No, the DNS name resolves dynamically to the least loaded server. Since 130.94.149.162 has a direct connection to the backbone unlike other mirrors, it doesn't move down in the server rankings.
From "Security Experts, Liability Limited" throwaway@dione.ids.pl
Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2003 2:11 PM
To: "Customer Awareness Forum" bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: serious vulnerability present. all doomed. over.
S.E.L.L. -- ADVISORY NUMBER 4F4E45 --.L.L.E.S
April 1, 2003
"We totally deny the allegations, and we're
trying to identify the allegators."
S.E.L.L disclosure timeline:
01/05/99: vulnerability identified and tested by S.E.L.L.
01/06/99: S.E.L.L. customers notified
01/06/99: oh, and I told my wife, she said it's silly
05/15/99: we got our tester out on bail
12/20/02: still don't get any respect from wife
03/30/03: vendors notified
04/01/03: public disclosure
Synopsis and impact:
A distributed denial of service condition is present in the election system
in many polypartisan democratic countries. A group of determined but
unskilled and not equipped low-income individuals, usually between 0.05%
and 2% of overall population of the country, can cause serious disruptions
or even a complete downfall of the democratic system and its institutions,
and wreak havoc and destruction without using any force.
This is considerably less than the majority of voters required in more
conventional attacks, at least in this social group.
The attack is generally difficult to prevent once occurs, since it is not
possible to make immediate changes to election ordinances, especially once
the process have started. Changes are often required to be passed at least
one year before taking any effect. As such, patching the bug might take a
considerable amount of time, perhaps also sufficient for the country to
fall into chaos and oblivion, and for things of unspeakable horror to
happen to all people like you and me.
Our company supports and takes pride in responsible and accurate
vulnerability reporting.
Not vulnerable:
United States (but to be evaluated)
Monarchies and dictatorships (until overthrown)
International waters (until claimed)
Attack details:
The attack relies on the fact that numerous election ordinances require
a certain number of voter signatures to be collected in order for a
candidate or a party to enter elections and be placed on a national
election list.
This approach is generally non-discriminatory, and it is impossible to
deny the right to be included on such a list for an otherwise eligible
individual who collected a given number of verifiable signatures. Most
countries do not implement a regulation that requires all votes on all
lists to be unique - so a single person can change his or her mind
and support two candidates. This is because of the difficulty of
cross-verification - most election procedures must still rely on manual
checking - and the possibility of malicious action of a hostile voter,
of course.
Depending on the election level - local, parliament or presidential -
a different number of signatures has to be collected. The number is usually
everywhere from 0.05% to 2% of the total population - typical figures are
1000-10000 (common for parliament), or 100000-1000000 (presidential) for
a medium to large country of 10-50 million citizens.
In our example, we use parliament elections where the minimum is set at
10000. In order for the attack to be successful, the attacker would have to
find that many co-conspirators - usually not impossible, since many voters
are dissatisfied with the system or life in general, or can be bribed
or tricked into signing a list. A careful attacker might choose a larger
number of co-conspirators to decrease the chances of the attack being
detected in routine signature validation phase. This could lead to all
conspirators being charged on the grounds of conspiracy to overthrow the
government - although charging all 10001+ conspirators might be an
In my timezone, it is currently 10:30 of March 31st. Shouldn't the Internet community wait until it is April 1st everywhere before trying to implement this suggestion?
BitTorrent requires an "origin server". There is always a guarantee that the file can be downloaded from the original source if necessary. eDonkey provides no such guarantee; no authoritive server; nothing. This gives BitTorrent a huge advantage in legitimate situations (where you thinking of anything else?).
BitTorrent can upload when behind a NAT, but the uploader must initiate the connection to the downloader because the NAT'd user can't accept incoming connections. This is how all P2P works. There is no connection between who initiates the connection and the transfer direction, it only matters when NAT is involved.
Forward port 6881-6889 and your problems will be solved.
FreeBSD's ports collection already has well over 7000 ports. I can see how NetBSD is useful to run Unix on esoteric hardware, but for i386 or Alpha platforms FreeBSD is king.
Slashdot Mirror
If you outlaw lead pipe, only criminals will have lead pipes.
But 802.11b is 8 syllables, and Wi-Fi is only 2. That's a 75% savings.
Owner of the Girls Gone Wild empire was arrested for reasons related to this article. A Good Thing, if you ask me.
Lemme guess, you?
At my school, WebSense blocked our high school web site; where we are able to retreive are assignments and check our grades. Scary indeed.
No, the DNS name resolves dynamically to the least loaded server. Since 130.94.149.162 has a direct connection to the backbone unlike other mirrors, it doesn't move down in the server rankings.
I'm still waiting for the CVS to be torrented. Now that would be cool.
Can't you use ^C or ^Break to exit?
Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2003 2:11 PM
To: "Customer Awareness Forum" bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Subject: serious vulnerability present. all doomed. over.
S.E.L.L. -- ADVISORY NUMBER 4F4E45 --
"We totally deny the allegations, and we're trying to identify the allegators."
S.E.L.L disclosure timeline:
01/05/99: vulnerability identified and tested by S.E.L.L.
01/06/99: S.E.L.L. customers notified
01/06/99: oh, and I told my wife, she said it's silly
05/15/99: we got our tester out on bail
12/20/02: still don't get any respect from wife
03/30/03: vendors notified
04/01/03: public disclosure
Synopsis and impact:
A distributed denial of service condition is present in the election system in many polypartisan democratic countries. A group of determined but unskilled and not equipped low-income individuals, usually between 0.05% and 2% of overall population of the country, can cause serious disruptions or even a complete downfall of the democratic system and its institutions, and wreak havoc and destruction without using any force.
This is considerably less than the majority of voters required in more conventional attacks, at least in this social group.
The attack is generally difficult to prevent once occurs, since it is not possible to make immediate changes to election ordinances, especially once the process have started. Changes are often required to be passed at least one year before taking any effect. As such, patching the bug might take a considerable amount of time, perhaps also sufficient for the country to fall into chaos and oblivion, and for things of unspeakable horror to happen to all people like you and me.
Our company supports and takes pride in responsible and accurate vulnerability reporting.
Not vulnerable:
Attack details:
The attack relies on the fact that numerous election ordinances require a certain number of voter signatures to be collected in order for a candidate or a party to enter elections and be placed on a national election list.
This approach is generally non-discriminatory, and it is impossible to deny the right to be included on such a list for an otherwise eligible individual who collected a given number of verifiable signatures. Most countries do not implement a regulation that requires all votes on all lists to be unique - so a single person can change his or her mind and support two candidates. This is because of the difficulty of cross-verification - most election procedures must still rely on manual checking - and the possibility of malicious action of a hostile voter, of course.
Depending on the election level - local, parliament or presidential - a different number of signatures has to be collected. The number is usually everywhere from 0.05% to 2% of the total population - typical figures are 1000-10000 (common for parliament), or 100000-1000000 (presidential) for a medium to large country of 10-50 million citizens.
In our example, we use parliament elections where the minimum is set at 10000. In order for the attack to be successful, the attacker would have to find that many co-conspirators - usually not impossible, since many voters are dissatisfied with the system or life in general, or can be bribed or tricked into signing a list. A careful attacker might choose a larger number of co-conspirators to decrease the chances of the attack being detected in routine signature validation phase. This could lead to all conspirators being charged on the grounds of conspiracy to overthrow the government - although charging all 10001+ conspirators might be an
Try here: http://www.scriptarchive.com/. and here.
In my timezone, it is currently 10:30 of March 31st. Shouldn't the Internet community wait until it is April 1st everywhere before trying to implement this suggestion?
BitTorrent requires an "origin server". There is always a guarantee that the file can be downloaded from the original source if necessary. eDonkey provides no such guarantee; no authoritive server; nothing. This gives BitTorrent a huge advantage in legitimate situations (where you thinking of anything else?).
Like URLBlaze?
BitTorrent can upload when behind a NAT, but the uploader must initiate the connection to the downloader because the NAT'd user can't accept incoming connections. This is how all P2P works. There is no connection between who initiates the connection and the transfer direction, it only matters when NAT is involved. Forward port 6881-6889 and your problems will be solved.
What advertisement?
yEnc is a hell of a lot better than your piss-poor base64!
I agree completely.
There is a mirror over at http://www.kiwiuk.net/gnutella2_draft.htm (not mine).
Of course.
You also have no frames or tables. Why not use a decent text-mode browser, such as w3m or links?
Yes.
FreeBSD's ports collection already has well over 7000 ports. I can see how NetBSD is useful to run Unix on esoteric hardware, but for i386 or Alpha platforms FreeBSD is king.