The bottom line is that Griffin and Horowitz are squandering billions to create a crew Launch vehicle that is piss-poor with respect to already existing EELV's. Their dream is our nightmare. Their sole motivation is the politics of jobs and where they are located- Florida mostly. They clearly do not want to go exploring or do real science.
Believe me- things like vibration and accleration are not the crux of man rating. All modern launch vehicles subject every functional part to extensive development and qualification testing which include vibe tests- which generally envelope accleration forces. The "ride" on an Atlas is incredibly benign compared to that for a solid. Combustion roughness on the Shuttle SRB's is huge compared to that for the RD-180. The key to safety is forcing incipient failures to the surface by whatever means before a human is there when they happen. You can do this by test but history has shown that failures these days usually involve system interactions that can only be seen in flight. That means that flying is more important than any test on the ground. Demonstrated reliability by flight experience cannot be replaced by analysis or wishful thinking. This will be the downfall of the CLV and CaLV vehicles which, as single pupose vehicles, will never rack up many flights.
The Saturn was also a point design with no flexibility to do much more than the single task of going to the moon with 3 guys- at least if economics makes any difference. Modern Phase 2 Atlas vehicles can replace the Saturn for a fraction of the price. Sorry to say that the F-1 is a pathetic engine compared to the RD-170 and RD-180. It's mass, Isp and complexity relegate it to the museum- not on a modern vehicle. J2 is only slightly better off. Trust me- when all is said and done there won't be much of the J-2 left in the J2S++ or whatever it ends up being called. They will take technology already demonstrated on the RB60 and just scale up. Working with 40 year old designs does not save you anything- just create more grief.
There is NO SUCH THING as "man rated". No two engineers can ever agree on what it means. Redundancy is present on modern EELV's in everything from avionics to valves to wires. So that is not the answer. Excessive redundancy buys NOTHING but cost and complexity and more failure modes. Man rated is what the NASA administrator wants it to be. The cost to upgrade minor systems to make everyone happy on Atlas or Delta is trivial beside the cost of new design. By a factor of at least 25. The bottom line is that NASA is too afraid to design the real exploration vehicles like an effective lunar lander and instead prefer to perform rote-style design of lifter hardware because they are mesmerized by the flame and smoke. The technology and experience for designing rockets is firmly rooted in the subcontractor community- not NASA- they have a lot of folks who have never released a single drawing to production. They are going to spend our tax money on an educational program to produce mediocre vehicles. At the end of 2014 they will have a lot of unproven hardware and the Atlas will have racked up probably 60-100 flights. Which is better- paper design where you think it is good versus a proven design? Which would YOU risk your life on?
Despite our desires NASA is well on its way to making EXACTLY the same mistake as it did on Saturn and Shuttle. The CLV is going to take 10 billion to develop- just so it can match existing EELV vehicle performance. All to make a couple of headstrong idiots realize some weird dream they had- namely Horowitz and Griffin. It will take at least eight years to get operational- we could be operational in four years with low cost Atlas derivative EELVS. The CLV operational costs will be sky high and hence launch rate will be less than three a year I bet. The cost and inflexibility of the CLV will make it obsolete well before it flies the first time.
The CaLV is worse than bad - it captures the worst of shuttle technology- the SSME's and SRMs and makes them an eternal boat anchor to progress. It will take probably twice what the CLV took to develop.
The lunar lander concept is amaturish and half-baked and the all-storeable CEV is obsolete NOW. The whole architecture should be killed and the proponents shown the door. When confronted they have been shown to be the most ill-informed technical leaders we have seen to date. The best thing for shuttle is for a smallish meteorite to hit the VAB and SPF- thus reducing the remaining shuttles to their constituent atoms. It would be a mercy. Space science would accelerate once the whole manned burden is removed without having a political scapegoat to blame for the job losses.
The sad thing is that when the bad technical decisions come to light the whole exploration vision will be killed- but not after tens of billions will have been wasted. And it will be a long time before we get to try again. Maybe not until the last half of the century. That will be the most lasting damage that this junk-engineering will generate. Think of the Hindenburg and its effect on ALL dirigibles and the irrational fear of hydrogen. These things permeate thought despite having poor foundations.
The design is interesting in a sophomoric way. It is clearly designed by someone who has never had to qualify a device for spaceflight. Highly cantilevered, indeterminate stuctures with eccentric centroids and active mechanisms in the loads paths are terrible. I would give that thing about 60 seconds on a vibe table before it came to pieces. The use of flex hoses with such large motions is also a really bad idea- expecially when they have to flex in multiple axes at once- there is no practical solution to make such a fluid connection last more than a few thousand cycles under cryogenic conditions under the 300 psig pressure conditions that are planned for CEV propulsion.
As someone who DOES design such things on a daily basis I give it a D- for practicality, cost and reliability/redundancy.
Also the control valving is highly decoupled from the combustion chamber which means high dribble volume and terrible min Ibit. Those simple stepper motors also have to operate at 165R for prolonged periods- this denies you most lubricants and requires special resolvers and the like. There is also no way that such a mechanism can deliver the frequency response of multiple small thrusters pointed in multiple directions. There is also the need to interface either a fiber optic or high voltage spark igniter lead to the thruster across large motions- could be a problem for the non-optical approach.
The issue is : just what problem are we trying to solve? is it cost of the combustion chamber? Number of valves? Weight? Overall complexity? Or is this just an interesting exercise for a kinematics class? The vehicle attitude control function can be performed two active and two standby modules- not four fully active as was used on Apollo. This is highly optimal for cryogenic thrusters since it minimizes the number of lines which must be chilled and pure 6 DOF operations are rare as opposed to simple maneuvers with coupled rotations and translations. This solution was proposed to NASA and rejected as being "just too different from what Apollo did". I cannot imagine them actually flying this contraption.
Elon Musk does not have a launch vehicle that can meet the Buy 3 performance requirements. Period. He has a dream. That is all. His rocket has yet to get a foot in the air. When it does he will have 1000 lbs to LEO capability. And one sample. Big deal. It is a long way from there to being able to lift 10 tons to GSO on a predictable basis. His costs are based on ignorance of what it takes to build and KEEP building some of the most sophisticated machines on the planet. They don't just come together like a doorknob- they require teams of highly skilled people to keep them alive. These overhead costs are always underestimated by newbies and it is what zaps their business case. The Russians can do it cheaply since they pay their highly skilled engineers a month what a Western engineer makes in two-four days.
Do a little research and check out just how anemic the US launch industry has become. The number of companies who even want to be bothered to make such high-end hardware has dwindled to typically 1-3 for each hardware specialty. This applies to things like pressure vessels, thrusters, main engines, sensors, insulation, motors, actuators, bellows, seals, hoses etc. The degree of expertise at these suppliers is also rapidly vanishing as the old dudes retire.
There is no monopoly being proposed with the formation of ULA. You can buy rockets from the Russians, ESA and Chinese if you want. Most do. The consolidation of the Atlas and Delta teams is the only solution to a bad problem- there is no business case at present for US-made launch vehicles at the present rates. Both companies would love to pull the plug and unload these unprofitable divisions- leaving the US with NO indigenous lift capability except the lame-ass shuttle. Maybe. By consolidating the teams the best of both can be forged together- not at first but gradually and yes a lot of jobs are going to be lost- but less than the alternative.
BTW these "dinosaurs" of the launch vehicle, LM & Boeing, have cut costs to orbit by nearly 50% over the past decade. That did not happen by being stupid. IT came from building on years of hard lessons.
The one hope that existed was that NASA exploration would use the Atlas and Delta teams and increase their launch tempo to make their business cases close. This would have pumped more business into the subcontractor pool as rates rose to >10 vehicles/year The EXISTING Atlas and Delta vehicles can match what Mike Griffin chose to make from scratch with the CLV vehicle. Straightforward mods to those vehicles supported the HLV requirements at 1/3 the cost. The CEV could have had multiple boost vehicle options to assure access to space. But Noooooo. So now there is another competitor in an already saturated market- the CLV. And all that raving about man-rating is a bunch of garbage. There is NO SUCH THING. NASA cannot even define it or live to even the basics of an optimally safe vehicle architecture. The most important aspect of making a safe machine is building experience with the damn thing. Without that your overly redundant design is just a failure waiting to happen. The present NASA exploration architecture is an accident in progress- low rate, super-complex, brand new vehicles designed by newbies who have never had to try to buy hardware at rate. And embedded in this horror show are the super- vulnerable SSME and big expensive solids- the two things that have held the shuttle back for decades. Anyone who understands the fine line between normal ignition and disaster during SSME start can clearly see that this engine is not optimal for human spaceflight- even with the fault tolerance.
This whole situation is bad for the US and bad for NASA. I suspect that Griffin would like to raise his launch rates by using CLV to move the payloads to ISS but he needs the money savings that result from using EELV's to pay for that CLV and the CEV and the HLV. It is already clear that if he had his way he would terminate ISS right now without hesistation. But i
The simplest, most capable, most flexible and most reliable commercial launch vehicle is the Atlas with 77 consecutive successful launches. Atlas can also lift multiple payloads but there is very little call for this sort of stuff. That is because the vehicle can be efficiently reconfigured to match the desired payload mass and orbital energy. The Ariane V is unable to do that and hence they MUST double manifest to be competitive. The following link illustrates current Atlas V capability.
The Atlas is unmatched in cost per pound to LEO for any launch vehicle built by people who are paid more than $10K a year. The Russian launch vehicles: the Proton and Zenit (Sea Launch ) are certainly cheaper because they are put together by third world countries. They are NOT cheaper because they are simpler or superior technology- on the contrary they contain far more elements, individual engines and in the case of the Proton require multiple burns of the upper stage just to get to GTO. None have any capabilty to GSO. Atlas and Centaur have had that capability - to put the payload in the FINAL position for decades.
The Ariane V ECA is a desperate attempt to become competitive in the world arena. The overall rocket concept was poor and represents a classic point-design. Very limited for anything other than a single mission type. This is weird since the Ariane IV was a truly classic design. Flexible with regard to payload mass at least.
I totally agree with you about Russian engines- that is why they are used on the Atlas V. Which, BTW, is a much newer design than the Energia- by a couple decades. As for Russian rockets- some US design teams do a better job. You are correct that there is no existing rocket that can lift 50t to LEO. This does not mean that they are not in development.
An Atlas HLV can lift 29 tons to LEO.
Take that HLV, modify upper stage diameter to match the present payload fairing and have a 70t propellant capacity, add 4 RL-10 engines ( plenty of space now) and you are in excess of 40t.
Change Booster diameter to match upper stage- add an RD-180 engine,increase propellant load to match . Without solids or strap-ons you are at 30t, add solids you are at 45t+.
Combine three such dual RD-180 boosters in an HLV configuration (a stack physically smaller than present Delta IV heavy) and the 70t upper stage and you are at 75t to LEO. Add two more boosters and you are at 120t. Add two more you are at 140t
How much effort/risk did this require? No new engines, two new tanks, go-do level mechanical design. Compare that to the ESAS architecture with its multiple new propulsion systems, huge tanks and drastic launch complex changes. The Energia was also a super-complex thing with all sorts of engines, multiple stages etc. From what I gather it had 88t to LEO capability. Mediocre for such complexity and cost. The 175 tons you describe has even more complexity. More importantly it has only one use- a Mars rocket. Single use means sky-high costs and terrible reliability. You must pick a sysytem that has commercial viability and also can be scaled to support the exploration needs. Doing only one is a Saturn solution- a dead end.
In an efficient architecture you can use two of those Atlas-derived 75t vehicles to place in excess of 5t of science mass on the lunar surface on the first mission. Not the lander or ascent stage masses- those are extraneous and should not be counted- just the consumables, humans and machines to make real exploratory and scientific progress. Subsequent missions can deliver even more. Since the cost of these machines is probably less than a third of the ESAS hardware you can fly three times as often. That makes costs even lower as rates rise.
Recognize that the centroid of optimal vehicle design does not reside within NASA any more- it is in industry. Optimal includes safest and most reliable too. When the budgets get pinched and NASA starts talking about how they can't go to the moon any more- remember- there are other solutions that are cheaper and better. Hundreds of people at NASA know about these alternatives and have been silenced. Don't despair of going to Mars or the moon because we can't afford the horrid ESAS archtecture. You just have to call the right people.
First of all NASA doesn't need any more money. They have shown with their latest exploration architecture that they have no notion of how to control expenditures and just giving them more money will not result in a better product. In fact, given the results of Mr Griffin's "study" of exploration architectures, it is amply clear that more money will result in a worse product. He couldn't have chosen a more expensive, risk-intensive and unreliable way to go to orbit- much less to the moon and Mars.
This is not an organization guided by logic and reasoning and a clear understanding of limits to dollars and technology. Only minor sections of it understand the benefits of small linked successful steps. Especially at its headquarters it is infatuated with the big new thing, the silver bullet solution done by fiat- at any cost. Of course historically this has led to crummy solutions that you could hardly pay more for. And worst of all it is intensively guided by the perverted politics and the sophomoric thinking of a egomaniacal newbie leader. God help you if you cross Griffin. His shit list is long and well used.
The sort of thinking in this report from NASA shows just how far away they are from realizing any true vision of exploration. You cannot explore efficiently with six or even a dozen crew. You will need at least two dozen to be more effective than simple robotic exploration and I would argue far more (on the order of 90) to be effective enough to justify the tens of billions in excess investment.
Assuming that a crew will perform like robots for anything over a few weeks while doing anything risky is nonsensical. Sitting in a can at ISS does not fall in this category. There is no real perceived risk there. Exploration means getting that space suit dirty. Having to rely on non-pristine gear that may have been abused by the previous user. There will be no one looking over your shoulder on Mars. If there are any actual people on the mission they are going to form relationships- whether mission control likes it or not. The dynamics of these relationships are unpredictable but are not necessarily a source of evil. In fact the opposite can be argued. A successful plan is not to ignore the problem and wish it away and end up with piss-poor ad hoc solutions but to think through the whole thing. This will mean that your crew selection parameters will have to change. A collection of neo-con prudes, or those with hair trigger jealously-induced violent streaks will probably not be the optimal solution.
For NASA to be even pondering this is a total waste of time and money at this stage. There is not enough money to complete (or even really start) the preposterous exploration vision given the present fiscal situation, the grossly inefficient architecture and typical programmatic cost ballooning that we have seen historically with NASA. Sad to say but they are going NOWHERE with the present plans. Squandering resources ( ie my tax money ) on this sort of fluff is an insult to the taxpayer- expecially given the quality of the work.
BTW you don't need to go to the Russians to get a decent heavy lift system for exploration. Especially a fossilized model like the Energia. They can be made right here in the US which is where the best new work on launch vehicles has been done. Unfortunately NASA has systematically removed these most competent teams from consideration in their thinking. When you insist that an untried and untested team are your first stringers you know what you get? Yep - a second-rate solution.
If you have limited capability and vision it certainly is easier to set a goal like: Go to LEO. However there are teams out there that have decades of experience and can step beyond that and respond to the question: Develop a cost effective transport architecture for tasks associated with earth-moon-mars missions for the next 20 years. Merely because NASA has blundered with Shuttle and now again with their half-baked SDV's it does not mean that the talent and energy to do better things is not out there.
How do I know this? Because we just spent the past three years doing precisely this task. We developed an entire, cost effective architecture that supported every mission type from comsats to a manned mars mission and all the steps in between. Its technology was the equal of anything Rutan can dream up - and it was done by a team that can actually make more than three of something and have them be identical. Development cost was 1/5th of SDV and could have been shared across users. Real performance and reliability were equal or better to SDV. Sad to say but technical excellence was trumped by personal preferences and political expediency. When those ungainly SDV's show up you should be aware of just how mediocre a solution they really are. Truly the Yugos of the spaceflight world. But hey...a real live astronaut came up with the idea!
When you set a series of limited goals like you mention you end up with a hodgepodge of stuff that is not interoperable, is totally suboptimal as a system and ends up being even more expensive than the previous screwup. The SDV "plan" has fallen into this trap already. They asked: "Go to LEO". Then "go to Lunar orbit". Then "Go to the lunar surface and back". etc. They end up with separate solutions for each problem but with a totally suboptimal overall architecture. Bottom line: it is unaffordable. Meaning; beware of newbie NASA administrators bearing costs for projects that are to be executed by untested government design teams who have NEVER done the kind of work they are being asked to do.
If automobile designers had asked " Go from San Diego to Sacramento" instead of " go from anywhere to anywhere" I doubt the car would be the masterpiece of transport that it has proven to be.
I also think that when people do not have a rigid budget they tend to produce crap. This is true of many authors, artists, musicians, directors etc. Their best work is often done early in their careers when they had strict limits on spending, length of books, special effects etc. Despite their whining they benefit from critical input. They succeed, they get known, remove layers of critical attention like an editor, can command huge salaries and budgets and their work becomes bloated, clumsy and boring. The same can happen with any creative enterprise. NASA just is a few orders of magnitude farther down the budget death spiral.
The "fleet" that you describe is the biggest waste of money yet concocted by NASA. They are proposing to build a CLV that will carry 25T to a suborbital trajectory (not orbit) that will cost at least 3 times what an EELV of identical performance could do. That EELV derived vehicle would have flown at a rate 2-3 times higher than the proposed CLV with high demonstrated reliability as a result. The CLV as proposed is just about the most inefficient and least reliable way to get to LEO that can be imagined. But when you insist on using only the parts that are enveloped by Shuttle today you end up with this sort of crap.
The HLV, with its five SSME's and NO defined upper stage is also at least twice as expensive and much less reliable than a similar EELV derived solution. With five high cat fraction engines packed in like sardines it will have near zero engine out capability and the need for seven engines functional to make orbit will mean terrible reliability. The whole concept sucks. This is obvious to anyone who does vehicle design in a serious way. It is not just marginally worse than the alternatives- it is worse by an order of magnitude when all elements are considered. This is because it was concocted by people who are not interested in going to the moon- they just want to keep doing the same job they've been doing for the past decades.
The entire architecture is a testament to the power of the shuttle mafia. It is lead by a man who has no real experience in these matters and has stated that he does not intend to stay beyond the end of the W's presidency. Hence he can make any stupid decision he wants.
Buying Soyuz's is just the lubricant for making the decision to never fly Shuttle again. Nobody sees a real need. There are numerous alternatives for lifting the ISS elements- faster than shuttle ever could. If that is even warranted- ISS is also a total waste of money. In order to afford the bloated exploration plans they must end shuttle work and redirect their workforce to do CLV design. This opens the door.
What is funny is that Griffin clearly expects personnel at NASA centers to do the design and execution of most elements of the architecture. Most of these people were not there when Shuttle was designed and have near zero direct experience with executing such a huge program. But they dare not move too much work out of house otherwise they will dis-employ themselves. So we have a ham-handed and complicated launch system that must be substantially executed by engineers who have been mostly keeping the archaic Shuttle alive over the past decades. Does this sound like a great plan to you?
I personally hope that silly-ass astronaut who dreamed up the CLV concept gets to see his "creation " come to life- the equivalent of the 1973 Chevrolet Vega of rockets. I am sure it will be remembered as the largest amateur-built rocket ever done.
As a designer of launch vehicles I really do hope that the SE concept is embraced by NASA with unabashed enthusiasm. The requirements for lift to GSO are staggering and would mean a resurgence in the launch industry of unprecedented proportions. launch costs would fall below $100/pound within years. Rocket technology would advance at a fearsome rate. Mass Production methods could drive costs below 50$/lb. It would be heaven. And then we could use some of those rockets to get yer deep venous thrombosis ridden ass OFF the elevator and on to someplace that you really want to go. Never forget that people rarely stay in the airport when they GO somewhere.
Re:I like it, but I also have questions and doubts
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I hate to rain on your parade but listen up: There is no such thing as Man- Rated. The shuttle and SRM do not adhere to their own definitions of redundancy- because in some cases it is not "practical" to achieve. So they get a waiver. All modern EELV's contain internal redundancy and are qualified in exactly the same way as Shuttle hardware. Virtually no changes are required to make an Atlas or Delta fly a man. What you mainly need is a system that tells them when to push the button and get off. That is a monitor system. Not a primary system like the main engines. In some ways all the fancy electronics in the world are no better than looking out the damn window for a really bright light.
This Man-rated argument is a red herring intended to cast the EELV's in a bad light primarily because they represent a threat to a lot of rice bowls. Bottom line reliability is maximized on a simple vehicle like the Atlas 402 (which can place a 10t capsule right at the ISS without any need for a secondary propulsion system). Elon Musk did his own analysis and showed this. His Falcon follows the same principles.
The reliability of the CaLV especially is going to suck. The catastrophic failure fraction of the SSME's alone is going to eat their lunch. They only chose them because that is all they could think of with their very limited imaginations. God forbid they should entertain something not invented there.
Mr Griffin only thinks this because he is so detached from reality that he would have to be hit on the head with an advanced structure to be convinced. Since the inception of the Shuttle there have been steady advances in cryogenic fluid system design, high performance materials and structures, pump and turbine design, engine performance, data transfer, handling and analysis and overall cost to manufacture, process and launch a rocket. Shuttle has not participated in many of these since it is a frozen design without any real motivation to change. Meanwhile the world has moved on. Unfortunately the suppliers that make Shuttle hardware do not want to change too much- hence the pressures to keep their obsolete hardware in production.
NASA is purporting to have increased reliability by putting an escape system that takes reliability from something like 1 failure in 200 to 1 failure in 2000. This ignores all the bad decisions in the design. The inability to terminate booster thrust imposes far more demanding requirements on the escape system and will definitely impact its reliability. They treat the SRM as a single motor when it is really ten motors that happen to share a single nozzle. It is the presence of unverifiable hot gas joints that makes this a basically bad design. You can argue that we have lived with this design and that it is proved but "putting up" with a flawed design is not a path to greatness.
I have seen schemes to dodge this fatal flaw by blowing the SRM into pieces so as to vent chamber pressure. This will impose even more unforeseen failure modes. ATK has sold people on the fact that a case burst on the SRM will not result in projectiles moving forward and hence only a small overpressure need be addressed. This is the sort of blinkered thinking that brought us Three Mile Island and the engineers that concocted it should be held personally responsible for any problems that occur in the future. If they had to be really responsible they might think through things more thoroughly.
The SSME is also a terrible choice. Although there has only been one significant inflight shutdown there have been many hotfire aborts during testing. This is OK for a ground lit engine but is totally unacceptable for an air lit design. The complex staged combustion design pretty much eliminates the capability for rapid restart- unlike nearly all upper stage engines in present use. This one fact severely compromises the entire design.
Nothing is being said about the brutal ascent trajectory that places the vehicle in much higher dynamic pressures than competitive vehicles. Limiting these aero forces directly improves the reliability by reducing critical loading and enables even overloaded structures to have a chance of remaining intact under unpredictable abort conditions. Because of the choice of the SRM, which has no throttle capability, off-optimal trajectories must be chosen just to keep loads under some kind of control.
Most importantly, the proposed system creates a whole series of stages and engines which share no common systems. Because of this they will accrue direct experience at a very slow rate. This direct experience is worth a thousand times more than all the reliability analyses in the world. It will take decades to build a statistically significant database. Meanwhile, less complex systems that are economically viable will fly more and build invaluable flight experience. Marginal systems can be improved as lessons are learned. Reliability improves as the machines are "sorted out". A broad exposure to varying environments will temper the design and season the engineers. NASA's hodgepodge collection of miscellaneous stages will never build rate to the point where it can match the demonstrated reliability of even a Chinese rocket. In between, they will run into the problem of hardware obsolescence which will force new systems to be designed just because you can't buy the old stuff- not because it is a real improvement. This is made worse by the terribly low production rates that are forced to by the high recurring costs.
The proposed "system" respects none of the lessons learned from decades of Shuttle and expendable rocket experience. It truly is an insult to competent vehicle designers that this hoax is foisted upon the taxpayers.
Yes compared to the existing non-functional shuttle system I am sure to the ignorant that this system looks good. If you owned a 1973 Vega I am sure that a 1995 car of any type would look good. However this is 2005 and the design shown is total crap as compared to alternatives that were placed before NASA in incredible detail. The alternatives would have not just created a manned lifter and a high-capacity cargo lifter but every other in-space function from earth escape to lunar landing was addressed with essentially two vehicle types. These designs are based on hardware that has greater demonstrated reliability than anything flying on shuttle and could have been developed for roughly 15% of what is being presently planned for Mr Griffin's monstrosity. No new engines were required. The SSME, the most expensive rocket engine ever made, was retired to a scrap heap where it belongs. Same goes for the SRM's which are a failure waiting to happen with something like 11 high pressure hot gas joints. Only NASA would preserve these two loser designs.
When the costs start to mount this will be cancelled and we will be set back most of a decade. We could have been flying within 4 years easily. As it is we will be lucky to get the CEV out of this.
These evolved EELValternatives (principally derivatives of the LM Atlas) were so good that Griffin himself forced the cancellation of publication of dozens of evolved EELV papers that were to be presented at AIAA conferences these past weeks. If these ideas were so weak why did he bother to make the effort. These papers would have shown an entirely new way of thinking about safety, reliability and cost effectiveness. Not the bankrupt Shuttle way. Common stages, engines, avionics, construction methods and high production rate were cornerstones of this proposed philosophy change. Instead we are treated to unique vehicles with single purposes, multiple engine types and drastic redesign and requalification efforts to get them to fly. The SRM's alone require a new propellant core formulation and geometry. SSME has NEVER been airlit and will require most of a billion dollars to qual it for that purpose. And the present cost of nearly $80M each will look like a bargain once P&W smells blood.
They could not even figure out how to make the CLV upper stage and EDS stage share some commonality- this means the total design of TWO new upper stages at a cost of who knows how many billions.
If you want to help us get to the moon and Mars ask questions about how this "solution" was arrived at. It most certainly was not on technical grounds. Industry personnel suspect a lot of intervention from political types from Alabama, Texas, Utah, Louisiana, Florida who are fighting to keep those bloated payrolls filled. Little do they know that those jobs are toast since the projected rates reduce nearly every factory to a standstill in terms of production. They are deluded that they will retain a stasis in jobs. Maybe if enough people ask how this was shown as an optimal plan then a change might be made. I doubt it but you never know.
What is funny is how little detail there really is on those vehicles. Engines have not been selected on some stages. Major functions are totally ignored. It appears to have been designed by a talented tech pubs guy with no real engineering experience. Word to the wise: pretty pictures are easy to come by these days- design integrity takes months to achieve and is highly dynamic. The SDLV plan is as hollow as a fortune cooky with a content of similar value.
My understanding is that based on realistic materials and masses that a space elevator which moved materials from the lunar surface to lunar orbit might make some sense. Most of space travel is about moving propellants around (95% or so) and most of that is moving oxygen around. So if you can make a dent in the energy investment of just moving O2 then you can make interplanetary space travel more efficient. This has no significant effect on the initial earth to orbit launch problem which is best solved by alternate means.
This of course assumes a quite elaborate lunar infrastructure with the ability to keep that elevator busy. This will require in-situ manufacturing capability and I would expect a lunar population on the order of 5-10 thousand to be realistic. So I think there is plenty of time to work on strong and economical materials. This is probably at least a century away. Perhaps longer given the terrible exploration architecture being foisted on us by the recent NASA decisions. OTOH it seems likely that the lunar base will probably be Chinese - with a reasonable infusion of effort they could easily be there in force within 60 years.
The recent appointment of Griffin as NASA head has lead to a change in their "vision". Unfortunately it is pretty much ALL in the wrong direction. This knucklehead, who purports to be an "open decision-maker" has conducted a dry-labbed launch trade which has undone in 60 days what has been in the works for years. An alternate lift strategy that would have been incredibly cheap, flexible and powerful was rejected by a hand picked team of cronies who care nothing except to preserve their precious shuttle. Many upper-level managers who were supporters of this EELV-based concept have had to change their tune or see their jobs threatened. A respected and key leader , Admiral Steidel walked over this situation.
And so we are treated to the shuttle-derived lift strategy that although it is terrible from a technical and cost perspective is sold as the ultimate in the reform of NASA. This architecture is optimal in only one thing- it is politically unbeatable since there is no immediate reduction in jobs at NASA or the big contractors. In fact Griffin himself has gone out of the way to suppress alternate launch architectures by insisting that industry not present papers and other results of the studies that were methodically carried out over the past years. Instead of reasoned logical engineering judgements we are now using command-style decision backed up by strong arm tactics to suppress alternatives. This is NOT the path to success at NASA despite what its headstrong leader apparently thinks.
The intended method of contracting for this over-priced monstrosity also reeks of corruption and insider dealings. Although the press pictures for the CLV and HLV shuttle derived vehicles look like pieces of Shuttle hardware they in fact require extensive redesign. These multi-billion dollar design efforts will not be competitively bid and instead the present "inside" companies will get these tasks without competitive pressures as mods to existing contracts. This violates the intent if not the letter of the Federal Acquisition Regs. And this behavior appears to be acceptable even in the aftermath of the recent Boeing procurement scandals- it is truly amazing the lack of backbone observable both in NASA and in industry.
Most importantly there is not enough money to complete even a part of the exploration vision. The launch strategy is so expensive that operating costs will not diminish as compared to Shuttle today and hence there is no money to develop the in-space stages and lunar landers that are required for lunar exploration. You can forget about Mars with the present path. Unless more tens of billions are added to NASA's budget we will only end up with a Crew Launch Vehicle that delivers the performance of an off-the-shelf EELV at roughly three times the price. We will be still stuck in LEO.
And I mentioned that the lift strategy is only politically viable in the short term. This is because in every case the rate of production of shuttle elements will fall as compared to today. External tanks become once a year things. We make maybe four shuttle solids per year instead of the potential 8-12 for today's (theoretical) shuttle ops. Production of SSME does increase- but it is made by the same companies that make EELV hardware- and there would have been a much larger increase in production for that hardware ( with benefits to cost as rates rise) had the EELV solution been selected. In the end NASA ends up with miniscule production rates and soaring prices. Also not a good ingredient for an effective exploration strategy.
My suggestion- force NASA to reveal the accounting that supported this terrible decision before more billions are spent. OMB and CBO should be forced to show why they finally caved on this obviously bad decision.
Oh and another thing- ISS need not be a total waste. In fact if you have some minimal level of vision you can move the thing to a useful place like L1. Do the math-it is not that tough. That is if you have an effective launch archtecture with a decent in-space stage. Unfortunately NASA's plans pretty much exclude this option. So we abandon tens of billions to burnup....
If these guys had made even ten meters of continuous fiber and demonstrated engineering design-quality properties they would put Toray out of business. I don't think that is quite in the cards yet. It does not serve your interests to portray something at a technology readiness level that it simply is not at. You will create the mechanical equivalent of vaporware which does a disservice to all evolving technologies.
The development of materials is always a stepwise process and involves not only the identification of the cool properties that you are seeking but also a clear understanding of the shortcomings of the material. And believe me a material as anisotropic as this material is bound to have some interesting ones. Recognize that only now has graphite composite technology reached the mainstream - 787 will be the first commercial aircraft with widespread composite primary structures. Many aircraft including advanced combat aircraft still use aluminum for primary structures.
Your simplification of the erection process suggests some rather sloppy thinking too. There is a significant energy difference between LEO (shuttle territory) and GEO. The largest rockets can place about 8 metric tons in GEO. That is in GEO- not in a transfer orbit. Shuttle has no lift capabilty to GEO at all. You must move the machines for hoisting materials and to integrate these structures into a load-bearing whole. That requires power and that means a lot of mass- that must be emplaced before you can begin hoisting. Before first fiber down you must stationkeep this system and implement a comm and control system. In any event this means you will have to place the largest geosync satellite ever launched and assemble it remotely from multiple pieces autonomously. This has never been done and represents a non-trivial task. I would estimate that you will have to place at least 50 metric tons at geosync. This will require at least a billion dollars in launch and integration costs as well as the development and testing of rendezvous and dock system as well as probably another half billion for the spacecraft themselves- and that is a very lowball estimate. It is much more likely to be three times that. This assumes that you can make fiber in megaton lots. Assuming it is on the order of high performance graphite/epoxy tows it will be $20-80/lbm. Very likely it will be far more.
And just what does this get you? Well you are not really in a great location. You still have to use in-space propulsion stages to get anywhere of interest like the moon. Departing from the elevator is of course straightforward but you must consider the mechanics and threat from an arriving vehicle. They must circularize and match plane from an arbitrary lunar orbit for example. This does cost energy- especially plane changes which are highly energy intensive. This means that the stage is heavier and more complex. A stage coming from Mars may well find it better to just directly aerobrake instead of using the elevator.
In the end the elevator is useful but is not a panacea- you must have good rockets and aerobraking technology. SInce you must have those anyway the incremental benefit of the elevator is reduced. The cost of maintenance is also not yet defined- and could be very high. The consequences of objects passing slowly through the VanAllen belts could also be significant- rockets generally pass through them in minutes- even a fast elevator will place the cargo in the belts for hours at a time.
So give this some thought- there is more to a car than just the tires or engine- it all has to work together. Without an internally consistent architecture the design will be a disaster. I suspect that the elevator will not be economically viable unless there is a very high demand- well above what is envisioned until very late in the century. Consider the marginal cost effectiveness of the Chunnel.
Isp is only the superficial measure of performance and efficiency for a booster. Many people have been mislead by this simple concept and that is why you have the shuttle and Delta IV- both of which are quite poor performers compared to other vehicles. Modern RP-1 (kerosene)/ LO2 engines have Isp's around 338 and deliver what is most important for a booster- thrust in a very small and weight-efficient package. Not only are the engines much smaller and lighter but the tanks are tiny compared to an equivalent H2/O2 booster. You have to make these tanks from aluminum which requires energy ( both to make the raw metal and as in the Shuttle case to remove most of it by machining to form orthogrid structures)- so the more metal the more energy investment.
The Russian RD-180 burns kerosene in an oxygen rich condition which leads to a very clean exhaust with very few unburned hydrocarbons or soot. You can see this by observing the appearance of the exhaust plumes at liftoff.
When you combine these facts with the costs of liquifaction, storage/boiloff losses and the need for acres of hydrocarbon-intensive foam for insulation you can see that a hydrogen booster is far from optimal from an overall pollution standpoint.
Solid rocket motors are by far the worst items since they have heavy cases made of either a lot of steel or graphite/epoxy- both of which are pretty energy intensive to synthesize. You also have to make the ammonium perchlorate and powdered aluminum as well as the rubber that they burn. This also must be mixed at poured at temperature so there is some process heat involved.
I had heard that when a SRM passes through the upper atmosphere that it deposits Cl2 that decomposes into free chlorine which is the anchor for ozone depletion. I had heard that the depletion is obvious and persistent. So the elimination of these motors from the upper atmosphere could be a tangible benefit. Present technology hybrid motors that do not release chlorine can just about match solids - especially when system integration, safety and hotfiring capability are included.
The best thing for NASA would be to have a nice transport accident like they drop the shuttle on to the floor of the VAB. Nobody dies and the decision to get rid of Shuttle is made by fate. This would finally force them to stop this nonsense. There are so many options available to them to replace the Shuttle they can scarcely do worse than the present situation. As it is they will piss away more millions to make the best foam covered tank that can be possibly be made- this is like making gold plated buggy whips. The entire system architecture is bankrupt- but like any addict they cannot stop themselves. They will squander all the money they have to keep this monkey on their back- to the detriment of nearly everything else.
I had hopes that Mr Griffin would finally bring some clear thinking to NASA- after all he has all those impressive degrees. But it appears that he too has been replaced by a pod person. Must be something in the water maybe.... Someday maybe before we are all dead a real leader who can see when the emperor has no clothes will appear- at least I have this nice dream.
OK so lets look at this concept- or rather the TWO vehicles that are involved.
The Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) is composed of what appears to be a regular SRB - but wait it isn't- it too has to be modified to interface with the BRAND NEW upper stage and of course the launch complex. And I will be shocked if significant mods to the thrust vector control system are not mandated. The vehicle requires a very large upper stage- why? Because the SRB delivers thrust in such a horribly non-optimal way- millions of pounds for only two minutes- you are nowhere near orbital velocity- and deep in the gravity well. So you have to make it up with an outsized upper stage which means you have to have a high thrust upper stage engine- which means even more senseless mass addition. Since the SRB thrust cannot be controlled it delivers very high dynamic pressure during ascent which translates directly into high loads on the payload and upper stage and that means more mass- which must be moved around later which means even more upper stage propellants etc. Of course there is NO WAY to shut down this beast and hence you are faced with a very high energy and high mass escape system for your CEV. Trajectory modifications for mission peculiar flights are extremely limited by the fixed impulse/time relationship of the solid.
And what does this give you? maybe 20-25T to LEO. And that is ALL. Want to grow? Sorry- no can do. You are stuck with a completely non-extensible system unless you make billion-dollar mods to the SRB. But then it isn't common anymore is it. This is what is called a point design (and a poor one at that)- it CAN do one thing OK and is completely useless for anything else. It ASSUMES that we always want to go to LEO first before going anywhere else- which is dead wrong from a mission design standpoint.
And what about that upper stage? With a 200Klbm propellant load it will require a new engine complement to make it work. You have a few choices- all of which stink. The J-2S- a non-existent engine with no flight history and whose J-2 related hardware has not been built in 30 years. This engine has all the hallmarks of a 1960's vintage machine and is going to be very expensive to make. The SSME- the most expensive and complex engine ever made and incapable of practical engine restart due to water condensation issues. This engine will cost as much as many whole launch vehicles per flight. The RS-68- designed as a booster engine with low Isp and uncertain restart capability. All of these engines will require hundreds of millions and years to convert over to upper-stage application - if it can ever be done. There is no doubt that they WILL be a total kludge once completed- these engines weigh thousands of pounds ( and that assumes only ONE- hence they are planning on no engine-out capability) - unlike the hundreds that would otherwise be required for an optimal vehicle. And the whole reason for these terrible choices is the poor choice of booster which forced the terrible upper stage size.
The upper stage is USELESS for anything else. The high thrust and lack of deep throttle makes it impractical for in-space operations- unless you want to design all of your in-space vehicles for high accelerations- which will drive their mass up like crazy. So in the end you will be compelled to design and build ANOTHER in-space stage with more optimal engines and structure.
And that is just ONE rocket- you have to make TWO for this scheme to work. For Shuttle side-mount you must build a new cargo carrier which replaces the cargo bay- a single use structure of significant complexity which will be the limiting volume for exploration vehicles forever. And its length and diameter are strictly limited by Shuttle experience base- want to make it bigger? You must address all-new vehicle aerodynamics and potential signficant structural redesign of ET. Of course hacking off the front of the orbiter forces a complete redesign of all systems since that is where their avionics and a LOT of other
Less than 10 billion in non-recurring will get you a state of the art earth to orbit and in-space propulsion architecture that could support long term exploration of the moon and Mars. You still have to pay for the flights of course- but they are much cheaper than SHuttle. Roughly $1000/lb to LEO at moderate launch rate.
The cost of going to space is NOT about the metal in the rocket- it is about the humans that support the activity- essentially overheads. Want to get to space cheap? Increase RATE. Overhead growth is small vs launch rate growth. If there was a "there" there in LEO for example then the demand might rise to the point where critical mass production thresholds would be crossed and even the cost of the hardware would collapse. Really rockets are MUCH MUCH simpler than aircraft- mostly they are big tanks with very simple turbomachines driving quite simple engines. Far simpler than a PW4000 engine on a modern jet. Avionics are laughably simple compared to a palm pilot- due to the quest for absolute reliability.
So the POTENTIAL for low cost flight to LEO and beyond is definitely there. We are just a wee bit away from the reality.
Going to Mars does not HAVE to bankrupt anyone- it all depends on the architecture and mindset. If NASA is allowed to levy stupidities that have no bearing on real safety and reliability then it will leave them gutted. The effort will exhaust their resources and public good will long before first manned flight. It is critical that the astronaut core and informed engineers actively fight these no-value-added requirements. Then maybe we might have a chance to really explore a new planet.
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The bottom line is that Griffin and Horowitz are squandering billions to create a crew Launch vehicle that is piss-poor with respect to already existing EELV's. Their dream is our nightmare. Their sole motivation is the politics of jobs and where they are located- Florida mostly. They clearly do not want to go exploring or do real science.
The Saturn was also a point design with no flexibility to do much more than the single task of going to the moon with 3 guys- at least if economics makes any difference. Modern Phase 2 Atlas vehicles can replace the Saturn for a fraction of the price. Sorry to say that the F-1 is a pathetic engine compared to the RD-170 and RD-180. It's mass, Isp and complexity relegate it to the museum- not on a modern vehicle. J2 is only slightly better off. Trust me- when all is said and done there won't be much of the J-2 left in the J2S++ or whatever it ends up being called. They will take technology already demonstrated on the RB60 and just scale up. Working with 40 year old designs does not save you anything- just create more grief.
There is NO SUCH THING as "man rated". No two engineers can ever agree on what it means. Redundancy is present on modern EELV's in everything from avionics to valves to wires. So that is not the answer. Excessive redundancy buys NOTHING but cost and complexity and more failure modes. Man rated is what the NASA administrator wants it to be. The cost to upgrade minor systems to make everyone happy on Atlas or Delta is trivial beside the cost of new design. By a factor of at least 25. The bottom line is that NASA is too afraid to design the real exploration vehicles like an effective lunar lander and instead prefer to perform rote-style design of lifter hardware because they are mesmerized by the flame and smoke. The technology and experience for designing rockets is firmly rooted in the subcontractor community- not NASA- they have a lot of folks who have never released a single drawing to production. They are going to spend our tax money on an educational program to produce mediocre vehicles. At the end of 2014 they will have a lot of unproven hardware and the Atlas will have racked up probably 60-100 flights. Which is better- paper design where you think it is good versus a proven design? Which would YOU risk your life on?
The CaLV is worse than bad - it captures the worst of shuttle technology- the SSME's and SRMs and makes them an eternal boat anchor to progress. It will take probably twice what the CLV took to develop.
The lunar lander concept is amaturish and half-baked and the all-storeable CEV is obsolete NOW. The whole architecture should be killed and the proponents shown the door. When confronted they have been shown to be the most ill-informed technical leaders we have seen to date. The best thing for shuttle is for a smallish meteorite to hit the VAB and SPF- thus reducing the remaining shuttles to their constituent atoms. It would be a mercy. Space science would accelerate once the whole manned burden is removed without having a political scapegoat to blame for the job losses. The sad thing is that when the bad technical decisions come to light the whole exploration vision will be killed- but not after tens of billions will have been wasted. And it will be a long time before we get to try again. Maybe not until the last half of the century. That will be the most lasting damage that this junk-engineering will generate. Think of the Hindenburg and its effect on ALL dirigibles and the irrational fear of hydrogen. These things permeate thought despite having poor foundations.
Also the control valving is highly decoupled from the combustion chamber which means high dribble volume and terrible min Ibit. Those simple stepper motors also have to operate at 165R for prolonged periods- this denies you most lubricants and requires special resolvers and the like. There is also no way that such a mechanism can deliver the frequency response of multiple small thrusters pointed in multiple directions. There is also the need to interface either a fiber optic or high voltage spark igniter lead to the thruster across large motions- could be a problem for the non-optical approach.
The issue is : just what problem are we trying to solve? is it cost of the combustion chamber? Number of valves? Weight? Overall complexity? Or is this just an interesting exercise for a kinematics class? The vehicle attitude control function can be performed two active and two standby modules- not four fully active as was used on Apollo. This is highly optimal for cryogenic thrusters since it minimizes the number of lines which must be chilled and pure 6 DOF operations are rare as opposed to simple maneuvers with coupled rotations and translations. This solution was proposed to NASA and rejected as being "just too different from what Apollo did". I cannot imagine them actually flying this contraption.
Do a little research and check out just how anemic the US launch industry has become. The number of companies who even want to be bothered to make such high-end hardware has dwindled to typically 1-3 for each hardware specialty. This applies to things like pressure vessels, thrusters, main engines, sensors, insulation, motors, actuators, bellows, seals, hoses etc. The degree of expertise at these suppliers is also rapidly vanishing as the old dudes retire.
There is no monopoly being proposed with the formation of ULA. You can buy rockets from the Russians, ESA and Chinese if you want. Most do. The consolidation of the Atlas and Delta teams is the only solution to a bad problem- there is no business case at present for US-made launch vehicles at the present rates. Both companies would love to pull the plug and unload these unprofitable divisions- leaving the US with NO indigenous lift capability except the lame-ass shuttle. Maybe. By consolidating the teams the best of both can be forged together- not at first but gradually and yes a lot of jobs are going to be lost- but less than the alternative.
BTW these "dinosaurs" of the launch vehicle, LM & Boeing, have cut costs to orbit by nearly 50% over the past decade. That did not happen by being stupid. IT came from building on years of hard lessons.
The one hope that existed was that NASA exploration would use the Atlas and Delta teams and increase their launch tempo to make their business cases close. This would have pumped more business into the subcontractor pool as rates rose to >10 vehicles/year The EXISTING Atlas and Delta vehicles can match what Mike Griffin chose to make from scratch with the CLV vehicle. Straightforward mods to those vehicles supported the HLV requirements at 1/3 the cost. The CEV could have had multiple boost vehicle options to assure access to space. But Noooooo. So now there is another competitor in an already saturated market- the CLV. And all that raving about man-rating is a bunch of garbage. There is NO SUCH THING. NASA cannot even define it or live to even the basics of an optimally safe vehicle architecture. The most important aspect of making a safe machine is building experience with the damn thing. Without that your overly redundant design is just a failure waiting to happen. The present NASA exploration architecture is an accident in progress- low rate, super-complex, brand new vehicles designed by newbies who have never had to try to buy hardware at rate. And embedded in this horror show are the super- vulnerable SSME and big expensive solids- the two things that have held the shuttle back for decades. Anyone who understands the fine line between normal ignition and disaster during SSME start can clearly see that this engine is not optimal for human spaceflight- even with the fault tolerance.
This whole situation is bad for the US and bad for NASA. I suspect that Griffin would like to raise his launch rates by using CLV to move the payloads to ISS but he needs the money savings that result from using EELV's to pay for that CLV and the CEV and the HLV. It is already clear that if he had his way he would terminate ISS right now without hesistation. But i
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlas_V_rocket
The Atlas is unmatched in cost per pound to LEO for any launch vehicle built by people who are paid more than $10K a year. The Russian launch vehicles: the Proton and Zenit (Sea Launch ) are certainly cheaper because they are put together by third world countries. They are NOT cheaper because they are simpler or superior technology- on the contrary they contain far more elements, individual engines and in the case of the Proton require multiple burns of the upper stage just to get to GTO. None have any capabilty to GSO. Atlas and Centaur have had that capability - to put the payload in the FINAL position for decades.
The Ariane V ECA is a desperate attempt to become competitive in the world arena. The overall rocket concept was poor and represents a classic point-design. Very limited for anything other than a single mission type. This is weird since the Ariane IV was a truly classic design. Flexible with regard to payload mass at least.
An Atlas HLV can lift 29 tons to LEO.
Take that HLV, modify upper stage diameter to match the present payload fairing and have a 70t propellant capacity, add 4 RL-10 engines ( plenty of space now) and you are in excess of 40t.
Change Booster diameter to match upper stage- add an RD-180 engine,increase propellant load to match . Without solids or strap-ons you are at 30t, add solids you are at 45t+.
Combine three such dual RD-180 boosters in an HLV configuration (a stack physically smaller than present Delta IV heavy) and the 70t upper stage and you are at 75t to LEO. Add two more boosters and you are at 120t. Add two more you are at 140t
How much effort/risk did this require? No new engines, two new tanks, go-do level mechanical design. Compare that to the ESAS architecture with its multiple new propulsion systems, huge tanks and drastic launch complex changes. The Energia was also a super-complex thing with all sorts of engines, multiple stages etc. From what I gather it had 88t to LEO capability. Mediocre for such complexity and cost. The 175 tons you describe has even more complexity. More importantly it has only one use- a Mars rocket. Single use means sky-high costs and terrible reliability. You must pick a sysytem that has commercial viability and also can be scaled to support the exploration needs. Doing only one is a Saturn solution- a dead end.
In an efficient architecture you can use two of those Atlas-derived 75t vehicles to place in excess of 5t of science mass on the lunar surface on the first mission. Not the lander or ascent stage masses- those are extraneous and should not be counted- just the consumables, humans and machines to make real exploratory and scientific progress. Subsequent missions can deliver even more. Since the cost of these machines is probably less than a third of the ESAS hardware you can fly three times as often. That makes costs even lower as rates rise.
Recognize that the centroid of optimal vehicle design does not reside within NASA any more- it is in industry. Optimal includes safest and most reliable too. When the budgets get pinched and NASA starts talking about how they can't go to the moon any more- remember- there are other solutions that are cheaper and better. Hundreds of people at NASA know about these alternatives and have been silenced. Don't despair of going to Mars or the moon because we can't afford the horrid ESAS archtecture. You just have to call the right people.
This is not an organization guided by logic and reasoning and a clear understanding of limits to dollars and technology. Only minor sections of it understand the benefits of small linked successful steps. Especially at its headquarters it is infatuated with the big new thing, the silver bullet solution done by fiat- at any cost. Of course historically this has led to crummy solutions that you could hardly pay more for. And worst of all it is intensively guided by the perverted politics and the sophomoric thinking of a egomaniacal newbie leader. God help you if you cross Griffin. His shit list is long and well used.
The sort of thinking in this report from NASA shows just how far away they are from realizing any true vision of exploration. You cannot explore efficiently with six or even a dozen crew. You will need at least two dozen to be more effective than simple robotic exploration and I would argue far more (on the order of 90) to be effective enough to justify the tens of billions in excess investment.
Assuming that a crew will perform like robots for anything over a few weeks while doing anything risky is nonsensical. Sitting in a can at ISS does not fall in this category. There is no real perceived risk there. Exploration means getting that space suit dirty. Having to rely on non-pristine gear that may have been abused by the previous user. There will be no one looking over your shoulder on Mars. If there are any actual people on the mission they are going to form relationships- whether mission control likes it or not. The dynamics of these relationships are unpredictable but are not necessarily a source of evil. In fact the opposite can be argued. A successful plan is not to ignore the problem and wish it away and end up with piss-poor ad hoc solutions but to think through the whole thing. This will mean that your crew selection parameters will have to change. A collection of neo-con prudes, or those with hair trigger jealously-induced violent streaks will probably not be the optimal solution.
For NASA to be even pondering this is a total waste of time and money at this stage. There is not enough money to complete (or even really start) the preposterous exploration vision given the present fiscal situation, the grossly inefficient architecture and typical programmatic cost ballooning that we have seen historically with NASA. Sad to say but they are going NOWHERE with the present plans. Squandering resources ( ie my tax money ) on this sort of fluff is an insult to the taxpayer- expecially given the quality of the work.
BTW you don't need to go to the Russians to get a decent heavy lift system for exploration. Especially a fossilized model like the Energia. They can be made right here in the US which is where the best new work on launch vehicles has been done. Unfortunately NASA has systematically removed these most competent teams from consideration in their thinking. When you insist that an untried and untested team are your first stringers you know what you get? Yep - a second-rate solution.
How do I know this? Because we just spent the past three years doing precisely this task. We developed an entire, cost effective architecture that supported every mission type from comsats to a manned mars mission and all the steps in between. Its technology was the equal of anything Rutan can dream up - and it was done by a team that can actually make more than three of something and have them be identical. Development cost was 1/5th of SDV and could have been shared across users. Real performance and reliability were equal or better to SDV. Sad to say but technical excellence was trumped by personal preferences and political expediency. When those ungainly SDV's show up you should be aware of just how mediocre a solution they really are. Truly the Yugos of the spaceflight world. But hey...a real live astronaut came up with the idea!
When you set a series of limited goals like you mention you end up with a hodgepodge of stuff that is not interoperable, is totally suboptimal as a system and ends up being even more expensive than the previous screwup. The SDV "plan" has fallen into this trap already. They asked: "Go to LEO". Then "go to Lunar orbit". Then "Go to the lunar surface and back". etc. They end up with separate solutions for each problem but with a totally suboptimal overall architecture. Bottom line: it is unaffordable. Meaning; beware of newbie NASA administrators bearing costs for projects that are to be executed by untested government design teams who have NEVER done the kind of work they are being asked to do.
If automobile designers had asked " Go from San Diego to Sacramento" instead of " go from anywhere to anywhere" I doubt the car would be the masterpiece of transport that it has proven to be.
I also think that when people do not have a rigid budget they tend to produce crap. This is true of many authors, artists, musicians, directors etc. Their best work is often done early in their careers when they had strict limits on spending, length of books, special effects etc. Despite their whining they benefit from critical input. They succeed, they get known, remove layers of critical attention like an editor, can command huge salaries and budgets and their work becomes bloated, clumsy and boring. The same can happen with any creative enterprise. NASA just is a few orders of magnitude farther down the budget death spiral.
The HLV, with its five SSME's and NO defined upper stage is also at least twice as expensive and much less reliable than a similar EELV derived solution. With five high cat fraction engines packed in like sardines it will have near zero engine out capability and the need for seven engines functional to make orbit will mean terrible reliability. The whole concept sucks. This is obvious to anyone who does vehicle design in a serious way. It is not just marginally worse than the alternatives- it is worse by an order of magnitude when all elements are considered. This is because it was concocted by people who are not interested in going to the moon- they just want to keep doing the same job they've been doing for the past decades.
The entire architecture is a testament to the power of the shuttle mafia. It is lead by a man who has no real experience in these matters and has stated that he does not intend to stay beyond the end of the W's presidency. Hence he can make any stupid decision he wants.
Buying Soyuz's is just the lubricant for making the decision to never fly Shuttle again. Nobody sees a real need. There are numerous alternatives for lifting the ISS elements- faster than shuttle ever could. If that is even warranted- ISS is also a total waste of money. In order to afford the bloated exploration plans they must end shuttle work and redirect their workforce to do CLV design. This opens the door.
What is funny is that Griffin clearly expects personnel at NASA centers to do the design and execution of most elements of the architecture. Most of these people were not there when Shuttle was designed and have near zero direct experience with executing such a huge program. But they dare not move too much work out of house otherwise they will dis-employ themselves. So we have a ham-handed and complicated launch system that must be substantially executed by engineers who have been mostly keeping the archaic Shuttle alive over the past decades. Does this sound like a great plan to you? I personally hope that silly-ass astronaut who dreamed up the CLV concept gets to see his "creation " come to life- the equivalent of the 1973 Chevrolet Vega of rockets. I am sure it will be remembered as the largest amateur-built rocket ever done.
As a designer of launch vehicles I really do hope that the SE concept is embraced by NASA with unabashed enthusiasm. The requirements for lift to GSO are staggering and would mean a resurgence in the launch industry of unprecedented proportions. launch costs would fall below $100/pound within years. Rocket technology would advance at a fearsome rate. Mass Production methods could drive costs below 50$/lb. It would be heaven. And then we could use some of those rockets to get yer deep venous thrombosis ridden ass OFF the elevator and on to someplace that you really want to go. Never forget that people rarely stay in the airport when they GO somewhere.
This Man-rated argument is a red herring intended to cast the EELV's in a bad light primarily because they represent a threat to a lot of rice bowls. Bottom line reliability is maximized on a simple vehicle like the Atlas 402 (which can place a 10t capsule right at the ISS without any need for a secondary propulsion system). Elon Musk did his own analysis and showed this. His Falcon follows the same principles.
The reliability of the CaLV especially is going to suck. The catastrophic failure fraction of the SSME's alone is going to eat their lunch. They only chose them because that is all they could think of with their very limited imaginations. God forbid they should entertain something not invented there.
Mr Griffin only thinks this because he is so detached from reality that he would have to be hit on the head with an advanced structure to be convinced. Since the inception of the Shuttle there have been steady advances in cryogenic fluid system design, high performance materials and structures, pump and turbine design, engine performance, data transfer, handling and analysis and overall cost to manufacture, process and launch a rocket. Shuttle has not participated in many of these since it is a frozen design without any real motivation to change. Meanwhile the world has moved on. Unfortunately the suppliers that make Shuttle hardware do not want to change too much- hence the pressures to keep their obsolete hardware in production.
I have seen schemes to dodge this fatal flaw by blowing the SRM into pieces so as to vent chamber pressure. This will impose even more unforeseen failure modes. ATK has sold people on the fact that a case burst on the SRM will not result in projectiles moving forward and hence only a small overpressure need be addressed. This is the sort of blinkered thinking that brought us Three Mile Island and the engineers that concocted it should be held personally responsible for any problems that occur in the future. If they had to be really responsible they might think through things more thoroughly.
The SSME is also a terrible choice. Although there has only been one significant inflight shutdown there have been many hotfire aborts during testing. This is OK for a ground lit engine but is totally unacceptable for an air lit design. The complex staged combustion design pretty much eliminates the capability for rapid restart- unlike nearly all upper stage engines in present use. This one fact severely compromises the entire design.
Nothing is being said about the brutal ascent trajectory that places the vehicle in much higher dynamic pressures than competitive vehicles. Limiting these aero forces directly improves the reliability by reducing critical loading and enables even overloaded structures to have a chance of remaining intact under unpredictable abort conditions. Because of the choice of the SRM, which has no throttle capability, off-optimal trajectories must be chosen just to keep loads under some kind of control.
Most importantly, the proposed system creates a whole series of stages and engines which share no common systems. Because of this they will accrue direct experience at a very slow rate. This direct experience is worth a thousand times more than all the reliability analyses in the world. It will take decades to build a statistically significant database. Meanwhile, less complex systems that are economically viable will fly more and build invaluable flight experience. Marginal systems can be improved as lessons are learned. Reliability improves as the machines are "sorted out". A broad exposure to varying environments will temper the design and season the engineers. NASA's hodgepodge collection of miscellaneous stages will never build rate to the point where it can match the demonstrated reliability of even a Chinese rocket. In between, they will run into the problem of hardware obsolescence which will force new systems to be designed just because you can't buy the old stuff- not because it is a real improvement. This is made worse by the terribly low production rates that are forced to by the high recurring costs.
The proposed "system" respects none of the lessons learned from decades of Shuttle and expendable rocket experience. It truly is an insult to competent vehicle designers that this hoax is foisted upon the taxpayers.
When the costs start to mount this will be cancelled and we will be set back most of a decade. We could have been flying within 4 years easily. As it is we will be lucky to get the CEV out of this.
These evolved EELValternatives (principally derivatives of the LM Atlas) were so good that Griffin himself forced the cancellation of publication of dozens of evolved EELV papers that were to be presented at AIAA conferences these past weeks. If these ideas were so weak why did he bother to make the effort. These papers would have shown an entirely new way of thinking about safety, reliability and cost effectiveness. Not the bankrupt Shuttle way. Common stages, engines, avionics, construction methods and high production rate were cornerstones of this proposed philosophy change. Instead we are treated to unique vehicles with single purposes, multiple engine types and drastic redesign and requalification efforts to get them to fly. The SRM's alone require a new propellant core formulation and geometry. SSME has NEVER been airlit and will require most of a billion dollars to qual it for that purpose. And the present cost of nearly $80M each will look like a bargain once P&W smells blood.
They could not even figure out how to make the CLV upper stage and EDS stage share some commonality- this means the total design of TWO new upper stages at a cost of who knows how many billions.
If you want to help us get to the moon and Mars ask questions about how this "solution" was arrived at. It most certainly was not on technical grounds. Industry personnel suspect a lot of intervention from political types from Alabama, Texas, Utah, Louisiana, Florida who are fighting to keep those bloated payrolls filled. Little do they know that those jobs are toast since the projected rates reduce nearly every factory to a standstill in terms of production. They are deluded that they will retain a stasis in jobs. Maybe if enough people ask how this was shown as an optimal plan then a change might be made. I doubt it but you never know.
What is funny is how little detail there really is on those vehicles. Engines have not been selected on some stages. Major functions are totally ignored. It appears to have been designed by a talented tech pubs guy with no real engineering experience. Word to the wise: pretty pictures are easy to come by these days- design integrity takes months to achieve and is highly dynamic. The SDLV plan is as hollow as a fortune cooky with a content of similar value.
This of course assumes a quite elaborate lunar infrastructure with the ability to keep that elevator busy. This will require in-situ manufacturing capability and I would expect a lunar population on the order of 5-10 thousand to be realistic. So I think there is plenty of time to work on strong and economical materials. This is probably at least a century away. Perhaps longer given the terrible exploration architecture being foisted on us by the recent NASA decisions. OTOH it seems likely that the lunar base will probably be Chinese - with a reasonable infusion of effort they could easily be there in force within 60 years.
And so we are treated to the shuttle-derived lift strategy that although it is terrible from a technical and cost perspective is sold as the ultimate in the reform of NASA. This architecture is optimal in only one thing- it is politically unbeatable since there is no immediate reduction in jobs at NASA or the big contractors. In fact Griffin himself has gone out of the way to suppress alternate launch architectures by insisting that industry not present papers and other results of the studies that were methodically carried out over the past years. Instead of reasoned logical engineering judgements we are now using command-style decision backed up by strong arm tactics to suppress alternatives. This is NOT the path to success at NASA despite what its headstrong leader apparently thinks.
The intended method of contracting for this over-priced monstrosity also reeks of corruption and insider dealings. Although the press pictures for the CLV and HLV shuttle derived vehicles look like pieces of Shuttle hardware they in fact require extensive redesign. These multi-billion dollar design efforts will not be competitively bid and instead the present "inside" companies will get these tasks without competitive pressures as mods to existing contracts. This violates the intent if not the letter of the Federal Acquisition Regs. And this behavior appears to be acceptable even in the aftermath of the recent Boeing procurement scandals- it is truly amazing the lack of backbone observable both in NASA and in industry.
Most importantly there is not enough money to complete even a part of the exploration vision. The launch strategy is so expensive that operating costs will not diminish as compared to Shuttle today and hence there is no money to develop the in-space stages and lunar landers that are required for lunar exploration. You can forget about Mars with the present path. Unless more tens of billions are added to NASA's budget we will only end up with a Crew Launch Vehicle that delivers the performance of an off-the-shelf EELV at roughly three times the price. We will be still stuck in LEO.
And I mentioned that the lift strategy is only politically viable in the short term. This is because in every case the rate of production of shuttle elements will fall as compared to today. External tanks become once a year things. We make maybe four shuttle solids per year instead of the potential 8-12 for today's (theoretical) shuttle ops. Production of SSME does increase- but it is made by the same companies that make EELV hardware- and there would have been a much larger increase in production for that hardware ( with benefits to cost as rates rise) had the EELV solution been selected. In the end NASA ends up with miniscule production rates and soaring prices. Also not a good ingredient for an effective exploration strategy.
My suggestion- force NASA to reveal the accounting that supported this terrible decision before more billions are spent. OMB and CBO should be forced to show why they finally caved on this obviously bad decision.
Oh and another thing- ISS need not be a total waste. In fact if you have some minimal level of vision you can move the thing to a useful place like L1. Do the math-it is not that tough. That is if you have an effective launch archtecture with a decent in-space stage. Unfortunately NASA's plans pretty much exclude this option. So we abandon tens of billions to burnup....
The development of materials is always a stepwise process and involves not only the identification of the cool properties that you are seeking but also a clear understanding of the shortcomings of the material. And believe me a material as anisotropic as this material is bound to have some interesting ones. Recognize that only now has graphite composite technology reached the mainstream - 787 will be the first commercial aircraft with widespread composite primary structures. Many aircraft including advanced combat aircraft still use aluminum for primary structures.
Your simplification of the erection process suggests some rather sloppy thinking too. There is a significant energy difference between LEO (shuttle territory) and GEO. The largest rockets can place about 8 metric tons in GEO. That is in GEO- not in a transfer orbit. Shuttle has no lift capabilty to GEO at all. You must move the machines for hoisting materials and to integrate these structures into a load-bearing whole. That requires power and that means a lot of mass- that must be emplaced before you can begin hoisting. Before first fiber down you must stationkeep this system and implement a comm and control system. In any event this means you will have to place the largest geosync satellite ever launched and assemble it remotely from multiple pieces autonomously. This has never been done and represents a non-trivial task. I would estimate that you will have to place at least 50 metric tons at geosync. This will require at least a billion dollars in launch and integration costs as well as the development and testing of rendezvous and dock system as well as probably another half billion for the spacecraft themselves- and that is a very lowball estimate. It is much more likely to be three times that. This assumes that you can make fiber in megaton lots. Assuming it is on the order of high performance graphite/epoxy tows it will be $20-80 /lbm. Very likely it will be far more.
And just what does this get you? Well you are not really in a great location. You still have to use in-space propulsion stages to get anywhere of interest like the moon. Departing from the elevator is of course straightforward but you must consider the mechanics and threat from an arriving vehicle. They must circularize and match plane from an arbitrary lunar orbit for example. This does cost energy- especially plane changes which are highly energy intensive. This means that the stage is heavier and more complex. A stage coming from Mars may well find it better to just directly aerobrake instead of using the elevator.
In the end the elevator is useful but is not a panacea- you must have good rockets and aerobraking technology. SInce you must have those anyway the incremental benefit of the elevator is reduced. The cost of maintenance is also not yet defined- and could be very high. The consequences of objects passing slowly through the VanAllen belts could also be significant- rockets generally pass through them in minutes- even a fast elevator will place the cargo in the belts for hours at a time.
So give this some thought- there is more to a car than just the tires or engine- it all has to work together. Without an internally consistent architecture the design will be a disaster. I suspect that the elevator will not be economically viable unless there is a very high demand- well above what is envisioned until very late in the century. Consider the marginal cost effectiveness of the Chunnel.
The Russian RD-180 burns kerosene in an oxygen rich condition which leads to a very clean exhaust with very few unburned hydrocarbons or soot. You can see this by observing the appearance of the exhaust plumes at liftoff.
When you combine these facts with the costs of liquifaction, storage/boiloff losses and the need for acres of hydrocarbon-intensive foam for insulation you can see that a hydrogen booster is far from optimal from an overall pollution standpoint.
Solid rocket motors are by far the worst items since they have heavy cases made of either a lot of steel or graphite/epoxy- both of which are pretty energy intensive to synthesize. You also have to make the ammonium perchlorate and powdered aluminum as well as the rubber that they burn. This also must be mixed at poured at temperature so there is some process heat involved.
I had heard that when a SRM passes through the upper atmosphere that it deposits Cl2 that decomposes into free chlorine which is the anchor for ozone depletion. I had heard that the depletion is obvious and persistent. So the elimination of these motors from the upper atmosphere could be a tangible benefit. Present technology hybrid motors that do not release chlorine can just about match solids - especially when system integration, safety and hotfiring capability are included.
The best thing for NASA would be to have a nice transport accident like they drop the shuttle on to the floor of the VAB. Nobody dies and the decision to get rid of Shuttle is made by fate. This would finally force them to stop this nonsense. There are so many options available to them to replace the Shuttle they can scarcely do worse than the present situation. As it is they will piss away more millions to make the best foam covered tank that can be possibly be made- this is like making gold plated buggy whips. The entire system architecture is bankrupt- but like any addict they cannot stop themselves. They will squander all the money they have to keep this monkey on their back- to the detriment of nearly everything else.
I had hopes that Mr Griffin would finally bring some clear thinking to NASA- after all he has all those impressive degrees. But it appears that he too has been replaced by a pod person. Must be something in the water maybe.... Someday maybe before we are all dead a real leader who can see when the emperor has no clothes will appear- at least I have this nice dream.
The Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) is composed of what appears to be a regular SRB - but wait it isn't- it too has to be modified to interface with the BRAND NEW upper stage and of course the launch complex. And I will be shocked if significant mods to the thrust vector control system are not mandated. The vehicle requires a very large upper stage- why? Because the SRB delivers thrust in such a horribly non-optimal way- millions of pounds for only two minutes- you are nowhere near orbital velocity- and deep in the gravity well. So you have to make it up with an outsized upper stage which means you have to have a high thrust upper stage engine- which means even more senseless mass addition. Since the SRB thrust cannot be controlled it delivers very high dynamic pressure during ascent which translates directly into high loads on the payload and upper stage and that means more mass- which must be moved around later which means even more upper stage propellants etc. Of course there is NO WAY to shut down this beast and hence you are faced with a very high energy and high mass escape system for your CEV. Trajectory modifications for mission peculiar flights are extremely limited by the fixed impulse/time relationship of the solid.
And what does this give you? maybe 20-25T to LEO. And that is ALL. Want to grow? Sorry- no can do. You are stuck with a completely non-extensible system unless you make billion-dollar mods to the SRB. But then it isn't common anymore is it. This is what is called a point design (and a poor one at that)- it CAN do one thing OK and is completely useless for anything else. It ASSUMES that we always want to go to LEO first before going anywhere else- which is dead wrong from a mission design standpoint.
And what about that upper stage? With a 200Klbm propellant load it will require a new engine complement to make it work. You have a few choices- all of which stink. The J-2S- a non-existent engine with no flight history and whose J-2 related hardware has not been built in 30 years. This engine has all the hallmarks of a 1960's vintage machine and is going to be very expensive to make. The SSME- the most expensive and complex engine ever made and incapable of practical engine restart due to water condensation issues. This engine will cost as much as many whole launch vehicles per flight. The RS-68- designed as a booster engine with low Isp and uncertain restart capability. All of these engines will require hundreds of millions and years to convert over to upper-stage application - if it can ever be done. There is no doubt that they WILL be a total kludge once completed- these engines weigh thousands of pounds ( and that assumes only ONE- hence they are planning on no engine-out capability) - unlike the hundreds that would otherwise be required for an optimal vehicle. And the whole reason for these terrible choices is the poor choice of booster which forced the terrible upper stage size.
The upper stage is USELESS for anything else. The high thrust and lack of deep throttle makes it impractical for in-space operations- unless you want to design all of your in-space vehicles for high accelerations- which will drive their mass up like crazy. So in the end you will be compelled to design and build ANOTHER in-space stage with more optimal engines and structure.
And that is just ONE rocket- you have to make TWO for this scheme to work. For Shuttle side-mount you must build a new cargo carrier which replaces the cargo bay- a single use structure of significant complexity which will be the limiting volume for exploration vehicles forever. And its length and diameter are strictly limited by Shuttle experience base- want to make it bigger? You must address all-new vehicle aerodynamics and potential signficant structural redesign of ET. Of course hacking off the front of the orbiter forces a complete redesign of all systems since that is where their avionics and a LOT of other
The cost of going to space is NOT about the metal in the rocket- it is about the humans that support the activity- essentially overheads. Want to get to space cheap? Increase RATE. Overhead growth is small vs launch rate growth. If there was a "there" there in LEO for example then the demand might rise to the point where critical mass production thresholds would be crossed and even the cost of the hardware would collapse. Really rockets are MUCH MUCH simpler than aircraft- mostly they are big tanks with very simple turbomachines driving quite simple engines. Far simpler than a PW4000 engine on a modern jet. Avionics are laughably simple compared to a palm pilot- due to the quest for absolute reliability.
So the POTENTIAL for low cost flight to LEO and beyond is definitely there. We are just a wee bit away from the reality.
Going to Mars does not HAVE to bankrupt anyone- it all depends on the architecture and mindset. If NASA is allowed to levy stupidities that have no bearing on real safety and reliability then it will leave them gutted. The effort will exhaust their resources and public good will long before first manned flight. It is critical that the astronaut core and informed engineers actively fight these no-value-added requirements. Then maybe we might have a chance to really explore a new planet.