A very simple defense against this lawsuit should be to note the filing date/time and that you had not yet visited their music festival at that time (provable by virtue of it simply not having happened yet) and therefore could not be one of the 200 specific, but unknown, people that the case is against.
I honestly have no idea how they knew I had a time machine.
no it can't possibly be professional trolling - someone with a 30-comment history (all on wikileaks subjects) who joined a week ago has just dismissed the idea.
If that's supposed to be a reference to me, you need to learn to do your research better. But then... it would explain why you're so hung up on this conspiracy theory.
Just because you're on the receiving end, doesn't mean that you understand how it was done. Getting the enemy's viewpoint can help gain a better understanding of not only the enemy but the situation itself.
I know I will hear a lot of counter-arguments to this but I'm going to say it anyway.
Don't be afraid to fly the martyr's flag.;)
The documents were leaked by people who are in a position of disagreement with their orders and the behavior of the military and political officials. Simply saying "I don't like it" isn't enough of a statement for anyone's needs or purposes. If they are in the know and have evidence that "bad things" are happening, presenting proof of these bad things is the only true means of expression.
One of the more perplexing things about service in the US Military is the lawful order. US Servicemen are required to assess whether an order is lawful and refrain from following it if it is not. The obvious issue with that is ensuring one's assessment is correct. The pitfall is making a moral judgment and finding that there was no legal standing to support it.
I understand that anti-war activists will cheer for those who's actions align with their strong-held moral beliefs. But that does not mean that any individual who also buys in to this moral stance also has a moral imperative to ignore their commitments and trust to do or publish whatever they please simply because they find it more effective than saying "I don't like it".
To be sure - the whistleblower is important to our society. There needs to be individuals who will stand up against power acting against society's best interest. But that doesn't mean every would-be whistleblower is right.
The U.S. and its involvements (interference) in the affairs of other sovereign nations is simply not appreciated by the majority of the world and this is especially true more recently. If there is anything that threatens the U.S. national security more than anything else, it is the increased disapproval of the U.S. in the world. People who are intent on sharing facts and truth wouldn't be as much of a problem if the U.S. was on the straight and narrow.
The world is an increasingly smaller place with various nations meddling in each other's affairs for hundreds of years. The exact nature of this meddling is a subject of history. But I find it sad that the US has been singled out as the great example while others apparently get a free pass.
The one thing I do agree is that the US' leadership over the past decade has been terrible. While I'm less critical of US actions, the actions of its leaders and the way they have presented these actions has done the US great harm (foreign and domestically). That is going to take decades to recover from.
As for facts and truth... sadly, they seem to be much more subjective than they would appear to be. Different people have different truths and facts aren't always insightful.
The notion of "if you haven't been doing anything wrong, then you have nothing to fear" has been used by governments against its citizens for a very long time. But when directed against governments, we see a pretty different set of standards.
That's an absurd notion when any government use it and it is equally absurd when used against government.
If you don't want people to know about what's in the documents, stop fucking talking about them.
I'm not sure if you were aware, but the secret was already out. And a large extent of that cat being let out of the bag was Wikileaks providing advanced copies of these documents to the press around the world. This isn't some slowly accelerating meme. The Streisand Effect had no part in this.
The concern I see is that the scope provided includes a lot of potential intel for a smart enemy; and there are smart enemies no matter how much they're demonized. If there is no drastic insight to be gained by publishing this information to the public, what is the justification for the risk of endangering people involved (troops, informants, government officials, etc.)?
I mean really, hiding the day that you raided an enemy location seems beyond pointless- the time and day that a bunch of soldiers busted in and shot some of your friends or the day a load of soldiers kicked down the door of the house next door seems like something that would stick in the mind.
If anything, that's the nature of these documents. A lot of the information needs to be redacted to ensure intel isn't being handed out. But at the same time, the point of publishing these is to substantiate claims. Redact too much information and you don't substantiate anything.
In these cases, I find it difficult to determine exactly how much information is too much. I'd imagine that in the case of the meeting, there's only so many meetings happening in so many locations within a province. If I read a report that the enemy has a report on a given meeting in that area, it's probably a pretty good chance I know what meeting was being spied on (but not a given).
In the case of the bombing, the time component is likely to be much more critical. One might know when one's forces were attacked (but then, in the confusion, that time may vary greatly). But it is not a given that one will know when enemy forces are observing the target. The redacted time seems to me an indication when observations were being made to establish "patterns of life" at the target location. Knowing those times may provide operational intel.
Are you looking at the same one as me? I'm looking at the one under the heading of "Botched Raid".
Apparently not. Damn you, Web 2.0.
Having seen what you're now looking at, I do disagree. It's not just a date but a date and time that appears to be when there were forces on the ground or making observations on the target. The date mentioned later is a date when the report had been updated. I know this because, again, I did a Google search and found sources that aren't as cautious as the NYT.
Time stamps for when a report is being created may not be nearly as sensitive as timestamps for when operations were ongoing. One is paperwork and relevance. The other is operational intel.
Which seems more than a little pointless since NAZIR HALLIMULLAH and MALANG should know what house they had a meeting in.
It might not be pointless if there were several meetings at different locations.
No, they redacted who's residence the meeting took place in. If you do a Google search for the text leading up to that name, you'll find other sources that quote the full text, including the name.
Before we get too far off-topic here, Wikileaks is still responsible for what they published. Along those lines, so is the NYT.
What's interesting here is that the NYT link you provided is, in fact, redacted. It is only one of many reports that Wikileaks published. And it is incomplete (although a simple Google search will uncover what the NYT decided to remove; thanks to Wikileaks).
If the new york times had the same chance do you think they would have refused to publish or even given the government the chance to remove stuff?
Yes. The New York Times would have done an article. There would have been a filter between raw data and published information. Granted - that doesn't guarantee that sensitive information doesn't get published. But there is some aspect of redaction and responsibility involved. And the NY Times would have been responsible for what they published.
Wikileaks doesn't get a free pass here. They took their action and they're responsible for it. Whether they took special steps in this case doesn't remove responsibility for what they've published.
The Pentagon had a clear choice. And Wikileaks had a clear choice. The Pentagon did what was appropriate - insisting on the sensitive nature of that information. Wikileaks did what was appropriate by them - publish sensitive information. If that sensitive information causes damage, then it is entirely the fault of Wikileaks. It is boggling that someone would claim that the Pentagon is somehow responsible for Wikileaks' actions.
Not really. Wikileaks may be a much more life-and-death situation than writing OSS code, but the notion of "You want to help? Then help!" is pretty apt..
The problem is that these are fundamentally different activities. OSS is about sharing code. Meanwhile, one does not limit the distribution of dangerous secrets by distributing those secrets to more people. If Wikileaks wants to be the clearinghouse for this information, than Assange and his group are solely responsible for any mistakes they make and damage caused by publishing that information.
Wait a second... are you sure you play EVE? You had a reasonable point and expressed it in an intelligent manner. You expressed no indication of over-blown ego. Furthermore, you were not insulting. I'm not entirely convinced you really do play.
What tactical advantage has been gained from the release by Wikileaks? I've heard this said again and again and have seen zero evidence to support it.
Keep in mind that I'm criticizing the concept being suggested. I'm not suggesting it.
Having said that, I'm not an opposing force (insurgent, Taliban, etc.) so I can't answer that question. Nor am I in a position to analyze behavior of those entities to plot out differences in behavior. And even if I were - you (and the rest of the general public) would be the last to know. That's the nature of this business.
Please tell me how this helps anybody fight against us?
Information is critical. Getting a view of the environment from your enemy's eyes can be invaluable. From these reports, one could surmise things like operating procedures, what the enemy pays attention to, what he notices and what he doesn't notice. Specific instances may indicate why an operation didn't go as expected. Or that the assumption that the enemy found something was wrong, therefore, they must have gotten their intel elsewhere. And so on.
It helps inform the public and has many oversight implications but I haven't seen anything that would change any tactical realities.
It's certainly informative. What I've seen so far is very interesting. But I'm not sure how much help it is one way or another.
The notion that sovereign nations can claim universal jurisdiction over war crimes and human rights violations is still controversial, although less so than it was 2-3 decades ago.
I'm not sure of the relevance here.
The notion that the United States can claim universal jurisdiction over the release of classified information, especially in this particular context, is probably not going to fly. If Wikileaks conspired with others to obtain the documents, there might be enough of a wedge to move foreign government officials (the Gary McKinnon situation comes to mind). If Wikileaks simply accepted the documents and published them, you can forget about it. The Wikileaks principals will have to avoid entering the U.S., since we apparently can't be bothered with civil liberties anymore*, but I don't think that any other government is politically suicidal enough to help the U.S. get ahold of them in the absence of a non-speech criminal act.
Which all assumes that they are going after the non-US citizens involved with Wikileaks. They might. But they might also have others in mind; others that fall under US law.
Keep in mind that I'm proposing that the intent here is not to keep you from reading the information. Or hearing about the information second-hand. This is (possibly) legal framework being targeted to non-military personnel. You're just a part of that framework.
Knowing what information has been disclosed is of tactical advantage to the soldiers - for example, if all the brouhaha about informants' names being disclosed is true it will be useful to the people who deal with informants to know if their contacts have been outed or not. Because of the bureaucracy and politics regarding something this high-profile that information is unlikely to make it's way "through channels" to people on the ground in a timely fashion.
Certainly possible. However, I would expect that anyone involved in handling informants already have a copy of Wikileaks' view of the very same documents they already have access to via official channels. And, depending on where these orders / directions are coming from, there are still likely to be people authorized to view Wikileaks sourced documents; probably without directly going to Wikileaks and without using general purpose office automation networks and systems.
Bureaucracy and politics doesn't ALWAYS mire down everything in the military and the Government in general. Even if the cynic in me tends to expect it to (and isn't always disappointed).
Namely the US Military's adversaries? That's crazy. How about the benefit to the lawmakers that are funding the war, the civilians that support the troops, and the troops that are risking their lives yet not being given real information about whether the effort is turning out to be worth anything?
You're describing legal advantage. I'm talking about tactical advantage. That seems to be the implication of pointing out that the US military's adversaries get unfettered access while its troops are restricted. What you're describing is what I had in mind when I noted "at least, not the impact being implied here."
Like deserting or going AWOL getting you court-martialed and either put in confinement for a month or 2/3rds of your pay or something like that. If you don't want to be there, shouldn't you be allowed to leave? Maybe thats why people end up so messed up in the military, because leaving when they know its unhealthy for them is pretty much an illegal act.
The military is a very different world. Members of the military are subject to and additional set of laws than normal citizens. A large part of that is due to the nature of their work. One finds oneself with extraordinary demands compared to most civilians.
As for leaving when you don't want to be there - that's certainly possible. You don't get to just get up and quit. But I've certainly seen people negotiate early terminations of their enlistment. I had one friend who was getting a great job offer but he had to shave off about 6 - 8 months of his enlistment. He had to really sell this to the Commander - but he did and he got his honorable discharge to pursue the offer. Granted, that's not always going to happen.
Finally, as for people ending up messed up... I'm not so sure. I didn't get messed up. I know lots of folks who didn't get messed up. But the pressure is certainly there. I saw a couple people crack during different times in my career.
I'm thinking the motive is to prevent damage to morale, but I can't see how the order is any less destructive on morale than the contents of these documents.
It's possible. But I have an alternative theory. This is the beginnings of legal action.
I've noted from my own experience in the past that where the US Government might fall behind, they tend to compensate with law. A script kiddie might get a chuckle out of having gotten away with logging in to IRC from a.gov address. But two years later, they may be shocked at having Feds showing up at their front door wanting them to go for a drive. Law is a long, laborious, and painstaking process. But as the Government is an entity of the law, they will use it to their best ability when all else fails.
Sure - we might all be chuckling about the futility of demanding the return of documents and forbidding troops from viewing digital copies of those documents; Streisand Effect on the global stage. But what if US Government agents already understand this? What if these are simply the steps they have to legally follow to establish that these documents have not, in any way, been released to the public? What if they are establishing Wikileak's position and limiting future legal maneuvering? What appears to be ludicrous could only appear to defy explanation because we don't yet have a good view of the tactic being put in to action.
Of course, time may also show that this is simply bureaucrats acting out without a firm grasp of reality. It wouldn't be the first time. I've certainly witnessed that as well. But one shouldn't immediately jump to this conclusion.
Slashdot Mirror
A very simple defense against this lawsuit should be to note the filing date/time and that you had not yet visited their music festival at that time (provable by virtue of it simply not having happened yet) and therefore could not be one of the 200 specific, but unknown, people that the case is against.
I honestly have no idea how they knew I had a time machine.
no it can't possibly be professional trolling - someone with a 30-comment history (all on wikileaks subjects) who joined a week ago has just dismissed the idea.
If that's supposed to be a reference to me, you need to learn to do your research better. But then... it would explain why you're so hung up on this conspiracy theory.
Just because you're on the receiving end, doesn't mean that you understand how it was done. Getting the enemy's viewpoint can help gain a better understanding of not only the enemy but the situation itself.
I know I will hear a lot of counter-arguments to this but I'm going to say it anyway.
Don't be afraid to fly the martyr's flag. ;)
The documents were leaked by people who are in a position of disagreement with their orders and the behavior of the military and political officials. Simply saying "I don't like it" isn't enough of a statement for anyone's needs or purposes. If they are in the know and have evidence that "bad things" are happening, presenting proof of these bad things is the only true means of expression.
One of the more perplexing things about service in the US Military is the lawful order. US Servicemen are required to assess whether an order is lawful and refrain from following it if it is not. The obvious issue with that is ensuring one's assessment is correct. The pitfall is making a moral judgment and finding that there was no legal standing to support it.
I understand that anti-war activists will cheer for those who's actions align with their strong-held moral beliefs. But that does not mean that any individual who also buys in to this moral stance also has a moral imperative to ignore their commitments and trust to do or publish whatever they please simply because they find it more effective than saying "I don't like it".
To be sure - the whistleblower is important to our society. There needs to be individuals who will stand up against power acting against society's best interest. But that doesn't mean every would-be whistleblower is right.
The U.S. and its involvements (interference) in the affairs of other sovereign nations is simply not appreciated by the majority of the world and this is especially true more recently. If there is anything that threatens the U.S. national security more than anything else, it is the increased disapproval of the U.S. in the world. People who are intent on sharing facts and truth wouldn't be as much of a problem if the U.S. was on the straight and narrow.
The world is an increasingly smaller place with various nations meddling in each other's affairs for hundreds of years. The exact nature of this meddling is a subject of history. But I find it sad that the US has been singled out as the great example while others apparently get a free pass.
The one thing I do agree is that the US' leadership over the past decade has been terrible. While I'm less critical of US actions, the actions of its leaders and the way they have presented these actions has done the US great harm (foreign and domestically). That is going to take decades to recover from.
As for facts and truth... sadly, they seem to be much more subjective than they would appear to be. Different people have different truths and facts aren't always insightful.
The notion of "if you haven't been doing anything wrong, then you have nothing to fear" has been used by governments against its citizens for a very long time. But when directed against governments, we see a pretty different set of standards.
That's an absurd notion when any government use it and it is equally absurd when used against government.
Sorry the Taliban need the names of the troops walking around in uniforms with guns to be able to shoot them... ?
It's not names of the troops; it's insight to how the troops operate (among other things).
If you don't want people to know about what's in the documents, stop fucking talking about them.
I'm not sure if you were aware, but the secret was already out. And a large extent of that cat being let out of the bag was Wikileaks providing advanced copies of these documents to the press around the world. This isn't some slowly accelerating meme. The Streisand Effect had no part in this.
The concern I see is that the scope provided includes a lot of potential intel for a smart enemy; and there are smart enemies no matter how much they're demonized. If there is no drastic insight to be gained by publishing this information to the public, what is the justification for the risk of endangering people involved (troops, informants, government officials, etc.)?
Or, possibly, Wikileaks and it's leadership aren't beyond criticism.
I mean really, hiding the day that you raided an enemy location seems beyond pointless- the time and day that a bunch of soldiers busted in and shot some of your friends or the day a load of soldiers kicked down the door of the house next door seems like something that would stick in the mind.
If anything, that's the nature of these documents. A lot of the information needs to be redacted to ensure intel isn't being handed out. But at the same time, the point of publishing these is to substantiate claims. Redact too much information and you don't substantiate anything.
In these cases, I find it difficult to determine exactly how much information is too much. I'd imagine that in the case of the meeting, there's only so many meetings happening in so many locations within a province. If I read a report that the enemy has a report on a given meeting in that area, it's probably a pretty good chance I know what meeting was being spied on (but not a given).
In the case of the bombing, the time component is likely to be much more critical. One might know when one's forces were attacked (but then, in the confusion, that time may vary greatly). But it is not a given that one will know when enemy forces are observing the target. The redacted time seems to me an indication when observations were being made to establish "patterns of life" at the target location. Knowing those times may provide operational intel.
Are you looking at the same one as me?
I'm looking at the one under the heading of "Botched Raid".
Apparently not. Damn you, Web 2.0.
Having seen what you're now looking at, I do disagree. It's not just a date but a date and time that appears to be when there were forces on the ground or making observations on the target. The date mentioned later is a date when the report had been updated. I know this because, again, I did a Google search and found sources that aren't as cautious as the NYT.
Time stamps for when a report is being created may not be nearly as sensitive as timestamps for when operations were ongoing. One is paperwork and relevance. The other is operational intel.
Which seems more than a little pointless since NAZIR HALLIMULLAH and MALANG should know what house they had a meeting in.
It might not be pointless if there were several meetings at different locations.
No, they redacted who's residence the meeting took place in. If you do a Google search for the text leading up to that name, you'll find other sources that quote the full text, including the name.
Before we get too far off-topic here, Wikileaks is still responsible for what they published. Along those lines, so is the NYT.
What's interesting here is that the NYT link you provided is, in fact, redacted. It is only one of many reports that Wikileaks published. And it is incomplete (although a simple Google search will uncover what the NYT decided to remove; thanks to Wikileaks).
If the new york times had the same chance do you think they would have refused to publish or even given the government the chance to remove stuff?
Yes. The New York Times would have done an article. There would have been a filter between raw data and published information. Granted - that doesn't guarantee that sensitive information doesn't get published. But there is some aspect of redaction and responsibility involved. And the NY Times would have been responsible for what they published.
Wikileaks doesn't get a free pass here. They took their action and they're responsible for it. Whether they took special steps in this case doesn't remove responsibility for what they've published.
And why aren't you buying that it's not the US military's fault?
The US military didn't publish this information to the public.
The Pentagon had a clear choice. And Wikileaks had a clear choice. The Pentagon did what was appropriate - insisting on the sensitive nature of that information. Wikileaks did what was appropriate by them - publish sensitive information. If that sensitive information causes damage, then it is entirely the fault of Wikileaks. It is boggling that someone would claim that the Pentagon is somehow responsible for Wikileaks' actions.
Not really. Wikileaks may be a much more life-and-death situation than writing OSS code, but the notion of "You want to help? Then help!" is pretty apt..
The problem is that these are fundamentally different activities. OSS is about sharing code. Meanwhile, one does not limit the distribution of dangerous secrets by distributing those secrets to more people. If Wikileaks wants to be the clearinghouse for this information, than Assange and his group are solely responsible for any mistakes they make and damage caused by publishing that information.
Wait a second... are you sure you play EVE? You had a reasonable point and expressed it in an intelligent manner. You expressed no indication of over-blown ego. Furthermore, you were not insulting. I'm not entirely convinced you really do play.
What tactical advantage has been gained from the release by Wikileaks? I've heard this said again and again and have seen zero evidence to support it.
Keep in mind that I'm criticizing the concept being suggested. I'm not suggesting it.
Having said that, I'm not an opposing force (insurgent, Taliban, etc.) so I can't answer that question. Nor am I in a position to analyze behavior of those entities to plot out differences in behavior. And even if I were - you (and the rest of the general public) would be the last to know. That's the nature of this business.
Please tell me how this helps anybody fight against us?
Information is critical. Getting a view of the environment from your enemy's eyes can be invaluable. From these reports, one could surmise things like operating procedures, what the enemy pays attention to, what he notices and what he doesn't notice. Specific instances may indicate why an operation didn't go as expected. Or that the assumption that the enemy found something was wrong, therefore, they must have gotten their intel elsewhere. And so on.
It helps inform the public and has many oversight implications but I haven't seen anything that would change any tactical realities.
It's certainly informative. What I've seen so far is very interesting. But I'm not sure how much help it is one way or another.
The notion that sovereign nations can claim universal jurisdiction over war crimes and human rights violations is still controversial, although less so than it was 2-3 decades ago.
I'm not sure of the relevance here.
The notion that the United States can claim universal jurisdiction over the release of classified information, especially in this particular context, is probably not going to fly. If Wikileaks conspired with others to obtain the documents, there might be enough of a wedge to move foreign government officials (the Gary McKinnon situation comes to mind). If Wikileaks simply accepted the documents and published them, you can forget about it. The Wikileaks principals will have to avoid entering the U.S., since we apparently can't be bothered with civil liberties anymore*, but I don't think that any other government is politically suicidal enough to help the U.S. get ahold of them in the absence of a non-speech criminal act.
Which all assumes that they are going after the non-US citizens involved with Wikileaks. They might. But they might also have others in mind; others that fall under US law.
Keep in mind that I'm proposing that the intent here is not to keep you from reading the information. Or hearing about the information second-hand. This is (possibly) legal framework being targeted to non-military personnel. You're just a part of that framework.
Knowing what information has been disclosed is of tactical advantage to the soldiers - for example, if all the brouhaha about informants' names being disclosed is true it will be useful to the people who deal with informants to know if their contacts have been outed or not. Because of the bureaucracy and politics regarding something this high-profile that information is unlikely to make it's way "through channels" to people on the ground in a timely fashion.
Certainly possible. However, I would expect that anyone involved in handling informants already have a copy of Wikileaks' view of the very same documents they already have access to via official channels. And, depending on where these orders / directions are coming from, there are still likely to be people authorized to view Wikileaks sourced documents; probably without directly going to Wikileaks and without using general purpose office automation networks and systems.
Bureaucracy and politics doesn't ALWAYS mire down everything in the military and the Government in general. Even if the cynic in me tends to expect it to (and isn't always disappointed).
Wasn't that before Carly?
Namely the US Military's adversaries? That's crazy. How about the benefit to the lawmakers that are funding the war, the civilians that support the troops, and the troops that are risking their lives yet not being given real information about whether the effort is turning out to be worth anything?
You're describing legal advantage. I'm talking about tactical advantage. That seems to be the implication of pointing out that the US military's adversaries get unfettered access while its troops are restricted. What you're describing is what I had in mind when I noted "at least, not the impact being implied here."
Like deserting or going AWOL getting you court-martialed and either put in confinement for a month or 2/3rds of your pay or something like that. If you don't want to be there, shouldn't you be allowed to leave? Maybe thats why people end up so messed up in the military, because leaving when they know its unhealthy for them is pretty much an illegal act.
The military is a very different world. Members of the military are subject to and additional set of laws than normal citizens. A large part of that is due to the nature of their work. One finds oneself with extraordinary demands compared to most civilians.
As for leaving when you don't want to be there - that's certainly possible. You don't get to just get up and quit. But I've certainly seen people negotiate early terminations of their enlistment. I had one friend who was getting a great job offer but he had to shave off about 6 - 8 months of his enlistment. He had to really sell this to the Commander - but he did and he got his honorable discharge to pursue the offer. Granted, that's not always going to happen.
Finally, as for people ending up messed up... I'm not so sure. I didn't get messed up. I know lots of folks who didn't get messed up. But the pressure is certainly there. I saw a couple people crack during different times in my career.
I'm thinking the motive is to prevent damage to morale, but I can't see how the order is any less destructive on morale than the contents of these documents.
It's possible. But I have an alternative theory. This is the beginnings of legal action.
I've noted from my own experience in the past that where the US Government might fall behind, they tend to compensate with law. A script kiddie might get a chuckle out of having gotten away with logging in to IRC from a .gov address. But two years later, they may be shocked at having Feds showing up at their front door wanting them to go for a drive. Law is a long, laborious, and painstaking process. But as the Government is an entity of the law, they will use it to their best ability when all else fails.
Sure - we might all be chuckling about the futility of demanding the return of documents and forbidding troops from viewing digital copies of those documents; Streisand Effect on the global stage. But what if US Government agents already understand this? What if these are simply the steps they have to legally follow to establish that these documents have not, in any way, been released to the public? What if they are establishing Wikileak's position and limiting future legal maneuvering? What appears to be ludicrous could only appear to defy explanation because we don't yet have a good view of the tactic being put in to action.
Of course, time may also show that this is simply bureaucrats acting out without a firm grasp of reality. It wouldn't be the first time. I've certainly witnessed that as well. But one shouldn't immediately jump to this conclusion.