Re dumped beyond easy reach? They tried that after WW1 and WW2.
"U.S. Disposal of Chemical Weapons in the Ocean: Background and Issues for Congress" http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33432.pdf has a nice list of US efforts after WW2. Pages 8,9,10 gives an idea of what happens when you just 'dump'.
The idea is your gov sub contracts the make safe "work". A complex chemical reaction overseen by skilled experts or expensive high temperature burring is needed and fully paid for.
A gov convoy arrives at your engineering site, you sign off and each load is inspected, signed off again and paperwork stamped and gov is 'happy'.
You are been paid for energy use, expert skills, time, danger, new filters, chemicals used, clean up and have a clearance level for the paperwork.
Another truck arrives and drives the same original 'load' to a waiting stolen/old ship at the shore and unloads at a secluded dock. Ship sails out and is sunk in a remote location.
The 'win' is between the cost of a gov totally paying for 'safely burned at high temperature" vs the cost of that truck drive to a ship.
Over many years the above cash adds up.
Stay away from the tame US companies - change to 'white' box hardware. Read up on the people who where correct over many years and rethink the academics and trusted coders pushing US brands.
Open source OS, not on a big US brand file system would help with any malware been sent down to your computer.
Beyond that its back to open time pads and a computer version of number stations.
Hi AC
Recall http://slashdot.org/story/13/07/03/1952228/mastercard-and-visa-start-banning-vpn-providers
If the gov knows your using a VPN via your traffic or CC, your IP is found no matter where the 'company' is located.
The NSA/GCHQ NSA never need enough disks to store bulk internet traffic.
They track you, your voice print, your cell use, internet use, your friends, your family, your friends friends as points of data, shopping, reading material, health... travel..
Small points of compressed data per person don't take up much space in any well funded domestic surveillance database.
Once you start been politically active, go for a gov job, write to the press a more bulk is collected is started.
The NSA/DEA https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intelligence-laundering show what a private company and a few staff could offer over the life span of a consumers phone use to a gov agency with less oversight by US courts.
Parallel construction seems to be the new 'old' trick.
Very good point fust. Its like Poland or East Germany, Soviet Union or Russia - you know the protest is been filmed. You know the secret intelligence services will catch up with you in their own time.
If they cant turn you into an informant you face ~'protesting' charges and conviction.
The optics of been seen protesting leak out and the official lies about events become news.
AC India had to 'breaking new grounds" just like every other country entering space.
India their development work from the 1950's onwards in a slow and careful way.
No country can just emerge with the maths, computing power and expert staff. It takes years and India put that effort into science and space exploration very early on. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Space_Research_Organisation#Formative_years
Re abuse power?... Nobody really knows what any staff do when the exit the gov.
Do they take codes, methods, skills with them and work in the same way?
What gov, company or other person do they end up working for in the private sector?
"Corporate and police spying on activists undermines democracy" http://www.bath.ac.uk/ipr/our-publications/policy-briefs/policy-brief-corporate-and-police-spying-on-activists.html
"The corporate security agencies and private spies involved in collecting and analysing activist intelligence - and in the subsequent (covert) actions - tend to see their background in the police or the secret service as a selling point and do not hesitate to use connections with former colleagues or friends."
Thank of it as locals given clearances and tech way beyond the very limited budgets of their mid level colleagues by the US and UK.
At a top level they get to go to the US and UK, they are supported in their expensive regional tech upgrades and their own continuing tech education.
The data flows one way - back to the USA/UK and their select friends but local EU staff in select nations have been well cared for over ~50 years.
EU secret services now face the reality of groups of individuals with top EU security clearance that are more dedicated to the UK/US than their own elected officials or their legal system.
Databases, court computers, law enforcement, political telco tech is all signed off as been nationally 'secure' by trusted local EU staff when they know full well its all linked to a growing list of other countries (and ex staff).
EU political leaders are slowly understanding the secure phone they where given is junk, trade negotiations where always 'lost' by their own trusted staff, their nations expensive mil/science and secure crypto efforts where given to a list of other countries for 'free' over decades.
In parts of the world you need a real court document or use bureaucrats that have legal clearance.
The NSA, DEA "parallel construction" telco idea can have many legal issues that most countries have faced or know never to get pulled into again.
Every top criminal can pay for insights into the domestic operation/tech policy formation of surveillance via their police, lawyers, press, judicial contacts.
They will never be caught or can bribe/counter most gov efforts.
Most countries understand that a defendant in court might just have a good lawyer and their own press/police friends at some point.
After that first legal finding with press support that a conviction was unsound due to lies in court by gov staff/contractors/tech expert witnesses - law reform efforts move to look at many other convictions by the same gov teams.
The problem with the UK and UK (NSA, GCHQ) weakened telco crypto is now we are seeing the '"Everyone does it!"" issues - they all have the codes to use in a domestic setting.
When the local staff exit the gov security services (misconduct or lured by private sector cash flow) they take the gov level telco codes/skills with them to the highest bidder (other govs, faiths, firms, mercenaries).
Weak US and UK encryption 'sold' to the world is junk at an international and domestic level.
You really want to ensure bank, medical, gov, school, court, legal, utility, telco records are used used by law enforcement by a court or use by a bureaucrat in your country - not just random person with the skills and a task.
With ex staff, the many gov friends of the US/UK, their contractors and their new private sector jobs - Everyone sees it all.
From legal gov work to not legal gov work to contractors with the cash - Thanks to Snowden the issues surrounding weakened telco crypto is now getting wider press attention.
Only the West tried to position itself via the UN, conventions covering conflicts, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helsinki_Accords to respect many legally listed human rights.
Many other countries under princes, juntas, communism, faiths just admit they need 'experts' and 'time' to bring their staff up to an very low international standard.
Think of it as a tool to let NGO's and US backed 'classic' color revolutions https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colour_revolution take hold and spread as web 2.0 was emerging.
After the Snowden news about total mastery of the 'internet' it all too late for US and UK use now.
If your the NSA or GCHQ every packet into and out of a country belongs to the gov for that ~"day". e.g. your message can go from the UK "around" the world a few times and back into the UK.
The GCHQ gets your entry IP, the message and your destination IP.
Why would have "monitoring x00 million Americans" ever be seen as mathematically impossible?
The phone numbers at both ends would be a filter - is one or both known/of interest? Are they related/friends/connected with a person/group of interest?
Are any of the words spoken during the call of interest? Later are any of the voice prints known?
That would keep the front end of any international and domestic system very busy for a short time per call but the number of kept calls would be low.
The private telco DEA/NSA link is an easy way to reflect on storage efforts in the past. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intelligence-laundering
You keep all material around the call, later the math of any new voice print. Content of the call would be based on operations, projects or just awaiting translation. Over time you have total generational recall of every call made in/to the USA but don't real need mathematically impossible storage given wise compression and cheap storage.
As for the super computers needed to quickly sort each "call' as made - that seems to be something even the UK under budget constrains of the 1970-80's could always keep up with.
The only issue that existed for the UK: the change over from a physical paper card filesystem to US digital storage (~early 1970's).
That was never a mathematically issue - just cost for the UK vs other expensive UK crypto/mil needs i.e. the software and hardware to sort and then keep digital records was for sale from the USA at that time.
False flag type or limited hangout? To speed up the domestic legal acceptance of a court usable all calls data into a national "lock box"?
Problems with the Snowden timeline? Getting from the CIA to a contractor with the NSA - who cleaned/reviewed the record and let the NSA/contractor continue with the hiring process?.
The gatekeeper/time frame for release on the documents? http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm "Tally now 548 pages (~1%) of reported 50,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.25% of that released)."
Re Queue the outrage as the Bruce Schneier interview at ~5.05 "technically is really a surprise" - this has all so far been hinted at in the open press for years.
The tame complicity of US brands, no legal protections, junk weakened gov standard encryption, no help for academia...
5.48 is an interesting point - the weak US encryption is for sale by contractors, ex staff and former staff to "anyone" with the cash.
Hi ReaI Re: "I am interested in who started the program of backbone taps with dark-fiber shunts and assemble;ed the data for the back-end."
My super short time line on POTS, fax, embassy junk encryption and national domestic database work.
Tempest was early 1950's in the real world by ~CIA. NATO and ~EU and neutral embassies junk US/ UK crypto where all fair game.
Grab Galactic Radiation and Background was the first elint sat (under a science cover story) was early 1960. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1998-06-18/news/1998169123_1_spy-satellites-grab-naval-research
The US COINS (Community On-line Intelligence System) as a database was late 1960's (vs paper files/cards).
1964 was Intelsat and the total collection of all calls by US/UK.
So a lot of data storing/searching ideas and the constant flow of calls and signals world wide by that time.
All the NSA had to do was set US and the peering of telcos to the US as international standards - junk crypto by default and super cheap calls.
The backbone taps with dark-fiber would have been some fancy, new expensive all 'digital exchange' upgrades back in the early 1980's.
Telcos worldwide that had always been tight/happy with regional copper and layers, over priced data serves suddenly did expensive national upgrades to new tech....
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in 1994 was useful too. Trade deals to ensure the world would have to buy the same equipment vs recoding and upgrades for the US only. Other nations where not going to be allowed to keep selling old tech vs the price of new US tech.
Its a bit like thanks to Snowden more people finally understanding that the US hardware, OS and brands are the way in by default over generations.
The telco system was the same idea.
I am interested what the crypto staff, mil and govs of other countries where thinking when they handed US/UK crypto to their mil/gov/banks/telcos/industry/legal systems. Did they not have the skills to test, know to look deeper, any understanding of what they where handing in bulk to other countries (UK?US and others)? Yet they seemed to be able to keep the Soviet Union out...
It depends on the era and section.
Warning the US military about the start of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tet_Offensive in 1968 South Vietnam.
Listening to Soviet manned space missions and missile tests.
Tunnels under embassies and distant submarine missions.
The idea presented now seems to be of a past 10 year flood of contractors with 'self written clearances', linguists, the cloud and political requests that have re shaped the domestic missions.
Espionage exercise like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_SHAMROCK showed reality - the US was always interested in 'everything' going back to the 1940's.
The only trick was to keep US staff, contractors and telcos believing in some magical divide between protected domestic data and the wider world.
The only real issue for US gov telco work was in the 1920-30's - how to hide needed funding and where/how to keep the skilled staff.
This what the GCHQ always warned the political leadership about. The GCHQ always just wanted to watch and be seen as just tracking the Russia/Soviet (or other distant bad country).
The UK political leadership wanted winning results in open courts wrt to crypto, logs and web/cell tracking.
Now even the "winning results" of logs and web/cell tracking will be seen as digital constructs.
Disk space is cheap with compressed files. The "average American" would only need to be the:
"average political American been active online/letters to press"
"average" protesting anti war American
"average American" who worked for a contractor, mil, gov or political party.. and seems to be reading the "wrong" political sites later in life...
average American with friends around the world or strange book buying habits...
i.e. disk space for any files on any section of the US population of interest to the US gov is not limited. The digital notes just keep on getting added and reviewed by contractors until the file is passed on for other tasks as needed.
To see how a select group of people known to be near such data will react. A location, network or hidden one way communications method or IP or new name might surface in haste.
It also slows the news cycle down. A person could be fed a fake news only to be retracted 12-48h later.
i.e. people been watched "rush" to strange computer networks to enter codes after a well placed fake story.
Slashdot Mirror
Re dumped beyond easy reach? They tried that after WW1 and WW2.
"U.S. Disposal of Chemical Weapons in the Ocean: Background and Issues for Congress"
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33432.pdf has a nice list of US efforts after WW2. Pages 8,9,10 gives an idea of what happens when you just 'dump'.
The idea is your gov sub contracts the make safe "work". A complex chemical reaction overseen by skilled experts or expensive high temperature burring is needed and fully paid for.
A gov convoy arrives at your engineering site, you sign off and each load is inspected, signed off again and paperwork stamped and gov is 'happy'.
You are been paid for energy use, expert skills, time, danger, new filters, chemicals used, clean up and have a clearance level for the paperwork.
Another truck arrives and drives the same original 'load' to a waiting stolen/old ship at the shore and unloads at a secluded dock. Ship sails out and is sunk in a remote location.
The 'win' is between the cost of a gov totally paying for 'safely burned at high temperature" vs the cost of that truck drive to a ship.
Over many years the above cash adds up.
Newer systems just go for a gait signature (specific walk). :)
The online albums aspect is going to be a huge supply of data
Stay away from the tame US companies - change to 'white' box hardware. Read up on the people who where correct over many years and rethink the academics and trusted coders pushing US brands.
Open source OS, not on a big US brand file system would help with any malware been sent down to your computer.
Beyond that its back to open time pads and a computer version of number stations.
Hi AC Recall http://slashdot.org/story/13/07/03/1952228/mastercard-and-visa-start-banning-vpn-providers
If the gov knows your using a VPN via your traffic or CC, your IP is found no matter where the 'company' is located.
The NSA/GCHQ NSA never need enough disks to store bulk internet traffic.
They track you, your voice print, your cell use, internet use, your friends, your family, your friends friends as points of data, shopping, reading material, health... travel..
Small points of compressed data per person don't take up much space in any well funded domestic surveillance database.
Once you start been politically active, go for a gov job, write to the press a more bulk is collected is started.
The NSA/DEA https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intelligence-laundering show what a private company and a few staff could offer over the life span of a consumers phone use to a gov agency with less oversight by US courts.
Parallel construction seems to be the new 'old' trick.
Very good point fust. Its like Poland or East Germany, Soviet Union or Russia - you know the protest is been filmed. You know the secret intelligence services will catch up with you in their own time.
If they cant turn you into an informant you face ~'protesting' charges and conviction.
The optics of been seen protesting leak out and the official lies about events become news.
India asked itself the about the payback of advanced technologies in the late 1940's to 1960's. :)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Space_Research_Organisation#Goals_and_objectives
Seems they got the funding mix right and can now enjoy the long term tech exports and get to add to space science
AC India had to 'breaking new grounds" just like every other country entering space.
India their development work from the 1950's onwards in a slow and careful way.
No country can just emerge with the maths, computing power and expert staff. It takes years and India put that effort into science and space exploration very early on.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Space_Research_Organisation#Formative_years
Just that the 'abuse power' aspect has been noted in the EU over the past years. All that GCHQ/NSA encryption and hardware skill set has passed into a few EU tech staff hands too.
A few times it seems to make the press or is reflected back in the wider EU legal system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SISMI-Telecom_scandal
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_wiretapping_case_2004–05
As for Snowden all the docs are in the hands of the press for the 'press' to sort, publish, keep, hold.. as they wish over time.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm the amount of data published so far and on what topics.
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
Re abuse power?... Nobody really knows what any staff do when the exit the gov.
Do they take codes, methods, skills with them and work in the same way?
What gov, company or other person do they end up working for in the private sector?
"Corporate and police spying on activists undermines democracy"
http://www.bath.ac.uk/ipr/our-publications/policy-briefs/policy-brief-corporate-and-police-spying-on-activists.html
"The corporate security agencies and private spies involved in collecting and analysing activist intelligence - and in the subsequent (covert) actions - tend to see their background in the police or the secret service as a selling point and do not hesitate to use connections with former colleagues or friends."
Thank of it as locals given clearances and tech way beyond the very limited budgets of their mid level colleagues by the US and UK.
At a top level they get to go to the US and UK, they are supported in their expensive regional tech upgrades and their own continuing tech education.
The data flows one way - back to the USA/UK and their select friends but local EU staff in select nations have been well cared for over ~50 years.
EU secret services now face the reality of groups of individuals with top EU security clearance that are more dedicated to the UK/US than their own elected officials or their legal system.
Databases, court computers, law enforcement, political telco tech is all signed off as been nationally 'secure' by trusted local EU staff when they know full well its all linked to a growing list of other countries (and ex staff).
EU political leaders are slowly understanding the secure phone they where given is junk, trade negotiations where always 'lost' by their own trusted staff, their nations expensive mil/science and secure crypto efforts where given to a list of other countries for 'free' over decades.
In parts of the world you need a real court document or use bureaucrats that have legal clearance.
The NSA, DEA "parallel construction" telco idea can have many legal issues that most countries have faced or know never to get pulled into again.
Every top criminal can pay for insights into the domestic operation/tech policy formation of surveillance via their police, lawyers, press, judicial contacts.
They will never be caught or can bribe/counter most gov efforts.
Most countries understand that a defendant in court might just have a good lawyer and their own press/police friends at some point.
After that first legal finding with press support that a conviction was unsound due to lies in court by gov staff/contractors/tech expert witnesses - law reform efforts move to look at many other convictions by the same gov teams.
The problem with the UK and UK (NSA, GCHQ) weakened telco crypto is now we are seeing the '"Everyone does it!"" issues - they all have the codes to use in a domestic setting.
When the local staff exit the gov security services (misconduct or lured by private sector cash flow) they take the gov level telco codes/skills with them to the highest bidder (other govs, faiths, firms, mercenaries).
Weak US and UK encryption 'sold' to the world is junk at an international and domestic level.
You really want to ensure bank, medical, gov, school, court, legal, utility, telco records are used used by law enforcement by a court or use by a bureaucrat in your country - not just random person with the skills and a task.
With ex staff, the many gov friends of the US/UK, their contractors and their new private sector jobs - Everyone sees it all.
From legal gov work to not legal gov work to contractors with the cash - Thanks to Snowden the issues surrounding weakened telco crypto is now getting wider press attention.
Only the West tried to position itself via the UN, conventions covering conflicts, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helsinki_Accords to respect many legally listed human rights.
Many other countries under princes, juntas, communism, faiths just admit they need 'experts' and 'time' to bring their staff up to an very low international standard.
Yes this was well understood in 1997 and still seems to be 'news' to many. You have many 'well' funded exit nodes in interesting locations.
"Low-Resource Routing Attacks Against Anonymous Systems" pdf:
http://digitool.library.colostate.edu/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=168113
Think of it as a tool to let NGO's and US backed 'classic' color revolutions https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colour_revolution take hold and spread as web 2.0 was emerging.
After the Snowden news about total mastery of the 'internet' it all too late for US and UK use now.
If your the NSA or GCHQ every packet into and out of a country belongs to the gov for that ~"day". e.g. your message can go from the UK "around" the world a few times and back into the UK.
The GCHQ gets your entry IP, the message and your destination IP.
Why would have "monitoring x00 million Americans" ever be seen as mathematically impossible?
The phone numbers at both ends would be a filter - is one or both known/of interest? Are they related/friends/connected with a person/group of interest?
Are any of the words spoken during the call of interest? Later are any of the voice prints known?
That would keep the front end of any international and domestic system very busy for a short time per call but the number of kept calls would be low.
The private telco DEA/NSA link is an easy way to reflect on storage efforts in the past.
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intelligence-laundering
You keep all material around the call, later the math of any new voice print. Content of the call would be based on operations, projects or just awaiting translation.
Over time you have total generational recall of every call made in/to the USA but don't real need mathematically impossible storage given wise compression and cheap storage.
As for the super computers needed to quickly sort each "call' as made - that seems to be something even the UK under budget constrains of the 1970-80's could always keep up with.
The only issue that existed for the UK: the change over from a physical paper card filesystem to US digital storage (~early 1970's).
That was never a mathematically issue - just cost for the UK vs other expensive UK crypto/mil needs i.e. the software and hardware to sort and then keep digital records was for sale from the USA at that time.
False flag type or limited hangout? To speed up the domestic legal acceptance of a court usable all calls data into a national "lock box"?
Problems with the Snowden timeline? Getting from the CIA to a contractor with the NSA - who cleaned/reviewed the record and let the NSA/contractor continue with the hiring process?.
The gatekeeper/time frame for release on the documents?
http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm "Tally now 548 pages (~1%) of reported 50,000. NSA head claims 200,000 (~.25% of that released)."
Re Queue the outrage as the Bruce Schneier interview at ~5.05 "technically is really a surprise" - this has all so far been hinted at in the open press for years.
The tame complicity of US brands, no legal protections, junk weakened gov standard encryption, no help for academia...
5.48 is an interesting point - the weak US encryption is for sale by contractors, ex staff and former staff to "anyone" with the cash.
Hi ReaI Re: "I am interested in who started the program of backbone taps with dark-fiber shunts and assemble;ed the data for the back-end." My super short time line on POTS, fax, embassy junk encryption and national domestic database work.
Tempest was early 1950's in the real world by ~CIA. NATO and ~EU and neutral embassies junk US/ UK crypto where all fair game.
Grab Galactic Radiation and Background was the first elint sat (under a science cover story) was early 1960.
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1998-06-18/news/1998169123_1_spy-satellites-grab-naval-research
The US COINS (Community On-line Intelligence System) as a database was late 1960's (vs paper files/cards).
1964 was Intelsat and the total collection of all calls by US/UK.
So a lot of data storing/searching ideas and the constant flow of calls and signals world wide by that time.
All the NSA had to do was set US and the peering of telcos to the US as international standards - junk crypto by default and super cheap calls.
The backbone taps with dark-fiber would have been some fancy, new expensive all 'digital exchange' upgrades back in the early 1980's.
Telcos worldwide that had always been tight/happy with regional copper and layers, over priced data serves suddenly did expensive national upgrades to new tech....
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act in 1994 was useful too. Trade deals to ensure the world would have to buy the same equipment vs recoding and upgrades for the US only. Other nations where not going to be allowed to keep selling old tech vs the price of new US tech.
Its a bit like thanks to Snowden more people finally understanding that the US hardware, OS and brands are the way in by default over generations.
The telco system was the same idea.
I am interested what the crypto staff, mil and govs of other countries where thinking when they handed US/UK crypto to their mil/gov/banks/telcos/industry/legal systems. Did they not have the skills to test, know to look deeper, any understanding of what they where handing in bulk to other countries (UK?US and others)? Yet they seemed to be able to keep the Soviet Union out...
It depends on the era and section.
Warning the US military about the start of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tet_Offensive in 1968 South Vietnam.
Listening to Soviet manned space missions and missile tests.
Tunnels under embassies and distant submarine missions.
The idea presented now seems to be of a past 10 year flood of contractors with 'self written clearances', linguists, the cloud and political requests that have re shaped the domestic missions.
Espionage exercise like https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_SHAMROCK showed reality - the US was always interested in 'everything' going back to the 1940's.
The only trick was to keep US staff, contractors and telcos believing in some magical divide between protected domestic data and the wider world.
The only real issue for US gov telco work was in the 1920-30's - how to hide needed funding and where/how to keep the skilled staff.
This what the GCHQ always warned the political leadership about. The GCHQ always just wanted to watch and be seen as just tracking the Russia/Soviet (or other distant bad country).
The UK political leadership wanted winning results in open courts wrt to crypto, logs and web/cell tracking.
Now even the "winning results" of logs and web/cell tracking will be seen as digital constructs.
Disk space is cheap with compressed files. The "average American" would only need to be the:
"average political American been active online/letters to press"
"average" protesting anti war American
"average American" who worked for a contractor, mil, gov or political party.. and seems to be reading the "wrong" political sites later in life...
average American with friends around the world or strange book buying habits...
i.e. disk space for any files on any section of the US population of interest to the US gov is not limited. The digital notes just keep on getting added and reviewed by contractors until the file is passed on for other tasks as needed.
To see how a select group of people known to be near such data will react. A location, network or hidden one way communications method or IP or new name might surface in haste.
It also slows the news cycle down. A person could be fed a fake news only to be retracted 12-48h later.
i.e. people been watched "rush" to strange computer networks to enter codes after a well placed fake story.