It gets to be a game of East Germany and West Germany. Who do you want to avoid been seen with to get in good with West Germany?
The rest of the world just moves around the East Germany aspect.
Yes something is wrong with that "manual analysis we can de-anonymize a very small fraction".
Its just other traffic on the NSA internal network we know as the internet.
Any message sent could be seen at the first ip changing hop, travel the Tor world trip, then seen at its final destination ip connection (lets say US to US or US friendly nation).
Might be hard in real time, but give a few days of total internet use to sort...
The other aspect is the FoxAcid idea. You would need tame ("US") antivirus vendor cooperation? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_Lantern_(software) ?
Antivirus vendor cooperation in the US as most targets in the USA trust US antivirus software on tame US consumer OS?
Thats a lot of hope that no smart user or international antivirus brand ever gets lucky.
Thats why most nations try to keep their domestic and foreign shield and sword agencies differentiated at some level.
Once people know their own their gov is listening in and it will be used in court they begin to alter their habits. The social contract falters.
They quickly work out they have the legal protections a random foreigner with a residence permit. No charming diplomats and skilled lawyers.
Gone are the easy days of signals intelligence, welcome the informants.
Tracking the people around the networks, chats, forums seems to be the way in.
The years of good chat and having a valued 'name' gets ~malware ~spyware ~keyloggers in.
Yes and if your dumped as a security risk by a duopoly or international or online auction sites with 'the other' brand of CC sharing this method?
Give to the wrong charity or a group connected to wrong charity , political organization, its hard to get your "fingerprint" as username and pw back:)
Re a "good case for them" and the precedent generated:)
The US brings it to a tame federal court, gets its 15-20-25 years-life conviction for one or more people.
Like the Soviet Union "power" has done its duty and its a win with advancement for the staff.
Then the unexpected optics start to take over. Terms like "political prisoner", martyr, cause celeb spread. The press... academies, lawyers.... books, movies follow.
That win feels great for a few months and is politically difficult for the next 15-20-25 years.
No amount of suckpuppets can rework that event:)
White boxes in homes, small business around suburbia with a huge optical pipes and a tame US 'consumer' isp account with interesting bandwidth options?
Sneaker net support or 1 staff member, connecting only to targeted users.
All the skilled admin would see was a fraction of a 'small' consumer pipe on a consumer account linked to an exchange in suburbia ie random domestic OS, known bandwidths, known isp... interest fades after fixing and seeing a more work waiting.
That night, day, week, month, year many more "small" efforts are made.
As such they really don't go to court with that information very often.
The GCHQ had to try that in the 1990's and with the new ideas around domestic US court friendly locked boxes - the NSA has new domestic mission visions too.
They would get your isp logs and into your adsl/HFC/optical device/router/switch:)
BeOS does provide a different file system outside Mac, Win, Linux - good.
BeOS does provide a different OS outside Mac, Win, Linux - good.
AV and firewall:)
yes hydrofoil, "infiltrate existing nodes" via fronts or tame turned users.
The classic thinking was always a total http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A like mastery of the US telco network - telco brand, OS, software would not save your message on their 'network'.
Any message in was seen before the first ip changing hop, let travel the "world" and then seen on its final destination ip connection (lets say US to US or US friendly nation).
The other aspect was a bulk of instant front groups running existing quality nodes in cities, suburbia to catch people on average, in bulk trying to use TOR.
This new news puts the US at a Russian or China level of been detected. The US has the network we call the internet as its own plaything in its totality - why mess around/even consider risking what smart admins might just stumble over one day?
The admins would tell friends, outside (non US) antivirus vendors would blog/research any new threats in very public ways.
The other sort of related computer use hint was "Senator: Let's monitor P2P for illegal files" and some unique string per discovered computer and files. http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9920665-7.html
This feels like disinformation - watch your system not the brands, not the networks - watch your file system, your code while the wider network and any encryption sold/gifted is junk. TOR is not "crypto" hard, why the dedicated per end user efforts? Thats a lot of cleared staff needed to spy on a lot of unique computers and keep the hidden software running and review the results:)
Hi john, re the virus aspect.
Recall the US hints at tame antivirus vendor cooperation. With tame lawyers, tame telcos, tame US software/hardware providers... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_Lantern_(software)
The virus/AV US cooperation aspect sounds interesting again.
Really depends on what cloud you bought into. Many will offer cpu and bandwidth but as some users have found out other expected benefits may be expensive or lacking.
Slashdot Mirror
Re http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/energy/oilandgas/10266957/Saudis-offer-Russia-secret-oil-deal-if-it-drops-Syria.html
AL-CIAda: the freedom fighters that just keep on helping, generation after generation.
“I can give you a guarantee to protect the Winter Olympics next year. The Chechen groups that threaten the security of the games are controlled by us,”
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/08/in-salt-lake-city-for-the-2002-olympics-the-nsa-may-have-read-your-texts/
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130821/00421524264/nsa-fbi-spied-all-emails-salt-lake-city-before-after-olympics.shtml
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2013/08/nsa-olympics-spying-salt-lake-city/
"nobody agreed that we would trade off our fundamental civil rights for the government to come in and spy on us"
Well AC the 'shocked' aspect is the formation of the domestic locked box, the soon to be "life" long phone records and use in domestic courts via concepts like "parallel construction".
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/05/the-nsa-is-giving-your-phone-records-to-the-dea-and-the-dea-is-covering-it-up/
The US civil libertarians do have an idea where a legal systems ends up with no digital privacy.
It gets to be a game of East Germany and West Germany. Who do you want to avoid been seen with to get in good with West Germany?
The rest of the world just moves around the East Germany aspect.
Yes something is wrong with that "manual analysis we can de-anonymize a very small fraction".
Its just other traffic on the NSA internal network we know as the internet.
Any message sent could be seen at the first ip changing hop, travel the Tor world trip, then seen at its final destination ip connection (lets say US to US or US friendly nation).
Might be hard in real time, but give a few days of total internet use to sort...
The other aspect is the FoxAcid idea. You would need tame ("US") antivirus vendor cooperation? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_Lantern_(software) ?
Antivirus vendor cooperation in the US as most targets in the USA trust US antivirus software on tame US consumer OS?
Thats a lot of hope that no smart user or international antivirus brand ever gets lucky.
Thats why most nations try to keep their domestic and foreign shield and sword agencies differentiated at some level.
Once people know their own their gov is listening in and it will be used in court they begin to alter their habits. The social contract falters.
They quickly work out they have the legal protections a random foreigner with a residence permit. No charming diplomats and skilled lawyers.
Gone are the easy days of signals intelligence, welcome the informants.
Recall the early days of brand name VoIP with p2p qualities? keep using it, its safe...difficult, tricky, outside the USA, complex... :)
Then reality unfolds years later
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/let-us-count-the-ways-how-the-feds-legally-technically-get-our-data/
Tracking the people around the networks, chats, forums seems to be the way in.
The years of good chat and having a valued 'name' gets ~malware ~spyware ~keyloggers in.
Yes and if your dumped as a security risk by a duopoly or international or online auction sites with 'the other' brand of CC sharing this method? :)
Give to the wrong charity or a group connected to wrong charity , political organization, its hard to get your "fingerprint" as username and pw back
Re a "good case for them" and the precedent generated :) :)
The US brings it to a tame federal court, gets its 15-20-25 years-life conviction for one or more people.
Like the Soviet Union "power" has done its duty and its a win with advancement for the staff.
Then the unexpected optics start to take over. Terms like "political prisoner", martyr, cause celeb spread. The press... academies, lawyers.... books, movies follow.
That win feels great for a few months and is politically difficult for the next 15-20-25 years.
No amount of suckpuppets can rework that event
White boxes in homes, small business around suburbia with a huge optical pipes and a tame US 'consumer' isp account with interesting bandwidth options?
Sneaker net support or 1 staff member, connecting only to targeted users.
All the skilled admin would see was a fraction of a 'small' consumer pipe on a consumer account linked to an exchange in suburbia ie random domestic OS, known bandwidths, known isp... interest fades after fixing and seeing a more work waiting.
That night, day, week, month, year many more "small" efforts are made.
As such they really don't go to court with that information very often.
The GCHQ had to try that in the 1990's and with the new ideas around domestic US court friendly locked boxes - the NSA has new domestic mission visions too.
The term limited hangout http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Limited_hangout, there was also this early on http://gawker.com/naomi-wolf-is-a-snowden-truther-513470303
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
Hi Mike,
http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
21 points on the capabilities, govs been governments consulted, the terms "selected" "withholding"
ye AC, expect to see a lot more efforts to bait something in the wild. The junk crypto and failed brands still have to be avoided too :)
Yes back to a lot of simple tools that do a few tasks very well and code that has been well understood.
They would get your isp logs and into your adsl/HFC/optical device/router/switch :) :)
BeOS does provide a different file system outside Mac, Win, Linux - good.
BeOS does provide a different OS outside Mac, Win, Linux - good.
AV and firewall
yes hydrofoil, "infiltrate existing nodes" via fronts or tame turned users. :)
The classic thinking was always a total http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A like mastery of the US telco network - telco brand, OS, software would not save your message on their 'network'.
Any message in was seen before the first ip changing hop, let travel the "world" and then seen on its final destination ip connection (lets say US to US or US friendly nation).
The other aspect was a bulk of instant front groups running existing quality nodes in cities, suburbia to catch people on average, in bulk trying to use TOR.
This new news puts the US at a Russian or China level of been detected. The US has the network we call the internet as its own plaything in its totality - why mess around/even consider risking what smart admins might just stumble over one day?
The admins would tell friends, outside (non US) antivirus vendors would blog/research any new threats in very public ways.
The other sort of related computer use hint was "Senator: Let's monitor P2P for illegal files" and some unique string per discovered computer and files.
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9920665-7.html
This feels like disinformation - watch your system not the brands, not the networks - watch your file system, your code while the wider network and any encryption sold/gifted is junk. TOR is not "crypto" hard, why the dedicated per end user efforts?
Thats a lot of cleared staff needed to spy on a lot of unique computers and keep the hidden software running and review the results
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/bitcoin-talk-forum-hacked-hours-after-making-cameo-in-silk-road-takedown/ might be it?
Hi john, re the virus aspect.
Recall the US hints at tame antivirus vendor cooperation. With tame lawyers, tame telcos, tame US software/hardware providers...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_Lantern_(software)
The virus/AV US cooperation aspect sounds interesting again.
Ty ixs :) *steganography
Australia was to get an http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia_Card back in the 1980's. :)
The later option was the http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax_File_Number , http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/100_point_check and a neat banking tracking system from the same time http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Transaction_Reports_and_Analysis_Centre
Some countries go for an ID card, others a list of ID options and tracking
If you read down into the article you will see the court aspect that is news :)
"On Sunday"....."successfully petitioned the Supreme Court in that country to restrain moves by state governments to make Aadhaar mandatory for public services."
As linked, more at:
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/aadhaar-infringes-on-our-fundamental-right-to-privacy/article5182765.ece
Really depends on what cloud you bought into. Many will offer cpu and bandwidth but as some users have found out other expected benefits may be expensive or lacking.
Re: felony in the process.
Yes the ability to get admin rights or add code while the owner is away/sleeping would be tempting as part of a larger offensive military cyber capacity.
With tasks been outsourced to private security firms and "jokes" about individuals on "lists" this could get interesting:
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/ex-nsa-chief-jokes-about-hunting-down-snowden-advocates-targeted-killings/
http://www.zerohedge.com/contributed/2013-10-02/chief-dhs-privacy-officer-government-called-privacy-office-terrorists
Maybe that ideological or privacy news related home sever makes a list too?