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User: AHuxley

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  1. Re:not a good sell on How IP Law Helps FOSS Communities · · Score: 1

    Some just want to be fellow travellers with a subtle message about Intellectual Property (IP) laws.
    Some efforts will be long term to lure skilled coders away to projects that dont have anti DRM clauses.
    Some efforts will be short term to ensure politicians stay informed about trade deals and the role of Intellectual Property (IP).

  2. Re:Where did /. go? on How IP Law Helps FOSS Communities · · Score: 1

    The splitter had issues during the crypto stories over the past days?

  3. Re:This is why I have a 1 week delayed install pol on Microsoft Botches More Patches In Latest Automatic Update · · Score: 2

    +1 Just enjoy the great games on good gpu drivers on fast gpu hardware.
    For other roles it seems to be a stressful OS choice.

  4. Re:Ain't that a surprise.. not.. on How IP Law Helps FOSS Communities · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Expect to see a lot more efforts like that after the NZ changes.
    From sockpuppets, astroturfing to huge reports and fancy foundations ... the public has to be corrected on the NZ legal story.

  5. Re:hmmm on Are the NIST Standard Elliptic Curves Back-doored? · · Score: 1

    Other countries buy into crypto and telco products... imported... any standards they set are domestic.
    Option one is to air gap, option two is to replace.

  6. Re:hmmm on Are the NIST Standard Elliptic Curves Back-doored? · · Score: 1

    The UK and US faced down an emerging French/German/Swedish/Norwegian ie EU zone crypto machine exports in the 1960's.
    Go cheap (fronts/contacts with in firms) and set an international standard with the govs.
    Something new will have to be used to bring the EU private sector back this time.

  7. Re:Courts frequently interpret the intent of a law on Court Declares Google Must Face Wiretap Charges For Wi-Fi Snooping · · Score: 1

    Countries legal systems had to find their way around the computer intrusion cases back in the 1980's.
    The full force of legal protection was directed at privacy vs some 'damage' case that could be reduced if the network was just 'looked' at.
    If only it was just one 'test' in 'one' country ...

  8. Re:We owe our thanks to Mr. Snowden on Are the NIST Standard Elliptic Curves Back-doored? · · Score: 1

    Re watching slashdot: We are days, weeks, months, years, decades late and talking about whats in the US press over the past days/months.
    The best sockpuppets can do is link to science (bread and games) and hope to shape the long term debate away from any more Fourth Amendment/illegality talk.
    Enjoy the crypto topics and comment away :)

  9. Re:hmmm on Are the NIST Standard Elliptic Curves Back-doored? · · Score: 1

    Others govs may love of all this as many have been invited into the basic telco/phone tracking and deep packet efforts by contractors.
    They can tap/log/track and are just as addicted to the daily file updates on all dissidents.
    The US has not much to fear as the AC mentioned trade sanctions and US bilateral trade deals would have telco cooperation in the fine print.
    If a US brand loses a contract due to "security questions" expect to see a reminder of what trade is in the local press and a powerful court/trade challenge.
    Nation by nation the US hope to rebuild its image and branding via new products and soft loans.
    Over time sockpuppets, trade deals and charm will solve all?

  10. Re:Meta review on Are the NIST Standard Elliptic Curves Back-doored? · · Score: 1

    RE it made DES significantly stronger?
    Banks and businesses where to get a strong version. At some point the "industry" went for a weaker code for wider use.
    Just good enough for commercial use, just weak enough for NSA/GCHQ to get in if needed.
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Encryption_Standard#NSA.27s_involvement_in_the_design
    ...'to reduce the length of the key from 64 to 48 bits. Ultimately they compromised on a 56-bit key"
    It seems the code was helped to be more protected (ie the significantly stronger aspect ) but was not going to be used without a way back in.

  11. The old cypher machine vs your new internet? on Are the NIST Standard Elliptic Curves Back-doored? · · Score: 1

    The darker crypto history of the 1950-80's would point to long term weak export grade devices.
    Why this generation of software and hardware would be allowed to be any different seems to have escaped a few people.
    First the govs look at the private leadership, the firms, the brands - help stop communists....
    If that fails, go for longterm staff with issues.
    If that fails, set up a gov backed front company or standard out spending and undercutting any emerging private experts.
    Looking back why did so few not see the lack of public gov interest after US crypto exports laws became more open (after public key cryptography?)
    All the world was presented with was vague whispers of way too much unencrypted data with optical, internet and mobile phones...too expensive, too difficult..
    The govs appetite never changed and funding in the past ~10 years was epic.

  12. Re:It's quite alarming that... on How To Turn Your Pile of Code Into an Open Source Project · · Score: 1

    Yes get that aspect down from day one :)
    Get your anti-DRM clauses in early.

  13. Re:PRISM compliant on Google's Encryption Plan To Stifle NSA's Dragnet Will Raise the Stakes · · Score: 2

    Make a "PRISM compliant" sticker :)

  14. Re:Disinformation on Google's Encryption Plan To Stifle NSA's Dragnet Will Raise the Stakes · · Score: 1

    Re Why would anyone believe they are on the publics side?
    Globally you would want the servers in the US or near US/UK friendly sites/telco loops.
    The fear is a network of French, Germany, Russian, Spanish, Chinese, Portuguese ect. of local quality domestic ad/seaching brands.
    They would only respond to their govs interests and demands for bulk raw sharing be just to regionally politically tempting.
    http://rt.com/news/prime-time/icq-panic-russia-us/
    "It all went smoothly – until the recent announcement by US law enforcement bodies who claimed that homeland security could be jeopardized if the service is located in Russia."
    http://rt.com/usa/russian-company-buys-icq/

  15. Re:Not a solution. on Google's Encryption Plan To Stifle NSA's Dragnet Will Raise the Stakes · · Score: 1

    The reality of large US domestic data storage would point to a total lifetime of routine surveillance been in budget and technically workable.
    The phone records aspect is a hint to that - bulk call metadata just waiting for 10's of years.
    Its not the cold war where keywords would alert to a message/voice and then keep that instance for later human translation or storage.
    Now you just keep the metadata, ip used, keywords found, voice print, image, video clip still, banking, telco use ie all traffic until needed. Tiny compressed, sorted, indexed fragments per person per day.
    If they keep using keywords or connecting (3 hops) to 'anyone' - then more storage and contractor man-hours are added.
    Nothing per generation of device is expensive if you can set the surrounding telco, legal and crypto standards.

  16. Re:Certain content delivery networks already do th on Google's Encryption Plan To Stifle NSA's Dragnet Will Raise the Stakes · · Score: 1

    A lesson from the consumer OS side - Lower cost and usable by not adding expensive features like good encryption until a real issue makes the press.
    Some regimes, monarchies and communist countries might have been swayed by that aspect too - trunk telco network has local rules and no encryption was allowed.
    Rapid global uptake of the brand is protected..

  17. Re:Not a solution. on Google's Encryption Plan To Stifle NSA's Dragnet Will Raise the Stakes · · Score: 1

    Now only the NSA and select advertisers can enjoy working on your data.

  18. Plain text is still the prize on Google's Encryption Plan To Stifle NSA's Dragnet Will Raise the Stakes · · Score: 2

    The plain text is still not legally protected under a NSL/hidden self-signed "court" at the advertising keyword end.
    The metadata is still not legally protected under a NSL/hidden self-signed "court" as sent.
    The mathematics of cryptography is great PR along the tube but reality sets in at the end of the tube again.
    http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/09/shifting_shadow_stormbrew_flying_pig_new_snowden_documents_show_nsa_deemed.html
    STORMBREW and FLYING PIG show some insights into router and covert data redirection, the use of fake security certificates and the results been unencrypted.
    Also note the bypassing (man-in-the-middle) ability via security certificates aspect.

  19. Re:Let's see what the constitution says about this on Device Security: How Border Searches Are Really Used · · Score: 1

    The next step is the colour of law for http://www.flyingmag.com/news/feds-say-pilots-have-no-rights
    If you stay in the USA but fly in a "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area" you may get to enjoy a full "ramp check".

  20. Re:What's the point on Device Security: How Border Searches Are Really Used · · Score: 1

    Dont bring any device of that generation and OS type. Just bring any of the really good, second hand laptops with OSX, Win 7/8 or Linux.
    Put in the productivity software and have some VPN you trust to get your work/holiday data back, travel with the laptop but nothing thats personal on it.
    No vids, no chat logs, no IM names, no images with faces/locations/gps/name/serial numbers in the files, no web cache, no digital books with your drm.
    Just random free software and free games :)
    If your data is cloned, MAC and any wireless serial numbers kept, its takes some time with all the free software and you get your laptop back.

  21. Re:Watch out what occurs to Lavabit on How To Foil NSA Sabotage: Use a Dead Man's Switch · · Score: 1
  22. Re:iPhone on How To Foil NSA Sabotage: Use a Dead Man's Switch · · Score: 1

    In 1984 you knew the gov was in your networked tv :)

  23. Re:You really think you're that important? on How To Foil NSA Sabotage: Use a Dead Man's Switch · · Score: 1

    Did we ever think email service would be that important?

  24. Re:Why lump everything in one category? on How To Foil NSA Sabotage: Use a Dead Man's Switch · · Score: 1

    Interesting point about the car wash and a vision of a "massive network chart" and been in the ~3 hops..
    http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander had some insight into just that on page 4:
    ""Later, we had a chance to review the information. It turns out that all [that] those guys were connected to were pizza shops.""

  25. Re:Post Employment Ad for "legal expert" on How To Foil NSA Sabotage: Use a Dead Man's Switch · · Score: 1

    To paraphrase a quote in support of NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act):
    ‘Shut up. You don’t get a lawyer.'"
    Somewhere a lawyer is searching for you.... will you be listed as "inoperative" "excised" "completed"?