It depends how Germany now understands the NSA and all its help setting up West German telco systems after WW2.
German decryption teams found gainful employment in 1945 with the UK/US TICOM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... teams.
Generations of West Germans worked with the NSA and traveled to the US to view emerging US systems, hardware and other crypto systems.
That kind of generational contact has allowed the US to handle elite German crypto staff and keep them away from any domestic West/German legal or political process.
That deal with the USA gave West German total mystery over its internal and international communications networks for decades.
So a few German elected political leaders are facing the might of decades of US/German military friendship at a top level beyond German law.
Other US West German intelligence contacts can be understood from the Gehlen Organization years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
All German political parties know is their communications have been tasked by the USA even when declared safe by decades of expert West/German crypto officials.
Any inter party or elected party efforts on this topic that where discussed over a secure German network of any kind would have been intercepted.
Given the years of US/UK access to West/German political communications it would be hard to find a cleared German crypto expert who could even present the scope of what was done to German communications networks. The clearance levels that exist in Germany for German experts would not be of any use to any committee and no German staff with US systems access would be cleared by the US to talk to anyone in Germany at any level.
The US and UK have that domestic legal staff aspect covered in an nation they 'help':) US security work given to local German staff out rank any domestic German legal traditions or German fact finding political settings.
The first and final hop of any type of internet connection would be with one advertising company?
Setting that persistent airborne cookie every session:)
Different trading companies had spice investments.
The UK had its large HMS Anderson (1941-57) sigint station and later the GCHQ had its Perkhar (1957-65) listening station (four hundred acres) in Sri Lanka.
It was one of the best sites the UK had in the Indian Ocean.
A fence, trusted staff on site, limited internal networks that are not connected to the outside world works well and are not that expensive.
But that wont get a cyber security contract long term to "fix" the system after every expensive logged intrusion.
The new networks have one good plus, wealth creation for the support, upgrade aspect.
So one cheap engineer can watch diverse networks rather than a vast unionized on site workforce per shift, every shift.
In the past low skilled staff would have to be in place, drive to or be on site 24/7.
The cost savings add up for the brand but the quality of the network installed expected correct commands on a private network not a network open to the world.
Years later all the limited networks open to the "net" per nation have been transversed and studied by a long list of people and other nations.
The "why" was to get costs down and remove staff while staying compliant with less on site experts.
It works but for the "internet" been allowed in as part of the trusted network.
Cyber-attacks, cyberspace are just a fancy way for wealthy US contractors to get more/new no bid funding and enjoy decades of wealth creation with new terms and sales.
It depends how a nations understands its strengths.
The US hopes the other side will always have a cell/sat phone, voice print, home computer, travel, be in CCTV range.
That political leaders can be contacted and make coup offers or let US "advisers" enter ie https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_United_States_military_operations
The Soviet Union, East Germany would study the outside life of the mil/gov staff members of interest and look for lifestyle choices that would make then open to some interaction or create their own Western staff over decades.
Once established a turned person can stay in place for years, even selecting projects.
The UK perfected both technical and human options thanks to its skill sets needed in Ireland and tracking all Irish funding from the US.
Whats the best small nation, low cost system? GCHQ, MI6, SAS. That gives a nation the broad digital propaganda narrative, with that perfect personal covert in country touch when needed.
Re the submissions "Few would argue that cyber-attacks are not prevalent in cyberspace."
What is cyberspace to a nation, cult, faith, idea, flag? Propaganda, shills, sock puppets have to actually know what they are doing pre culture, pre coup.
Most nations and their wider, educated diasporas are very resistant to such "cyber" efforts. Color revolutions with outside funding soon fail.
Yes looking up from a home setting AC? Or down the grid (HVDC).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
The DC air conditioner might still be interesting with a savings % on site for solar been more direct and less AC to DC conversion loss.
Re "On a more serious note, what are the benefits/costs of using AC over DC in the home?"
AC gives you the national grid, hydro, power stations and epic scale.
DC gives a solar setup one less DC to AC to DC loss conversion to get the same result in the home setting (lots of roof panels, sun, short DC wire length to correctly sized air con unit).
Re: Do modern TVs run on AC, or are they just converting it to DC internally as well?
A boat, RV or truck shop can help with a list of DV 12v and 24v devices. Wire thickness, length, amps, devices used, storage then gets to be interesting design cost in the home setting.
With AC within reason any electrician can give you a great deal of "power" from the grid, 24/7 per room. With DC the length, width, usage, voltage math starts to get more interesting per device added.
Yes, found your own brand or ensure you are indispensable within a huge brand. Long shifts, constant reports, just in time repairs, solutions, over time.
If the company is getting a lot of no bid government work why change the system? Thats years of quality pay for running around trying to keep the contracts, working with consultants, networking, making friends..
Yes NSA and CIA are globally active with their own staff from other nations working on shared projects, cleared for NSA and CIA work, vaults, papers, files, networks.
The NSA has it collection systems, the CIA has its own vast duplicated networks.
That is not on some open, random, unencrypted, English searchable database in the USA waiting for any internal or external search request.
Very few nations keep any data in any readable form that can walk. East Germany lost its list of trusted staff to the West and ensured it never had an easy to find list until it went digital and the CIA got the final staff list. Switzerland lost its under mountain project/location of structures list.
The only searchable, English, plain text list that exist are bait, traps, honeypot, limited hangouts. Or lists of staff that are understood to have been in public, are are listed in other roles, front companies, web 2.0 stories, fake SS numbers, fake histories.
Honeypot of staff after 2000 with every name in English, project names on the same database, letters about how well a project went and the staff who worked on them all searchable. Just waiting to be read by any internal or external staff member with access or who could get access...
Its just a lot of useful cutouts, web 2.0 names, bait, front companies, names, terms, funding, locations that might have existed to push staff and products into US operations and bases after 2000.
If the US needed a deep cover mission for a fancy international NGO, a staff member can be located on their post 2000 work. The readable, open, contractor database can be looked into and Bob or Sally is found with a few years of work for the US mil or gov as their job application shows, with a SS number and other background.
Such a list also keeps all post 2000 contractors distant from all other US mil and gov staff going back decades.
Staff that have had war time experiences, talked to too many translators, made dual citizen friends under the stress of occupations, been friends with other nations staff, other nations embassy workers and contractors.
Every nation that thought it turned some cleared US staff since 2000 now understands that name is on a plain text list with on an open network. Who or what did they really get?
Sometimes unencrypted, network facing and plain text has its own long term value for other longer term honeypot missions.
Staff in the US used that huge easy to read database everyday, got to look up and enter names. Great to watch who was searching for what terms, names over years. Sensitive information is kept very secure AC, other bulk readable information is left to be found, internally and for others.
The US just lost its after 2000 plain text list of contractors and their letters of commendations/projects in an open network facing database.
How secure would the AI communications code be if that is the past standard of US network security?
Thats easy to do with a Tailored Access Operations unit like hardware upgrade to all exported systems to a nation or front company over many years and upgrades.
All computers arrives ready for collection as installed by default. For admin staff or the more secure communications room. Just waiting for an alternative network day, weeks, months later after local install and site testing.
An embassy site or massive gov building might open to visitors, cleaning contractors, new staff, insiders with faith or cult like foreign loyalties, people offering products for demo or sale, tours, public requests within that magic air gap distance thats not miles on a classic mil base but down to floors or 100's of feet.
The classic secure communications room might be very secure to trusted staff only but the wider network might be very leaky over 10's-100 of feet beyond physical security.
Physical access vs site access has always been the magic that so few designers understood. The network outside the building was 100% safe. At the next room distance plain text recovery was still an option.
The TEMPEST origins are within the CIA going back to the very early 1950's.
The UK stumbled on TEMPEST like results thanks to a leaky embassy cypher machine in 1952 that offered up plain text.
France was the main target going into the 1950's until corrective hardware was added in the early 1960's.
The US and UK also had success with the new methods in Berlin and Vienna against Soviet communications networks.
In theory every advanced cryptographic expert should have been fully aware of the issues into the 1960's-70's on any advanced device on the open market.
The main issue seems to be the use of average PC enclosures in very secure sites. The staff are trusted, the site is kept away from random outsiders, distance and physical security been the focus. The more historical view would be to build a much better enclosure, encrypt and have better site security.
Learn from France and its total loss of communications security in the 1950's...
Yes, who has the go, no go code, the free fire grid, zone code that gets searched for all movement?
On an plain text, unencrypted database with a plain text letter of commendation for that project?
Could control code walk out, not just plain text, unencrypted lists and letters of commendations.. on network facing databases?
Re ""thing that identifies enemies and attacks them""
The fun part about that is every other army will be looking up the digital version of Operation Skye https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... to bait expensive AI drones into expending its mission load all over wastelands or other optically interesting areas.
Lets hope the AI drones CRM 114 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... holds and the
"... enemy cannot plant false transmissions and fake orders, once the attack orders have been passed and acknowledged, the CRM 114 is to be switched into the receiver circuit. The three code letters of the period are to be set on the alphabet dials of the CRM 114, which will then block any transmissions other than those preceded by the set letters from being fed into the receiver."
Re ""American Exceptionalism" basically means we allow ourselves to commit war crimes with impunity."
The AI option will just add another layer of legal protection to the contractors and US government.
The "computer did it" seems to work wonders with new staff and staff retention.
Re "One of the things that has consistently mystified me about Americans' complacency with drone warfare is the underlying assumption that our current monopoly on drones is going to last forever."
The US still has the bandwidth to each drone to get the huge flow of image data back in real time and the international networks to encrypt commands.
Re "For all intents and purposes, we're already using killbots, and the really important point here is that airborne killbots can be used (for now) with impunity across borders."
A page from UK history during the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... and hopes AI drones will allow for the total grid like control over vast areas of the world? Worked well for the UK in the early 1900-30's back with total signals intelligence.....
The problem is the signal flow up and down so an AI will slow that command link tampering issue by not allowing any confusing new commands in while been totally aware of its mission, location and all local movement.
What is been sold on is another U2, D-21 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... to try and out fly, out smart all other nations for decades.
The problem is how much "smarts" can the US afford to lose in a real crash or super computer projected blind SAM event?
The US mil has always been very hesitant to load up any device with too much technology, better to use a crew or sat control allowing the drone hold 1980's optics any nation can buy and a sat link back to push up all the collected data and a simple weapons system.
The loss of a commanded drone with its design, sat dish, optics and engine is no real loss. The recovery of the AI drone with its total encryption package is a loss that could be difficult to recover from.
Over time 'random' AI flight patterns could become super computer friendly and then its just the need for a big, fast SAM thats never been turned on in the past.
Its a race over decades, who can control a drone to get it to land anywhere or predict an AI flight path in time?
How much randomness can be designed into every unique AI drone for every mission approach, mission and then return?
Nations will use any networks other passive radar like system to look up and track. What can a AI drone be fooled into expending all its limited payload on? Low cost, fancy emissions and optical fooling artwork in vast empty open areas lure in vast numbers of very complex AI drones?
The good news its more in the press and people are talking of constitutional protections. People can see the US legal digital Berlin Wall in use.
US based brands now have the interesting legal complexity of user data flowing to the US gov in the US.
Options?
Become more of a multinational and move US based big data to Ireland or other parts of the EU?
The NSA and GCHQ needed network access but the brands had to keep the freedom front up. If the press keeps on reporting on US big brands court issues interesting people will just use social media less. The UK was always aware of how any population might become highly sensitised to surveillance and did its best to find ways just to watch.
Re "Haven't we been reading about this for a few years now?"
Considering the decades of early cell phone like devices, pagers, consumer desktop computers, smart phones, personal digital assistant/handheld PC, tablets?
Thats a lot of easy, court free access over many, many years:)
One pubic example found in the press would have been constant pressure on the US from the UK over Ireland/US connections in the 1970-90's over emerging computer and advanced phone use.
Very old ideas that got tested on every US network connection or computer system of interest decades ago.
Re "many times of malware"
Thats the key to the magic of one time bespoke malware that a user/group of interest is fooled into allowing. What can an AV cloud with behavioural analysis do? Would a smart admin see it time time? The ip the data flows out to is unique, the software was user 'installed' and does not match any understood pattern or emerging threat.
If a city, state, county or federal investigation only uses the expensive software one time, its magical vs all domestic and international AV products, cloud and behavioural analysis or internal OS logging.
The trick fails when nation states fails read the instructions about the crafted malware been a one time deal.
It depends AC. If the user opens 10 or 200? tabs in one window for some reason?
Optical bandwidth, 64 bit OS, i7, real gpu, 32 gigs of ram can cover for a browser with slow code issues?
The browser has to be fast to serve ads, keep banking secure, keep the MS branding fresh in the users mind and be web standard compliant.
The days of only working with a MS web site creation application are over but the same MS branding issues will always be the same.
Fast is easy. Ad blocking, security, branding is the ongoing issue for M$. How much will any new computer cost with Windows 10 Pro?
Will ad blocking work? Will ads display at the desktop level if a brand pays enough vs the browser?
With the NSA and other nations providing total network access its hard to then undo the vast parallel construction effort with local malware on one computer to build a multi year case.
The problem for the use of digital and voice product in court is the mentioned "reasonable ex post notice to a computer’s owner" in an open court.
Soon the entire US judicial system and the press would be aware of methods, law enforcement friendly US developed operating systems and antivirus issues, malware providers and their experts in open court testimony.
Everyone of interest would quickly understand privacy and anonymity cannot be found on any US network or device designed or sold that connects to a US network.
Over the years many efforts have been made to support law enforcements own understanding that some networks and phones are 'safe'.
Even local, state and low level federal officials then understand and help propagate the no trapdoor, back door cover stories they saw in a local tech demo
The cover story that some brands, generations or easy to buy products are totally secure is often positioned as random talking points in the national media and on computer related sites.
The UK had many issues with advance phone tracking methods leaking from the court system in the 1970-80's as computer, phone and cell phone technology was been made public.
The US wanted to ensure the same would never happen with its cell phone tracking so it uses IMSI-catchers and light aircraft with dirtbox like units well outside the US court system. Every wifi, cell device and other signals over vast areas per year.
Onion router like networks face the same constant mapping and software/network OS layer issues.
Collect it all is the new cheap, easy way to map entire local communities every year. The real magic is keeping methods away from courts, the press, citizen journalism with walk in FOIA requests at a city or state level or other legal teams.
The hardware paper trail still exists in some city and regional bureaucracies just waiting for a correctly worded in person FOIA request.
The UK was much smarter as it centralized its expert help to law enforcement well beyond the courts, press.
The US and UK became very interested in the photocopier aspect when the UK found a photocopier without a counter or security in an area with its security document vaults. An individual had been using it to make all the copies wanted of secure documents and walking out with the clean copies.
The US and UK then upgraded and further restricted photocopier access policy with counters, educated security staff and by installing cameras in the photocopier units to record what was been copied and by what person.
Very old ideas that had to be rushed out to solve unexpected wider problems.
The tracking of digital files worked in the same way. Baited access to plain text databases to see how staff would respond and what they searched or did not attempt to search.
Slashdot Mirror
It depends how Germany now understands the NSA and all its help setting up West German telco systems after WW2.
:)
German decryption teams found gainful employment in 1945 with the UK/US TICOM https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... teams.
Generations of West Germans worked with the NSA and traveled to the US to view emerging US systems, hardware and other crypto systems.
That kind of generational contact has allowed the US to handle elite German crypto staff and keep them away from any domestic West/German legal or political process.
That deal with the USA gave West German total mystery over its internal and international communications networks for decades.
So a few German elected political leaders are facing the might of decades of US/German military friendship at a top level beyond German law.
Other US West German intelligence contacts can be understood from the Gehlen Organization years https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
All German political parties know is their communications have been tasked by the USA even when declared safe by decades of expert West/German crypto officials.
Any inter party or elected party efforts on this topic that where discussed over a secure German network of any kind would have been intercepted.
Given the years of US/UK access to West/German political communications it would be hard to find a cleared German crypto expert who could even present the scope of what was done to German communications networks.
The clearance levels that exist in Germany for German experts would not be of any use to any committee and no German staff with US systems access would be cleared by the US to talk to anyone in Germany at any level.
The US and UK have that domestic legal staff aspect covered in an nation they 'help'
US security work given to local German staff out rank any domestic German legal traditions or German fact finding political settings.
The first and final hop of any type of internet connection would be with one advertising company? :)
Setting that persistent airborne cookie every session
Different trading companies had spice investments.
The UK had its large HMS Anderson (1941-57) sigint station and later the GCHQ had its Perkhar (1957-65) listening station (four hundred acres) in Sri Lanka.
It was one of the best sites the UK had in the Indian Ocean.
A fence, trusted staff on site, limited internal networks that are not connected to the outside world works well and are not that expensive.
But that wont get a cyber security contract long term to "fix" the system after every expensive logged intrusion.
The new networks have one good plus, wealth creation for the support, upgrade aspect.
So one cheap engineer can watch diverse networks rather than a vast unionized on site workforce per shift, every shift.
In the past low skilled staff would have to be in place, drive to or be on site 24/7.
The cost savings add up for the brand but the quality of the network installed expected correct commands on a private network not a network open to the world.
Years later all the limited networks open to the "net" per nation have been transversed and studied by a long list of people and other nations.
The "why" was to get costs down and remove staff while staying compliant with less on site experts.
It works but for the "internet" been allowed in as part of the trusted network.
Cyber-attacks, cyberspace are just a fancy way for wealthy US contractors to get more/new no bid funding and enjoy decades of wealth creation with new terms and sales.
It depends how a nations understands its strengths.
The US hopes the other side will always have a cell/sat phone, voice print, home computer, travel, be in CCTV range.
That political leaders can be contacted and make coup offers or let US "advisers" enter ie
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_United_States_military_operations
The Soviet Union, East Germany would study the outside life of the mil/gov staff members of interest and look for lifestyle choices that would make then open to some interaction or create their own Western staff over decades.
Once established a turned person can stay in place for years, even selecting projects.
The UK perfected both technical and human options thanks to its skill sets needed in Ireland and tracking all Irish funding from the US.
Whats the best small nation, low cost system? GCHQ, MI6, SAS. That gives a nation the broad digital propaganda narrative, with that perfect personal covert in country touch when needed.
Re the submissions "Few would argue that cyber-attacks are not prevalent in cyberspace."
What is cyberspace to a nation, cult, faith, idea, flag? Propaganda, shills, sock puppets have to actually know what they are doing pre culture, pre coup.
Most nations and their wider, educated diasporas are very resistant to such "cyber" efforts. Color revolutions with outside funding soon fail.
Yes looking up from a home setting AC? Or down the grid (HVDC). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...
The DC air conditioner might still be interesting with a savings % on site for solar been more direct and less AC to DC conversion loss.
Re "On a more serious note, what are the benefits/costs of using AC over DC in the home?"
AC gives you the national grid, hydro, power stations and epic scale.
DC gives a solar setup one less DC to AC to DC loss conversion to get the same result in the home setting (lots of roof panels, sun, short DC wire length to correctly sized air con unit).
Re: Do modern TVs run on AC, or are they just converting it to DC internally as well?
A boat, RV or truck shop can help with a list of DV 12v and 24v devices. Wire thickness, length, amps, devices used, storage then gets to be interesting design cost in the home setting.
With AC within reason any electrician can give you a great deal of "power" from the grid, 24/7 per room. With DC the length, width, usage, voltage math starts to get more interesting per device added.
Yes, found your own brand or ensure you are indispensable within a huge brand. Long shifts, constant reports, just in time repairs, solutions, over time.
If the company is getting a lot of no bid government work why change the system? Thats years of quality pay for running around trying to keep the contracts, working with consultants, networking, making friends..
Yes NSA and CIA are globally active with their own staff from other nations working on shared projects, cleared for NSA and CIA work, vaults, papers, files, networks.
The NSA has it collection systems, the CIA has its own vast duplicated networks.
That is not on some open, random, unencrypted, English searchable database in the USA waiting for any internal or external search request.
Very few nations keep any data in any readable form that can walk. East Germany lost its list of trusted staff to the West and ensured it never had an easy to find list until it went digital and the CIA got the final staff list. Switzerland lost its under mountain project/location of structures list.
The only searchable, English, plain text list that exist are bait, traps, honeypot, limited hangouts. Or lists of staff that are understood to have been in public, are are listed in other roles, front companies, web 2.0 stories, fake SS numbers, fake histories.
Honeypot of staff after 2000 with every name in English, project names on the same database, letters about how well a project went and the staff who worked on them all searchable. Just waiting to be read by any internal or external staff member with access or who could get access...
Its just a lot of useful cutouts, web 2.0 names, bait, front companies, names, terms, funding, locations that might have existed to push staff and products into US operations and bases after 2000.
If the US needed a deep cover mission for a fancy international NGO, a staff member can be located on their post 2000 work. The readable, open, contractor database can be looked into and Bob or Sally is found with a few years of work for the US mil or gov as their job application shows, with a SS number and other background.
Such a list also keeps all post 2000 contractors distant from all other US mil and gov staff going back decades.
Staff that have had war time experiences, talked to too many translators, made dual citizen friends under the stress of occupations, been friends with other nations staff, other nations embassy workers and contractors.
Every nation that thought it turned some cleared US staff since 2000 now understands that name is on a plain text list with on an open network. Who or what did they really get?
Sometimes unencrypted, network facing and plain text has its own long term value for other longer term honeypot missions.
Staff in the US used that huge easy to read database everyday, got to look up and enter names. Great to watch who was searching for what terms, names over years. Sensitive information is kept very secure AC, other bulk readable information is left to be found, internally and for others.
The US just lost its after 2000 plain text list of contractors and their letters of commendations/projects in an open network facing database.
How secure would the AI communications code be if that is the past standard of US network security?
Thats easy to do with a Tailored Access Operations unit like hardware upgrade to all exported systems to a nation or front company over many years and upgrades.
All computers arrives ready for collection as installed by default. For admin staff or the more secure communications room. Just waiting for an alternative network day, weeks, months later after local install and site testing.
An embassy site or massive gov building might open to visitors, cleaning contractors, new staff, insiders with faith or cult like foreign loyalties, people offering products for demo or sale, tours, public requests within that magic air gap distance thats not miles on a classic mil base but down to floors or 100's of feet.
The classic secure communications room might be very secure to trusted staff only but the wider network might be very leaky over 10's-100 of feet beyond physical security.
Physical access vs site access has always been the magic that so few designers understood. The network outside the building was 100% safe. At the next room distance plain text recovery was still an option.
The TEMPEST origins are within the CIA going back to the very early 1950's.
The UK stumbled on TEMPEST like results thanks to a leaky embassy cypher machine in 1952 that offered up plain text.
France was the main target going into the 1950's until corrective hardware was added in the early 1960's.
The US and UK also had success with the new methods in Berlin and Vienna against Soviet communications networks.
In theory every advanced cryptographic expert should have been fully aware of the issues into the 1960's-70's on any advanced device on the open market.
The main issue seems to be the use of average PC enclosures in very secure sites. The staff are trusted, the site is kept away from random outsiders, distance and physical security been the focus. The more historical view would be to build a much better enclosure, encrypt and have better site security.
Learn from France and its total loss of communications security in the 1950's...
Yes, who has the go, no go code, the free fire grid, zone code that gets searched for all movement?
On an plain text, unencrypted database with a plain text letter of commendation for that project?
Could control code walk out, not just plain text, unencrypted lists and letters of commendations.. on network facing databases?
Re ""thing that identifies enemies and attacks them""
The fun part about that is every other army will be looking up the digital version of Operation Skye https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... to bait expensive AI drones into expending its mission load all over wastelands or other optically interesting areas.
Lets hope the AI drones CRM 114 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... holds and the
"... enemy cannot plant false transmissions and fake orders, once the attack orders have been passed and acknowledged, the CRM 114 is to be switched into the receiver circuit. The three code letters of the period are to be set on the alphabet dials of the CRM 114, which will then block any transmissions other than those preceded by the set letters from being fed into the receiver."
Re ""American Exceptionalism" basically means we allow ourselves to commit war crimes with impunity."
The AI option will just add another layer of legal protection to the contractors and US government.
The "computer did it" seems to work wonders with new staff and staff retention.
Re "One of the things that has consistently mystified me about Americans' complacency with drone warfare is the underlying assumption that our current monopoly on drones is going to last forever."
The US still has the bandwidth to each drone to get the huge flow of image data back in real time and the international networks to encrypt commands.
Re "For all intents and purposes, we're already using killbots, and the really important point here is that airborne killbots can be used (for now) with impunity across borders."
A page from UK history during the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... and hopes AI drones will allow for the total grid like control over vast areas of the world? Worked well for the UK in the early 1900-30's back with total signals intelligence.....
The problem is the signal flow up and down so an AI will slow that command link tampering issue by not allowing any confusing new commands in while been totally aware of its mission, location and all local movement.
What is been sold on is another U2, D-21 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... to try and out fly, out smart all other nations for decades.
The problem is how much "smarts" can the US afford to lose in a real crash or super computer projected blind SAM event?
The US mil has always been very hesitant to load up any device with too much technology, better to use a crew or sat control allowing the drone hold 1980's optics any nation can buy and a sat link back to push up all the collected data and a simple weapons system.
The loss of a commanded drone with its design, sat dish, optics and engine is no real loss. The recovery of the AI drone with its total encryption package is a loss that could be difficult to recover from.
Over time 'random' AI flight patterns could become super computer friendly and then its just the need for a big, fast SAM thats never been turned on in the past.
Its a race over decades, who can control a drone to get it to land anywhere or predict an AI flight path in time?
How much randomness can be designed into every unique AI drone for every mission approach, mission and then return?
Nations will use any networks other passive radar like system to look up and track.
What can a AI drone be fooled into expending all its limited payload on? Low cost, fancy emissions and optical fooling artwork in vast empty open areas lure in vast numbers of very complex AI drones?
The good news its more in the press and people are talking of constitutional protections. People can see the US legal digital Berlin Wall in use.
US based brands now have the interesting legal complexity of user data flowing to the US gov in the US.
Options?
Become more of a multinational and move US based big data to Ireland or other parts of the EU?
The NSA and GCHQ needed network access but the brands had to keep the freedom front up. If the press keeps on reporting on US big brands court issues interesting people will just use social media less. The UK was always aware of how any population might become highly sensitised to surveillance and did its best to find ways just to watch.
Re "Haven't we been reading about this for a few years now?" :)
Considering the decades of early cell phone like devices, pagers, consumer desktop computers, smart phones, personal digital assistant/handheld PC, tablets?
Thats a lot of easy, court free access over many, many years
One pubic example found in the press would have been constant pressure on the US from the UK over Ireland/US connections in the 1970-90's over emerging computer and advanced phone use.
Very old ideas that got tested on every US network connection or computer system of interest decades ago.
Re "many times of malware"
Thats the key to the magic of one time bespoke malware that a user/group of interest is fooled into allowing. What can an AV cloud with behavioural analysis do? Would a smart admin see it time time? The ip the data flows out to is unique, the software was user 'installed' and does not match any understood pattern or emerging threat.
If a city, state, county or federal investigation only uses the expensive software one time, its magical vs all domestic and international AV products, cloud and behavioural analysis or internal OS logging.
The trick fails when nation states fails read the instructions about the crafted malware been a one time deal.
It depends AC. If the user opens 10 or 200? tabs in one window for some reason?
Optical bandwidth, 64 bit OS, i7, real gpu, 32 gigs of ram can cover for a browser with slow code issues?
The browser has to be fast to serve ads, keep banking secure, keep the MS branding fresh in the users mind and be web standard compliant.
The days of only working with a MS web site creation application are over but the same MS branding issues will always be the same.
Fast is easy. Ad blocking, security, branding is the ongoing issue for M$. How much will any new computer cost with Windows 10 Pro?
Will ad blocking work? Will ads display at the desktop level if a brand pays enough vs the browser?
With the NSA and other nations providing total network access its hard to then undo the vast parallel construction effort with local malware on one computer to build a multi year case.
The problem for the use of digital and voice product in court is the mentioned "reasonable ex post notice to a computer’s owner" in an open court.
Soon the entire US judicial system and the press would be aware of methods, law enforcement friendly US developed operating systems and antivirus issues, malware providers and their experts in open court testimony.
Everyone of interest would quickly understand privacy and anonymity cannot be found on any US network or device designed or sold that connects to a US network.
Over the years many efforts have been made to support law enforcements own understanding that some networks and phones are 'safe'.
Even local, state and low level federal officials then understand and help propagate the no trapdoor, back door cover stories they saw in a local tech demo
The cover story that some brands, generations or easy to buy products are totally secure is often positioned as random talking points in the national media and on computer related sites.
The UK had many issues with advance phone tracking methods leaking from the court system in the 1970-80's as computer, phone and cell phone technology was been made public.
The US wanted to ensure the same would never happen with its cell phone tracking so it uses IMSI-catchers and light aircraft with dirtbox like units well outside the US court system. Every wifi, cell device and other signals over vast areas per year.
Onion router like networks face the same constant mapping and software/network OS layer issues.
Collect it all is the new cheap, easy way to map entire local communities every year. The real magic is keeping methods away from courts, the press, citizen journalism with walk in FOIA requests at a city or state level or other legal teams.
The hardware paper trail still exists in some city and regional bureaucracies just waiting for a correctly worded in person FOIA request.
The UK was much smarter as it centralized its expert help to law enforcement well beyond the courts, press.
The US and UK became very interested in the photocopier aspect when the UK found a photocopier without a counter or security in an area with its security document vaults. An individual had been using it to make all the copies wanted of secure documents and walking out with the clean copies.
The US and UK then upgraded and further restricted photocopier access policy with counters, educated security staff and by installing cameras in the photocopier units to record what was been copied and by what person.
Very old ideas that had to be rushed out to solve unexpected wider problems.
The tracking of digital files worked in the same way. Baited access to plain text databases to see how staff would respond and what they searched or did not attempt to search.