Where your premise is flawed is that it makes the assumption that inventing a cure for something somehow eradicates all potential for sufficient profit from creating that cure to be sustainable. This assumption is, in fact, entirely false - and quite provably so.
Obviously a profit is necessary to be sustainable, but why would a cure necessarily cause profit to suddenly die off? Or do you think that you'd somehow ever run out of people to treat?
You can't upload if you haven't caught up on your backlog of reviewing and rejecting or approving whoever you're assigned to.
What happens if you approve stuff that the metamoderator disagrees with? Do you also get blocked from uploading?
Bear in mind that your suggested system is simply self-reinforcing, and does not generally allow for the insertion of new or potentially even controversial information, even if there is an otherwise objectively legitimate reason for it.
It was my understanding that the context is only whether or not curing is a sustainable business model. Different people may still easily have differing priority orders, effectively playing by different rules.
I had thought of using the term "Extra-Terrestrial", but the problem with it is that the term "Extra-Terrestrial" is often taken as a noun, instead of an adjective, and could imply that the department's concern is actually about aliens, and not about what happens off of the planet.
I was making a serious suggestion, Conceptually, there's nothing wrong with the idea of creating a new branch for the military whose domain of interest is off-planet, even if we aren't yet technologically at a point where something like it is really necessary, but "Space Force" quite honestly sounds stupid, IMO.
Removing the requirement to have a Mac to develop iDevice applications means that it becomes increasingly practical for non-developers to install applications from source on their devices.... applications that might do things that bypass normal App store restrictions.
p>
I don't think Apple wants to do that.
When I was in high school my science teacher passed around a sample of uranium in a sealed transparent container that resembled a hollow acrylic cylinder. Handling it, you could tell from how the weight distribution changed as you tipped the cylinder from one side to the other so that the small rock would move inside to one edge that the container itself was very light, but I'll never forget how that tiny rock, itself resembling a more or less ordinary grey pebble barely more than a couple of cm across at its widest point, just seemed almost unnaturally heavy for its size to me.
And to be honest, I don't know for sure what material that cylinder was actually made of. It looked like acrylic or plastic, but I had always assumed that the container was made of something special to protect us from radiation, but thinking about it now, it was probably just to keep us from getting any uranium dust directly on our skin.
Does this further take into consideration that lots of people download music that they frequently stream, and keep it cached on a flash device? SD cards are a lot tinier than CD's, so even if they both end up as land-fill, the SD card is going to be easier on the environment, won't it?
... I'm wondering if there is any reason that this story is news here other than as fan service for readers that get satisfaction from bashing Christianity or other religions?
In game theory, its better to keep target alive by keeping the disease under control and patient in need of medication, rather than curing the ailment outright.
That depends on the rules of the game that everyone else is playing by, doesn't it? Your priorities might not be the same as everyone else's. If you can make a cure then achieving that end as quickly as you can will still make a lot of sense.
The most profitable option is still to stick with the treatment and hope everyone else also see's the same thing.
I trust you realize that this operation depends, rather critically, on the idea that everyone else, particularly your competitors, will see things exactly the same way.
The so-called "most profitable" option is also the riskiest... hope might very well be one of the most important traits we have as a species that can keep us going when outlooks are bad, but it's quite certainly a pretty crappy concept to try and found a venture on where you expect to seriously make any money. In principle, it's not any different than using your money to play lottery.
What's wrong with trying to improve the quality of life in the meantime?
We are still many centuries away from being a species that can live on multiple planets... the sheer magnitude of difficulty in life support off of earth being one of the biggest hurdles, so being a true interplanetary species will require finding another planet that can actually support life such as ours (and further assuming that such a planet isn't already claimed by another species that could interpret our attempts to colonize as an unwanted invasion). For practical purposes, that puts us at being not merely interplanetary, but interstellar, and that is roughly 1000 years away.
Fear of an extinction event before that time isn't going to make progress happen significantly faster, at least not on a scale that would have any significance to a human lifespan. 700 years, 800 years, a thousand years.... what's the difference to anyone alive today?
Nobody is saying that we shouldn't be trying to figure out ways to eventually expand the human race to the stars, but we shouldn't be wanting to not try and make the lives of those who are alive today any better because of it.
No, actually, you didn't... it seemed to me that you suggested that what I was describing wouldn't work just because the exchange that the number is actually coming from had spoofed the #, so you can't rely on its validity, but in general, that won't actually work because when the reverse lookup is done on the number, it would end up at a *different* exchange than the caller.
Conspiring with another exchange to permit number spoofing would still necessitate that the spammer have complete control over how a call gets routed, to ensure that their spoofed number actually gets routed to that exchange.
Essentially, it become roughly on par with faking an IP address, which works if you aren't expecting any sort of return data, but when a reverse lookup happens, per the protocol I described, any claimed caller ID information can be seen as valid.... or not verified. Yes, it does require a significant percentage of the exchanges to be updated before a significant number of calls will be recognized with the new protocol. but that's absolutely no different than when caller ID was first created.... most exchanges needed to be updated to support it before you would get caller ID info for most calls, even if you had a caller ID box on your phone.
Blu-Ray requires always online for the authentication methods in use now
Citation?
In my experience, a bluray player needs to be online when it is first turned on, to download updates, but after those updates are installled, the player will play discs just fine.
Your method uses the spoofed number to start the reverse lookup with (as thats the only number you got). As long as that number actually exists, how would the "endpoint" (which actually owns the number) know it was a spoofed number or legitimate one ?
Well, first of all, the endpoint would recognize it as a number that actually belongs to that exchange.
Secondly, when the caller places an outgoing call from an updated exchange, that caller's endpoint adds an entry into its temporary cache that it is making an outgoing call. If or when the reverse lookup happens, the caller's endpoint will see that indeed there is an entry for that number, and respond with an acknowledgement. Entries in this cache are, as I said, removed after being present for a minute or two... long enough to complete a call, but not so long as to be unrepresentative of what calls were recently outgoing from that exchange.
If the caller tries to place a call from a number that is spoofed, however, the reverse lookup wouldn't generally end up at the same exchange as the outgoing call, no entry would be found, and the call could be assumed to contain unverified caller ID information. Without making prior arrangements with whatever endpoint *is* going to be reached when a reverse lookup happens (which would be the case, for example, with legitimate spoofed outgoing calls where the caller wants the company's 1-800 number to show up at the recipient), the would-be spammer is going to be left with very few options for remaining undetected... in the end, they would have to settle for being classified the same as if there were no caller ID at all.
Not quite. I would really like to be able to see who spoofs his number, and who doesn't.
I suppose you can display that a caller has spoofed their number but that number could not be verified, although that might be of limited use, since it won't help you identify who the actual caller is. Effectively, it's the same as if they had not transmitted any caller ID information at all.
And without doing a reverse lookup, there's no way to know if the caller is actually calling you from the number that is being sent as their claimed number... remember, you never can known where the caller is actually from, all you can ever know is the number that they *claim* to be from, because there is no way for an exchange to know whether the originating number is genuine for any call that does not actually begin at that particular exchange (short of doing the same reverse lookup that I described previously, but then why not just do that at the endpoint instead of making each and every exchange do it?)
Every subscriber - company and private persons alike - as well as all phone exchanges - in, but also outside the country - would need to upgrade their equipment to make your idea work.
Perhaps it has evaded your attention that caller ID itself is a fairly recent innovation, and until a significant percentage of the country had been upgraded, a recipient would not tend to receive any caller identification at all.
The idea works just fine before a majority of the country has been upgraded... if the person being called doesn't have an upgraded exchange, then they have no way to verify the caller ID as genuine. If the caller doesn't have an upgraded exchange, then the recipient has no way to verify the caller ID is genuine. This is absolutely no different than the telephone landscape as caller ID itself was being first introduced. Meanwhile, upgraded exchanges that *are* making phone calls to eachother can enjoy the improved verification system, and as more participate, more numbers can be verified.
Which means the "bad actors" only need to relocate to a country which does not want, or simply doesn't have the money to cooperate to continue as if nothing has changed.
And the recipient of calls from such places would see that there is no verified caller ID information in that call, and they could choose to ignore it.
True, although it happens to be the case in this instance, that the "Carlton Dance" was Ribeiro's own innovation. All the script mentioned at the point where he first did it was "Carlton dances". Nobody at the time initially expected that it would be anything particularly special or memorable, but its surprising popularity after it was first performed by him on the show led to it being nicknamed the "Carlton Dance" soon after, and it was repeated several times throughout the series. The first time, however, those moves were genuinely the actor's own idea to use in the show. (although he openly admits that he pilfered the idea from how he saw Courtney Cox was dancing in a Bruce Springsteen video).
Individual dance movements themselves cannot generally be copyrighted as far as I know, although I believe that entire dance performances may be. The "Carlton Dance" is not a specific entire dance, however, it is only a single specific and very simple dance movement. While entire dances can be copyrighted, as far as I am aware, individual dance movements themselves cannot be. That said, this sort of thing might ordinarily fall under trademark protection because it has a specific name associated with it.
But even there, I expect that there is already some danger of trademark dillution in that area, and such protection may be refused on those grounds.
In reality, IP protection for this should have been applied for before the first episode that utilized it had publicly aired. Copyright, however, would never be applicable, because while it might generally be referred to as the "Carlton Dance", it's technically not really a dance, but simply the execution of a particular gesture.
I take it you mean that as in "the caller who spoofed a number wants you to be able to reach him (or his principal) again". Thats not quite true. Quite the opposite even.
Spam, regardless of the type, lives by just getting its message across. It doesn't even expect a response.
You misunderstand.... I am suggesting that a caller who spoofs his number and doesn't expect you to be able to potentially call that number back *should* be treated as an unverified caller, exactly as if they had sent no caller ID information at all. If your exchange can't do a reverse lookup on the caller ID info that it gets (which is what the caching mechanism I described would implement), then any claimed caller ID info would be seen as fraudulent.
Again, why that complex ? All the phone exchange "at the border" needs to know is if the the exchange transferring those calls can be trusted. If not he can simply refuse to accept them - until they clean their act up.
The decision to refuse to accept a call that does not contain trustworthy information should be left up to the recipient, not up to some intermediary... and that's why only the recipient's endpoint would technically need to have any upgrades for this to be useful. Besides, intermediary connections have no special way to know if a number that is being claimed is actually what it says it is any more than your own directly connected exchange does. You may as well put the responsibility for verification directly on the endpoints, and take a "no response" scenario to the reverse lookup as if there was no caller ID in the first place. If the caller's endpoint also had it, when a reverse lookup reaches that exact exchange, the reverse lookup succeeds and the caller. In the general case of illegitimate spoofing, if the reverse lookup reaches any other exchange other than that of the actual caller , whether that exchange has been upgraded or not, the number would not be be treated as valid. In the more specific case of legitimate spoofing, the exchange at the number to be spoofed would also be updated, and assuming that the caller's claimed number is recognized as one that the number is allowed to spoof for, this exchange would do the same verification as the recipients endpoint would before it would trust to add an entry into its own cache (since it is this spoofed number's exchange that will be reached when the recipient does its own reverse lookup).
If the caller tried to spoof a number whose own endpoint exchange was not also upgraded, in which it would not be... while if they tried to spoof a number whose own endpoint exchange could not verify that the caller was legitimately allowed to spoof that number (again, via a reverse lookup to make sure that the real caller is who they are claiming to be), then that exchange wouldn't add an entry for that call to its cache.
If you think the entire reverse lookup process I described is the part that is too complex, I'm wondering how, exactly, you think that reverse lookup could otherwise be technically performed? As I said, an exchange has absolutely no independent ability to, on its own, verify that any claimed number that is passing through it, and to which it has no direct connection, is actually coming from where it says it is, so you may as well put the responsibility of verifying the call via reverse lookup at the endpoint, rather than at some intermediary. You need additional complexity just to support the reverse lookup in the first place, and the only reason you might need anything more is to support genuinely legitimate caller ID spoofing. Note that in the system I described it is literally *impossible* for a recipient who has this system installed on their end to get a spoofed number unless the spam caller also directly controls the *endpoint* exchange for the number they are claiming to be calling from. This would place an upper limit on the number of such numbers that a spammer could practically claim t
I thought it was about the caller ID. And that gets send before the targets phone even rings (and normally accepted only than).
Except you can't route the caller ID any differently than the phone call itself... that would require a complete overhaul of every exchange, not just those at endpoints, and would provide no useful incremental upgrade path. Until at least a majority of exchanges supported it, it would generally be completely useless. You could, as I thought you were suggesting, route the entire call through another exchange, but that's a pretty heavy load for it to carry if many other places from around the country are doing the same thing.
The mechanism I described would only require no more than the caller's exchange, the receiver's exchange, and the spoof number's exchange (if different from the caller) to be enhanced... the effects of it would be felt sooner, thereby incentivizing the necessary cash flow to complete the transition.
[Verification is impossible], without verifiable correct list of who owns - or has the right to use - which phonenumbers
Not at all... you should be, after all, able to *call* that number. If it's not a number you can call, then it shouldn't be treated as genuine.
Essentially, a reverse lookup amounts to basically making a special type of call back to the number that is being claimed... when the special reverse call reaches the final exchange, rather than replying back that the line is busy or passing this call onto an extra line that may be allocated for the phone#, this end-point exchange just looks up info in its cache to see if the caller's phone number is really being called by who they say it is. If the exchange responds with an affirmative, then it can pass on the call display info to the receiver's phone. Entries in the cache can be removed perhaps a minute or two after they are inserted, long enough to allow a call to be completed, but not so long as to cause the cache to fill up or to be unrepresentative of the calls that have recently been placed from that exchange.
And so if, for example, somebody from, say, India wants to spoof some USA number, they will have to control the exchange that governs the USA number they are trying to spoof, because otherwise when your phone does the reverse lookup, the call is going to end up at that USA exchange, and the call isn't going to be found there, meaning it issues no response.
USA exchanges that allowed such spoofing to occur using their own numbers could be flagged quite easily, and being under USA jurisdiction, the companies that maintain them could be penalized or possibly even entirely blacklisted until they are brought into compliance.
Did you get a screen cap of any that you noticed that were off? I looked at about 30 pics, and I couldn't see anything like what you are talking about, despite actively *looking* for it.
Slashdot Mirror
Where your premise is flawed is that it makes the assumption that inventing a cure for something somehow eradicates all potential for sufficient profit from creating that cure to be sustainable. This assumption is, in fact, entirely false - and quite provably so.
Obviously a profit is necessary to be sustainable, but why would a cure necessarily cause profit to suddenly die off? Or do you think that you'd somehow ever run out of people to treat?
What happens if you approve stuff that the metamoderator disagrees with? Do you also get blocked from uploading?
Bear in mind that your suggested system is simply self-reinforcing, and does not generally allow for the insertion of new or potentially even controversial information, even if there is an otherwise objectively legitimate reason for it.
It was my understanding that the context is only whether or not curing is a sustainable business model. Different people may still easily have differing priority orders, effectively playing by different rules.
I had thought of using the term "Extra-Terrestrial", but the problem with it is that the term "Extra-Terrestrial" is often taken as a noun, instead of an adjective, and could imply that the department's concern is actually about aliens, and not about what happens off of the planet.
I was making a serious suggestion, Conceptually, there's nothing wrong with the idea of creating a new branch for the military whose domain of interest is off-planet, even if we aren't yet technologically at a point where something like it is really necessary, but "Space Force" quite honestly sounds stupid, IMO.
So they will have to deliberately "cripple" XCode in order to make it viable on iDevices.
Not being able to import source code into a development environment completely defeats the point of having one.
Removing the requirement to have a Mac to develop iDevice applications means that it becomes increasingly practical for non-developers to install applications from source on their devices.... applications that might do things that bypass normal App store restrictions. p> I don't think Apple wants to do that.
Like I said, I was just curious... it seemed like a lot of posts were pointing in that direction when I commented, which is why I asked.
But I have a pretty strong hunch it'll never happen.
When I was in high school my science teacher passed around a sample of uranium in a sealed transparent container that resembled a hollow acrylic cylinder. Handling it, you could tell from how the weight distribution changed as you tipped the cylinder from one side to the other so that the small rock would move inside to one edge that the container itself was very light, but I'll never forget how that tiny rock, itself resembling a more or less ordinary grey pebble barely more than a couple of cm across at its widest point, just seemed almost unnaturally heavy for its size to me.
And to be honest, I don't know for sure what material that cylinder was actually made of. It looked like acrylic or plastic, but I had always assumed that the container was made of something special to protect us from radiation, but thinking about it now, it was probably just to keep us from getting any uranium dust directly on our skin.
Does this further take into consideration that lots of people download music that they frequently stream, and keep it cached on a flash device? SD cards are a lot tinier than CD's, so even if they both end up as land-fill, the SD card is going to be easier on the environment, won't it?
(pronounced "doo-see'-pa")
Department of United States Extra-Planetary Affairs
Sounds a hell of a lot less juvenile than "Space Force".
My 2c.
... I'm wondering if there is any reason that this story is news here other than as fan service for readers that get satisfaction from bashing Christianity or other religions?
That depends on the rules of the game that everyone else is playing by, doesn't it? Your priorities might not be the same as everyone else's. If you can make a cure then achieving that end as quickly as you can will still make a lot of sense.
Actually, a tetrahedron.
Haven't you ever heard of the expression "the 4 corners of the earth"?
I trust you realize that this operation depends, rather critically, on the idea that everyone else, particularly your competitors, will see things exactly the same way.
The so-called "most profitable" option is also the riskiest... hope might very well be one of the most important traits we have as a species that can keep us going when outlooks are bad, but it's quite certainly a pretty crappy concept to try and found a venture on where you expect to seriously make any money. In principle, it's not any different than using your money to play lottery.
What's wrong with trying to improve the quality of life in the meantime?
We are still many centuries away from being a species that can live on multiple planets... the sheer magnitude of difficulty in life support off of earth being one of the biggest hurdles, so being a true interplanetary species will require finding another planet that can actually support life such as ours (and further assuming that such a planet isn't already claimed by another species that could interpret our attempts to colonize as an unwanted invasion). For practical purposes, that puts us at being not merely interplanetary, but interstellar, and that is roughly 1000 years away.
Fear of an extinction event before that time isn't going to make progress happen significantly faster, at least not on a scale that would have any significance to a human lifespan. 700 years, 800 years, a thousand years.... what's the difference to anyone alive today?
Nobody is saying that we shouldn't be trying to figure out ways to eventually expand the human race to the stars, but we shouldn't be wanting to not try and make the lives of those who are alive today any better because of it.
No, actually, you didn't... it seemed to me that you suggested that what I was describing wouldn't work just because the exchange that the number is actually coming from had spoofed the #, so you can't rely on its validity, but in general, that won't actually work because when the reverse lookup is done on the number, it would end up at a *different* exchange than the caller.
Conspiring with another exchange to permit number spoofing would still necessitate that the spammer have complete control over how a call gets routed, to ensure that their spoofed number actually gets routed to that exchange.
Essentially, it become roughly on par with faking an IP address, which works if you aren't expecting any sort of return data, but when a reverse lookup happens, per the protocol I described, any claimed caller ID information can be seen as valid.... or not verified. Yes, it does require a significant percentage of the exchanges to be updated before a significant number of calls will be recognized with the new protocol. but that's absolutely no different than when caller ID was first created.... most exchanges needed to be updated to support it before you would get caller ID info for most calls, even if you had a caller ID box on your phone.
Citation?
In my experience, a bluray player needs to be online when it is first turned on, to download updates, but after those updates are installled, the player will play discs just fine.
Well, first of all, the endpoint would recognize it as a number that actually belongs to that exchange.
Secondly, when the caller places an outgoing call from an updated exchange, that caller's endpoint adds an entry into its temporary cache that it is making an outgoing call. If or when the reverse lookup happens, the caller's endpoint will see that indeed there is an entry for that number, and respond with an acknowledgement. Entries in this cache are, as I said, removed after being present for a minute or two... long enough to complete a call, but not so long as to be unrepresentative of what calls were recently outgoing from that exchange.
If the caller tries to place a call from a number that is spoofed, however, the reverse lookup wouldn't generally end up at the same exchange as the outgoing call, no entry would be found, and the call could be assumed to contain unverified caller ID information. Without making prior arrangements with whatever endpoint *is* going to be reached when a reverse lookup happens (which would be the case, for example, with legitimate spoofed outgoing calls where the caller wants the company's 1-800 number to show up at the recipient), the would-be spammer is going to be left with very few options for remaining undetected... in the end, they would have to settle for being classified the same as if there were no caller ID at all.
I suppose you can display that a caller has spoofed their number but that number could not be verified, although that might be of limited use, since it won't help you identify who the actual caller is. Effectively, it's the same as if they had not transmitted any caller ID information at all.
And without doing a reverse lookup, there's no way to know if the caller is actually calling you from the number that is being sent as their claimed number... remember, you never can known where the caller is actually from, all you can ever know is the number that they *claim* to be from, because there is no way for an exchange to know whether the originating number is genuine for any call that does not actually begin at that particular exchange (short of doing the same reverse lookup that I described previously, but then why not just do that at the endpoint instead of making each and every exchange do it?)
Perhaps it has evaded your attention that caller ID itself is a fairly recent innovation, and until a significant percentage of the country had been upgraded, a recipient would not tend to receive any caller identification at all.
The idea works just fine before a majority of the country has been upgraded... if the person being called doesn't have an upgraded exchange, then they have no way to verify the caller ID as genuine. If the caller doesn't have an upgraded exchange, then the recipient has no way to verify the caller ID is genuine. This is absolutely no different than the telephone landscape as caller ID itself was being first introduced. Meanwhile, upgraded exchanges that *are* making phone calls to eachother can enjoy the improved verification system, and as more participate, more numbers can be verified.
And the recipient of calls from such places would see that there is no verified caller ID information in that call, and they could choose to ignore it.
True, although it happens to be the case in this instance, that the "Carlton Dance" was Ribeiro's own innovation. All the script mentioned at the point where he first did it was "Carlton dances". Nobody at the time initially expected that it would be anything particularly special or memorable, but its surprising popularity after it was first performed by him on the show led to it being nicknamed the "Carlton Dance" soon after, and it was repeated several times throughout the series. The first time, however, those moves were genuinely the actor's own idea to use in the show. (although he openly admits that he pilfered the idea from how he saw Courtney Cox was dancing in a Bruce Springsteen video).
Individual dance movements themselves cannot generally be copyrighted as far as I know, although I believe that entire dance performances may be. The "Carlton Dance" is not a specific entire dance, however, it is only a single specific and very simple dance movement. While entire dances can be copyrighted, as far as I am aware, individual dance movements themselves cannot be. That said, this sort of thing might ordinarily fall under trademark protection because it has a specific name associated with it.
But even there, I expect that there is already some danger of trademark dillution in that area, and such protection may be refused on those grounds.
In reality, IP protection for this should have been applied for before the first episode that utilized it had publicly aired. Copyright, however, would never be applicable, because while it might generally be referred to as the "Carlton Dance", it's technically not really a dance, but simply the execution of a particular gesture.
You misunderstand.... I am suggesting that a caller who spoofs his number and doesn't expect you to be able to potentially call that number back *should* be treated as an unverified caller, exactly as if they had sent no caller ID information at all. If your exchange can't do a reverse lookup on the caller ID info that it gets (which is what the caching mechanism I described would implement), then any claimed caller ID info would be seen as fraudulent.
The decision to refuse to accept a call that does not contain trustworthy information should be left up to the recipient, not up to some intermediary... and that's why only the recipient's endpoint would technically need to have any upgrades for this to be useful. Besides, intermediary connections have no special way to know if a number that is being claimed is actually what it says it is any more than your own directly connected exchange does. You may as well put the responsibility for verification directly on the endpoints, and take a "no response" scenario to the reverse lookup as if there was no caller ID in the first place. If the caller's endpoint also had it, when a reverse lookup reaches that exact exchange, the reverse lookup succeeds and the caller. In the general case of illegitimate spoofing, if the reverse lookup reaches any other exchange other than that of the actual caller , whether that exchange has been upgraded or not, the number would not be be treated as valid. In the more specific case of legitimate spoofing, the exchange at the number to be spoofed would also be updated, and assuming that the caller's claimed number is recognized as one that the number is allowed to spoof for, this exchange would do the same verification as the recipients endpoint would before it would trust to add an entry into its own cache (since it is this spoofed number's exchange that will be reached when the recipient does its own reverse lookup).
If the caller tried to spoof a number whose own endpoint exchange was not also upgraded, in which it would not be... while if they tried to spoof a number whose own endpoint exchange could not verify that the caller was legitimately allowed to spoof that number (again, via a reverse lookup to make sure that the real caller is who they are claiming to be), then that exchange wouldn't add an entry for that call to its cache.
If you think the entire reverse lookup process I described is the part that is too complex, I'm wondering how, exactly, you think that reverse lookup could otherwise be technically performed? As I said, an exchange has absolutely no independent ability to, on its own, verify that any claimed number that is passing through it, and to which it has no direct connection, is actually coming from where it says it is, so you may as well put the responsibility of verifying the call via reverse lookup at the endpoint, rather than at some intermediary. You need additional complexity just to support the reverse lookup in the first place, and the only reason you might need anything more is to support genuinely legitimate caller ID spoofing. Note that in the system I described it is literally *impossible* for a recipient who has this system installed on their end to get a spoofed number unless the spam caller also directly controls the *endpoint* exchange for the number they are claiming to be calling from. This would place an upper limit on the number of such numbers that a spammer could practically claim t
Except you can't route the caller ID any differently than the phone call itself... that would require a complete overhaul of every exchange, not just those at endpoints, and would provide no useful incremental upgrade path. Until at least a majority of exchanges supported it, it would generally be completely useless. You could, as I thought you were suggesting, route the entire call through another exchange, but that's a pretty heavy load for it to carry if many other places from around the country are doing the same thing.
The mechanism I described would only require no more than the caller's exchange, the receiver's exchange, and the spoof number's exchange (if different from the caller) to be enhanced... the effects of it would be felt sooner, thereby incentivizing the necessary cash flow to complete the transition.
Not at all... you should be, after all, able to *call* that number. If it's not a number you can call, then it shouldn't be treated as genuine.
Essentially, a reverse lookup amounts to basically making a special type of call back to the number that is being claimed... when the special reverse call reaches the final exchange, rather than replying back that the line is busy or passing this call onto an extra line that may be allocated for the phone#, this end-point exchange just looks up info in its cache to see if the caller's phone number is really being called by who they say it is. If the exchange responds with an affirmative, then it can pass on the call display info to the receiver's phone. Entries in the cache can be removed perhaps a minute or two after they are inserted, long enough to allow a call to be completed, but not so long as to cause the cache to fill up or to be unrepresentative of the calls that have recently been placed from that exchange.
And so if, for example, somebody from, say, India wants to spoof some USA number, they will have to control the exchange that governs the USA number they are trying to spoof, because otherwise when your phone does the reverse lookup, the call is going to end up at that USA exchange, and the call isn't going to be found there, meaning it issues no response.
USA exchanges that allowed such spoofing to occur using their own numbers could be flagged quite easily, and being under USA jurisdiction, the companies that maintain them could be penalized or possibly even entirely blacklisted until they are brought into compliance.
Did you get a screen cap of any that you noticed that were off? I looked at about 30 pics, and I couldn't see anything like what you are talking about, despite actively *looking* for it.