"A function of weighted inputs" isn't actually meaningful for nonlinear functions. Even very simple physical models that express a component of how Earth temperature (among other things) works are nonlinear. Apparently mathematics is more advanced than you're familiar with.
You can actually find fairly simple and reasonably accurate models for response to some parameters -- such as Earth orbital distance or Solar output -- in basic physics texts.
Can't find the models? For God's sake, there are peer-reviewed climatological journals. Fucking pick one up and start reading.
Mozilla doesn't care if they're being sold for money or not, they care if they're performing a certain level of validation. Once CAcert performs that level of validation, they'll be included.
I think your estimate of how costly it is to remove the extra heat generated is too high.
I entirely agree about wired always-on devices, though. I have a ton of AC-to-DC converters and power supplies that are terribly inefficient and a host of devices (including chargers) that are always running in standby mode.
No. Perhaps typically *you* encounter a self-signed cert in a secure context. Most people encounter them by browsing to some random web site that didn't want to pay for a real cert, at which point a wall of text appears with "keep browsing" or "cancel", and then invariably choose "keep browsing".
A real certificate authority, of course, has the option of revoking a certificate. So if they issue a cert to live.com to someone who shouldn't have it, once the error is found, they can revoke it.
You need a cert that applies to a domain you control in order to do SSL. Obviously they have no way to check or police what goes on in that domain and what you do with the data. That's not the function of a signed certificate; it's just to ensure that when you think you have an encrypted connection to www.joessite.com, it's really going to www.joessite.com.
An EV certificate says more about the certificate-holder, and some people (like Newegg) actually have them.
"Is that the entire problem with the current "debate" on global warming?"
No, the problem with the "debate" is the same as the problem with the evolution "debate" -- there are a lot of loud people who somehow became convinced that science is actually a giant conspiracy, that their half-assed nonquantitative arguments have equal footing with extensive research, and have no real intention of performing any critical thinking that might challenge their hastily-formed decision.
The tiring thing about these worthless "global warming discussions" is that I've seen better scientific critical thinking out of first-year premed students (in undergrad). Nobody here is a competent scientist, much less a climatologist, but they sure are fucking egotistical enough to compensate for a room full of researchers.
Unless the solar cells die out very quickly, that's pretty easy to manage. Pizza ovens hardly take an impressive amount of energy to run and benefit from scaling.
This isn't some theoretical attack, it's a known weakness in the mechanical voting systems. You're just not familiar with the voting machine, so my description doesn't make sense.
The mechanical voting machine has a single large lever, a board full of toggles, and a curtain. On entering, you pull the lever, which closes the curtain. We'll call that lever state "voting". You then flip the toggles for the items you want to vote for. For example, you might flip "John" under the "President" column and "Yes" under the "Proposition 127" column. You can change your mind, but the system (ostensibly) prevents you from marking two toggles in the same column simultaneously. You then flip the lever to the other state, "not voting". This transition causes all set toggles to be unset and, in the process, increments an internal counter for each set toggle. This is all done with gears. It also reopens the curtain, so you cannot vote multiple times.
A toggle can be easily jammed with pencil lead. The toggle will appear to set and unset normally, but until the piece of lead is worked out of the system, the "gears turn, incrementing an internal counter" part fails.
That's not correct. You can undetectably modify a mechanical voting machine.
Suppose Eve, the attacker and a registered voter, dislikes candidate A. She shows up to the polls early with a piece of pencil lead in her pocket. She inserts the lead into an appropriate gap under candidate A's lever. While this doesn't interfere with the apparent operation of the lever, it actually prevents the mechanical operation that counts the vote. Future voters will think they're voting for A, but in fact are voting for nobody. As the pencil lead is soft, it will not last the whole day before it crumbles into dust and the machine returns to working order.
This does work, and the only way to detect it is to conduct careful forensic examination on the internals of every single machine (since you can't easily detect "this machine *might* have been tampered with).
There are actually potential approaches to provably secure electronic voting -- software assurance isn't quite as smoke-and-mirrors as you make it out to be (though yes, if you're running Windows, you've lost the software assurance game) and multiparty cryptographic protocols can help a lot. These approaches are probably tougher than conducting careful examinations of every mechanical voting machine in a state, and nobody has come close to actually implementing them.
This is, in fact, the current solution used in California, which has moved to optical-scan ballots.
Note that you can save a lot of time and money if everyone who doesn't need assistance just fills out the optical-scan ballot by hand. People who need the assistance can use a machine to produce a properly-filled-out optical-scan paper ballot.
The counting is then done by an entirely different machine. A random set of districts are required to perform a hand count of the ballots to verify the results. The important feature is that the paper ballots provide a later fallback measure if the optical-scan system fails.
I'm pretty sure a simple Google search would supply you with man papers on the potential failure modes of a voting system and how electronic voting systems fail to address them.
Let's just say they'd love your voting "system" in Chicago.
First, the paper-ballot-counters aren't connected to networks, generally.
Second, a system where a paper ballot is counted by an electronic machine has a critical feature that an all-electronic system lacks: it's auditable, with an independent backup of the vote (the paper ballot).
The voting machine hardware has problems, too. For example, you can change the software on them without anyone noticing.
Without going into details, there are many very difficult problems in making a working electronic voting system. Presenting radio buttons and using the result to increment counters is the tiniest fraction of what needs to be done.
Incidentally, the mechanical lever systems bear the same major problem as electronic voting systems: they can be undetectably modified.
No, electronic voting machines were adopted as a result of the Help America Vote act, the primary goal of which was to prevent easily-misinterpreted ballots, particularly for the elderly or disabled.
While there are problems with paper ballots, for sure, their failure modes are a lot more graceful. In general, when electronic voting machines are maliciously altered, the fact that they've been altered is undetectable and there's no backup data that can be used to fix the problem. Further, their operations while running are difficult to audit.
Problems like a counter adding an extra hundred to his candidate have known solutions and are easy to audit -- they install cameras in every counting location and only permit counting in groups.
At low probabilities, it's safe to multiply by the number of passengers.
In Japan it's probably different, but estimating based on my recent flights within the US, there's no more than a couple of Nanos per flight. 100 is a lot -- you'd need an international flight just to get that many passengers.
The major difference is that an engine or a battery bursting into flame roughly places the contents of the airplane at risk. There are many situations where everyone in the airplane is at risk (e.g., all technical failures).
If you hijack a plane to fly it into a building, the plane's passengers are a minor casualty compared to the damage to the building and the people in it, and the "morale impact" is entirely different.
Slashdot Mirror
Someone's going to offer them such a job, but probably not publicly in the context of an investigation.
"A function of weighted inputs" isn't actually meaningful for nonlinear functions. Even very simple physical models that express a component of how Earth temperature (among other things) works are nonlinear. Apparently mathematics is more advanced than you're familiar with.
You can actually find fairly simple and reasonably accurate models for response to some parameters -- such as Earth orbital distance or Solar output -- in basic physics texts.
Can't find the models? For God's sake, there are peer-reviewed climatological journals. Fucking pick one up and start reading.
Mozilla doesn't care if they're being sold for money or not, they care if they're performing a certain level of validation. Once CAcert performs that level of validation, they'll be included.
I think your estimate of how costly it is to remove the extra heat generated is too high.
I entirely agree about wired always-on devices, though. I have a ton of AC-to-DC converters and power supplies that are terribly inefficient and a host of devices (including chargers) that are always running in standby mode.
No. Perhaps typically *you* encounter a self-signed cert in a secure context. Most people encounter them by browsing to some random web site that didn't want to pay for a real cert, at which point a wall of text appears with "keep browsing" or "cancel", and then invariably choose "keep browsing".
A real certificate authority, of course, has the option of revoking a certificate. So if they issue a cert to live.com to someone who shouldn't have it, once the error is found, they can revoke it.
It's almost as if he didn't see the BlackHat talk about how running a VPN client within a browser is the worst idea ever.
You need a cert that applies to a domain you control in order to do SSL. Obviously they have no way to check or police what goes on in that domain and what you do with the data. That's not the function of a signed certificate; it's just to ensure that when you think you have an encrypted connection to www.joessite.com, it's really going to www.joessite.com.
An EV certificate says more about the certificate-holder, and some people (like Newegg) actually have them.
This is pretty much what I'm talking about. You haven't bothered to find or understand the models or the research, so you claim they don't exist.
On top of that, you seem to think that the average Earth temperature is a linear function of independent inputs.
Interesting that you say that climatologists should say that have no clue, as the summary and article indicate they know exactly why it's occurring.
I know, I know. You don't like other things that have to say. Shockingly, that's not the same thing as them having no clue.
"Is that the entire problem with the current "debate" on global warming?"
No, the problem with the "debate" is the same as the problem with the evolution "debate" -- there are a lot of loud people who somehow became convinced that science is actually a giant conspiracy, that their half-assed nonquantitative arguments have equal footing with extensive research, and have no real intention of performing any critical thinking that might challenge their hastily-formed decision.
The tiring thing about these worthless "global warming discussions" is that I've seen better scientific critical thinking out of first-year premed students (in undergrad). Nobody here is a competent scientist, much less a climatologist, but they sure are fucking egotistical enough to compensate for a room full of researchers.
Use the EFF's connection testers, and report any information you can to the EFF.
With an RST injector, you'll generally get multiple packets with the same TCP sequence number (one of which is an RST) and multiple RSTs in sequence.
Climatologists use fairly long-term data.
Perhaps you're confusing that with your "data", which appears to have exactly 3 data points, one per year.
Yeah, but you realize the pizza oven is being used to create the solar cells, not in the process of running them, right?
An electric toaster oven isn't going to reach the
Unless the solar cells die out very quickly, that's pretty easy to manage. Pizza ovens hardly take an impressive amount of energy to run and benefit from scaling.
This isn't some theoretical attack, it's a known weakness in the mechanical voting systems. You're just not familiar with the voting machine, so my description doesn't make sense.
The mechanical voting machine has a single large lever, a board full of toggles, and a curtain. On entering, you pull the lever, which closes the curtain. We'll call that lever state "voting". You then flip the toggles for the items you want to vote for. For example, you might flip "John" under the "President" column and "Yes" under the "Proposition 127" column. You can change your mind, but the system (ostensibly) prevents you from marking two toggles in the same column simultaneously. You then flip the lever to the other state, "not voting". This transition causes all set toggles to be unset and, in the process, increments an internal counter for each set toggle. This is all done with gears. It also reopens the curtain, so you cannot vote multiple times.
A toggle can be easily jammed with pencil lead. The toggle will appear to set and unset normally, but until the piece of lead is worked out of the system, the "gears turn, incrementing an internal counter" part fails.
That's not correct. You can undetectably modify a mechanical voting machine.
Suppose Eve, the attacker and a registered voter, dislikes candidate A. She shows up to the polls early with a piece of pencil lead in her pocket. She inserts the lead into an appropriate gap under candidate A's lever. While this doesn't interfere with the apparent operation of the lever, it actually prevents the mechanical operation that counts the vote. Future voters will think they're voting for A, but in fact are voting for nobody. As the pencil lead is soft, it will not last the whole day before it crumbles into dust and the machine returns to working order.
This does work, and the only way to detect it is to conduct careful forensic examination on the internals of every single machine (since you can't easily detect "this machine *might* have been tampered with).
There are actually potential approaches to provably secure electronic voting -- software assurance isn't quite as smoke-and-mirrors as you make it out to be (though yes, if you're running Windows, you've lost the software assurance game) and multiparty cryptographic protocols can help a lot. These approaches are probably tougher than conducting careful examinations of every mechanical voting machine in a state, and nobody has come close to actually implementing them.
This is, in fact, the current solution used in California, which has moved to optical-scan ballots.
Note that you can save a lot of time and money if everyone who doesn't need assistance just fills out the optical-scan ballot by hand. People who need the assistance can use a machine to produce a properly-filled-out optical-scan paper ballot.
The counting is then done by an entirely different machine. A random set of districts are required to perform a hand count of the ballots to verify the results. The important feature is that the paper ballots provide a later fallback measure if the optical-scan system fails.
I'm pretty sure a simple Google search would supply you with man papers on the potential failure modes of a voting system and how electronic voting systems fail to address them.
Let's just say they'd love your voting "system" in Chicago.
First, the paper-ballot-counters aren't connected to networks, generally.
Second, a system where a paper ballot is counted by an electronic machine has a critical feature that an all-electronic system lacks: it's auditable, with an independent backup of the vote (the paper ballot).
The voting machine hardware has problems, too. For example, you can change the software on them without anyone noticing.
Without going into details, there are many very difficult problems in making a working electronic voting system. Presenting radio buttons and using the result to increment counters is the tiniest fraction of what needs to be done.
Incidentally, the mechanical lever systems bear the same major problem as electronic voting systems: they can be undetectably modified.
No, electronic voting machines were adopted as a result of the Help America Vote act, the primary goal of which was to prevent easily-misinterpreted ballots, particularly for the elderly or disabled.
While there are problems with paper ballots, for sure, their failure modes are a lot more graceful. In general, when electronic voting machines are maliciously altered, the fact that they've been altered is undetectable and there's no backup data that can be used to fix the problem. Further, their operations while running are difficult to audit.
Problems like a counter adding an extra hundred to his candidate have known solutions and are easy to audit -- they install cameras in every counting location and only permit counting in groups.
If only we didn't depend on them to keep us from falling toward the ground!
At low probabilities, it's safe to multiply by the number of passengers.
In Japan it's probably different, but estimating based on my recent flights within the US, there's no more than a couple of Nanos per flight. 100 is a lot -- you'd need an international flight just to get that many passengers.
I'm not going to go into security theater here.
The major difference is that an engine or a battery bursting into flame roughly places the contents of the airplane at risk. There are many situations where everyone in the airplane is at risk (e.g., all technical failures).
If you hijack a plane to fly it into a building, the plane's passengers are a minor casualty compared to the damage to the building and the people in it, and the "morale impact" is entirely different.