a pain inducer while a Bene Gesserit witch holds a the gom jabbar to his or her neck. If the applicant removes his or her hand from the box in response to the pain, the highly poisonous and pointy gom jabbar is used and the applicant dies. If the applicant does not remove his or her hand from the box despite the pain, the applicant passes and is considered human. Frank Herbert's theory is that the test of being a human is that a human's intellect allows the human to act in an intelligent manner despite strong animalistic urges to act otherwise. Compared to this, Turing's test seems simplistic - pretend well enough to be a human, and you'll be a human.

    It is ironic, however, that a computer would pass the gom jabbar more readily than a homo sapiens. However, both tests start with an implicit principal assumption: A definition as to what a human is. Many of us here (not to single out /. readers) would not pass as human to the Bene Gesserit. Some may not pass as human to Turing. The question we have to answer before developing a test for intelligence isn't whether or not a computer can be intelligent, but rather what exactly is intelligence. Turing's test is little more than a "if it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, then it's a duck" test. Is that enough? I really don't think that it is. A true intelligence ought to be able to act in an inspired, creative, and perhaps even irrational manner. Many of the things we do are not entirely rational, including much of the partisan discussion concerning various OS's.

    --
    144l. ph34r my 133t l3g4l 5k1lz!
    1. Re:Frank Herbert's Turing Test... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 0

      "A true intelligence ought to be able to act in an inspired, creative, and perhaps even irrational manner. Many of the things we do are not entirely rational, including much of the partisan discussion concerning various OS's."

      You seem to have a clear idea of what this would entail. This means, then, that the machine would need to show these things to pass the Turing test. So what is the content of what you are saying?

  64. And now for something relevant... by Goonie · · Score: 1
    How about let's discuss the encyclopedia entry, seeing it's on a topic that at least some of us know something about (though some of the comments make me wonder...)

    One comment that I have about the entry is that it spends time criticising Turing's guesses as to when machines might be able to pass the Test. To me, that section of Turing's paper is just idle speculation that has nothing to do with the paper's central contentions.

    --

    Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from a rigged demo
    --Andy Finkel (J. Klass?)
  65. the Chinese room may be impossible then by Trepidity · · Score: 1

    I believe if one accepts Chomsky's theories of language, that it is actually impossible to encode all possible language behavior as an input-output system. I'm not an expert on the subject so I can't say so for sure though. The thrust, though, would be that language has to be encoded in a manner which is more complex than a stimulus-response system because no stimulus-response system can fully implement language; thus, Searle's example of a Chinese room built on a stimulus-response system would be impossible to construct, making his thought experiment incoherent.

    1. Re:the Chinese room may be impossible then by Some+Dumbass... · · Score: 1

      thus, Searle's example of a Chinese room built on a stimulus-response system would be impossible to construct, making his thought experiment incoherent.

      Although I basically agree with you, let's remember that the original thrust of the Chinese Room argument was to prove that _programs_ could not emulate humans (the Turing Test being just one example of what "emulate" meant). I seem to recall that the Chinese Room was supposed to have computational power equivalent to a Turing Machine. If it does, then the whole Chomsky argument actually works in Searle's favor. It says that no computer program, at least one running on a serial computer, could possibly emulate human language perfectly, because it could achieve no better than Stimulus-Reponse behavior. I vaguely recall there being some issues about where the memory (the equivalent of a Turning Machine's tape) is in the Chinese Room, so I'm not sure how this argument turns out.

  66. Try this one... by Wandering+Idiot · · Score: 1

    This is a much better site, as far as Singularity-type stuff goes. It's the personal page of Eliezer Yudkowsky, one of the founders of the Singularity Institute (a much blander site than his personal one).

  67. Searle's Chinese Room by Conspir8or · · Score: 1

    I hosted a bachelor party at Searle's Chinese Room. Excellent catering, a great price, and never an empty glass. Might I recommend the Scorpion Bowls.

    1. Re:Searle's Chinese Room by Carnivorous+Carrot · · Score: 1

      And at the bachelor party you put your winkies through a hole in the wall and tried to decide whether it was a woman or gay man on the other side, trying to answer the eternal question as to whether a woman really understands what's going on, or is just pushing symbols around according to fixed rules, uncomprehending.

      --
      "Has [being a kidnapped teenage girl, raped repeatedly for months] changed you?" - Katie Couric to Elizabeth Smart
  68. The real problem with the Chinese Room by Tomble · · Score: 2, Interesting
    Yes, the room does know chinese. Or at least, there is a knowing of chinese occurring, regardless of "what" has that knowing. (maybe thats a bit like "Does a dog have buddha nature?" "Mu!" ...or maybe it isn't)

    The chinese room argument goes thus:

    • A man who knows no chinese stands in a room with a small hole in the wall.
    • Cards (or whatever) with unknown symbols (actually chinese, but he doesnt understand that) are passed through the hole in the wall to the man. The man can pass cards of his own back out of the hole in the wall.
    • The man has a very complex set of instructions on what to do with each card, in terms of memorising abstract facts (that dont necessarily have any sort of meaning to the man outside of what the instructions tell him to do with them), doing calculations of sorts based on those facts, to produce new ones, and eventually either picking one of a large number of cards to pass out of the hole or drawing meaningless lines on blank cards, etc. (These instructions implement some sort of state machine, in case that's somehow unclear).
    • When somebody passes cards that spell out sentences of chinese into the room, after a time, a set of cards will be passed out that spell out other sentences of chinese that affect appropriate replies to the sentences passed in. In other words, to the person on the outside, either there is somebody inside who speaks chinese, or the room itself does.
    • Now, the crux of Searle's argument is that when the chap comes out of the room, and you talk to him in chinese or hand him a letter written in chinese, etc, it will mean absolutely sweet FA to him, as he does not know chinese. He was the only one in the room, so therefore there was no understanding of chinese occurring within the room.

    My own view of this argument is that it is a big heap of bullshit.

    • I write this comment in response to the comment you wrote having read other stuff, etc.
    • Now, I go up to you, and saw the top of your skull off.
    • I take your brain out, take it to some quiet corner, and ask it if it understands yet what is wrong with the chinese room argument.
    • Your brain says nothing. Obviously I have only written stuff to you. I have no reason to suppose you can understand spoken English-it's possible to know the one and not the other. So I write the question down and show it to your brain.
    • Your brain still fails to answer me. Pah! It obviously doesn't understand English, and what I have been doing here is clearly just talking to myself, any reply I get must just be from some sort of unconscious automaton with no true understanding.
    --
    Be careful! New moon tonight.
    1. Re:The real problem with the Chinese Room by Carnivorous+Carrot · · Score: 1

      Is that Chinese room argument any different from saying there's a little gremlin in your brain pushing the atoms through your nerve cells according to fixed rules? No, the gremlin, nor the brain-as-machine don't "think", but you, the instantiation of that thinking, do. "The universe", playing the part of the man in the room here, doesn't "think" anymore than he does, though it does the dirty work of physically running your brain.

      --
      "Has [being a kidnapped teenage girl, raped repeatedly for months] changed you?" - Katie Couric to Elizabeth Smart
    2. Re:The real problem with the Chinese Room by Elwood+P+Dowd · · Score: 1

      See, that's exactly what I mean. Who takes Searle seriously? His point lasts 30 seconds in front of undergraduates, and a few minutes on /. before serious flaws are unearthed. So the real question is: Who cares what Searle thinks?

      --

      There are no trails. There are no trees out here.
    3. Re:The real problem with the Chinese Room by Tomble · · Score: 1
      Sorry, I just realised that your previous message had said "I never really understood who takes his argument seriously."

      When I'd written, I'd thought you'd said "takes this argument seriously", ie- the idea that the room is the one that knows chinese, which is obviously something that many people can't accept (because it is sounds so silly and contrary to common sense), and I'd thought that you were one of those people too. Then I thought your reply to me was a sarcastic put-down to me (as in "huh, what do undergrads and stupid slashdotters know?") until I looked again properly just now! Doh!

      Next week, I shall strike back at further imaginary enemies!! Anyways...

      --
      Be careful! New moon tonight.
  69. Look, Turing proposed the 'test' as a joke by hqm · · Score: 2, Informative

    If anyone would bother to actually read Turing's paper where he describes the 'test', you would see that he was not proposing the test literally, but as a reductio-ad-absurdum argument.

    The issue was that many people at that time (and many today) seem to have a religious belief that thinking cannot be implemented in any way except with a human biological brain. Turing could clearly see that the human brain was a computational engine, and he of course defined the concept of a universal computer. Thus, it was obvious to him that you could build an artificial intelligence.

    His "test" was really a way of gently pointing out the absurdity of the arguments of people like Searle (who came much later), who would blindly deny that a machine could ever think.

    Turing's point was, to paraphrase "look, if I give you a machine which is indistinguishable in every respect from a human, which you can talk to in depth on any subject of the arts or sciences, and you *still* don't call that intelligence, then you are just so wedged that there is no point in talking about this anymore".

    He would be saddened I think, and slightly disgusted, to see people twisting the whole purpose of his little thought experiment to argue for the kind of ignorance and transparently idiotic rhetoric of the kind that Searle and other "critics" of artificial intelligence try to make.

  70. I'm not sure it successfully shows that by Trepidity · · Score: 1

    Searle's main thrust seems to be that the Chinese Room is an example of simple lookup table responses, which he claims is not understanding. If there was a full Turing machine running the responses (rather than a simple lookup table), it becomes much less clear that he can say there's no understanding going on.

    1. Re:I'm not sure it successfully shows that by Servants · · Score: 1
      Well, you don't need Chomsky to see that a simple lookup table won't work; sentences can be arbitrarily long, so you can always make a sentence longer than the longest sentence your lookup table knows. Searle only talks about a "set of rules", not a lookup table, so his room really could be a Turing machine.

      Then he says that rule application can never produce understanding, and tries to make this claim sound obviously correct. (I think it's not, if only because everything above the quantum level, presumably including the brain, seems to be deterministic and in principle describable by rules.)

  71. Implications of passing the Turing test? by sllim · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Forgive me. I posted this in a different article a few days ago. I didn't really get any feedback. This subject fits my question much better.

    Lets say that one day a computer passes the Turing test. Then lets say that a few years later it passes it again, only this time it passes utilizing voice recognition and speech synthesis.

    If you think about it this is gonna be a really hard test for the computer to pass. I can't even imagine what is involved in figuring in voice inflection, accents and stuff like that.

    Anyways it is at the point where you are on the telephone and you can converse with a computer and you have no idea it is a machine.
    Hence, it passed the Turing test.

    What happens if the computer begins to make the argument that turning it off and disasembling it is no different then killing a person or an animal?

    What happens if the computer starts to make the argument that it is capable of thought?

    What are the implications of that?

    1. Re:Implications of passing the Turing test? by leodegan · · Score: 1

      I believe most supporters of strong-AI overlook some of the philosophical implications of a conscious machine. To me it is less alarming that a computer would insist on having rights, and more alarming that we would have demonstrated the human mind is a deterministic machine. This would have serious consequences in our concept of ethics and justice. Our current freedom is contingent on the assumption we have freewill. Demonstrating the brain is simply a biological computer would drive us away from punishment for crimes and towards rehabilitation and brainwashing. Our Goverments, in turn, would evolve to be more deterministic and controlling.

      It is not the computers having their rights elevated to ours that worries me. It is our rights being lowered to that of a computer's that worries me.

  72. Sounds like the author is Pro-War by pediddle · · Score: 1

    Why couldn't it be the case that there are intelligent things that are unable to carry on a conversation, or, at any rate, unable to carry on a conversation with creatures like us? (See, for example, [the] French [...])

  73. Reverse engineering is the way to go by gad_zuki! · · Score: 1

    >there has been progress reverse-engineering brain regions like some auditory or visiual

    I think that is the best argument for AI or Simulated intelligence or whatever you'd call the final results.

    Sure, knowing what kind of atom at what location and reproducing those results exactly is probably impossible, but the black-box approach to reverse engineering doesn't have to be that exact. A reasonable facsimile of what a human, or more realistic right now, an animal brain would be pretty impressive. It could even be emulated as software, but it's just as possible that it will start as custom hardware first.

    Look at the recent articles about the artificial hippocampus developed at the university of southern California. They used a black box reverse engineering approach; they didn't punch out a bunch of algorithms all day and simulate neurons on a supercomputer first. Imagine other reversed engineer brain parts acting in concert. That's probably your best bet for classic sci-fi-like AI right there, plus it has applications in helping people with brain disease and mind-blowing possibilities regarding brain customization.

    Maybe AI is like manned flight and massive and cheap computing power. One day it's a big deal if not a fraud and then a couple decades later we're sick of all the talking doors and think the refrigerator has a crush on the robot dog.

  74. So clever so soon? by NicenessHimself · · Score: 1

    Maybe Turing imagined that _he_ would build such a robot so quickly. Very few modern engineers can light a candle to him..

  75. Turing test as applied to Networks like Internet by leoaugust · · Score: 1

    The notion that Turing proposed about determining Artificial Intelligence, emerging from "computer bits," has to be broadened in context of the "network bits" or "nits." This is because of the human-nature derived unpredictability in the Human-Computer networks.

    While the material and natural forces help to differentiate between, say high and low voltage, and define the computer bit, the human-nature forces help differentiate between bestseller and pulp fiction, and thus partially define the "network bit" or "nit." This confoundedness of human or their agent involvement in the very definition of the symbolic meaning, and value, of different "states" (like high and low and lower, or 0 and 1) differentiates the network "nit" from the computer "bit."

    When we try to adapt the Turing Test to try to decide if the human-computer network can be said to be "thinking" as well as a human, we must pay special attention to the

    • nature of the interrogator - in the networks the "interrogator" cannot be defined precisely in space, time, or personalities. Some of the roles are being taken by emarketplaces, brokers, infomediaries, chat rooms, discussion boards, etc. Thus in the network, no single interrogator exists, and thus the uncertainity in the definition of the interrogators, must be factored in the fidelity of the questions transmitted from the questioner and the responses passed on by the interrogator.
    • number of humans and computers in the closed room - in Turing's Test it was possible to isolate one human and one computer, and try to see if the questioner outside the room could tell the difference between them. But in the "closed room" of the networks like the Internet, millions of computer systems, and millions of humans, are present. For a questioner, or a Internet User, in our case, the queries and the responses between humans and computers are confounded, and the question between trying to differentiate between one human and a computer in a closed room, becomes meaningless.

    Thus, we have to modify and adapt the Turing test if we want to apply it to intelligence in networked machine and human - or in the HuCoNOS - Human-Computer Network Operating System More dtails are available here http://www.bubbleui.com/thesis/Invention%20disclos ure%20NCSU%20Sept%2025%202000.doc

    --
    To see a world in a grain of sand, and then to step back and see the beach where the sand lies ...
  76. Nope by FooBarWidget · · Score: 2, Interesting

    You're wrong, that's completely untrue. In fact, it's the exact opposite.
    Check those articles about jwz's "review" or one of those distribution reviews. Count the number of +3/4/5 Insightful/Informative/Interesting posts that say Linux is a usability nightmare or is nothing compared to Windows XP or how it will never succeed on the desktop.

    I can't even understand why someone modded you up. Talking about how Slashdot is pro-Linux anti-MS always makes someone get modded up, even though the exact opposite of what they claim is true.

  77. Passing the Turing Test by tadas · · Score: 1

    Before I have my coffee in the morning, *I* couldn't pass the Turing test.

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  78. I'm an Axiom - start with me! by Axiom_1 · · Score: 1
    Ahh, the Objectivists are coming out to play!

    While "People think" is a perfectly good Axiom, it isn't appropriate in this case. Given that nobody is going to derive a definition of Intelligence from the Axioms of Number Theory, or any other existing formal system, we will have to apply Inductive Logic (rather than Deductive) to come up with one.

    The core of every system of Inductive Logic is always some variation of the rule: (IF A THEN B) ENTAILS (IF B THEN A). The entailment may be to some degree of probability or fuzzy-truth, depending on the system, but that rule is always there. It is the formalization of the idea "If it happens that way some of the time, maybe it always happens that way."

    Your Axiom "People think" could be expressed as: IF (X is a Person) THEN (X thinks). Using the rule of inductive logic, we would could then conclude that IF (X thinks) THEN (X is a person), which means that only people can think. Obviously not something you want as an Axiom.

    Even if you want to say "but I don't intend to use inductive logic", you're still going to confuse people, because it is the way most people think. If I tell someone that both of these statements are true: "If it is raining, then I am wet", and "I am wet", and then as them if this means it is raining, most people will say "yes, of course!".

    Turing recognized this problem, which is why he postulated a new Axiom for thinking: IF (X passes the Turing Test) THEN (X thinks), or, more simply "Things that pass the Turing Test think."

    Whether you agree with the Axiom or not, he has the right approach. Several alternate Axioms have been proposed, and each have a following in the world of AI:

    Anything which acts like a human thinks.

    Anything which acts rationally thinks.

    Anything which can autonomously generate models of its environment like a human does thinks.

    Anything which can autonomously generate accurate models of its environment thinks.

    I'm sure there are more that I don't know about.

    Obviously, all of these are very vague Axioms, and different projects in AI investigate different aspects of them. The most common variation on the research is changing the domain of thinking. It could be argued that we have already made computers that can think about chess, checkers, network optimization, and many microdomains. What we haven't made is a computer that can think about the politics, the world, or the Turing Test.

    Arguably most important, we have not made a computer that can think about its own thoughts. The ability to self-reflect is what some consider the core of intelligence. If you believe the computer is a wet machine, then you likely accept that consciousness is the ability of that machine to represent nearly any aspect of its own operation.

    At the moment, my internal model of myself says that I am hungry, so I'm going to go eat.

  79. Many people fail the Turing Test by Axiom_1 · · Score: 1
    English Literature Professors fail because no real person knows how to spell those words.

    Engineers often fail because, well, most of them seem more like a computer than a simple chatterbot does.

    As much as this seems like a joke post, I was actually told this by an AI professor who had some simple chatterbots pass the Turing Test in his lab, and realized that there was a problem with using Electrical Engineering graduate students as the "Real People".

  80. Re:Brain simulation [More] by de+Selby · · Score: 1

    I took a look around and found some quantum simulators: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~jwallace/simtable.htm