> And we're the ones who are going to have to live with it.
We're the ones who will have to (a) reverse the abuse, (b) fix the system to prevent future abuse.
Politicians are not at a loss in the face of technology. They are advised by the very best technologists that money can buy. In fact, most advanced technology is funded by politicians (military or government sponsored R&D).
We can't be surprised when individual politicians employ technology for political (economic) gain. But we can and must expect that the political system evolve towards the use of technology to represent the values of all constituents.
Those in an engineering co-op program who have already gained industrial experience to complement their engineering foundation -- please consider switching to law, sooner rather than later.
You're absolutely correct. And until there was organized labor, organized management did exactly what they wanted, when they wanted.
Hence the need for an organized identity lobby. It could theoretically emerge from current vehicles for collective bargaining (e.g. unions), but their lack of tech literacy makes that unlikely. A new structure of organized resistance is needed, but will not emerge solely on the basis of political or moral objection. It will require, like all organizations, economic motivation.
Current pro-ID lobbies are using the safe cover of security, but the long term goals are clearly economic. After the golden pro-ID economic objectives slide out behind the black shields of security, it will be clear to all that an economic resistance is the only response.
In the long term, Isaac Newton wins. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. I'll show you mine if you show me yours.
If we have to carry cards, we can also carry card readers. If we have to show id, then the person requesting id also has to show id. We swap cards and read them into our respective card-reading wireless terminals.
Technology is neutral. When we sense that we are being outnumbered by a more organized ecosystem, there will inevitably be an organized defense. Organized labor was a necessary response to organized management. Identity will be no different. While there are fascist motivations for strong identity, there are many more economic motivations. Hence, there will be economic incentives for social organization around identity.
Their people will talk to your people.
Everyone needs "people" -- and the government is not "your" people.
Multi-culturalism is itself a cultural attribute. Not easy to engineer, but not impossible either. Canada earned its multi-cultural credentials with Quebec, leaving an uneasy union of British and French. The recognition of two national languages went a long way to head off the tyranny of either.
Toronto is now home to dozens of languages (plus English & French) and, except around World Cup time, is quite sane. The cultures are melting, but they are melting at the edges, instead of being shredded and spun vigorously.
The FCC regulates many devices for compliance with specific standards. Just about all electronics have to comply with RFI regulations that ensure non-interference with neighboring radio and television receivers. I believe this affects primarily the power supply.
My (not very clear) point was that functionality creep is inevitably accompanied by regulatory creep. This thread is about the convenience of using a (historically data processing) computer as the functional equivalent of a global radio.
While blurring the boundaries can be attractive from the user's point of view, we can make architectural choices that slow the encroachment of regulatory bodies. If we don't want to accept radio regulations all the time, let's ensure that the radio circuitry is removable from the data processing circuitry.
I was using the Centrino bundle as an example, but the criticism applies to any hardware bundling of Pentium M and "built in" Wi-Fi. The distinction is whether the user can remove all radio (communication) related components from the notebook.
Can I use the mini-PCI slot for a device that is not Wi-Fi? Can I remove the antenna that is built into the laptop chassis? If not, it seems difficult to argue that my data processing device is not simultaneously a communications device, subject to FCC regulation.
Note the difference with dialup modems, which become part of the POTS network while connected to a phone line. A wireless modem is under no such restriction.
But your radio never performed encryption/decryption or balanced your checkbook. Nor was your computer regulated by the FCC. But now that your data processing device has become a communications device, the FCC (or non-US equivalent) has jurisdiction over your computer.
This is why Wi-Fi should never be integrated with the motherboard chipset (a la Centrino). Keep it as an optional add-on. Let the FCC regulate a PC Card or USB device, not the entire computer.
Down with non-optional bundling of law with convenience.
Recounts have to be requested, they are not triggered by a difference between the two records. Recounts are typically only requested when the margin of victory is very small, otherwise the loser bears the political cost of appearing to be a sore loser. This produces an incentive for fraud to create a large margin of victory in many places and a tiny margin in 1 or 2 places for a media-distracting recount.
If a recount is triggered and a difference is found between the two records, which record do you take as correct? The paper one? Why?
If the paper and electronic records are both being protected by the same humans, then the humans' protective attention has been diluted for no gain.
If the paper record is stronger than the electronic record, it should be the primary count, not the secondary count (which would only be consulted during a recount).
We are demoting the stronger record (paper) in favor of a weaker one (electronic) and comforting ourselves with the illusion that we have a "strong" backup which will almost never be checked.
That's equivalent to the difference between single sign-on and a mirrored database. You have (a) increased system complexity, (b) doubled the risk of failure (two fraud targets instead of one), and (c) paid the opportunity cost of not improving voter registration and authentication.
Good point. Plus they could make a case for needing mechanical assistance. What to do?
How about people in wheelchairs in New York? They must take up more square footage (seated) than a scooter (standing). Is there a maximum legal size for wheelchairs?
Maybe you limit the quota to those who have no alternate means of locomotion - that would handle both fat people and wheelchairs.
Diebold is one animator away from being a cartoon villian. Gerrymandering is at least equally destructive to democracy. From America as a One Party State:
"... We are at risk of becoming an autocracy in three key respects. First, Republican parliamentary gimmickry has emasculated legislative opposition in the House of Representatives (the Senate has other problems). House Majority Leader Tom DeLay of Texas has both intimidated moderate Republicans and reduced the minority party to window dressing, rather like the token opposition parties in Mexico during the six-decade dominance of the PRI.
Second, electoral rules have been rigged to make it increasingly difficult for the incumbent party to be ejected by the voters, absent a Depression-scale disaster, Watergate-class scandal or Teddy Roosevelt-style ruling party split. After two decades of bipartisan collusion in the creation of safe House seats, there are now perhaps just 25 truly contestable House seats in any given election year (and that's before the recent Republican super gerrymandering). What once was a slender and precarious majority -- 229 Republicans to 205 Democrats (including Bernie Sanders of Vermont, an independent who votes with Democrats) -- now looks like a Republican lock. In the Senate, the dynamics are different but equally daunting for Democrats. As the Florida debacle of 2000 showed, the Republicans are also able to hold down the number of opposition votes, with complicity from Republican courts. Reform legislation, the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA), may actually facilitate Republican intimidation of minority voters and reduce Democratic turnout. And the latest money-and-politics regime, nominally a reform, may give the right more of a financial advantage than ever.
Third, the federal courts, which have slowed some executive-branch efforts to destroy liberties, will be a complete rubber stamp if the right wins one more presidential election.
Those federal courts? They have a little something to do with copyright law (see other stories on Slashdot today).
Is at least as important as a paper trail. Since we already have systems that have a paper trail (i.e. paper ballots), computers could be better used to improve the accuracy and reliability of the voter registration process. This would reduce tampering by hostile insiders *and* outsiders.
> I trust my local bank more than any > government agency with money.
You think you do. Would you bank at an institution that was not FDIC Insured? FDIC = Federal Government.
Ford? See Ralph Nader and vehicle safety.
Private vs public hospital? At the same price point?
PG&E participated in the price gouging of California, which had nothing to do with electricity and everything to do with manipulation of so-called deregulation that was rejected by libertarians. Happy about your taxes? Or the $15B bond measure?
John Edwards ran a stellar campaign on exactly those principles, including 2-week internet disclosure of lobbyist meetings, 7-day advance notice of Senate bill changes and free broadcast time for political campaigns.
Although questionable tactics were used to force him from the race, it was extremely encouraging to see how many people did vote for the non-FUD presidential candidate.
Public perception of voter apathy is the single most dangerous threat to electoral integrity, because it provides convenient cover for "low turnouts" (which could be suppressed votes).
Diebold stories unfortunately help feed the apathy myth, even as they perform necessary education on the larger need to improve our process.
You need to create financial incentives that yield a net increase in process quality (vote tabulation integrity). Think ISO 9001, FDA and pharmaceutical regulation, CISSP, HIPAA, Sarbanes-Oxley and other auditing standards.
Randomness is an essential component of auditing (and encryption) systems, especially in local regions with small populations where physical threats can subvert processes. In such cases, no number of nominally independent local auditors (including poll inspectors) can ensure non-tampering. There were many issues of concern in the 2004 Democratic primaries.
Random inspection by randomly selected auditors from the largest possible international pool would be step one in the auditing of electoral integrity.
Risk management of financial integrity would look at the size of the potential loss in a system compromise. What would be that size in a national U.S. election? Annual national spending? Number of deaths in a military conflict? Societal opportunity cost of ineffective trade, health or education policy?
There are already financial incentives for electoral integrity - for boards of directors, pension fund managers, international aid distribution. Some work better than others, but basic principles are known:
Shorter filing deadlines
Longer inspection deadlines
Robust records retention
Time-locked revolving doors
Economic autonomy of auditors
Computer security relies on defense in depth and is most cautious about insider trust assumption.
Electoral integrity is a superset of computer security.
Can you recommend a couple of sites to learn about Linux text-to-speech and/or voice recognition, especially X integration?
> And we're the ones who are going to have to live with it.
We're the ones who will have to (a) reverse the abuse, (b) fix the system to prevent future abuse.
Politicians are not at a loss in the face of technology. They are advised by the very best technologists that money can buy. In fact, most advanced technology is funded by politicians (military or government sponsored R&D).
We can't be surprised when individual politicians employ technology for political (economic) gain. But we can and must expect that the political system evolve towards the use of technology to represent the values of all constituents.
Those in an engineering co-op program who have already gained industrial experience to complement their engineering foundation -- please consider switching to law, sooner rather than later.
Your Dwindling Protections Online.
Your Rights haven't changed.
You're absolutely correct. And until there was organized labor, organized management did exactly what they wanted, when they wanted.
Hence the need for an organized identity lobby. It could theoretically emerge from current vehicles for collective bargaining (e.g. unions), but their lack of tech literacy makes that unlikely. A new structure of organized resistance is needed, but will not emerge solely on the basis of political or moral objection. It will require, like all organizations, economic motivation.
Current pro-ID lobbies are using the safe cover of security, but the long term goals are clearly economic. After the golden pro-ID economic objectives slide out behind the black shields of security, it will be clear to all that an economic resistance is the only response.
In the long term, Isaac Newton wins. For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. I'll show you mine if you show me yours.
If we have to carry cards, we can also carry card readers. If we have to show id, then the person requesting id also has to show id. We swap cards and read them into our respective card-reading wireless terminals.
Technology is neutral. When we sense that we are being outnumbered by a more organized ecosystem, there will inevitably be an organized defense. Organized labor was a necessary response to organized management. Identity will be no different. While there are fascist motivations for strong identity, there are many more economic motivations. Hence, there will be economic incentives for social organization around identity.
Their people will talk to your people.
Everyone needs "people" -- and the government is not "your" people.
Multi-culturalism is itself a cultural attribute. Not easy to engineer, but not impossible either. Canada earned its multi-cultural credentials with Quebec, leaving an uneasy union of British and French. The recognition of two national languages went a long way to head off the tyranny of either.
Toronto is now home to dozens of languages (plus English & French) and, except around World Cup time, is quite sane. The cultures are melting, but they are melting at the edges, instead of being shredded and spun vigorously.
> Don't get used to the current state of affairs, because it's
> going to get a hell of a lot worse eventually.
Supreme Court Justice Kenneth Starr.
Lifetime appointments last longer than 4 years.
The FCC regulates many devices for compliance with specific standards. Just about all electronics have to comply with RFI regulations that ensure non-interference with neighboring radio and television receivers. I believe this affects primarily the power supply.
My (not very clear) point was that functionality creep is inevitably accompanied by regulatory creep. This thread is about the convenience of using a (historically data processing) computer as the functional equivalent of a global radio.
While blurring the boundaries can be attractive from the user's point of view, we can make architectural choices that slow the encroachment of regulatory bodies. If we don't want to accept radio regulations all the time, let's ensure that the radio circuitry is removable from the data processing circuitry.
I was using the Centrino bundle as an example, but the criticism applies to any hardware bundling of Pentium M and "built in" Wi-Fi. The distinction is whether the user can remove all radio (communication) related components from the notebook.
Can I use the mini-PCI slot for a device that is not Wi-Fi? Can I remove the antenna that is built into the laptop chassis? If not, it seems difficult to argue that my data processing device is not simultaneously a communications device, subject to FCC regulation.
Note the difference with dialup modems, which become part of the POTS network while connected to a phone line. A wireless modem is under no such restriction.
But your radio never performed encryption/decryption or balanced your checkbook. Nor was your computer regulated by the FCC. But now that your data processing device has become a communications device, the FCC (or non-US equivalent) has jurisdiction over your computer.
This is why Wi-Fi should never be integrated with the motherboard chipset (a la Centrino). Keep it as an optional add-on. Let the FCC regulate a PC Card or USB device, not the entire computer.
Down with non-optional bundling of law with convenience.
Those escape sequences worked on xterm, ansi, vt100 emulations. Will remember tput in case I get stuck on a weird terminal, thanks.
Recounts have to be requested, they are not triggered by a difference between the two records. Recounts are typically only requested when the margin of victory is very small, otherwise the loser bears the political cost of appearing to be a sore loser. This produces an incentive for fraud to create a large margin of victory in many places and a tiny margin in 1 or 2 places for a media-distracting recount.
If a recount is triggered and a difference is found between the two records, which record do you take as correct? The paper one? Why?
If the paper and electronic records are both being protected by the same humans, then the humans' protective attention has been diluted for no gain.
If the paper record is stronger than the electronic record, it should be the primary count, not the secondary count (which would only be consulted during a recount).
We are demoting the stronger record (paper) in favor of a weaker one (electronic) and comforting ourselves with the illusion that we have a "strong" backup which will almost never be checked.
That's equivalent to the difference between single sign-on and a mirrored database. You have (a) increased system complexity, (b) doubled the risk of failure (two fraud targets instead of one), and (c) paid the opportunity cost of not improving voter registration and authentication.
Good point. Plus they could make a case for needing mechanical assistance. What to do?
How about people in wheelchairs in New York? They must take up more square footage (seated) than a scooter (standing). Is there a maximum legal size for wheelchairs?
Maybe you limit the quota to those who have no alternate means of locomotion - that would handle both fat people and wheelchairs.
For submitting a new listing (free) for the next edition of the book, go here.
No need to single out Segway. Limit the square footage of sidewalk that can be used by single humans during rush hour.
This will allow use when the sidewalk is empty (which can yield a registration fee that goes towards sidewalk maintenance).
For rush hour, a square footage quota will incent R&D for the scooter-pooling version of Segway.
Those federal courts? They have a little something to do with copyright law (see other stories on Slashdot today).
Is at least as important as a paper trail. Since we already have systems that have a paper trail (i.e. paper ballots), computers could be better used to improve the accuracy and reliability of the voter registration process. This would reduce tampering by hostile insiders *and* outsiders.
The most imporant aspect of the voting computer is that it generates paper?
Maybe we should have computers count paper instead of first counting votes and then generating paper.
A real improvement in accountability would be a computer system that audited the *humans* who audit the *process*.
Don't you mean:
"11 dogs including one named Spot"
> I trust my local bank more than any
> government agency with money.
You think you do. Would you bank at an institution that was not FDIC Insured? FDIC = Federal Government.
Ford? See Ralph Nader and vehicle safety.
Private vs public hospital? At the same price point?
PG&E participated in the price gouging of California, which had nothing to do with electricity and everything to do with manipulation of so-called deregulation that was rejected by libertarians. Happy about your taxes? Or the $15B bond measure?
John Edwards ran a stellar campaign on exactly those principles, including 2-week internet disclosure of lobbyist meetings, 7-day advance notice of Senate bill changes and free broadcast time for political campaigns.
Although questionable tactics were used to force him from the race, it was extremely encouraging to see how many people did vote for the non-FUD presidential candidate.
Public perception of voter apathy is the single most dangerous threat to electoral integrity, because it provides convenient cover for "low turnouts" (which could be suppressed votes).
Diebold stories unfortunately help feed the apathy myth, even as they perform necessary education on the larger need to improve our process.
Randomness is an essential component of auditing (and encryption) systems, especially in local regions with small populations where physical threats can subvert processes. In such cases, no number of nominally independent local auditors (including poll inspectors) can ensure non-tampering. There were many issues of concern in the 2004 Democratic primaries.
Random inspection by randomly selected auditors from the largest possible international pool would be step one in the auditing of electoral integrity.
Risk management of financial integrity would look at the size of the potential loss in a system compromise. What would be that size in a national U.S. election? Annual national spending? Number of deaths in a military conflict? Societal opportunity cost of ineffective trade, health or education policy?
There are already financial incentives for electoral integrity - for boards of directors, pension fund managers, international aid distribution. Some work better than others, but basic principles are known:
- Shorter filing deadlines
- Longer inspection deadlines
- Robust records retention
- Time-locked revolving doors
- Economic autonomy of auditors
Computer security relies on defense in depth and is most cautious about insider trust assumption.Electoral integrity is a superset of computer security.