Slashdot is badly borken these days. I just had a post disappear completely the other day. It said comment submitted, but it never showed up on the page.
Let's not be racist about it. The plant was designed by General Electric (GE nowadays). Immelt, slimy toad that he is, jumped in the media fray VERY early on, to do damage control:
He offered help! He should have started by offering excuses! A group of GE whistleblowers were pointing out design flaws in that exact type of plant in the 970s! Design flaws which played a role in the accident, moreover:
Why do you care so much about karma? I have enough of it to burn that I can continue this VERY off-topic talk. Don't you? Oh, but perhaps you are a known troll and fresh out of sockpuppets?
He's a nuke shill, no mistake about that. I doubt he's including the land permanently contaminated by Mayak, Fukushima and Chernobyl in his "land use" statistics.
Unit 1 IC train A was shut down by operators to avoid excessive cooling which would have thermally stressed the metal of the RPV and shortened the life of an already old plant. Later, power to operate the valves that would have made it active again became unavailable.
At that point, the RPV should have been vented and water should have been added using fire engines. This was not done for a variety of reasons, such as that the evacuation was not over yet. When at last venting was attempted, it was found that a valve needed for venting ad failed closed, possibly because of excessive pressure. Attempts to open it manually met with failure.
So, eventually the reactor vented itself. Explosively.
The severe accident management guidelines did NOT, in fact, state that venting should only be performed post-evac. They were ignored in the event.
Even later in the accident sequence sufficient fresh water became unavailable for a while (the first reactor explosion damaged fire trucks, severed water lines and prompted a TOTAL evacuation of the site). A decision was made to delay salt-water cooling. This probably contributed to the melt-through in reactor 3.
No, you stupid fuck. The plant was beyond hope, but the radioactive emissions were not pre-ordained. Proper cooling (which would have meant functioning ICs OR venting+water injection) could have saved the day.
They only reason the plant became a risk was due to the land dropping a meter.
Where do you people get this kind of bullshit? The run-up was 13-15 metres, the typhoon breakwater (which btw was only intended to protect the harbor) was only 5 metres high.
Capital-L limits turned out to be rather flexible, in the event. The 20 mSv/year limit quickly got dumped in favor of an "emergency" 250 mSv one which was not rescinded since. Acceptable total doses to population took a similar course. ALARA principle was thrown out the window, in any case.
Cumulative doses for workers may or may not have been tracked in the first few days. Cumulative doses for residents of the evacuated zone have certainly NOT been tracked, most residents have only gotten scanned for external contamination, with portable detectors, upon being evacuated. Some of those who left the area by themselves have never been screened in any way.
Workers may or may not have known what they were being exposed to. The incident with stepping in contaminated water happened mostly because there was only ONE detector issued per work crew. Apparently there was a shortage of detectors and dosimeters...
Fukushima was planned to close only in the sense that the original license of reactor 1 was due to expire.
TEPCO's report is, indeed, somewhat weak. Yet its conclusions seem to have been accepted at face value by both the IAEA and the J-gov. So? What am I to do? Discount it entirely because you say so?
Your remarks on geography are unclear, to say the least. I will articulate my position for you and you can try to disprove it:
Many places on Japan's eastern seaboard are conducive to tsunamis. In fact, the entire coastline is a succession of coves and gulfs, facing a huge earthquake-generating fault. The only variable that protects some places and dooms others is where the epicenter of the latest big-enough quake happens to be in relation to said coves and gulfs.
Such events are so common in Japan, specifically on the eastern coast of it, that the Japanese made up a word for them.
Given all of the above, TEPCO should have expected, planned and built for a tsunami at least as high as the worst one on record in the past 100 years. Instead, they lowered the construction site to save money on pumps!
I point out that work completely stopped at the plant on several occasions. I support this with a statement from the highest levels of J-gov. You keep contradicting me with no evidence. Why?
This is relevant because it changes expectations about what sort of safety preparation the plant should have received. For example, many have talked of TEPCO ignoring historical precedent (such as you have) while ignoring that the plant was to enter the process of decommissioning.
The license extension did not come out of the blue. It was a process drawn out over several years. TEPCO fully expected and hoped this to happen, they even re-analyzed plant seismic safety and concluded everything will be A-OK.
I disagree. There were cracks in the structure (here, the "pit"). These didn't impair the recovery effects, but they may have contributed to radioactive water leaks which the plant has experienced.
I give you official conclusions of the plant operator, as supported by facts and modeling, you give me speculation, i.e. bullshit.
Geography can greatly amplify or diminish the effects of tsunami (which is what happened in large part at Fukushima, but not at a nearby plant in Tokai). It's like saying North America's eastern seaboard sees extreme tides of 16 meters, just because a small component, the Bay of Fundy does.
Obviously, the terrain at Fukushima WAS and IS conducive to a tsunami upswell. So, keeping the scale about the same, it's like saying Palm Beach may get hit by hurricanes because Orlando was hit a couple times. IOW, not that much of a stretch.
Actually, they most likely did work selflessly and continually even when they were evacuated from the site.
Please stop calling them officers. It's doing you no good and it perpetrates the mistaken impression that these people have anything to do with law enforcement. They do not.
There's an easier way. All the SWAT pigs will get jammers. So nothing will be going out to the 'net and your fellow FOSS terrorists when they break down your door at 2.30 AM.
Slashdot Mirror
Actual quote from the actual fine article:
their eventual aim is to produce silk from worms that has the toughness of spider silk.
Slashdot is badly borken these days. I just had a post disappear completely the other day. It said comment submitted, but it never showed up on the page.
In theory at least, the safety of the entire plant was checked, as unit 1 was to receive an operating license extension.
I am aware of that. It's perhaps a sign of immaturity on my part, although it does help me sleep better.
Let's not be racist about it. The plant was designed by General Electric (GE nowadays). Immelt, slimy toad that he is, jumped in the media fray VERY early on, to do damage control:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56fb5f92-4e0e-11e0-a9fa-00144feab49a.html#axzz1hguiUtBH
He offered help! He should have started by offering excuses! A group of GE whistleblowers were pointing out design flaws in that exact type of plant in the 970s! Design flaws which played a role in the accident, moreover:
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/03/15/3520/reactors-heart-japanese-nuclear-crisis-raised-concerns-early-1972-memos-show
also, this:
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/03/15/956586/-Whistleblower-Expose-of-GE-Inspection-Coverup-RARE-EU-Authored-US-BWR-Damage-Report-?via=tag
Where?
Yes, you are correct, of course. I am just very, very angry. I think I am conveying that pretty effectively.
Any thoughts on what I have posted, just to keep this semi-on-topic?
You do know, Google senpai, that there are several methods, none of which have been validated in proper epidemiological studies?
The Techa river cohort is just about all we had, pre-Fukushima.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16238437
Now, there will be the Fukushima schoolchildren to study. Their deaths from cancer and leukemia will further enlighten us, 50 years from now....
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/life_and_death/AJ2011110916955
Thanks. It's just that I am tired of all the mealy-mouthed "oh but nuclear is SCIENCE and SCIENCE is doubleplusgood" harping.
Keep that beer in mind, I plan to come on over when your gov't starts showing signs of sanity.
Why do you care so much about karma? I have enough of it to burn that I can continue this VERY off-topic talk. Don't you? Oh, but perhaps you are a known troll and fresh out of sockpuppets?
He's a nuke shill, no mistake about that. I doubt he's including the land permanently contaminated by Mayak, Fukushima and Chernobyl in his "land use" statistics.
Are you counting deaths from cancer? How?
I like to believe that I am on a tech-oriented site where being right is more important than being polite.
There is no downmod for "stuff that I happen to find offensive" by the way but feel free to abuse mod points and call me a troll, if you have them.
Or if you don't like my style you could say it to my face, using your own name to identify yourself like a real person does.
Unit 1 IC train A was shut down by operators to avoid excessive cooling which would have thermally stressed the metal of the RPV and shortened the life of an already old plant. Later, power to operate the valves that would have made it active again became unavailable.
At that point, the RPV should have been vented and water should have been added using fire engines. This was not done for a variety of reasons, such as that the evacuation was not over yet. When at last venting was attempted, it was found that a valve needed for venting ad failed closed, possibly because of excessive pressure. Attempts to open it manually met with failure.
So, eventually the reactor vented itself. Explosively.
The severe accident management guidelines did NOT, in fact, state that venting should only be performed post-evac. They were ignored in the event.
Even later in the accident sequence sufficient fresh water became unavailable for a while (the first reactor explosion damaged fire trucks, severed water lines and prompted a TOTAL evacuation of the site). A decision was made to delay salt-water cooling. This probably contributed to the melt-through in reactor 3.
No, you stupid fuck. The plant was beyond hope, but the radioactive emissions were not pre-ordained. Proper cooling (which would have meant functioning ICs OR venting+water injection) could have saved the day.
They only reason the plant became a risk was due to the land dropping a meter.
Where do you people get this kind of bullshit? The run-up was 13-15 metres, the typhoon breakwater (which btw was only intended to protect the harbor) was only 5 metres high.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi_nuclear_disaster#Fukushima_I_Nuclear_Power_Plant
TEPCO knew about the risk of a 10-meter tsunami, and ignored it:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/29/fukushima-daiichi-operator-tsunami-warning
Even TEPCO's own report says they fucked up the risk assessment:
http://uk.news.yahoo.com/fukushima-not-prepared-tsunami-tepco-report-102155428.html
Capital-L limits turned out to be rather flexible, in the event. The 20 mSv/year limit quickly got dumped in favor of an "emergency" 250 mSv one which was not rescinded since. Acceptable total doses to population took a similar course. ALARA principle was thrown out the window, in any case.
Cumulative doses for workers may or may not have been tracked in the first few days. Cumulative doses for residents of the evacuated zone have certainly NOT been tracked, most residents have only gotten scanned for external contamination, with portable detectors, upon being evacuated. Some of those who left the area by themselves have never been screened in any way.
Workers may or may not have known what they were being exposed to. The incident with stepping in contaminated water happened mostly because there was only ONE detector issued per work crew. Apparently there was a shortage of detectors and dosimeters...
Ah for crying out loud.
Fukushima was planned to close only in the sense that the original license of reactor 1 was due to expire.
TEPCO's report is, indeed, somewhat weak. Yet its conclusions seem to have been accepted at face value by both the IAEA and the J-gov. So? What am I to do? Discount it entirely because you say so?
Your remarks on geography are unclear, to say the least. I will articulate my position for you and you can try to disprove it:
Many places on Japan's eastern seaboard are conducive to tsunamis. In fact, the entire coastline is a succession of coves and gulfs, facing a huge earthquake-generating fault. The only variable that protects some places and dooms others is where the epicenter of the latest big-enough quake happens to be in relation to said coves and gulfs.
Such events are so common in Japan, specifically on the eastern coast of it, that the Japanese made up a word for them.
Given all of the above, TEPCO should have expected, planned and built for a tsunami at least as high as the worst one on record in the past 100 years. Instead, they lowered the construction site to save money on pumps!
I point out that work completely stopped at the plant on several occasions. I support this with a statement from the highest levels of J-gov. You keep contradicting me with no evidence. Why?
Why am I talking to you, again?
I gave a citation (from the plant operator, no less!) for the part you quoted.
Nowhere does it say that the crack was caused by the earthquake. The Reuters article is unavailable, btw.
But not from the example you gave.
What does this even mean?
So? And when are you going to disprove something I've actually claimed.
So I disproved just about every claim you had.
6/10 I'm not angry but you did make me reply, twice.
This is relevant because it changes expectations about what sort of safety preparation the plant should have received. For example, many have talked of TEPCO ignoring historical precedent (such as you have) while ignoring that the plant was to enter the process of decommissioning.
The license extension did not come out of the blue. It was a process drawn out over several years. TEPCO fully expected and hoped this to happen, they even re-analyzed plant seismic safety and concluded everything will be A-OK.
I disagree. There were cracks in the structure (here, the "pit"). These didn't impair the recovery effects, but they may have contributed to radioactive water leaks which the plant has experienced.
I give you official conclusions of the plant operator, as supported by facts and modeling, you give me speculation, i.e. bullshit.
Geography can greatly amplify or diminish the effects of tsunami (which is what happened in large part at Fukushima, but not at a nearby plant in Tokai). It's like saying North America's eastern seaboard sees extreme tides of 16 meters, just because a small component, the Bay of Fundy does.
Obviously, the terrain at Fukushima WAS and IS conducive to a tsunami upswell. So, keeping the scale about the same, it's like saying Palm Beach may get hit by hurricanes because Orlando was hit a couple times. IOW, not that much of a stretch.
Actually, they most likely did work selflessly and continually even when they were evacuated from the site.
Speculation. Worse, it ain't true.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/16/fukushima-workers-evacuate-radiation-spikes
Direct quote from the article, person cited is Yukio Edano:
The workers cannot carry out even minimal work at the plant now. Because of the radiation risk we are on standby
Your post is a collection of lies.
Fukushima Dai-ichi unit 1 was granted a 10 year license extension just prior to the incident
http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2011/fukushima_reactorext
The earthquake did not damage the plant
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-02/tepco-says-earthquake-didn-t-damage-critical-units-at-fukushima-reactor.html
Fuel rods were not removed, they could not have been. They are still in there, molten down.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-24/tepco-confirms-meltdown-of-no-2-3-reactors-at-fukushima-1-.html
The tsunami was not unprecedented, bigger tsunami wave run-ups have occurred on Japan's eastern seaboard in the past 100 years.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1933_Sanriku_earthquake
During the incident, the people at the plant did not work selflessly and continually to help prevent the incident from escalating further, but rather evacuated on multiple occasions.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/latest-nuclear-plant-explosion-in-japan-raises-radiation-fears/2011/03/15/ABwTmha_story.html?wpisrc=nl_natlalert
Please stop calling them officers. It's doing you no good and it perpetrates the mistaken impression that these people have anything to do with law enforcement. They do not.
Right about the time Clement Atlee became Prime-Minister. Britain is an American protectorate ever since WWII. Get over it.
So I'm supposed to believe that you RTFA? Are you new here, or what?
There's an easier way. All the SWAT pigs will get jammers. So nothing will be going out to the 'net and your fellow FOSS terrorists when they break down your door at 2.30 AM.