> This approach allows for complex browsers to actually become safer, by simplifying them. The browser is broken up into a set of components. Each component runs in a separate process, completely isolated (by the operating system) from the other components. In addition, each component is isolated from the rest of the system using mandatory access controls (SELinux in this case) which prevent the component from doing anything that it doesn't need to do. [...] > This approach is known to work - it's similar to the approach used by operating system kernels.
Unfortunately, this approach is also known to have several big problems. Take a quick spin through google for the "confused deputy" problem and you will see one of the primary complaints of ACL-based security. Capability-security researchers think they have a solution and in fact created a capability-secure browser called CapDesk several years ago. If anyone is actually interested in the problem they should check it out.
> This is a US centric site, I know, so people please remember that the USA is about 10 years behind the rest of the world when it comes to mobile communication. If not more. Ericsson is a European company and their ideas are more for the European and Asian markets than for the USA market.
Here in the "backwards" US I can get unlimited EVDO rev A (comparable or better speeds than your HSPCA service and better latency) in more than 150 cities, with an automatic downgrade to 1xRTT (much better than GPRS) in markets without EVDO service. For this I will pay $60 for unlimited bandwidth on a wireless card for my laptop. If I were to use a Bluetooth DUN tether through my phone I could get this service for even less; the only downside to this is that the carrier is Sprint and since my company pays for my "backward" iPhone it is not worth the bother for me to carry a second phone just for data service.
Of course, since most of the places I work are blanketed by multiple available wifi hotspots it is frequently not even worth the bother of carrying the card around.
Actually, mnet was based on mojonation, which used Rabin's IDA for splitting the data in a distributed filesystem. While I created the mojonation architecture (and can actually say "been there, done that, printed the t-shirts...") I can't actually claim precendence on the idea -- the real first ideas for this space came from the Intermezzo system and also from Mark Lillibridge's work at DEC.
The current incarnation of these ideas can be seen in the Allmydata service, which uses Tornado/Raptor codes (very advanced forward error-correction) to split up the data. There are several problems with using Rabin's IDA for this purpose, ones which bit us in the ass several times and which I think might end up causing problems for this system...
P.S. Anyone know a good AND easy recipe for Hollandaise sauce? Im about ready to give up on my eggs benedict dream.
Since you are talking about a rather unstable emulsion that gets rather finicky if you do not watch the heat (when the egg proteins shrink and squeeze out the butter you are simply screwed...) I would recommend taking a peak at the version in Julia Childs' "The Way To Cook" for the basics. It is also a bit of a cheat, but there are whisks out now that also have built in thermometers so you can watch the temp of the sauce as you are whisking in the butter. Williams-Sanoma carries them and I am sure you can find them online.
If you want to get good at Hollandaise, practice making your own mayo. Hollondaise is basically a trickier version of mayo, but mayo is easier to recover from pilot errors since you are not heating it and so the "oh shit, I just cooked the egg proteins" landmine is removed from the equation.
I guess I should not have tried to be glib and should have addressed the problems with mix networks and other anonymity schemes directly.
Against a powerful adversary (e.g. an law enforcement agency, not the RIAA) your entire anonymous network is just a black box. Instead of the hop diagram you provided:
S-H-H-H-A-A-A-U
the attacker sees
S-H-H-H-{A}-U
They just treat the entire A network as if it was a single entity and eliminate it from the equation (and since they are a powerful adversary they are probably watching the packets at an upstream backbone site and can eliminate most of the S-H-H... hops as well.) The only way to fix this is to introduce timing delays in packets and not small delays either, enough of a delay that your powerful adversary runs out of space to store all of the packets entering and leaving the anonymous network. An anonymous mix network only works if it can't be passively examined in this manner, and at the moment Tor does not make this assurance.
This only works if the tattle-tale knows how to find you.
With TOR, a malicious host doesn't know your IP so all it can do is reveal {someone exiting the TOR network at IP address x.x.x.x at time t accessed my site}.
I'll try to make my reply short, but here is the basic problem with all packet-mixing schemes (including Tor, its onion-router predecessor, the freedom network run by zero-knowledge systems back in the day, and the pipenet proposal from Wei Dai that started all of this...)
Against a powerful adversary you run into a fundemental problem: they have the resources to treat your entire magic network as a big black box. Packets go in, and packets come out. How they are mixed up in the middle does not matter, since they are looking for connecting the endpoints. Noise introduced into channels to obscure traffic fall away to simple statistical analysis. At the end of the day what matters to users is getting packets from point A to point B and back to A. In order to truly hide this fact you need to introduce timing delays and change the payload sizes. Changing payload sizes is not too difficult, but introducing timing delays really tends to annoy people and can completely break sites using AJAX and modern web techniques.
If the NSA and wanted to know what you were looking at through Tor they would use their giant packet sniffer in the sky to connect packets leaving your system with packets passing out to of the Tor cloud; they would not get your the first time this happened, but eventually a pattern would be built that would connect your system to a set of destination URLs. This is becoming even easier now that ever other site has decided that AJAX (and its constant back and forth between server and client) is the way to go. Since the NSA has access to a lot of resources they could also create a lot of Tor nodes to further subdivide the Tor network and eventually partition you into a smaller and smaller space (by tracking the timings and sizes of packets going through the nodes they control.) There are various ways to protect against this, but they are all costly because they introduce inefficiency to the network and some of them are impractical because they break the user's (or web site designer's) expectation of what should be happening when a browser hits a particular URL.
TANSTAAFL and there is no magic bullet for internet privacy.
1. What are the theories behind simple anonymous sharing of data?
It depends on what you mean by the terms "simple", "anonymous", and "sharing." Seriously. There is a lot of crypto research out there that touches upon the various possibilities, but it all boils down to this: the more anonymity you have in the network the higher the cost of using that network for everyone involved (where cost == increased bandwidth & CPU consumption and increased message passing latency.) In terms of what is possible there is basically a big dial, labelled "apply various crypto protocols and message-hiding techniques", that you can turn to decide how much inconvenience you are willing to put up with in return for better privacy.
2. Is it possible to completely diversify the Internet away from IP-based hosting to a new swarm-network of anonymous users all hosting little pieces of various forms of information? 2b. Is anyone working on this swarm idea?
Possible, but difficult. The difficulty increases significantly if you want to ensure reliability & availability of the data provided by the swarm or provide the nifty "web 2.0" trappings that most people have come to expect from web sites. Various projects are working on components of this mythical system, ranging from the Tor networking system mentioned in the original post to the Invisible Internet Project and GNUNet. Nailing the whole package in a single effort is a non-starter for anyone who has even casually glanced at the relevant research necessary to begin such a project, so each effort focuses on one specific aspect and eventually it might be possible to combine these efforts into a single coherent sytem.
In other words, don't hold your breath waiting for this one to actually come about.
3. As information becomes more accessible, will the need for information privacy be important? 3b. Is it more important to create a totally anonymous information sharing network than it is to work on harder to break encryption schemes?
I won't bother trying to answer the first part of the question because it is a matter of personal preference. As far as the second half of the question goes, having good end-to-end security does not help you if either of the endpoints is compromised; a malicious server can reveal that you are surfing for child porn while a malicious user can reveal that your site is distributing bomb-making recipes with no need for the points in between the two ends to break the communications encryption.
one of the comments was that the Fedral Air Marshals had viewed footage from the Explosive Decompression myth in their training
How very scary.
That particular mythbusting episode was one that got it wrong. The mythbusters confused static for dynamic pressure when trying to determine what would happen if a gun was fired through a airline window while in flight; pressurizing the plane to equal the air pressure differential between cruising altitude and ground level is not the same as having this same pressure differential exposed while a plane is travelling in excess of 500mph.
The toxoplasmodium parasite already does this to rodents. As a part of its lifecycle it needs to get from a mouse into a cat. It manages to perform this by modifying the mouse's brain to no longer be afraid of the scent of a cat and to perform certain actions (e.g. don't worry about staying in the dark parts of the grain silo...) that increase the probability that a cat will end up eating the rodent. This allows the parasite to move on to its next host.
The neurological effects of this parasite are also why pregnant women should not scoop the litter box, the parasite leaves the cat via its dung and if it gets inhaled by a pregnant woman it can cause neurological problems for the fetus (the woman's immune system can handle the parasite, but the fetus does not have a strong enough immune system to kill the parasite.)
Annyone want to bet that what these researches have discovered is the chemical pathway that allows toxoplasmodium gondii to accomplish this neat neurological trick?
EROS was a direct descendant of KeyKOS, a capability-secure OS that ran on IBM S/370 systems, and Coyotos is a direct descendant of EROS. FWIW, KeyKOS was itself based upon a prototype design for a secure mainframe OS called GNOSIS (which I do not think was ever actually implemented, while KeyKOS was a real product back in the days when mainframes ruled the earth.)
Thanks. Some of it should be up now. The problem with putting together the first FAQ for a consumer-oriented product is that we have a lot of details that techies might want to know that will either bore or scare the mythical "grandma" user.
I'm jealous that the UK has *any* time limit, be it two weeks or three months. I don't believe the US has ever clearly defined "speed trial," though I could be wrong.
You would be wrong. The actual definition depends on the circumstances, but there is a large body of case law that sets out the limits as to what is required to fulfill a defendants 6th amaendment rights. Here is a helpful primer if you are actually curious.
MojoNation. Bram successfully identified the unnecessary complexity in the system and ruthlessly culled these bits, so he deserves full props for innovation here, but not for "invention."
Error-corrected and replicated so that 50% of the cloud could disappear and you would still have 4 or 5 nines of reliability.
Per-file, content-dependant encryption (e.g. every file gets its own AES encryption key)
Free accounts have a 10:1 provided vs. consumed ratio (to cover replication and error-correction bloat, with the ratio expected to drop over time) and people who want to buy a better ratio or even not have to provide space can do so.
Access to data backed-up by any of your systems from any other system you have installed the software on. (No more need to fiddle with system-to-system sync to make sure you have access to all of your files.)
Sound interesting? If so, head over to Allmydata and sign up for the beta test. [Windows only at the moment, but OS X and Linux versions will be available in a couple of months...]
A solution similar to the one suggested in this page is already being beta tested. Windows-only at the moment, but that will change. Based on the same technology that BitTorrent was derived from...
caesin is protein, you just made dried cheese
on
Makers of MAKE
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· Score: 2, Informative
FYI, caesin is one of the predominant proteins in milk. It is not plastic. What you are making is a coagulate, using the acid to unfold the proteins and get them to clump together.
Another description of this "plastic" is acid-precipitated cheese.
You have made a lump of mozzarella and dried it out.
I think others will hit the "does anyone dive on just O2" answers by pointing out the point where O2 gets toxic. So the answer to your question of whether or not anyone dives with _just_ a pure O2 tank will be "no". If I am doing a deep dive with a decco stop and want to offgas faster before leaving the water I will take a 100% O2 tank for the last stop, but more often than that will be having a 50% O2 tank that can be used for the last couple of stops. You will get the nitrogen out of your blood faster by reducing the partial pressure of N2 in your lungs, and you do this by replacing the N2 in what you are breathing with more O2 -- it sucks the N2 out of your tissue a lot faster.
Having said all that, the closest you will come to someone diving on pure O2 is a closed-circuit rebreather. These systems will have a tank of O2 that is bled into the gas loop you are breathing from to replace the O2 that your metabolism has converted to CO2 (which is pulled out via a lithium hydroxide cartridge usually.) There will usually be a second tank of gas to keep the breathing loop at the appropriate pressure for the current depth.
What this invention could do is replace the O2 tank in this sort of rebreather with something that would pull the O2 out of the water.
Sorry you feel that way, but your reasoning regarding the US Consitution is wrong. The US Constitution clearly states that the US Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in only a few cases. In the last couple of years there was a fight between New York and New Jersey over which state "owned" an island, and this made news among legal scholars because it was the first case of original jurisdiction for the court that anyone alive had seen.
In all other cases the US Supreme Court has "appellate" jurisdiction, which means that other courts can have their cases appealed to the supremes and they can make a final decision. if you actaully read the text you will see that this same clause which provides for supreme court review also explicitly states that the legislature can limit this appellate jurisdiction as it sees fit. The first case the supremes decided of any importance (Marbury v. Madison, the case in which the supreme court made an audacious power grab and declared that it had the right to decide whether or not laws were "constitutional") was also the case in which the supreme court ceded to the legislative branch the abiliity to do just what they are now doing.
You are also sadly mistaken about what would happen in your own country, since you lack a court with the real authority to do what the US supremes can do (all other national courts want to be the SOCTUS when they grow up...) The only effective check to this sort of power you have is a fairly strong legislative branch, one with more balls than the US legislative branches, but one that is just as easily subverted by popular frenzies as our is.
If Indonesia had truly fallen apart less than a decade ago as some thought it might and you suddenly had ten million or so Indonesians washing up on your shore who do you think would have stood in the way of a similar action? Oh, and how is Pauline Hanson and One Nation doing these days?
Just becuase it's a part of the bill doesn't mean it can't get struck down in judicial review.
Yes. It does.
If that part is taken to court, the court will probably say that the "no judicial review" part is unconstitutional and can't be enforced.
No. The court, refering to such weak precedence as Marbury v. Madison, will acknowledge that the legislature does have the authority to limit appellate jurisdiction by not even bothering to give an appeal based on this fact a second thought.
The same bit of the consititution that gives the court its authority in these matters also cleearly spells out in the text itself that the legislature can limit the jurisdiction of the court in this way.
Well, the dicey part is that Congress never acted on this, and I don't see how check and balances can continue to work if they start doing this now.
Yes they have. This is not the first time such language has been in a bill, nor will it be the last. The US Supreme Court has already acknowledged such in the past. The same constitution that gives the Supremes their power also provides the legislature with the authority to neuter that power. In fact, the case in point that you will want to check out is Marbury vs. Madison, the case from which all power of supreme court review flows from, in which the court recognizes the right of the legislature to limit jurisdiction in this manner (for reference, the court has original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in all other cases except where the legislative branch carves out an exception.)
CleanFlicks/ClearPlay has defended its position based on traditional notions of fair use.
And because a defendant in a lawsuit makes a claim you automatically assume that it has validity?
I am not sure whether your original whine or this somewhat confused reponse is sadder, but let's get a few things straight. Both ClearPlay and CleanFlicks had been sued by the DGA (Director's Guild of America) for copyright violations. Oirignally it was just CleanFlicks, but ClearPlay was added as a co-defendant once they started to get traction in the marketplace. ClearPlay downloads an edit list to the DVD player that jumps over objectionable frames, while CleanFlicks created a new derivative DVD that they then rented out (and kept copies of the originals around so that the were not engaging in outright piracy.)
CleanFlicks made the fair use argument in an attempt to make as many claims as possible in the hope that one offered them protection, and by having ClearPlay as a co-defendant they might have stood a chance. CleanFlicks had created a derivative work, which is not covered by fair use exceptions (a tranformative work actually...) This was also not the only argument they made, it was one of several that were part of a fairly broad scramble to find any legal protection for the service they were offering.
BTW, if you are going to cut and paste from a web site that is better informed than you are (M.E.L.O.N in this case) it is probably good karma to give them the props for knowing what they are talking about when you clearly didn't. You should also have followed all of the links on that page, specifically the one leading to the "Q & A: What is Fair Use?" page where you would have learned that the fair use claim that CleanFlicks was trying to make had a snowball's chance in hell of succeeding.
It is also worth noting that the text of the bill only applies to ClearPlay, not CleanFlicks. Specifically, S.167/H.R.357 provides an exception to 17 USC 107 whereby paragraph 11 now protects software and hardware that modifies a work in play, if no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer program or other technology." Therefore the fair use argument is moot since ClearPlay is now explicitly covered by an exemption (expect to see them dropped from the CleanFlicks suit soon, eliminating the only fair use claims the defendants had...)
Heres a thought. If buying a DVD does not necessarily provide me with the fair use rights to strip out its content and modify/store it to my needs, how does that provide Clearplay with the right to filter out what they deem filthy?
Because the Clearplay filtering operates on the original DVD. They are not getting a free pass to distribute new DVDs that have their editing applied, but to distribute software for DVD players that applies filters to an original DVD that the user has inserted into the player. If your desire to store/modify a DVD only applied to an original DVD then you too would be covered (e.g you can make a "nothing but the dirty bits" filter and are covered by this law.)
RTFA and do a bit of research before making yourself look like an ass next time...
You are so full of it I do not even know where to begin...
you need money to pay for the necessary processing power and crackers to break it almost anything (probably could remove the almost) today is crackable...
Unless your money has somehow bought you a loophole in information theory, a properly used one-time pad is UNBREAKABLE and no amount of processing power will ever change this fact. You could burn cycles until the heat-death of the universe and be no closer to cracking the message than when you started. Even using "standard" cryptography it is easy to build a cipher which is computationally infeasible to break, the only thing which will change this is a breakthrough in mathematics.
most especially non-military non-intelligence encryption methods it's just a matter of time and money to break it that's the whole reason why they want quantum cryptopgrahy
Math doesn't work differently for the military, for spies, or for you and me. Quantum crypto solves the key distribution problem, but it does not actaully encrypt the message. If you and I were to use a quantum crypto channel to exchange a message an evesdropper could still sniff the key (it is improbable, but still possible), the only benefit of quantum crypto is that you would know that this evesdropping occurred. In this case evedropping becomes a denial of service attack.
most especially non-military non-intelligence encryption methods it's just a matter of time and money to break it that's the whole reason why they want quantum cryptopgrahy
You are just making this up as you go along, aren't you? A hash is used for authenticating messages, not encrypting them, but it suffers from the difficult problem of trying to take a large number of bits and distill them down into a smaller number of bits in a non-reversible way. It is that last bit (the non-reversible part) that is the problem. Your claim that you could build a rainbow table for something "simple" like SHA1 is laughable. Check out an article by a real physicist (I suggest Seth Lloyd's "Physical limits of computation") to get a reality check. The short version is that if you could use quantum spin to record your rainbow table into a mole of carbon it would just barely fit. OTOH it would take you around 10,000 years to initialize your super-database because you are limited by how quickly you can flip bits (which takes energy and produces heat) and unless you want to be computing at the wavefront of a thermonuclear explosion there is a practical limit to how much energy you can put into your system. Now, when the time comes to read this data you are going to want to do a massively parallel search, so you need to spread out your data. To keep it under the previously mentioned heat limit you need to spread out your quantum database to be something on the order of 10^20 cubic meters, which is only 90% of the volume of the planet earth. I am sure that everyone else on the planet will be happy to live on the remaining 10% when your "infinite money" check clears the bank...
As someone who has watched, helped with, and discussed various anonymous networks from Pipenet through Onion routing and Tor I can give you the quick summary for why NRL was interested in anonymous browsing (because when they first came out with the Onion network stuff it really was a surprise.)
Sometimes, government agencies would prefer it if web queries did not show up in the server's logs as coming from a.mil or.gov site.
Just knowing what someone is reading or researching is a good source of intel, some government agencies see more benefit to this than the downside of potential terrorist uses.*
Jim
* anyway, if you work for a big governement agency you have the resources to treat these sorts of networks like a big black box and link up the endpoints. This is a fatal flaw to _all_ real-time anonymous networks. A big attacker can treat all of the fancy games you play in the middle of network as noise and just link up "message X went into dark network at time T and a message close to the size of message X came out of the network at time T +1, followed by a similarly linkable message going back the other way..."
An indexer has no way to know if you own a legit copy of what you wish to download
If you have a legit copy then you have no need to download another copy, you can just use your legit copy if you need to change the format or make a backup.
Slashdot Mirror
> This approach allows for complex browsers to actually become safer, by simplifying them. The browser is broken up into a set of components. Each component runs in a separate process, completely isolated (by the operating system) from the other components. In addition, each component is isolated from the rest of the system using mandatory access controls (SELinux in this case) which prevent the component from doing anything that it doesn't need to do.
[...]
> This approach is known to work - it's similar to the approach used by operating system kernels.
Unfortunately, this approach is also known to have several big problems. Take a quick spin through google for the "confused deputy" problem and you will see one of the primary complaints of ACL-based security. Capability-security researchers think they have a solution and in fact created a capability-secure browser called CapDesk several years ago. If anyone is actually interested in the problem they should check it out.
> This is a US centric site, I know, so people please remember that the USA is about 10 years behind the rest of the world when it comes to mobile communication. If not more. Ericsson is a European company and their ideas are more for the European and Asian markets than for the USA market.
Here in the "backwards" US I can get unlimited EVDO rev A (comparable or better speeds than your HSPCA service and better latency) in more than 150 cities, with an automatic downgrade to 1xRTT (much better than GPRS) in markets without EVDO service. For this I will pay $60 for unlimited bandwidth on a wireless card for my laptop. If I were to use a Bluetooth DUN tether through my phone I could get this service for even less; the only downside to this is that the carrier is Sprint and since my company pays for my "backward" iPhone it is not worth the bother for me to carry a second phone just for data service.
Of course, since most of the places I work are blanketed by multiple available wifi hotspots it is frequently not even worth the bother of carrying the card around.
The current incarnation of these ideas can be seen in the Allmydata service, which uses Tornado/Raptor codes (very advanced forward error-correction) to split up the data. There are several problems with using Rabin's IDA for this purpose, ones which bit us in the ass several times and which I think might end up causing problems for this system...
P.S. Anyone know a good AND easy recipe for Hollandaise sauce? Im about ready to give up on my eggs benedict dream.
Since you are talking about a rather unstable emulsion that gets rather finicky if you do not watch the heat (when the egg proteins shrink and squeeze out the butter you are simply screwed...) I would recommend taking a peak at the version in Julia Childs' "The Way To Cook" for the basics. It is also a bit of a cheat, but there are whisks out now that also have built in thermometers so you can watch the temp of the sauce as you are whisking in the butter. Williams-Sanoma carries them and I am sure you can find them online.
If you want to get good at Hollandaise, practice making your own mayo. Hollondaise is basically a trickier version of mayo, but mayo is easier to recover from pilot errors since you are not heating it and so the "oh shit, I just cooked the egg proteins" landmine is removed from the equation.
I guess I should not have tried to be glib and should have addressed the problems with mix networks and other anonymity schemes directly.
Against a powerful adversary (e.g. an law enforcement agency, not the RIAA) your entire anonymous network is just a black box. Instead of the hop diagram you provided:
S-H-H-H-A-A-A-U
the attacker sees
S-H-H-H-{A}-U
They just treat the entire A network as if it was a single entity and eliminate it from the equation (and since they are a powerful adversary they are probably watching the packets at an upstream backbone site and can eliminate most of the S-H-H... hops as well.) The only way to fix this is to introduce timing delays in packets and not small delays either, enough of a delay that your powerful adversary runs out of space to store all of the packets entering and leaving the anonymous network. An anonymous mix network only works if it can't be passively examined in this manner, and at the moment Tor does not make this assurance.
With TOR, a malicious host doesn't know your IP so all it can do is reveal {someone exiting the TOR network at IP address x.x.x.x at time t accessed my site}.
I'll try to make my reply short, but here is the basic problem with all packet-mixing schemes (including Tor, its onion-router predecessor, the freedom network run by zero-knowledge systems back in the day, and the pipenet proposal from Wei Dai that started all of this...)
Against a powerful adversary you run into a fundemental problem: they have the resources to treat your entire magic network as a big black box. Packets go in, and packets come out. How they are mixed up in the middle does not matter, since they are looking for connecting the endpoints. Noise introduced into channels to obscure traffic fall away to simple statistical analysis. At the end of the day what matters to users is getting packets from point A to point B and back to A. In order to truly hide this fact you need to introduce timing delays and change the payload sizes. Changing payload sizes is not too difficult, but introducing timing delays really tends to annoy people and can completely break sites using AJAX and modern web techniques.
If the NSA and wanted to know what you were looking at through Tor they would use their giant packet sniffer in the sky to connect packets leaving your system with packets passing out to of the Tor cloud; they would not get your the first time this happened, but eventually a pattern would be built that would connect your system to a set of destination URLs. This is becoming even easier now that ever other site has decided that AJAX (and its constant back and forth between server and client) is the way to go. Since the NSA has access to a lot of resources they could also create a lot of Tor nodes to further subdivide the Tor network and eventually partition you into a smaller and smaller space (by tracking the timings and sizes of packets going through the nodes they control.) There are various ways to protect against this, but they are all costly because they introduce inefficiency to the network and some of them are impractical because they break the user's (or web site designer's) expectation of what should be happening when a browser hits a particular URL.
TANSTAAFL and there is no magic bullet for internet privacy.
1. What are the theories behind simple anonymous sharing of data?
It depends on what you mean by the terms "simple", "anonymous", and "sharing." Seriously. There is a lot of crypto research out there that touches upon the various possibilities, but it all boils down to this: the more anonymity you have in the network the higher the cost of using that network for everyone involved (where cost == increased bandwidth & CPU consumption and increased message passing latency.) In terms of what is possible there is basically a big dial, labelled "apply various crypto protocols and message-hiding techniques", that you can turn to decide how much inconvenience you are willing to put up with in return for better privacy.
2. Is it possible to completely diversify the Internet away from IP-based hosting to a new swarm-network of anonymous users all hosting little pieces of various forms of information? 2b. Is anyone working on this swarm idea?
Possible, but difficult. The difficulty increases significantly if you want to ensure reliability & availability of the data provided by the swarm or provide the nifty "web 2.0" trappings that most people have come to expect from web sites. Various projects are working on components of this mythical system, ranging from the Tor networking system mentioned in the original post to the Invisible Internet Project and GNUNet. Nailing the whole package in a single effort is a non-starter for anyone who has even casually glanced at the relevant research necessary to begin such a project, so each effort focuses on one specific aspect and eventually it might be possible to combine these efforts into a single coherent sytem.
In other words, don't hold your breath waiting for this one to actually come about.
3. As information becomes more accessible, will the need for information privacy be important? 3b. Is it more important to create a totally anonymous information sharing network than it is to work on harder to break encryption schemes?
I won't bother trying to answer the first part of the question because it is a matter of personal preference. As far as the second half of the question goes, having good end-to-end security does not help you if either of the endpoints is compromised; a malicious server can reveal that you are surfing for child porn while a malicious user can reveal that your site is distributing bomb-making recipes with no need for the points in between the two ends to break the communications encryption.
one of the comments was that the Fedral Air Marshals had viewed footage from the Explosive Decompression myth in their training
How very scary.
That particular mythbusting episode was one that got it wrong. The mythbusters confused static for dynamic pressure when trying to determine what would happen if a gun was fired through a airline window while in flight; pressurizing the plane to equal the air pressure differential between cruising altitude and ground level is not the same as having this same pressure differential exposed while a plane is travelling in excess of 500mph.
The toxoplasmodium parasite already does this to rodents. As a part of its lifecycle it needs to get from a mouse into a cat. It manages to perform this by modifying the mouse's brain to no longer be afraid of the scent of a cat and to perform certain actions (e.g. don't worry about staying in the dark parts of the grain silo...) that increase the probability that a cat will end up eating the rodent. This allows the parasite to move on to its next host.
The neurological effects of this parasite are also why pregnant women should not scoop the litter box, the parasite leaves the cat via its dung and if it gets inhaled by a pregnant woman it can cause neurological problems for the fetus (the woman's immune system can handle the parasite, but the fetus does not have a strong enough immune system to kill the parasite.)
Annyone want to bet that what these researches have discovered is the chemical pathway that allows toxoplasmodium gondii to accomplish this neat neurological trick?
EROS was a direct descendant of KeyKOS, a capability-secure OS that ran on IBM S/370 systems, and Coyotos is a direct descendant of EROS. FWIW, KeyKOS was itself based upon a prototype design for a secure mainframe OS called GNOSIS (which I do not think was ever actually implemented, while KeyKOS was a real product back in the days when mainframes ruled the earth.)
Care to try again?
Thanks. Some of it should be up now. The problem with putting together the first FAQ for a consumer-oriented product is that we have a lot of details that techies might want to know that will either bore or scare the mythical "grandma" user.
I'm jealous that the UK has *any* time limit, be it two weeks or three months. I don't believe the US has ever clearly defined "speed trial," though I could be wrong.
You would be wrong. The actual definition depends on the circumstances, but there is a large body of case law that sets out the limits as to what is required to fulfill a defendants 6th amaendment rights. Here is a helpful primer if you are actually curious.
What would that be?
MojoNation. Bram successfully identified the unnecessary complexity in the system and ruthlessly culled these bits, so he deserves full props for innovation here, but not for "invention."
How does this sound?
You store my data, I will store yours.
Error-corrected and replicated so that 50% of the cloud could disappear and you would still have 4 or 5 nines of reliability.
Per-file, content-dependant encryption (e.g. every file gets its own AES encryption key)
Free accounts have a 10:1 provided vs. consumed ratio (to cover replication and error-correction bloat, with the ratio expected to drop over time) and people who want to buy a better ratio or even not have to provide space can do so.
Access to data backed-up by any of your systems from any other system you have installed the software on. (No more need to fiddle with system-to-system sync to make sure you have access to all of your files.)
Sound interesting? If so, head over to Allmydata and sign up for the beta test. [Windows only at the moment, but OS X and Linux versions will be available in a couple of months...]
A solution similar to the one suggested in this page is already being beta tested. Windows-only at the moment, but that will change. Based on the same technology that BitTorrent was derived from...
FYI, caesin is one of the predominant proteins in milk. It is not plastic. What you are making is a coagulate, using the acid to unfold the proteins and get them to clump together.
Another description of this "plastic" is acid-precipitated cheese.
You have made a lump of mozzarella and dried it out.
I think others will hit the "does anyone dive on just O2" answers by pointing out the point where O2 gets toxic. So the answer to your question of whether or not anyone dives with _just_ a pure O2 tank will be "no". If I am doing a deep dive with a decco stop and want to offgas faster before leaving the water I will take a 100% O2 tank for the last stop, but more often than that will be having a 50% O2 tank that can be used for the last couple of stops. You will get the nitrogen out of your blood faster by reducing the partial pressure of N2 in your lungs, and you do this by replacing the N2 in what you are breathing with more O2 -- it sucks the N2 out of your tissue a lot faster.
Having said all that, the closest you will come to someone diving on pure O2 is a closed-circuit rebreather. These systems will have a tank of O2 that is bled into the gas loop you are breathing from to replace the O2 that your metabolism has converted to CO2 (which is pulled out via a lithium hydroxide cartridge usually.) There will usually be a second tank of gas to keep the breathing loop at the appropriate pressure for the current depth.
What this invention could do is replace the O2 tank in this sort of rebreather with something that would pull the O2 out of the water.
Sorry you feel that way, but your reasoning regarding the US Consitution is wrong. The US Constitution clearly states that the US Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in only a few cases. In the last couple of years there was a fight between New York and New Jersey over which state "owned" an island, and this made news among legal scholars because it was the first case of original jurisdiction for the court that anyone alive had seen.
In all other cases the US Supreme Court has "appellate" jurisdiction, which means that other courts can have their cases appealed to the supremes and they can make a final decision. if you actaully read the text you will see that this same clause which provides for supreme court review also explicitly states that the legislature can limit this appellate jurisdiction as it sees fit. The first case the supremes decided of any importance (Marbury v. Madison, the case in which the supreme court made an audacious power grab and declared that it had the right to decide whether or not laws were "constitutional") was also the case in which the supreme court ceded to the legislative branch the abiliity to do just what they are now doing.
You are also sadly mistaken about what would happen in your own country, since you lack a court with the real authority to do what the US supremes can do (all other national courts want to be the SOCTUS when they grow up...) The only effective check to this sort of power you have is a fairly strong legislative branch, one with more balls than the US legislative branches, but one that is just as easily subverted by popular frenzies as our is.
If Indonesia had truly fallen apart less than a decade ago as some thought it might and you suddenly had ten million or so Indonesians washing up on your shore who do you think would have stood in the way of a similar action? Oh, and how is Pauline Hanson and One Nation doing these days?
Just becuase it's a part of the bill doesn't mean it can't get struck down in judicial review.
Yes. It does.
If that part is taken to court, the court will probably say that the "no judicial review" part is unconstitutional and can't be enforced.
No. The court, refering to such weak precedence as Marbury v. Madison, will acknowledge that the legislature does have the authority to limit appellate jurisdiction by not even bothering to give an appeal based on this fact a second thought.
The same bit of the consititution that gives the court its authority in these matters also cleearly spells out in the text itself that the legislature can limit the jurisdiction of the court in this way.
Well, the dicey part is that Congress never acted on this, and I don't see how check and balances can continue to work if they start doing this now.
Yes they have. This is not the first time such language has been in a bill, nor will it be the last. The US Supreme Court has already acknowledged such in the past. The same constitution that gives the Supremes their power also provides the legislature with the authority to neuter that power. In fact, the case in point that you will want to check out is Marbury vs. Madison, the case from which all power of supreme court review flows from, in which the court recognizes the right of the legislature to limit jurisdiction in this manner (for reference, the court has original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in all other cases except where the legislative branch carves out an exception.)
CleanFlicks/ClearPlay has defended its position based on traditional notions of fair use.
And because a defendant in a lawsuit makes a claim you automatically assume that it has validity?
I am not sure whether your original whine or this somewhat confused reponse is sadder, but let's get a few things straight. Both ClearPlay and CleanFlicks had been sued by the DGA (Director's Guild of America) for copyright violations. Oirignally it was just CleanFlicks, but ClearPlay was added as a co-defendant once they started to get traction in the marketplace. ClearPlay downloads an edit list to the DVD player that jumps over objectionable frames, while CleanFlicks created a new derivative DVD that they then rented out (and kept copies of the originals around so that the were not engaging in outright piracy.)
CleanFlicks made the fair use argument in an attempt to make as many claims as possible in the hope that one offered them protection, and by having ClearPlay as a co-defendant they might have stood a chance. CleanFlicks had created a derivative work, which is not covered by fair use exceptions (a tranformative work actually...) This was also not the only argument they made, it was one of several that were part of a fairly broad scramble to find any legal protection for the service they were offering.
BTW, if you are going to cut and paste from a web site that is better informed than you are (M.E.L.O.N in this case) it is probably good karma to give them the props for knowing what they are talking about when you clearly didn't. You should also have followed all of the links on that page, specifically the one leading to the "Q & A: What is Fair Use?" page where you would have learned that the fair use claim that CleanFlicks was trying to make had a snowball's chance in hell of succeeding.
It is also worth noting that the text of the bill only applies to ClearPlay, not CleanFlicks. Specifically, S.167/H.R.357 provides an exception to 17 USC 107 whereby paragraph 11 now protects software and hardware that modifies a work in play, if no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer program or other technology." Therefore the fair use argument is moot since ClearPlay is now explicitly covered by an exemption (expect to see them dropped from the CleanFlicks suit soon, eliminating the only fair use claims the defendants had...)
Heres a thought. If buying a DVD does not necessarily provide me with the fair use rights to strip out its content and modify/store it to my needs, how does that provide Clearplay with the right to filter out what they deem filthy?
Because the Clearplay filtering operates on the original DVD. They are not getting a free pass to distribute new DVDs that have their editing applied, but to distribute software for DVD players that applies filters to an original DVD that the user has inserted into the player. If your desire to store/modify a DVD only applied to an original DVD then you too would be covered (e.g you can make a "nothing but the dirty bits" filter and are covered by this law.)
RTFA and do a bit of research before making yourself look like an ass next time...
You are so full of it I do not even know where to begin...
you need money to pay for the necessary processing power and crackers to break it almost anything (probably could remove the almost) today is crackable...
Unless your money has somehow bought you a loophole in information theory, a properly used one-time pad is UNBREAKABLE and no amount of processing power will ever change this fact. You could burn cycles until the heat-death of the universe and be no closer to cracking the message than when you started. Even using "standard" cryptography it is easy to build a cipher which is computationally infeasible to break, the only thing which will change this is a breakthrough in mathematics.
most especially non-military non-intelligence encryption methods it's just a matter of time and money to break it that's the whole reason why they want quantum cryptopgrahy
Math doesn't work differently for the military, for spies, or for you and me. Quantum crypto solves the key distribution problem, but it does not actaully encrypt the message. If you and I were to use a quantum crypto channel to exchange a message an evesdropper could still sniff the key (it is improbable, but still possible), the only benefit of quantum crypto is that you would know that this evesdropping occurred. In this case evedropping becomes a denial of service attack.
most especially non-military non-intelligence encryption methods it's just a matter of time and money to break it that's the whole reason why they want quantum cryptopgrahy
You are just making this up as you go along, aren't you? A hash is used for authenticating messages, not encrypting them, but it suffers from the difficult problem of trying to take a large number of bits and distill them down into a smaller number of bits in a non-reversible way. It is that last bit (the non-reversible part) that is the problem. Your claim that you could build a rainbow table for something "simple" like SHA1 is laughable. Check out an article by a real physicist (I suggest Seth Lloyd's "Physical limits of computation") to get a reality check. The short version is that if you could use quantum spin to record your rainbow table into a mole of carbon it would just barely fit. OTOH it would take you around 10,000 years to initialize your super-database because you are limited by how quickly you can flip bits (which takes energy and produces heat) and unless you want to be computing at the wavefront of a thermonuclear explosion there is a practical limit to how much energy you can put into your system. Now, when the time comes to read this data you are going to want to do a massively parallel search, so you need to spread out your data. To keep it under the previously mentioned heat limit you need to spread out your quantum database to be something on the order of 10^20 cubic meters, which is only 90% of the volume of the planet earth. I am sure that everyone else on the planet will be happy to live on the remaining 10% when your "infinite money" check clears the bank...
In short, physics trumps money in this case.
As someone who has watched, helped with, and discussed various anonymous networks from Pipenet through Onion routing and Tor I can give you the quick summary for why NRL was interested in anonymous browsing (because when they first came out with the Onion network stuff it really was a surprise.)
.mil or .gov site.
Sometimes, government agencies would prefer it if web queries did not show up in the server's logs as coming from a
Just knowing what someone is reading or researching is a good source of intel, some government agencies see more benefit to this than the downside of potential terrorist uses.*
Jim
* anyway, if you work for a big governement agency you have the resources to treat these sorts of networks like a big black box and link up the endpoints. This is a fatal flaw to _all_ real-time anonymous networks. A big attacker can treat all of the fancy games you play in the middle of network as noise and just link up "message X went into dark network at time T and a message close to the size of message X came out of the network at time T +1, followed by a similarly linkable message going back the other way..."
An indexer has no way to know if you own a legit copy of what you wish to download
If you have a legit copy then you have no need to download another copy, you can just use your legit copy if you need to change the format or make a backup.
Care to try again?