> It's clear that nefarious corporate interests are > foisting inadequately engineered products on the > state election commisssions...
Foisting, bullshit. They are merely offering their admittedly crappy products for sale. The foisting is being done by the election commissions under pressure from the Federal government.
> In the case of paper ballots going into boxes, you > trust that your box doesn't disappear in transit > to the counting place, and that your ballot > doesn't somehow stick to someone else's, or get > accidentally damaged.
You don't have to trust anyone. You can stay after you vote and watch the ballot box and follow it to the "counting place". You may not have time for that, but you can be sure that your favorite candidate's representives will.
This doesn't understand. The hospital security engineer's job is not making the hospital's systems secure. His job is making them compliant with Federal regulations.
I think Linus could sue Darl et. al. as individuals. They are the people who made the statements: Linus needn't concern himself about who their employer happens to be. They might be able to demand that SCO indemnify them, but if it is bankrupt by then...
> They pressured dozens of senators with the > phrase "Lost jobs" and "Communist" and they > wrote legislation to ban code being release to > the GPL and Linux at the NSA.
Bullshit. From http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/news.html:
1 October 2003
An updated public release of SELinux was made today.
> As VoteHere points out, authoritative paper > receipts really just turn the machine into a very > expensive pencil, when they offer the potential to > do so much more.
A pencil, expensive or otherwise, is all that is needed.
> it at least lets you know when an attack is > happening, which is a huge step up from most > paper and even electronic systems.
All that you need to do to detect an attack on a paper system is stand there and watch it. Molly Pollwatcher can do that. With computerized systems she has to trust the experts.
Yes. Just feed the "receipts" (i.e., paper ballots) into a scantron, count them, and announce the results. don't bother to have the touch screen machine do any counting at all.
Unfortunately, such schemes cannot even be explained (let alone proven) to the average poll watcher, and she should not trust a system she cannot understand.
Make a touch screen machine that prints individual paper scantron ballots. The rest of the system can remain unchanged.
> One of the biggest reasons? Blind people. DRE > machines are *huge* for blind people, because they > can be supplemented with an audio interface that > help them vote unassisted.
A touch screen that prints a paper ballot can also be fitted with an audio interface.
> Computer-mediated voting allows any number of > interfaces to be presented in order to overcome > various disabilities.
All of those interfaces can be used with machines that print paper ballots.
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> It's clear that nefarious corporate interests are
> foisting inadequately engineered products on the
> state election commisssions...
Foisting, bullshit. They are merely offering their admittedly crappy products for sale. The foisting is being done by the election commissions under pressure from the Federal government.
> Imagine what history would be like if those people
> voted? I bet, historically, the world would be a
> different place all together.
Especially considering that they know even less about the candidates and issues than do those who do vote, which is appallingly little.
> In the case of paper ballots going into boxes, you
> trust that your box doesn't disappear in transit
> to the counting place, and that your ballot
> doesn't somehow stick to someone else's, or get
> accidentally damaged.
You don't have to trust anyone. You can stay after you vote and watch the ballot box and follow it to the "counting place". You may not have time for that, but you can be sure that your favorite candidate's representives will.
This doesn't understand. The hospital security engineer's job is not making the hospital's systems secure. His job is making them compliant with Federal regulations.
Of course it can be private individual. The use of the word "corporation" in the article is just political polemic.
The bill is bad enough as it stands. Nothing is gained by using loaded and misleading language to describe it.
> ...against anyone who uses information that's in
> a database that a corporation asserts it owns.
This legislation is certainly objectionable, but nothing in it singles out corporations.
> I really can't see thing getting to court somehow
Why do you think it won't get to court? IBM isn't going to settle.
> If SCO goes belly up, what happens to its assets?
If it is liquidated they are sold at auction. They may be sold piecemeal or all to one buyer depending on which seems likely to bring the most money.
IBM seems like a likely buyer for SCO's assets.
> Deciding to keep the Debian accounts disables
> effectively stops the entire developement of
> Debian.
It does no such thing.
> Nobody has been able to upload packages in the
> last week, and lots of services are down.
It is not necessary to have an account on a Debian machine to upload packages. Packages are authenticated by the developer's GPG signature.
> It is sad to see one weak password responsible for
> such a breach.
There is no evidence that the password was weak. James seems to think that it was sniffed.
I think Linus could sue Darl et. al. as individuals. They are the people who made the statements: Linus needn't concern himself about who their employer happens to be. They might be able to demand that SCO indemnify them, but if it is bankrupt by then...
> At some poing they'll get it throught their heads
> that there is no way they can win this battle.
The thing is, it's too late for them to back down. IBM is not going to settle and is not going to drop its counterclaims no matter what SCO does.
> Paper was itself a technology at one point,
And it stopped being a technology when?
> And wouldn't the aerospace industry be pleased to
> find some bonus Titanium (Ti)?
Titanium dioxide is commonplace. It's the pigment in most white paint. Titanium is not scarce: just hard to refine and work.
Their GPL violations are a civil matter between them and the kernel authors. Nothing to do with any Attorneys General.
> They pressured dozens of senators with the
:
> phrase "Lost jobs" and "Communist" and they
> wrote legislation to ban code being release to
> the GPL and Linux at the NSA.
Bullshit.
From http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/news.html
1 October 2003
An updated public release of SELinux was made today.
> These aren't the only two places with such
> reversals of fortune - how does your region fare?
Not well. Milk prices remain low.
> There are all sorts of attacks that Molly
> Pollwatcher will never catch.
Name some (hint: she and her predecessors have been monitoring elections for centuries).
> You also have to make sure that the ballot doesn't
> get changed/lost after submission.
You figure the poll watchers all go home as soon as the polls close?
> As VoteHere points out, authoritative paper
> receipts really just turn the machine into a very
> expensive pencil, when they offer the potential to
> do so much more.
A pencil, expensive or otherwise, is all that is needed.
> it at least lets you know when an attack is
> happening, which is a huge step up from most
> paper and even electronic systems.
All that you need to do to detect an attack on a paper system is stand there and watch it. Molly Pollwatcher can do that. With computerized systems she has to trust the experts.
> Is there anything I missed?
Yes. Just feed the "receipts" (i.e., paper ballots) into a scantron, count them, and announce the results. don't bother to have the touch screen machine do any counting at all.
Clever, and perhaps even provably secure.
Unfortunately, such schemes cannot even be explained (let alone proven) to the average poll watcher, and she should not trust a system she cannot understand.
Make a touch screen machine that prints individual
paper scantron ballots. The rest of the system can remain unchanged.
Nothing wrong with that, as long as the paper ballots are there to be recounted if necessary.
> With this system, the votes are printed and
> visible to you. If you're going to complain that
> the machine stuffed up, you have to tell someone.
The machine could have a REJECT button which would drop the spoiled ballot into a shredder and let you try again.
> One of the biggest reasons? Blind people. DRE
> machines are *huge* for blind people, because they
> can be supplemented with an audio interface that
> help them vote unassisted.
A touch screen that prints a paper ballot can also be fitted with an audio interface.
> Computer-mediated voting allows any number of
> interfaces to be presented in order to overcome
> various disabilities.
All of those interfaces can be used with machines that print paper ballots.
> Due to the nature of the spam, the second should
> never receive spam unless someone is sending email
> to random 8-character accounts at my domain
Both accounts will receive spam.