When Apple released their iPad with retina display I read that the additional pixels require more electronics in the display which block some of the light. This in turn means that a stronger backlight is needed to have the same light output compared to a lower resolution display. For LCD it was an important factor at that time. For OLED, this might not make that much of a difference unless some of the connections would be on top of the pixels or due to a minimum border size per pixel.
Are you sure you don't mean sweep for every possible IP? In case of a private network, that would be 16 million addresses (1.6 * 10^7) which is a lot less than 2.81 * 10^14. Unless it filters MAC addresses somehow, exhausting the entire range would require going through 2.81 * 10^14 addresses. If that were possible using just 1 bit of traffic per address, it'd still take 2.81 * 10^14 / 10^7 (10Mbps) = 2.81 * 10^7 seconds which is just over 325 days.
You're supposed to put all your devices behind the "Whitebox". Using your solution would give them skewed results, according to their terms:
The Whitebox should be placed in between your existing router and your networked computers. Any devices that connected via ethernet cable to your existing router should instead connect to the Whitebox. This ensures that the SamKnows device is always aware of the network being used and will never run tests at a time when you require your full bandwidth to be available. (Whitebox faq)
The problem of factoring a large number is hard when it's a semiprime where both factors are very large numbers around the same magnitude as the square root of the semiprime. In this case 191605050401140404051920181528 can be factored into 2^3 * 3 * 23 * 222647 * 694079 * 8335727 * 269462689 which is easy to factor as the one but largest factor is only ~= 8 million. A naive program that just divides by 2 and all odd numbers up to 8335727 can give you the answer in less than a minute on a moderate computer nowadays. After finding the 8335727 factor you know that you will not have any more factors in 269462689 since sqrt(269462689) ~= 16415 which is the largest divisor you'd have to try to factor it.
Don't click the 'Get certificate' button. Once you click 'Add exception' and the pop-up is shown, Firefox is already retrieving the certificate. When it has retrieved the certificate, the 'Permanently store this exception' box is checked. If you click, 'Get certificate', the process starts over again. So what happens is that you uncheck the 'Permanently' checkbox and the 'Get certificate' process will re-check it again just before your click on the 'Confirm' button is processed. Indeed, very annoying.
If you can't get the receiver on the WinTV card to work, you can also build a small receiver yourself. It's easy to build, and easy to set up with lirc:
http://www.lirc.org/receivers.html
While condensation trails block incoming sunlight which has a cooling effect, they block more radiation coming from the earth. Therefor contrails have an overall warming effect.
Actually, even keeping your email adres on Windows Live just became harder. It used to be that if you didn't use your email for a long time that all messages would be deleted but you could reactivate your account at any time if you remembered your password. I'm not sure if it's because of a change in policy or the move to windows live but I recently noticed that my password didn't work anymore on mailboxes that I hadn't used in a while. Apparantly they were available for registration.
Upsampling will not put more information in the picture. It just makes it look better. Possibly Apple is using the same way to upsample the video as you'd do yourself using Quicktime. However, when they have to recompress the video to distribute the upsampled video, there will be another round of quality loss. This is probably what makes the video from Apple look worse than just upsampling yourself.
"In fact the blast was not the result of a meeting between water and rubidium and caesium, but the triggering of a bomb, Sky television confirmed yesterday."
"But in a 2004 episode, the producers compromised. Explaining what happened when the metals were put in the bath, a crew member said: "Absolutely bloody nothing. The density of caesium ensured it hit the bottom of the bath like a lead weight. The volume of water then drowned out the thermal shock. They could not go home empty-handed. So they rigged a bomb in the bottom of the bath."
With a man in the middle attack you never stand a chance unless you use SSL with verified keys. However, this cookie stealing also works by simply making your victim visit a page. A way to defend against this is verifying the source IP address. In some cases this might not work due to proxies (in case the victim and attacker pass the same proxy somewhere which doesn't relay forwarded_for information), but in most cases this will be enough though.
For this attack, using SSL doesn't even make a difference. Whether the hidden iframe uses SSL with an injected string or plain http won't make a difference.
As for the user visiting 'dangerous' pages: If you allow any user to insert javascript code on pages on your website there'll be lots of ways to make the attack seem innocent. I've played a few online php games that allowed players to create their own profile page with limited html code. Well, since they missed a few places to strip javascript code it was easy to put up some cookie stealing code and just send a message to the admins/moderators: "Look what a nice profile page I have". Then you just wait for the session cookie.
1) A user will go to the bad guy's website
Well, that's the hard part, but you could even try using an HTML formatted mail.
2) That the user will have an account on the attacked website
The place to put the code injection was on the login screen, so it's open for anyone. You could hide the login page in an invisable iframe.
3) That said user will want to log into the attacked website right after going to the badguy website?
The important thing is that the target logs on during the timeframe where the cookie is valid. If you're lucky and the site uses a permanent cookie, you could even take over a login session from days ago. If it's a session cookie you could take over a previous session if the user didn't close his browser after previously using the admin application.
A few months ago I was on vacation in Tenerife. At some point a shopkeeper walks up to me and tells me he wants to show me a trick with my camera. So I follow the guy into the shop where he makes two pictures of me with my camera, one with and one without a flash. Then he hooks it up to the TV to show me te pictures. Both pictures were in general way too dark and the one with the flash overexposed in the foreground.
He tells me he's going to swap out my 'cheap' CF card with a 'special' one. After swapping the cards he takes another picture and just like magic the picture is almost perfect. He explains that that's because my 'cheap' card card uses compression. So while my camera is capable of shooting 3.3MP, the card is only storing 1.6MP while his 'special' one will store all 3.3MP. Well, seeing the results it all sounded like a plausible story and I'm pretty sure he had already conviced some customers to buy new CF cards.
The reason why the 'cheap' card looked so bad and the 'special' one had such good quality? Turn contrast up and brightness down on the television when showing the 'cheap' pictures and press reset while switching the CF cards. Both 'cheap' pictures looked fine on the camera's LCD.
True, if you mean by privacy that someone else can't read your data without access to the database. However, the problem is that someone can still copy your RFID tag and write new data about you in the database. For example with this passport someone could cross the border with a copy of your RFID, marking you as being out of the country.
You could make this harder by using active tags that use a private key to sign messages but don't reveal the private key itself. However, you could still impersonate someone if you work together with a partner in proximity of the victim and you proxy the signal. A way to defend against that would be very strict timings in the reader, but this would probable make the RFID tag too expensive as well. (If you allow 1 millisecond variation in response time, you could proxy the signal 150 km)
It might be possible to do it right, but it probably won't be done.
How is this any different from someone stealing your passport now?
Because it's not even necessary to steal your passport, it's not even necessary to touch it. You can walk past someone at 25 feet and copy it. If you have an ordinary passport and keep it in a safe place all the time you can be pretty sure no one takes it without you knowing and if they steal it, you might notice it's missing.
Besides, if the RFID card is designed to be readable at 25 feet, it's probably possible to do so at a much longer distance using special equipment.
That's what looks to me like the most logical solution and is what I expected when I looked at the barcode. However there are quite some big stores over here where the barcode is just XXXXXX-YYYYYY-C where X is fixed for all returns, Y is the amount (plain readable format) and C is the barcode checksum. Returning the same amount worth of bottles gives exactly the same barcode.
The idea is to proxy the signal, without interpreting it. The only thing I want to accomplish is to have the card reader talk to a card that's far away. It's kinda like a walky-talky, but instead of transfering voice, it's tranfering an rfid conversation.
So I stand over at the cashier with a receiver that picks up the authorization request and retransmits it via wireless. A friend stands next to you, picks up the wireless signal and re-transmits the rfid authentication request to your card. Then he uses his rfid receiver to pick up the response and re-transmit it back to my device which will send it to the card reader again. That way I don't have to understand anything from what the rfid data is about (it could even be transfered in analog form), but the card reader would be talking to someone else's card.
So 2 people need to work together to steal some money. One stands close to the victim and the other walks over to the cashier. Instead of recording the signal you now proxy it. The one at the cashier picks up the signal from the reader and uses a wireless transmitter to get the signal to the person by the victim who sends the data to the card. Send the response from the card back to the reader and you're done.
I also think it doesn't have much to do with being emotional about the picture. You just see something out of the ordinary and try to reflect on it, mostly because it's something 'rare'. It's just like passing by cars and shops. You usually see them, but don't really look at them. Just when there's something extra-ordinary about them, you look again. In this case, you don't often see 'images of injury and dismemberment' (I hope) which draws your attention. At the same time, I didn't really look at the other pictures either, just trying to find a clue if they're rotated or not (mostly checking horizon/sky). If I were asked to try to remember details about the rotated picture, I would probably miss some of the pictures following the rotated one as well.
Slashdot Mirror
When Apple released their iPad with retina display I read that the additional pixels require more electronics in the display which block some of the light. This in turn means that a stronger backlight is needed to have the same light output compared to a lower resolution display. For LCD it was an important factor at that time. For OLED, this might not make that much of a difference unless some of the connections would be on top of the pixels or due to a minimum border size per pixel.
of course you need able arms to operate a steering wheel so that's a given
Not always
Are you sure you don't mean sweep for every possible IP? In case of a private network, that would be 16 million addresses (1.6 * 10^7) which is a lot less than 2.81 * 10^14. Unless it filters MAC addresses somehow, exhausting the entire range would require going through 2.81 * 10^14 addresses. If that were possible using just 1 bit of traffic per address, it'd still take 2.81 * 10^14 / 10^7 (10Mbps) = 2.81 * 10^7 seconds which is just over 325 days.
That number is large.
You're supposed to put all your devices behind the "Whitebox". Using your solution would give them skewed results, according to their terms:
The Whitebox should be placed in between your existing router and your networked computers. Any devices that connected via ethernet cable to your existing router should instead connect to the Whitebox. This ensures that the SamKnows device is always aware of the network being used and will never run tests at a time when you require your full bandwidth to be available. (Whitebox faq)
The problem of factoring a large number is hard when it's a semiprime where both factors are very large numbers around the same magnitude as the square root of the semiprime. In this case 191605050401140404051920181528 can be factored into 2^3 * 3 * 23 * 222647 * 694079 * 8335727 * 269462689 which is easy to factor as the one but largest factor is only ~= 8 million. A naive program that just divides by 2 and all odd numbers up to 8335727 can give you the answer in less than a minute on a moderate computer nowadays. After finding the 8335727 factor you know that you will not have any more factors in 269462689 since sqrt(269462689) ~= 16415 which is the largest divisor you'd have to try to factor it.
Don't click the 'Get certificate' button. Once you click 'Add exception' and the pop-up is shown, Firefox is already retrieving the certificate. When it has retrieved the certificate, the 'Permanently store this exception' box is checked. If you click, 'Get certificate', the process starts over again. So what happens is that you uncheck the 'Permanently' checkbox and the 'Get certificate' process will re-check it again just before your click on the 'Confirm' button is processed. Indeed, very annoying.
63 servers * 48 disk of 1 TB = 3024 TB. According to the announcement on the archive.org 3 Petabytes would be right.
Later this year, Oracle will retire the Classic MetaLink support portal and provide a single support interface through My Oracle Support.
So it does appear that it won't take too long before you'll be unable to use Metalink without flash.
If you can't get the receiver on the WinTV card to work, you can also build a small receiver yourself. It's easy to build, and easy to set up with lirc: http://www.lirc.org/receivers.html
While condensation trails block incoming sunlight which has a cooling effect, they block more radiation coming from the earth. Therefor contrails have an overall warming effect.
Actually, even keeping your email adres on Windows Live just became harder. It used to be that if you didn't use your email for a long time that all messages would be deleted but you could reactivate your account at any time if you remembered your password. I'm not sure if it's because of a change in policy or the move to windows live but I recently noticed that my password didn't work anymore on mailboxes that I hadn't used in a while. Apparantly they were available for registration.
Upsampling will not put more information in the picture. It just makes it look better. Possibly Apple is using the same way to upsample the video as you'd do yourself using Quicktime. However, when they have to recompress the video to distribute the upsampled video, there will be another round of quality loss. This is probably what makes the video from Apple look worse than just upsampling yourself.
Maybe if you disable cookies Google always uses English (probably based on your IP/location).
% 20Preferences%20&prev=http://www.google.com/search ?q=poodles&q=&submit=Save%20Preferences%20 so it should work regardless of the browser or OS.
The url is simply a redirect (HTTP/1.0 302) to http://www.google.com/setprefs?hl=ga&submit2=Save
"In fact the blast was not the result of a meeting between water and rubidium and caesium, but the triggering of a bomb, Sky television confirmed yesterday."
"But in a 2004 episode, the producers compromised. Explaining what happened when the metals were put in the bath, a crew member said: "Absolutely bloody nothing. The density of caesium ensured it hit the bottom of the bath like a lead weight. The volume of water then drowned out the thermal shock. They could not go home empty-handed. So they rigged a bomb in the bottom of the bath."
source: http://www.badscience.net/?p=270
and: http://www.badscience.net/?p=261
With a man in the middle attack you never stand a chance unless you use SSL with verified keys. However, this cookie stealing also works by simply making your victim visit a page. A way to defend against this is verifying the source IP address. In some cases this might not work due to proxies (in case the victim and attacker pass the same proxy somewhere which doesn't relay forwarded_for information), but in most cases this will be enough though.
For this attack, using SSL doesn't even make a difference. Whether the hidden iframe uses SSL with an injected string or plain http won't make a difference.
As for the user visiting 'dangerous' pages: If you allow any user to insert javascript code on pages on your website there'll be lots of ways to make the attack seem innocent. I've played a few online php games that allowed players to create their own profile page with limited html code. Well, since they missed a few places to strip javascript code it was easy to put up some cookie stealing code and just send a message to the admins/moderators: "Look what a nice profile page I have". Then you just wait for the session cookie.
1) A user will go to the bad guy's website
Well, that's the hard part, but you could even try using an HTML formatted mail.
2) That the user will have an account on the attacked website
The place to put the code injection was on the login screen, so it's open for anyone. You could hide the login page in an invisable iframe.
3) That said user will want to log into the attacked website right after going to the badguy website?
The important thing is that the target logs on during the timeframe where the cookie is valid. If you're lucky and the site uses a permanent cookie, you could even take over a login session from days ago. If it's a session cookie you could take over a previous session if the user didn't close his browser after previously using the admin application.
A few months ago I was on vacation in Tenerife. At some point a shopkeeper walks up to me and tells me he wants to show me a trick with my camera. So I follow the guy into the shop where he makes two pictures of me with my camera, one with and one without a flash. Then he hooks it up to the TV to show me te pictures. Both pictures were in general way too dark and the one with the flash overexposed in the foreground.
He tells me he's going to swap out my 'cheap' CF card with a 'special' one. After swapping the cards he takes another picture and just like magic the picture is almost perfect. He explains that that's because my 'cheap' card card uses compression. So while my camera is capable of shooting 3.3MP, the card is only storing 1.6MP while his 'special' one will store all 3.3MP. Well, seeing the results it all sounded like a plausible story and I'm pretty sure he had already conviced some customers to buy new CF cards.
The reason why the 'cheap' card looked so bad and the 'special' one had such good quality? Turn contrast up and brightness down on the television when showing the 'cheap' pictures and press reset while switching the CF cards. Both 'cheap' pictures looked fine on the camera's LCD.
ALL this can be done with protection of privacy
True, if you mean by privacy that someone else can't read your data without access to the database. However, the problem is that someone can still copy your RFID tag and write new data about you in the database. For example with this passport someone could cross the border with a copy of your RFID, marking you as being out of the country.
You could make this harder by using active tags that use a private key to sign messages but don't reveal the private key itself. However, you could still impersonate someone if you work together with a partner in proximity of the victim and you proxy the signal. A way to defend against that would be very strict timings in the reader, but this would probable make the RFID tag too expensive as well. (If you allow 1 millisecond variation in response time, you could proxy the signal 150 km)
It might be possible to do it right, but it probably won't be done.
How is this any different from someone stealing your passport now?
Because it's not even necessary to steal your passport, it's not even necessary to touch it. You can walk past someone at 25 feet and copy it. If you have an ordinary passport and keep it in a safe place all the time you can be pretty sure no one takes it without you knowing and if they steal it, you might notice it's missing.
Besides, if the RFID card is designed to be readable at 25 feet, it's probably possible to do so at a much longer distance using special equipment.
VMWare stores a disk as a file, and I am not aware of a way to have multiple virtual machines accessing that file at the same time and writing to it.
You can share a virtual disk, see Enabling SCSI Reservation for more information
That's what looks to me like the most logical solution and is what I expected when I looked at the barcode. However there are quite some big stores over here where the barcode is just XXXXXX-YYYYYY-C where X is fixed for all returns, Y is the amount (plain readable format) and C is the barcode checksum. Returning the same amount worth of bottles gives exactly the same barcode.
Apparantly it already has been tested and found working: http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~gh275/relay.pdf
I found the link thanks to this post by gaetan-g.
The idea is to proxy the signal, without interpreting it. The only thing I want to accomplish is to have the card reader talk to a card that's far away. It's kinda like a walky-talky, but instead of transfering voice, it's tranfering an rfid conversation.
So I stand over at the cashier with a receiver that picks up the authorization request and retransmits it via wireless. A friend stands next to you, picks up the wireless signal and re-transmits the rfid authentication request to your card. Then he uses his rfid receiver to pick up the response and re-transmit it back to my device which will send it to the card reader again. That way I don't have to understand anything from what the rfid data is about (it could even be transfered in analog form), but the card reader would be talking to someone else's card.
So 2 people need to work together to steal some money. One stands close to the victim and the other walks over to the cashier. Instead of recording the signal you now proxy it. The one at the cashier picks up the signal from the reader and uses a wireless transmitter to get the signal to the person by the victim who sends the data to the card. Send the response from the card back to the reader and you're done.
There's no sideways building, the rotated pictures are trees. You can see them here in detail: http://users.pandora.be/tomenmieke/rub_index/
I also think it doesn't have much to do with being emotional about the picture. You just see something out of the ordinary and try to reflect on it, mostly because it's something 'rare'. It's just like passing by cars and shops. You usually see them, but don't really look at them. Just when there's something extra-ordinary about them, you look again. In this case, you don't often see 'images of injury and dismemberment' (I hope) which draws your attention. At the same time, I didn't really look at the other pictures either, just trying to find a clue if they're rotated or not (mostly checking horizon/sky). If I were asked to try to remember details about the rotated picture, I would probably miss some of the pictures following the rotated one as well.