This trend has to have held true at a similar point-in-time in XP's launch lifecycle as well. Individual purchasers of Windows OS seldom are the first to show enthusiasm about spending the retail price for a new version. Those who will own it will be the ones who would have had it handed down the OEM path.
The survey should focus on corporate software purchase decision makers at this point in time to get an accurate pulse on the adoption sentiment.
Secondly, this survey should be conducted on these "US adults" (assuming that most were responding from a personal purchase/use context) no earlier than a year from first retail release. So, do this survey around Christmas this year and then see what it says.
Not to mention, sentiments should be dull at best considering the product complexity introduced, and the poor marginal benefit perceived of Vista over the incumbent XP.
But nothing comes for free. If Google is providing certain services and is promising to continue to provide value through technology over the next decade, then it is claiming to do so because these ads and its related business model is going to feed them.
It is naive to expect that ads are bad. I honestly don't know how much my consumer habits respond to ads, but I fully understand how that enables some savvy business models to provide tremendous value for "free" to end users like me today.
However, ads thrown at you in a poorly thought way are their own animal. It is premature at this point to expect that Microsoft does not know how, when, and where to deliver its ads and why.. right on the first day of adCenter, and people pulling their hair out over this rhetoric.
However, again, I fully understand what you have said though. And I quite appreciate that this world is getting submerged in consumerism. The ads... incidentally, are just a small (very small) manifestation of that.
Why does everyone flip out at the sound of ads, taking stands on a very black and white view of possible business model and channels of delivery.
Given the ubiquity of MS Office, think of how it might benefit small businesses and the general productivity if the layman of Microsoft floated a lighter version of MS Office for "free", where it would place ads.
It would be truly foolish to think that Microsoft would want to place obtrusive or not-so-well-thought-out ad-strategies in its top-shelf products that have 90% market share.
As for adCenter, its about time for an also-ran to start running.
The reality is this: companies like Nike, Walmart, and others who indirectly run "sweatshops" in Bangladesh, Pakistan and other countries may not live up to the labor standards in first world economies.
However, in parts of the world where this is rampant, these "sweatshops" are also the best thing that happened to the people who are employed here. It is permitting them to nudge their way out of abject poverty and sustain themselves. This is very serious.
While activism and human rights efforts have helped to uplift the working conditions, and push for more reasonable labor laws in these countries, if these "sweatshops" were to be closed down as a result of this media- and public-activism, that would truly do more harm than good to the population in question.
someone musing about re-uniting the split up Gondowonaland.. + while loosely re-reading the word as "Gone to Wonderland"... + of course, thinking of the guy being on dope
I have used TMobile for a few years now (need to desperately get out of it by the way).. and they have on more than one occassion unlocked my phone for free. All I had to do was call up customer service, who would capture the IMEI number and ask me to call back in a couple of days. When I did, they'd give me the "unlock code", which I would be required to punch in, and the phone would be unlocked -- just like that.
Why can't we have credit card companies map a customer's account information to a biometric ID. For example, I go to a store and place my thumb on a reader and enter a PIN.
No more carrying any credit cards or anything!!
- - -
I suppose contact-less payment systems have more utility - as illustrated by/. readers who posted about rapid transport fare payment systems, etc.
Besides, I am not aware of the cost implications of biometric readers versus RFID readers.
It would be safer to be a legal expert to comment on this. However, a few things come to mind:
In the US, I have always seen ads that bash the competitor. Pepsi vs Coke, etc.
No, not in all such ads have I seen a [* "Pepsi" is a registered TM of...]
Since you cannot have a [* BlahBlah is a registered TM of...], this case should have been about setting the precedent on such matters with regard to online advertising. I think we just missed the bus here.
I don't see how Geico stands to lose from all this, unless someone fraudulently enrolls me into an insurance product falsely claiming it to be Geico's. You would probably succeed if I were blind. In which case I wouldn't be driving.
My common sense says that this ad should be permitted "Better than Geico's 15% savings". Hell, why not. If this is true, I want to know.
What's the point of contextual intelligently purchased AdWords, if I cannot bring my product to the correct market segment triggered by reference to my competition.
In summary, I feel Google is definitely not liable. Nor are its customers who purchased these words.
If anything, the precedent that shall be set, should be a slap on the wrist.
If anything, the precedent that is being set here is a step backwards in online marketing and advertising.
PS: I typed in "Geico" in Google, but didn't get any sponsored ads that mentioned the name in the header or the body of the ad.
Considering how the industry has witnessed a departure of movie-consumers from theaters, it is really that segment of movie-watching that cannot be replicated at home, which will draw the movie-goer back to the theaters.
I still haven't seen an IMAX movie, so I am a bit clueless about what a "3D" movie looks like, what kind of screen shape it requires, etc. And most of all, if one can see a thriller or romantic drama just as naturally on such media, as one can see a panoramic Grand Canyon video, etc.
But, the point is that such visual enhancements are due now. Not just in the visual effects of computer-animation rich productions, but also in presentation of video altogether.
The best way to understand this is to imagine saying a few years later, "wow, and we used to be so content and thrilled watching movies in 2D.."
I am not sure if I am permitted to quote major chunks of a paid-article, but the one from which I am copying excerpts here is very compelling and well written, and makes some good points that fall in the context of this thread.
Even if everyone involved in terrorising London turns out to have been British-born, it is clear that the bombers had access to sophisticated explosives, not easily available in suburban Yorkshire; and, more important, that they were influenced by ideas, images and interpretations of Islam that would continue to circulate electronically, even if every extremist who tried to enter Britain were intercepted. So the best that terrorist-hunters in Britain and elsewhere in Europe can do is to trace how disaffected people from their own tranquil suburbs form connections with ideological mentors, and ultimately terrorist sponsors, who live overseas, and how those godfathers find recruits in western countries.
...
In Britain, too, security services have concluded that these days, connections between local youths and foreign godfathers are usually formed at the youths' behest. To a surprising extent, the onus is on individual zealots (or groups of them) to find mentors. Al-Qaeda does not actively seek recruits for the jihadist cause, partly because that would attract the attention of the security services and partly because, ever since the destruction of its bases in Afghanistan, it has--in the view of well placed British observers--been too loosely organised to recruit systematically.
This highlights one of the main difficulties of the "war on terror". In 2001, when America and its allies responded to the attacks on New York and Washington by declaring war on the al-Qaeda network, it seemed an identifiable adversary, with bases, financial structures and a leadership that could be singled out and struck. Since then, it has become something much looser: not even a "franchise", as it is commonly labelled, but more an ideological community, held together above all by electronic connections, which seeks inspiration from a common source.
...
Through the web, even dead al-Qaeda fighters live on, says Mr Ulph. On one website that ceased operations last year (but has several imitators), it was possible to read the writings of senior, recently slain al-Qaeda men on everything from physical training to guerrilla tactics.
...
A group of young Muslims will often travel quite a long way down the road to violent jihad before meeting anybody with terrorist expertise. Some never find the contacts they seek, and resort to their own devices; only occasionally does this have deadly results for anybody besides themselves. One example of such amateurism is that of two Moroccan men from the Dutch city of Eindhoven, Ahmed el-Bakiouli and Khalid el-Hassnaoui, who tried to enter Afghanistan in December 2001 in the hope of fighting some Americans. Having failed, they went to Kashmir, where they were swiftly killed by Indian security forces. In Britain, several terrorist plots uncovered since 2001 have been striking for their incompetence and lack of outside expertise.
Things become far more dangerous, of course, when committed radicals come into contact with veterans of wars in Chechnya and Bosnia, or of the Afghan training camps where several hundred Britons are believed to have been schooled. These veterans either have the know-how to plan an atrocity, or can find somebody who does, and it is under their influence that hopeless missions can turn deadly. Whether this happens or not is often a matter of chance. Take the Egyptian Mohammed Atta and other members of the "Hamburg cell" that plotted the September 11th attacks. They were drawn into mega-terror after meeting someone who introduced them first to an al-Qaeda operative in Germany, and then to masterminds in Afghanistan.
I am not sure if I am permitted to quote major chunks of a paid-article, but the one from which I am copying excerpts here is very compelling and well written, and makes some good points that fall in the context of this thread.
Economist, "The Enemy Within", July 14, 2005Even if everyone involved in terrorising London turns out to have been British-born, it is clear that the bombers had access to sophisticated explosives, not easily available in suburban Yorkshire; and, more important, that they were influenced by ideas, images and interpretations of Islam that would continue to circulate electronically, even if every extremist who tried to enter Britain were intercepted. So the best that terrorist-hunters in Britain and elsewhere in Europe can do is to trace how disaffected people from their own tranquil suburbs form connections with ideological mentors, and ultimately terrorist sponsors, who live overseas, and how those godfathers find recruits in western countries....
In Britain, too, security services have concluded that these days, connections between local youths and foreign godfathers are usually formed at the youths' behest. To a surprising extent, the onus is on individual zealots (or groups of them) to find mentors. Al-Qaeda does not actively seek recruits for the jihadist cause, partly because that would attract the attention of the security services and partly because, ever since the destruction of its bases in Afghanistan, it has--in the view of well placed British observers--been too loosely organised to recruit systematically.
This highlights one of the main difficulties of the "war on terror". In 2001, when America and its allies responded to the attacks on New York and Washington by declaring war on the al-Qaeda network, it seemed an identifiable adversary, with bases, financial structures and a leadership that could be singled out and struck. Since then, it has become something much looser: not even a "franchise", as it is commonly labelled, but more an ideological community, held together above all by electronic connections, which seeks inspiration from a common source....
Through the web, even dead al-Qaeda fighters live on, says Mr Ulph. On one website that ceased operations last year (but has several imitators), it was possible to read the writings of senior, recently slain al-Qaeda men on everything from physical training to guerrilla tactics....
A group of young Muslims will often travel quite a long way down the road to violent jihad before meeting anybody with terrorist expertise. Some never find the contacts they seek, and resort to their own devices; only occasionally does this have deadly results for anybody besides themselves. One example of such amateurism is that of two Moroccan men from the Dutch city of Eindhoven, Ahmed el-Bakiouli and Khalid el-Hassnaoui, who tried to enter Afghanistan in December 2001 in the hope of fighting some Americans. Having failed, they went to Kashmir, where they were swiftly killed by Indian security forces. In Britain, several terrorist plots uncovered since 2001 have been striking for their incompetence and lack of outside expertise.
Things become far more dangerous, of course, when committed radicals come into contact with veterans of wars in Chechnya and Bosnia, or of the Afghan training camps where several hundred Britons are believed to have been schooled. These veterans either have the know-how to plan an atrocity, or can find somebody who does, and it is under their influence that hopeless missions can turn deadly. Whether this happens or not is often a matter of chance. Take the Egyptian Mohammed Atta and other members of the "Hamburg cell" that plotted the September 11th attacks. They were drawn into mega-terror after meeting someone who introduced them first to an al-Qaeda operative in Germany, and then to masterminds in Afghanistan. If this had not happened, the Hamburg group might have ended up as cannon-fodder in Chechnya.
Slashdot Mirror
This trend has to have held true at a similar point-in-time in XP's launch lifecycle as well. Individual purchasers of Windows OS seldom are the first to show enthusiasm about spending the retail price for a new version. Those who will own it will be the ones who would have had it handed down the OEM path.
The survey should focus on corporate software purchase decision makers at this point in time to get an accurate pulse on the adoption sentiment.
Secondly, this survey should be conducted on these "US adults" (assuming that most were responding from a personal purchase/use context) no earlier than a year from first retail release. So, do this survey around Christmas this year and then see what it says. Not to mention, sentiments should be dull at best considering the product complexity introduced, and the poor marginal benefit perceived of Vista over the incumbent XP.
Understood.
But nothing comes for free. If Google is providing certain services and is promising to continue to provide value through technology over the next decade, then it is claiming to do so because these ads and its related business model is going to feed them.
It is naive to expect that ads are bad. I honestly don't know how much my consumer habits respond to ads, but I fully understand how that enables some savvy business models to provide tremendous value for "free" to end users like me today.
However, ads thrown at you in a poorly thought way are their own animal. It is premature at this point to expect that Microsoft does not know how, when, and where to deliver its ads and why.. right on the first day of adCenter, and people pulling their hair out over this rhetoric.
However, again, I fully understand what you have said though. And I quite appreciate that this world is getting submerged in consumerism. The ads... incidentally, are just a small (very small) manifestation of that.
Debraj
Why does everyone flip out at the sound of ads, taking stands on a very black and white view of possible business model and channels of delivery.
Given the ubiquity of MS Office, think of how it might benefit small businesses and the general productivity if the layman of Microsoft floated a lighter version of MS Office for "free", where it would place ads.
It would be truly foolish to think that Microsoft would want to place obtrusive or not-so-well-thought-out ad-strategies in its top-shelf products that have 90% market share.
As for adCenter, its about time for an also-ran to start running.
The reality is this: companies like Nike, Walmart, and others who indirectly run "sweatshops" in Bangladesh, Pakistan and other countries may not live up to the labor standards in first world economies.
However, in parts of the world where this is rampant, these "sweatshops" are also the best thing that happened to the people who are employed here. It is permitting them to nudge their way out of abject poverty and sustain themselves. This is very serious.
While activism and human rights efforts have helped to uplift the working conditions, and push for more reasonable labor laws in these countries, if these "sweatshops" were to be closed down as a result of this media- and public-activism, that would truly do more harm than good to the population in question.
http://www.shapeservices.com/eng/im/GMAIL/ Someone's selling Blackberries dedicated to their use to check Gmail emails.
what if i pretend to be deaf and dumb. can i respond with ASL? :)
I think you should think of it as:
someone musing about re-uniting the split up Gondowonaland..
+
while loosely re-reading the word as "Gone to Wonderland"...
+
of course, thinking of the guy being on dope
I have used TMobile for a few years now (need to desperately get out of it by the way).. and they have on more than one occassion unlocked my phone for free. All I had to do was call up customer service, who would capture the IMEI number and ask me to call back in a couple of days. When I did, they'd give me the "unlock code", which I would be required to punch in, and the phone would be unlocked -- just like that.
Why can't we have credit card companies map a customer's account information to a biometric ID. For example, I go to a store and place my thumb on a reader and enter a PIN. No more carrying any credit cards or anything!! - - - I suppose contact-less payment systems have more utility - as illustrated by /. readers who posted about rapid transport fare payment systems, etc.
Besides, I am not aware of the cost implications of biometric readers versus RFID readers.
- In the US, I have always seen ads that bash the competitor. Pepsi vs Coke, etc.
- No, not in all such ads have I seen a [* "Pepsi" is a registered TM of...]
- Since you cannot have a [* BlahBlah is a registered TM of...], this case should have been about setting the precedent on such matters with regard to online advertising. I think we just missed the bus here.
- I don't see how Geico stands to lose from all this, unless someone fraudulently enrolls me into an insurance product falsely claiming it to be Geico's. You would probably succeed if I were blind. In which case I wouldn't be driving.
- My common sense says that this ad should be permitted "Better than Geico's 15% savings". Hell, why not. If this is true, I want to know.
- What's the point of contextual intelligently purchased AdWords, if I cannot bring my product to the correct market segment triggered by reference to my competition.
In summary, I feel Google is definitely not liable. Nor are its customers who purchased these words.If anything, the precedent that shall be set, should be a slap on the wrist.
If anything, the precedent that is being set here is a step backwards in online marketing and advertising.
PS: I typed in "Geico" in Google, but didn't get any sponsored ads that mentioned the name in the header or the body of the ad.
Considering how the industry has witnessed a departure of movie-consumers from theaters, it is really that segment of movie-watching that cannot be replicated at home, which will draw the movie-goer back to the theaters.
I still haven't seen an IMAX movie, so I am a bit clueless about what a "3D" movie looks like, what kind of screen shape it requires, etc. And most of all, if one can see a thriller or romantic drama just as naturally on such media, as one can see a panoramic Grand Canyon video, etc.
But, the point is that such visual enhancements are due now. Not just in the visual effects of computer-animation rich productions, but also in presentation of video altogether.
The best way to understand this is to imagine saying a few years later, "wow, and we used to be so content and thrilled watching movies in 2D.."
I am not sure if I am permitted to quote major chunks of a paid-article, but the one from which I am copying excerpts here is very compelling and well written, and makes some good points that fall in the context of this thread.
...
...
Economist, "The Enemy Within" - July 14, 2005
Even if everyone involved in terrorising London turns out to have been British-born, it is clear that the bombers had access to sophisticated explosives, not easily available in suburban Yorkshire; and, more important, that they were influenced by ideas, images and interpretations of Islam that would continue to circulate electronically, even if every extremist who tried to enter Britain were intercepted. So the best that terrorist-hunters in Britain and elsewhere in Europe can do is to trace how disaffected people from their own tranquil suburbs form connections with ideological mentors, and ultimately terrorist sponsors, who live overseas, and how those godfathers find recruits in western countries.
In Britain, too, security services have concluded that these days, connections between local youths and foreign godfathers are usually formed at the youths' behest. To a surprising extent, the onus is on individual zealots (or groups of them) to find mentors. Al-Qaeda does not actively seek recruits for the jihadist cause, partly because that would attract the attention of the security services and partly because, ever since the destruction of its bases in Afghanistan, it has--in the view of well placed British observers--been too loosely organised to recruit systematically.
This highlights one of the main difficulties of the "war on terror". In 2001, when America and its allies responded to the attacks on New York and Washington by declaring war on the al-Qaeda network, it seemed an identifiable adversary, with bases, financial structures and a leadership that could be singled out and struck. Since then, it has become something much looser: not even a "franchise", as it is commonly labelled, but more an ideological community, held together above all by electronic connections, which seeks inspiration from a common source.
...
Through the web, even dead al-Qaeda fighters live on, says Mr Ulph. On one website that ceased operations last year (but has several imitators), it was possible to read the writings of senior, recently slain al-Qaeda men on everything from physical training to guerrilla tactics.
A group of young Muslims will often travel quite a long way down the road to violent jihad before meeting anybody with terrorist expertise. Some never find the contacts they seek, and resort to their own devices; only occasionally does this have deadly results for anybody besides themselves. One example of such amateurism is that of two Moroccan men from the Dutch city of Eindhoven, Ahmed el-Bakiouli and Khalid el-Hassnaoui, who tried to enter Afghanistan in December 2001 in the hope of fighting some Americans. Having failed, they went to Kashmir, where they were swiftly killed by Indian security forces. In Britain, several terrorist plots uncovered since 2001 have been striking for their incompetence and lack of outside expertise.
Things become far more dangerous, of course, when committed radicals come into contact with veterans of wars in Chechnya and Bosnia, or of the Afghan training camps where several hundred Britons are believed to have been schooled. These veterans either have the know-how to plan an atrocity, or can find somebody who does, and it is under their influence that hopeless missions can turn deadly. Whether this happens or not is often a matter of chance. Take the Egyptian Mohammed Atta and other members of the "Hamburg cell" that plotted the September 11th attacks. They were drawn into mega-terror after meeting someone who introduced them first to an al-Qaeda operative in Germany, and then to masterminds in Afghanistan.
I am not sure if I am permitted to quote major chunks of a paid-article, but the one from which I am copying excerpts here is very compelling and well written, and makes some good points that fall in the context of this thread. Economist, "The Enemy Within", July 14, 2005 Even if everyone involved in terrorising London turns out to have been British-born, it is clear that the bombers had access to sophisticated explosives, not easily available in suburban Yorkshire; and, more important, that they were influenced by ideas, images and interpretations of Islam that would continue to circulate electronically, even if every extremist who tried to enter Britain were intercepted. So the best that terrorist-hunters in Britain and elsewhere in Europe can do is to trace how disaffected people from their own tranquil suburbs form connections with ideological mentors, and ultimately terrorist sponsors, who live overseas, and how those godfathers find recruits in western countries. ...
In Britain, too, security services have concluded that these days, connections between local youths and foreign godfathers are usually formed at the youths' behest. To a surprising extent, the onus is on individual zealots (or groups of them) to find mentors. Al-Qaeda does not actively seek recruits for the jihadist cause, partly because that would attract the attention of the security services and partly because, ever since the destruction of its bases in Afghanistan, it has--in the view of well placed British observers--been too loosely organised to recruit systematically.
This highlights one of the main difficulties of the "war on terror". In 2001, when America and its allies responded to the attacks on New York and Washington by declaring war on the al-Qaeda network, it seemed an identifiable adversary, with bases, financial structures and a leadership that could be singled out and struck. Since then, it has become something much looser: not even a "franchise", as it is commonly labelled, but more an ideological community, held together above all by electronic connections, which seeks inspiration from a common source. ...
Through the web, even dead al-Qaeda fighters live on, says Mr Ulph. On one website that ceased operations last year (but has several imitators), it was possible to read the writings of senior, recently slain al-Qaeda men on everything from physical training to guerrilla tactics. ...
A group of young Muslims will often travel quite a long way down the road to violent jihad before meeting anybody with terrorist expertise. Some never find the contacts they seek, and resort to their own devices; only occasionally does this have deadly results for anybody besides themselves. One example of such amateurism is that of two Moroccan men from the Dutch city of Eindhoven, Ahmed el-Bakiouli and Khalid el-Hassnaoui, who tried to enter Afghanistan in December 2001 in the hope of fighting some Americans. Having failed, they went to Kashmir, where they were swiftly killed by Indian security forces. In Britain, several terrorist plots uncovered since 2001 have been striking for their incompetence and lack of outside expertise.
Things become far more dangerous, of course, when committed radicals come into contact with veterans of wars in Chechnya and Bosnia, or of the Afghan training camps where several hundred Britons are believed to have been schooled. These veterans either have the know-how to plan an atrocity, or can find somebody who does, and it is under their influence that hopeless missions can turn deadly. Whether this happens or not is often a matter of chance. Take the Egyptian Mohammed Atta and other members of the "Hamburg cell" that plotted the September 11th attacks. They were drawn into mega-terror after meeting someone who introduced them first to an al-Qaeda operative in Germany, and then to masterminds in Afghanistan. If this had not happened, the Hamburg group might have ended up as cannon-fodder in Chechnya.