Try reading actually reading my message - I did not say they didn't use the manuals, nor did I say they relied entirely on memory. Each has it's place it and time.
Getting a Top Secret clearance isn't all that hard, especially for a generalized clearance that's not going to used as a basis for access to compartmentalized information. It's when your being vetted for accesses and compartments that they really rake your past over the coals.
That's the new "Internet News" media standard. Story titles will flat out lie if they have to get you to click that link. It's all about driving traffic. "A rips B" is a classic New Media headline. BTW, the HuffingtonPost is the worst at this. I used to read it regularly when it was a political site and before it turned into a tabloid Kardashian watch rag.
New? Hardly. Slashdot has been a past master at this for as long as I've been around - well over a decade now.
quite arguing syntax. you can win any argument on syntax, and it's easy to do so, but it's meaningless, and showcases that you haven't any idea about that which is being discussed.
I'm not arguing on syntax - I'm addressing the claims you made. Claims that, now having been shown to be false and that you've admitted to be false, you're now trying to pretend you never said or never meant. (Accompanied by moving the goalposts and a little mudslinging and ad hominem since you have nothing else.)
And yes, I have experience with what is being discussed. I've used those types of procedures and binders in simulations, in trainers, and in actual real world life-and-death emergencies.
what happens when the program crashes while searching??
What happens if you drop the binder/reference card and it slides behind/under something? Yes, I've seen this happen. And I've seen the binder explode when it happens too.
And no, the pilot doesn't ask for restart procedures in the middle of an emergency - that's why he's been trained and trained and trained some more. To drive those procedures so deep in his memory and reflexes that decades later, sitting in the sun in a retirement home, he'll *still* remember them. The binders or tablets are there to supplement this memory and for use when things slow down, not for use in the middle of a crisis when you have to react in less than a handful of seconds.
sure, the ipad is a great way to replace paper. but clearly someone's forgotten what the flight bags are for. there are a few beautiful things about paper -- it's always there, it has zero dependencies, laminated it can withstand more than the human using it, and absolutely nothing can go wrong with it. it just can't break.
You honestly think paper has no dependencies and nothing can go wrong? I've actually used these types of manual in emergency situations (though on a submarine rather than an airplane), and nothing could be further from the truth.
You need light to read. You need the binder to be intact (I.E. pages to be in place and in order). You need the changes to have been entered and entered correctly. (A very tedious task indeed, and it eats a lot of man hours to do it right.) Etc... etc... I've been in situations where I've encountered one or more of these failures.
so since these things are consulted when the plane breaks, two engines die, and the power is out, it's nice to have the redundancy be a completely different technology.
A completely different technology than... what exactly? I mean, that's a nice buzzword phrase but it doesn't mean anything. There's no difference, really, in the situation described between paper and an electronic tablet. Who cares if the power is out? You unplug the tablet and it runs on batteries. If you really need the tablet and the batteries are dying - you plug it into an outlet that's powered by the same source powering your instruments. (If you're power is so effed for so long that you don't have battery or generator power *somewhere* on the aircraft, you're in very deep shit indeed. I.E. dead.)
But that money will not be taxed as "income" because it does not meet the USofA's TAX definition of "income" at this time.
Nor does it meet any rational definition of income - because taking out a loan is taking on a debt. Otherwise, the next step will be to tax me for the 'income' of taking out a loan to buy a house or of taking out a loan secured by my equity in a house.
Re:This is why a flat tax will not work.
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But notice - your bank balance appreciates due to interest, and you don't take it out - you just leave it there. It is nonetheless taxed as income. It your wealth was in financial instruments like stock, and it appreciates, no tax on the increase.
That's because interest is cash income - and increases in stock value are not. It's a critical difference, and one that too many people in this debate are ignoring.
Re:Ok so figure out a way to not screw other peopl
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You are not taxed while you own it, you only have to pay that tax when you realize that value gain e.g. you've made a profit. For a house, this would be when you sell it.
That's how it works *now* in the US. This is not what is being proposed.
What's being proposed is to tax increases in value even if you do not see a cash profit. If you own a stock, and the value goes up, you pay taxes on the increase. If you own property and the value goes up, you pay taxes on the increase. Etc.. etc... It *is* a wealth tax.
Translation: You'll grasp at any straw to put all the blame on management and completely absolve the engineers of any blame - even if that requires disbelieving reality and rejecting evidence that runs contrary to your deeply held religious faith.
Indeed - between the Japanese earthquake and the floods in Thailand, the big digital camera manufacturers (from cheap consumer all the way up to professional gear) have taken a hefty hit this past year.
While the cold contributed to the problem - the real problem was joint rotation, the flex of the case when the propellant was ignited and came up to pressure. This caused the joint to open up and leak, even at temperatures well above freezing and well within the operational guidelines.
I think that's the bigger issue here. NASA really hasn't changed, they're the same arrogant, top heavy, risk adverse organization they bloated into during the 80's.
That's the urban legend. The reality is that all that got started as the Apollo program got rolling, and only got worse as time went on. (And that applied to engineers as well as management.)
it was the circumstances surrounding the loss and the general lack of accountability afterwards
How many of the engineers who insisted a faulty design that failed to meet spec ("there shall be zero leakage") was safe to fly were held accountable? Like so many, you're reaching for any reason you can find to blame management - but you're doing so by cherry picking which parts of the story to base your beliefs on.
Engineers aren't saints, and they aren't always right.
When an engineer says don't go with the launch. Sorry but just stfu and listen to him. FFS, he's not the idiot citizen who doesn't know squat. He's an engineer
He's an engineer that spent over a decade working a design he knew did not meet spec ("there shall be no blowby"), and never said a word. Why should I believe him when he suddenly changes his story?
I'm actually burning mod points that I used because I just have to point out that, I have a Bachelor's of Science in Business with a focus in Management (long title for BS of Management degree), and this topic and topics like it never came up. Not once. Not ever.
The you either slept through or skipped the classes where it was covered - or you went to cheap ass diploma mill school. I know many people with management degrees - and each and every one of them either took a full course on ethics or encountered it piecemeal across other classes.
Perhaps he should be nominated for the not-yet existing Bradley Manning prize for integrity in the face of overwhelming odds.
That would require integrity. But the reality is that he (and the other Thiokol and NASA engineers) insisted for years that despite the SRB not meeting spec ("there shall be no leakage") that it was safe to fly. Then he changed his story, and subsequently has insisted the changed version is the truth.
From the political contracts that needed segmented boosters for inland transport
[sigh] Not this myth again.
Monolithic boosters were rejected on multiple grounds.
It was virtually impossible to pour them with consistent characteristics along the grain. It was extremely difficult to pour them with consistent performance during the burn. I.E. the motors required consistent and predictable characteristics both longitudinally and radially.) There were difficulties in ensuring complete and even mixing. There were difficulties due to turbulence during the pour. There were difficulties in curing due to the lower portions being under great pressure due to the weight of the propellant above them... Smaller grain segments reduced or eliminated these problems.
These problems also prevented another key requirement from being met - they could not produce matched pairs of boosters. Unbalanced thrust could produce excessive stress on the external tank structure or even exceed the Shuttle's control limits and cause it to tumble. Again, smaller grain segments reduce or eliminate these problems because left hand and right hand segments could be matched from the same pour.
There was also another problem - handling the bastards. At the scale of these motors, they aren't stiff - they will actually flex when being rotated from vertical to horizontal (being lifted from the mold and readied for transport) and again when being rotated from the horizontal to the vertical (when being taken off the transport and readied for installation). This flex, even though it was minor, could delaminate the grain from the case and the tension and compression loads could physically damage the grain. And there was no getting around the need to handle them thus - because they needed to be cast nose down, while they flew nose up. The flex and stress on smaller segments is negligible.
Another handling difficulty was the sheer weight of the thing. This wasn't just a problem that could be solved by getting a big crane either... You see, the lower portion of the grain bears the weight of all the grain above it - and the grain is actually somewhat flexible. (It's called solid fuel, but it's not really solid like a rock... it's much closer to tire rubber than anything else... it can and does deform under stress.) Not only would the grain change shape as it flowed, but it could also tear itself apart under it's own weight. With smaller segments, these stresses are manageable.
Yes, maybe these problems could have been solved with sufficient time and money, but NASA had neither and they did have an ace in the hole: There was no flight experience with large monolithics, but there was at least limited flight experience with large segemented boosters.
So in the end, NASA chose exactly the type of solution everybody seems to think they always should make, especially with manned craft... Fiscally conservative. Schedule conservative. Technically conservative. And, with the knowledge available to them at that time, safety conservative.
If I remember the Challenger report correctly it was mentioned that the O-ring problem was not unique to STS-51L, it had occurred on previous flights and NASA were well aware of the effects of subzero temperatures on the compounds used. It took the destruction of Challenger for the issue to finally be addressed with a seal redesign
You remember it mostly correctly - but there's more to it.
The cause of the leakage was joint rotation (not cold), and had been known to engineers and management since the early 70's.
While the cold contributed to the problem - most of the damage on previous flights had actually occurred at temperatures far higher.
The engineers insisted that leakage was a minor problem and that it was safe fly while a redesign was underway.
The redesign actually was underway months before the loss of Challenger.
Seriously, it's a myth that the problem was unknown and was primarily caused by the cold (though the cold made it worse).
My 2: 17 may be a low number, but 3 is a much lower one, and you only needed to hear your engineers!
That's just the thing - they listen to their engineers. Right up until the point where the engineers changed their stories. And that's the part of the tale that Boisjoly et al have spent the last quarter century refusing to acknowledge.
The tale starts in the late 60's/early 70's when NASA codified the standards for the Shuttle's segmented solids.* The item in question reads something like "There shall be zero leakage or blow by at segment joints". Well, during testing of the SRB's - they started getting small amounts of leakage and blow by at the segments joints due to joint roation. So, the engineers added a backup O-ring, and despite the fact that the backup was occasionally damaged and leaked... The engineers told management the problem was under control and that it was safe to fly.
So, they went ahead and flew... And the problems with leakage and blow by continued to occur. The engineers insisted that with some minor modifications to the joint, the problem would go away.** In the meantime, the engineers insisted that is was safe to continue to fly.
The comes the evening of January 27th... and the engineers change their story. Now, it's not safe to fly. Management, understandably are just a wee bit confused - is it safe to fly or not? Worse yet, the engineers cannot provide a sound engineering rationale for the sudden reversal of their position.
Since the engineers couldn't or wouldn't do what they were paid to do - the managers did what they were paid to and made the call to launch. And that call was made in a large part because they did listen to their engineers, who had repeatedly told them that the problem was under control and it was safe to fly.
The moral of the story? Managers aren't saints. But neither are engineers.
* No, despite all the ill-informed commentary you've heard over the years, monolithics were not a viable option. It's extraordinarily difficult to pour them such that the grain is sufficiently uniform along it's length. It's virtually impossible to pour them in matched pairs. It's virtually impossible to handle them without damaging the grain.
** This is why the revised design was available so fast after the accident - the design process was already underway.
Yes, of course, but think of this from an engineering sense.
I am - but thinking of it from an engineering sense means looking at all plausible causes (which you aren't) and reviewing all the available evidence (which you haven't, unless you read Russian).
You try and do something for the very first time with a new device and it instantly fails. Now, it is possible that some random error happened to happen just then, but it is much more probably that the failure is connected with the use of new capabilities.
However, "more probable" does not mean "actually did happen". (I repeat this because it doesn't seem to have sunk in the first time.)
Now, as it happens, the failure is software related, so it is natural to blame a software error.
Now, as it happens, where the failure occurred depends on which (rough and fast) translation of the report you read. Thanks, but I'll stick with engineering and leave the bias to you.
Slashdot Mirror
Try reading actually reading my message - I did not say they didn't use the manuals, nor did I say they relied entirely on memory. Each has it's place it and time.
Getting a Top Secret clearance isn't all that hard, especially for a generalized clearance that's not going to used as a basis for access to compartmentalized information. It's when your being vetted for accesses and compartments that they really rake your past over the coals.
Funny as hell - and nail on the head too. Well played.
New? Hardly. Slashdot has been a past master at this for as long as I've been around - well over a decade now.
I'm not arguing on syntax - I'm addressing the claims you made. Claims that, now having been shown to be false and that you've admitted to be false, you're now trying to pretend you never said or never meant. (Accompanied by moving the goalposts and a little mudslinging and ad hominem since you have nothing else.)
And yes, I have experience with what is being discussed. I've used those types of procedures and binders in simulations, in trainers, and in actual real world life-and-death emergencies.
Your original claim was that paper had no dependencies - your admission that this claim is incorrect requires no further reply. My work here is done.
What happens if you drop the binder/reference card and it slides behind/under something? Yes, I've seen this happen. And I've seen the binder explode when it happens too.
And no, the pilot doesn't ask for restart procedures in the middle of an emergency - that's why he's been trained and trained and trained some more. To drive those procedures so deep in his memory and reflexes that decades later, sitting in the sun in a retirement home, he'll *still* remember them. The binders or tablets are there to supplement this memory and for use when things slow down, not for use in the middle of a crisis when you have to react in less than a handful of seconds.
You honestly think paper has no dependencies and nothing can go wrong? I've actually used these types of manual in emergency situations (though on a submarine rather than an airplane), and nothing could be further from the truth.
You need light to read. You need the binder to be intact (I.E. pages to be in place and in order). You need the changes to have been entered and entered correctly. (A very tedious task indeed, and it eats a lot of man hours to do it right.) Etc... etc... I've been in situations where I've encountered one or more of these failures.
A completely different technology than... what exactly? I mean, that's a nice buzzword phrase but it doesn't mean anything. There's no difference, really, in the situation described between paper and an electronic tablet. Who cares if the power is out? You unplug the tablet and it runs on batteries. If you really need the tablet and the batteries are dying - you plug it into an outlet that's powered by the same source powering your instruments. (If you're power is so effed for so long that you don't have battery or generator power *somewhere* on the aircraft, you're in very deep shit indeed. I.E. dead.)
Yes, it's taxable as income. The same as if you win a truck. Neither has anything to do with taxes on the realization of gains.
Nor does it meet any rational definition of income - because taking out a loan is taking on a debt. Otherwise, the next step will be to tax me for the 'income' of taking out a loan to buy a house or of taking out a loan secured by my equity in a house.
That's because interest is cash income - and increases in stock value are not. It's a critical difference, and one that too many people in this debate are ignoring.
That's how it works *now* in the US. This is not what is being proposed.
What's being proposed is to tax increases in value even if you do not see a cash profit. If you own a stock, and the value goes up, you pay taxes on the increase. If you own property and the value goes up, you pay taxes on the increase. Etc.. etc... It *is* a wealth tax.
Since you ask for citations for things I never said, you can fuck off.
But the whole sordid story of the SRB and O-ring design history is all right there in the Rogers Commission report.
Translation: You'll grasp at any straw to put all the blame on management and completely absolve the engineers of any blame - even if that requires disbelieving reality and rejecting evidence that runs contrary to your deeply held religious faith.
Conclusion: You're an idiot.
Indeed - between the Japanese earthquake and the floods in Thailand, the big digital camera manufacturers (from cheap consumer all the way up to professional gear) have taken a hefty hit this past year.
While the cold contributed to the problem - the real problem was joint rotation, the flex of the case when the propellant was ignited and came up to pressure. This caused the joint to open up and leak, even at temperatures well above freezing and well within the operational guidelines.
So, no, he wasn't correct. He wasn't even close.
That's the urban legend. The reality is that all that got started as the Apollo program got rolling, and only got worse as time went on. (And that applied to engineers as well as management.)
How many of the engineers who insisted a faulty design that failed to meet spec ("there shall be zero leakage") was safe to fly were held accountable? Like so many, you're reaching for any reason you can find to blame management - but you're doing so by cherry picking which parts of the story to base your beliefs on.
Engineers aren't saints, and they aren't always right.
He's an engineer that spent over a decade working a design he knew did not meet spec ("there shall be no blowby"), and never said a word. Why should I believe him when he suddenly changes his story?
The you either slept through or skipped the classes where it was covered - or you went to cheap ass diploma mill school. I know many people with management degrees - and each and every one of them either took a full course on ethics or encountered it piecemeal across other classes.
That would require integrity. But the reality is that he (and the other Thiokol and NASA engineers) insisted for years that despite the SRB not meeting spec ("there shall be no leakage") that it was safe to fly. Then he changed his story, and subsequently has insisted the changed version is the truth.
[sigh] Not this myth again.
Monolithic boosters were rejected on multiple grounds.
It was virtually impossible to pour them with consistent characteristics along the grain. It was extremely difficult to pour them with consistent performance during the burn. I.E. the motors required consistent and predictable characteristics both longitudinally and radially.) There were difficulties in ensuring complete and even mixing. There were difficulties due to turbulence during the pour. There were difficulties in curing due to the lower portions being under great pressure due to the weight of the propellant above them... Smaller grain segments reduced or eliminated these problems.
These problems also prevented another key requirement from being met - they could not produce matched pairs of boosters. Unbalanced thrust could produce excessive stress on the external tank structure or even exceed the Shuttle's control limits and cause it to tumble. Again, smaller grain segments reduce or eliminate these problems because left hand and right hand segments could be matched from the same pour.
There was also another problem - handling the bastards. At the scale of these motors, they aren't stiff - they will actually flex when being rotated from vertical to horizontal (being lifted from the mold and readied for transport) and again when being rotated from the horizontal to the vertical (when being taken off the transport and readied for installation). This flex, even though it was minor, could delaminate the grain from the case and the tension and compression loads could physically damage the grain. And there was no getting around the need to handle them thus - because they needed to be cast nose down, while they flew nose up. The flex and stress on smaller segments is negligible.
Another handling difficulty was the sheer weight of the thing. This wasn't just a problem that could be solved by getting a big crane either... You see, the lower portion of the grain bears the weight of all the grain above it - and the grain is actually somewhat flexible. (It's called solid fuel, but it's not really solid like a rock... it's much closer to tire rubber than anything else... it can and does deform under stress.) Not only would the grain change shape as it flowed, but it could also tear itself apart under it's own weight. With smaller segments, these stresses are manageable.
Yes, maybe these problems could have been solved with sufficient time and money, but NASA had neither and they did have an ace in the hole: There was no flight experience with large monolithics, but there was at least limited flight experience with large segemented boosters.
So in the end, NASA chose exactly the type of solution everybody seems to think they always should make, especially with manned craft... Fiscally conservative. Schedule conservative. Technically conservative. And, with the knowledge available to them at that time, safety conservative.
You remember it mostly correctly - but there's more to it.
Seriously, it's a myth that the problem was unknown and was primarily caused by the cold (though the cold made it worse).
That's just the thing - they listen to their engineers. Right up until the point where the engineers changed their stories. And that's the part of the tale that Boisjoly et al have spent the last quarter century refusing to acknowledge.
The tale starts in the late 60's/early 70's when NASA codified the standards for the Shuttle's segmented solids.* The item in question reads something like "There shall be zero leakage or blow by at segment joints". Well, during testing of the SRB's - they started getting small amounts of leakage and blow by at the segments joints due to joint roation. So, the engineers added a backup O-ring, and despite the fact that the backup was occasionally damaged and leaked... The engineers told management the problem was under control and that it was safe to fly.
So, they went ahead and flew... And the problems with leakage and blow by continued to occur. The engineers insisted that with some minor modifications to the joint, the problem would go away.** In the meantime, the engineers insisted that is was safe to continue to fly.
The comes the evening of January 27th... and the engineers change their story. Now, it's not safe to fly. Management, understandably are just a wee bit confused - is it safe to fly or not? Worse yet, the engineers cannot provide a sound engineering rationale for the sudden reversal of their position.
Since the engineers couldn't or wouldn't do what they were paid to do - the managers did what they were paid to and made the call to launch. And that call was made in a large part because they did listen to their engineers, who had repeatedly told them that the problem was under control and it was safe to fly.
The moral of the story? Managers aren't saints. But neither are engineers.
* No, despite all the ill-informed commentary you've heard over the years, monolithics were not a viable option. It's extraordinarily difficult to pour them such that the grain is sufficiently uniform along it's length. It's virtually impossible to pour them in matched pairs. It's virtually impossible to handle them without damaging the grain.
** This is why the revised design was available so fast after the accident - the design process was already underway.
I am - but thinking of it from an engineering sense means looking at all plausible causes (which you aren't) and reviewing all the available evidence (which you haven't, unless you read Russian).
However, "more probable" does not mean "actually did happen". (I repeat this because it doesn't seem to have sunk in the first time.)
Now, as it happens, where the failure occurred depends on which (rough and fast) translation of the report you read. Thanks, but I'll stick with engineering and leave the bias to you.
Small, but decidedly non-zero. So I should point out that "improbable" != "impossible".