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I can probably afford some advice from a lawyer, and may very well go that route,

I've never worked with him, but I suggest you start with NewYorkCountryLawyer. Ray's contact information is on his website, Beckerman Legal.

but I sincerely doubt I could afford defend myself against an actual lawsuit.

That's all the more reason to consult an attorney now!

Once you and NYCL have agreed on fees, you can transfer funds through these payment options.

Afraid I'm going to have to value the words of my law professors over yours on this particular point. It is not a four prong "argument", that is considerably understating things. Four factor analysis is THE LAW here, it's not an argument. The four factors/prongs in fair use analysis are explicitly stated in the statute. They can be found at 17 USC section 107. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/107 . "Benefit to society" is not one of the four factors. Chin's discussion of the benefit to society is not in the context of one of the four factors. Rather it is in the "Overall Analysis" section immediately following his detailed four factor analysis..

This is all in the actual decision. It might help you to (re?)read the decision, and pay close attention to the subheadings. http://beckermanlegal.com/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/authorsguild_google_131114Decision.pdf

Chin's discussion of fair use (beginning on page 16) could serve as an excellent introduction to what fair use really is, and how it is applied in US copyright law.

When you win a copyright case you may be awarded your attorneys fees. I can't wait to see YouTube's attorneys fee motion. It's going to make my firm's bills seem like chicken feed.

But the defendant's lawyers have done a great job of beating back the Evil Empire, and in so doing have accomplished an important victory for the vitality of the internet.

where the link itself is

The problem is that when you go to that link, the title at the top of the browser page is

That's probably because there's a missing title tag in the web page. Wait, strike that. I checked the page and the problem is that the actual title of the page is that long file address.

Are you talking about my law firm web site or my blog post on blogger.com?

For justice to prevail the loser HAS to pay all court costs. Period!

You're wrong if you thing that will improve access to the courts; it would only make it worse. It would make it an even higher stakes poker game. The real things that would improve access to justice are such things as (a) making it easier rather than harder to bring class actions, (b) making it easier rather than harder for other forms of contingent cases, (c) investing money in civil legal aid, (d) developing laws to encourage prepaid legal services, and (e) the courts not bending the law -- as they sometimes do -- to accommodate large corporations abusing the judicial system (see my article on how the RIAA was given numerous unfair advantages by the courts in its war against ordinary people: "Large Recording Companies vs The Defenseless", ABA Judges Journal, Equal Access to Justice issue, 2008)

For example SONY BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, Capitol Records v. Jammie Thomas-Rasset, ..

..RIAA vs usenet.com

For pity's sake. Making stuff up was bad enough, now you're clutching at straws.

Yes, sometimes people refer to Arista Records LLC et al v. Usenet.com as "RIAA v. Usenet.com". No, people using that shorthand way to refer to it does not change reality.

For a list of the plaintiffs in that case see the court ruling here : http://beckermanlegal.com/pdf/?file=/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/090630DecisionOfMotions.pdf

Note that the RIAA is not amongst them. They are all listed individually because they all participated directly. The RIAA did not sue. It did not represent the parties.

You are clearly very ignorant about this subject. That's okay, there's lots of things I'm ignorant about too. But I know when to admit it. Do you?

In case you're interested in reading the arguments I made in 2009 in this case, as to why the verdict was in violation of due process, here they are (PDF)

The complaint (PDF) included a 3rd claim for "negligence". Complaint, paragraphs 47 to 58.

The defendant moved to dismiss the 3rd claim for "negligence" on preemption grounds and the EFF filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the request for dismissal of the negligence claim on preemption grounds.

Thereafter the Judge granted the motion to dismiss the 3rd claim for negligence on preemption grounds.

You can say whatever you want, but the documents don't lie.

By suggesting that this didn't really happen, you are misleading anyone who cares to accept you as credible, and your motivations for doing so are curious indeed.

You can play whatever games you like, but I deeply resent your suggestion that the summary which I wrote was somehow inaccurate. If you don't intend any "offense", don't say something I wrote was wrong when it's right, and the only thing "wrong" is your outlandish argument that the papers do not mean what they say.

You are completely correct.

"Capitol Records Motion To Enjoin ReDigi Denied" is the title which one of the lawyers for Redigi used in the /. article earlier today.

Slashdot had an article submitted by Ray Beckerman this morning about the denial of this preliminary injunction, along with links to the oral arguments and the briefs proffered, along with the 66-page pdf transcript of the hearing and the judge's ruling. I also commented about "hot bench" and about my favorite lines in the hearings.

http://yro.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=2659829&cid=38965481

http://yro.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=2659829&cid=38965299

Beckerman also included links to pdf copies of

Transcript of oral argument in Capitol Records v ReDigi

Transcript of oral argument in Capitol Records v ReDigi

February 6, 2012, Order Denying Preliminary Injunction Motion

All of these can also be found as links on http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/

cat > hashthis
$SALT
http://yro.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=2661259&op=Reply&threshold=1&commentsort=0&mode=thread&pid=38973925

md5sum hashthis
910c865dee059153de0c601df5386e64 hashthis

You are completely correct.

"Capitol Records Motion To Enjoin ReDigi Denied" is the title which one of the lawyers for Redigi used in the /. article earlier today.

Slashdot had an article submitted by Ray Beckerman this morning about the denial of this preliminary injunction, along with links to the oral arguments and the briefs proffered, along with the 66-page pdf transcript of the hearing and the judge's ruling. I also commented about "hot bench" and about my favorite lines in the hearings.

http://yro.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=2659829&cid=38965481

http://yro.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=2659829&cid=38965299

Beckerman also included links to pdf copies of

Transcript of oral argument in Capitol Records v ReDigi

Transcript of oral argument in Capitol Records v ReDigi

February 6, 2012, Order Denying Preliminary Injunction Motion

All of these can also be found as links on http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/

cat > hashthis
$SALT
http://yro.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=2661259&op=Reply&threshold=1&commentsort=0&mode=thread&pid=38973925

md5sum hashthis
910c865dee059153de0c601df5386e64 hashthis

From NYCL's site: http://beckermanlegal.com/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/capitol_redigi_120201OrderDenyGoogleMotionLeaveFileAmicus.pdf

I broke from Slashdot tradition and actual read the opinion.

http://beckermanlegal.com/pdf/?file=/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/realview_2020_110920DecisionDamages.pdf

The Order states:

Defendant's motion for remittitur is allowed (Doc. 238). Defendant shall inform the court by September 29, 2011 whether it
seeks a new trial. If not, judgement shall enter in the amount of $4,200 plus pre-judgment interest of 12% from 2004.

So ... if there's going to be a new trial, wouldn't they already have informed the court?

The question here isn't whether she's liable. It's for how much.

Alito's dissent (starting on page 26) is interesting, and gets into just how thorny a problem it is to prove an "innocent infringer" defense under 17 U.S.C. 504. (And again, an "innocent infringer" isn't off the hook--it just reduces the minimum statutory damages that may be awarded to the rights-holder.) Basically, the girl argued that she was too young, too technically unsophisticated--not a willful infringer for the purposes of awarding damages. The judge who originally reduced the damages more or less agreed with her (his ruling can be found here. The court of appeals then looked at the argument differently. (There order is here.. They considered the innocent infringer defense directly under 17 U.S.C. 402(d) (full text available here. Basically, that says you can't be an innocent infringer if you have "access to" published recordings that have the copyright notice on them. The court of appeals pretty broadly said that this provision prevented Ms. Harper from claiming innocent infringement. Bottom line, she never disputed that she had access to such recordings (whatever that might mean).

Alito doesn't like the appeals court saying that this "access to" argument may act as a matter of law to prevent someone from being an innocent infringer. I think he's right about that--access should be a question of fact that needs to be decided on evidence, and it seems like nobody in this case really talked much about it.

and force them to prove that the movie was downloaded,

Well, according to the complaint filed by ACHTE/NEUNTE they allege that "...each Defendant, without the permission or consent of the Plaintiff, has used, and continues to use, an online media distribution system to distribute to the public, including by making available for distribution to others, the Copyrighted Motion Picture."

They are not simply complaining that people are downloading their material, but actively distributing it too.

In this case, I regret somewhat that the ludicrously-high numbers would seem to have been made up by P2PNet, not by the RIAA.

P2PNet got that number by taking the $750-$150,000 per infringement damages that are entitled for copyright infringement under US law, and multiplying the lowest figure by the 200 million downloads also mentioned in the legal document they linked to. That only comes to $150bn, rather than $1.5tr, but as the upper bound would be $30tr, I guess that is acceptable.

Unfortunately, that 200m figure is the number of downloads of Lime Wire, not the number of copyright infringements the RIAA are claiming, so there is no real reason to multiply those numbers together. Even the RIAA accepts such a large amount as ludicrous and if you read the actual document, they only claim that "LimeWire’s liability undoubtedly will run into the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars." Note that the RIAA can only get damages for infringements of material covered by their members, that aren't exempt under fair use, aren't done in other jurisdictions and that they can actually "prove" - so this also limits the scope of the damages.

Obviously this is still rather silly as LimeWire should not be liable for anything, but please try to avoid making up numbers - leave that to the professionals at the IFPI, MPA etc.

Good comment; wish I had mod points.

In this case, I regret somewhat that the ludicrously-high numbers would seem to have been made up by P2PNet, not by the RIAA.

P2PNet got that number by taking the $750-$150,000 per infringement damages that are entitled for copyright infringement under US law, and multiplying the lowest figure by the 200 million downloads also mentioned in the legal document they linked to. That only comes to $150bn, rather than $1.5tr, but as the upper bound would be $30tr, I guess that is acceptable.

Unfortunately, that 200m figure is the number of downloads of Lime Wire, not the number of copyright infringements the RIAA are claiming, so there is no real reason to multiply those numbers together. Even the RIAA accepts such a large amount as ludicrous and if you read the actual document, they only claim that "LimeWire’s liability undoubtedly will run into the hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars." Note that the RIAA can only get damages for infringements of material covered by their members, that aren't exempt under fair use, aren't done in other jurisdictions and that they can actually "prove" - so this also limits the scope of the damages.

Obviously this is still rather silly as LimeWire should not be liable for anything, but please try to avoid making up numbers - leave that to the professionals at the IFPI, MPA etc.

Thus, a Defendant's distribution of even one unlawful copy of a motion picture can result in the nearly instantaneous worldwide distribution of that single copy to a limitless number of people.

I don't know about how brazen the RIAA is, but as far as I can tell, the Court ruled them statutory damages--There was a table with each song on a row and a column titled "Statutory Damages Award," and written in each box was 22,500.00 (source). If they thought they were handing down a punishment, well, they picked the wrong box. While I agree with you that tens of thousands in compensation for each song is ridiculous, that's how the fools ruled.

perhaps we have a temporal disconnect here, as the defendant was without lawyer in the initial part of the case

http://beckermanlegal.com/pdf/?file=/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/londonsire_does_080617TranscriptConference.pdf

therefore, the abuse of the client's naivety was well-established long before they got serious representation. the unsymmetrical levels of legal sophistication was abused by corporate counsel, specifically in regards to the common meaning of "distribution", for a long running time in the early narrative of this case

the argument that "gosh, he was tricked by the cunning lawyers on the other side" fails

no, this argument succeeds on many levels and in multiple meanings, many times, long before the harvard brigade showed up on scene

in fact, "gosh, he was tricked by the cunning lawyers on the other side" is the core of the entire problem here with the music industry's tactics

the music industry does not depend upon legal integrity to win its cases. they depend upon the unsymmetrical nature of financial resources and legal acumen between defendant and corporate counsel

so you are attempting to dispel the very meat of the issue here in this case, and in many other cases, with after-the-fact claims: that things are balanced because interested academic counsel is now involved. no. this case was imbalanced a long time beforehand, and in many other cases not so blessed by academic interest, remain unbalanced

as soon as serious counsel shows up out of empathy for the abused defendants, the corporate sharks skulk away. if no such serious counsel shows up, the sharks have a feeding frenzy. this feeding frenzy is not based on legal integrity, it is based on simple abuse of overwhelming resources on one side of the court room

so you are currently tacking in the direction of intellectual honesty in the narrow scope of this particular scenario, and i thank you for that. however, you are still failing intellectual honesty-wise on the larger themes in play here. so i ask that you now continue your tack towards intellectual honesty and extend the scope of your attempt to be honest on the issues and admit the obvious about what is really in play here: no real legal integrity on the side of corporate counsel, simply deft maneuvering, manipulation of unsophisticates, and generalized abuse of unsymmetrical resources

for example, you will never see the music industry pursue cases like this against organizations or individuals with deep pockets. because this is a fight they know they will lose. they have no case, they only have muscular posturing that impresses legal unsophisticates. the music industry merely picks on the poor and the weak with chest thumping and menace and scares them into capitulatization with overwhelming legal force

therefore, if you yourself have any legal, moral, or intellectual integrity about you, you will give up the charade that there is anything valid in the notion this is a fair fight going on here

crocodile tears

No - the special verdict form had damages per work, not per infringement, in accordance with the statute.

Well, I'm looking at these documents: Jury Instructions, Jury Verdict Form.

In the first, the language is

The Copyright Act entitles a plaintiff to a sum of not less than $750 and
not more than $30,000 per act of infringement (that is, per sound recording
downloaded or distributed without license), as you consider just.

In the second, there is some conflicting language. The instruction says "You must determine the just amount of damages to award for each act of infringement, as set out below," although where a value is to be entered, it says "[W]hat damages do you award the Plaintiff for this copyrighted work."

I think there's a valid argument as to confusing instructions.

The special verdict form required them to write the amount of damages for each work - they had to write "$22,500" 30 times. So to say that they ended up intending only to award $22,500 is a bit of a stretch.

No, I mean they would've written $750 30 times, but that here, they instead multiplied each of the 30 awards of $750 by another 30, resulting in the $22,500 figure. The extra 30 is the suspicious round number, which could indicate multiplying the minimum to account for multiple acts of infringement, even though statutory damages should only be awarded per work, regardless of the number of infringements.

I think there's both congressional record, statutory, and case history precedent for interpreting willfulness as "malicious" or "fraudulent", and I don't think Tenenbaum counted as either.

More or less the dispute between which is required: willful copying (e.g. I am deliberately downloading this track) and willful infringement (e.g. I am aware that downloading this track will infringe its copyright, and I am deliberately doing so)?

Might work, but there was a damning conversation that Tenenbaum had with his father about this sort of thing being infringing, so I think that the best he'd manage would be to require plaintiffs to show infringement after that conversation to still get to willfulness.

No - the special verdict form had damages per work, not per infringement, in accordance with the statute.

Well, I'm looking at these documents: Jury Instructions, Jury Verdict Form.

In the first, the language is

The Copyright Act entitles a plaintiff to a sum of not less than $750 and
not more than $30,000 per act of infringement (that is, per sound recording
downloaded or distributed without license), as you consider just.

In the second, there is some conflicting language. The instruction says "You must determine the just amount of damages to award for each act of infringement, as set out below," although where a value is to be entered, it says "[W]hat damages do you award the Plaintiff for this copyrighted work."

I think there's a valid argument as to confusing instructions.

The special verdict form required them to write the amount of damages for each work - they had to write "$22,500" 30 times. So to say that they ended up intending only to award $22,500 is a bit of a stretch.

No, I mean they would've written $750 30 times, but that here, they instead multiplied each of the 30 awards of $750 by another 30, resulting in the $22,500 figure. The extra 30 is the suspicious round number, which could indicate multiplying the minimum to account for multiple acts of infringement, even though statutory damages should only be awarded per work, regardless of the number of infringements.

I think there's both congressional record, statutory, and case history precedent for interpreting willfulness as "malicious" or "fraudulent", and I don't think Tenenbaum counted as either.

More or less the dispute between which is required: willful copying (e.g. I am deliberately downloading this track) and willful infringement (e.g. I am aware that downloading this track will infringe its copyright, and I am deliberately doing so)?

Might work, but there was a damning conversation that Tenenbaum had with his father about this sort of thing being infringing, so I think that the best he'd manage would be to require plaintiffs to show infringement after that conversation to still get to willfulness.

> What is your angle?

Hard to tell, Ray. But if he's Thaetetus, does that make you Socrates? :]

Seriously, though, there are about a zillion Dan Roses out there. Mostly he appears to spend his time making random legal comments on Slashdot among a handful of others. Seems like he *might* be at UNC School of Law. The email has an extra dot, but I think Gmail ignores those. If that's true, he's part of the Lambda Law Students Association (a legal association for homosexuals), which doesn't really explain his interest in the RIAA & copyrights. That said, Google is giving some very strange results, so who knows?

That said, this exchange was pretty ugly for Tenenbaum. I assume it's what he's talking about. Of course, I see nothing in there admitting specifically to violating the distribution right. And I don't have a court transcript, either, which I trust more than random internet reports about the case.

I say that because there are other things out there like this story which claims that "Harvard Law School Professor Charles Nesson has conceded in a letter to the US Department of Justice that his client, accused peer-to-peer infringer Joel Tenenbaum, "downloaded music for [his] own enjoyment."" which points to this letter on your website. The problem is that I've read the letter three times and I can't find that "quote" in it anywhere, unless they got it by cutting out the phrase "is alleged to have," which would make their quote the same kind of dishonesty that led to $312,000 in sanctions recently.

The link in the article points to a framed view of the PDF. The PDF itself is here. Let's post bare links please? ...ank

Marie Lindor, Beckerman's client, ...was accused of making copyrighted music available on the Kazaa file sharing program. After five depositions and three years of legal maneuvering, the RIAA has dropped the case against the woman whom Beckerman said has "never turned on a computer.

Let me get this straight. Who's providing "false information," "misdirecting... relevant facts and events," and concealing "critical information and evidence regarding the infringement at issue" again?

According to the decision, "plaintiffs' counsel requested leave to file this motion, having learned less than one month earlier , at the deposition of Yanick Raymond-Wright, that defendant's daughter had brought a desktop computer into her mother's home and had connected it to the Internet in the summer of 2004" (emphasis added). The decision goes on to day that "[d]efendant does not suggest that plaintiffs could have discovered this information sooner, as neither defendant nor the other deponents in this case recalled Ms. Raymond-Wright's 2004 visit or the presence of her computer in her mother's home."

It sounds like they sued Ms. Lindor because of alleged infringement activities that were traced to her internet account. Then they kept the suit open while trying to find out who might have used her account. It looks like it just took several years before they could identify the right defendant. It also looks like the defendant's incomplete testimony is one of the reasons why the plaintiffs did not identify the right defendant earlier.

JFC. The arrogance and hypocrisy is mind-boggling.

The Magistrate Judge probably reviewed the evidence presented pretty closely and with an open mind. The opinion seems well-reasoned and balanced on its face. I personally would not second-guess the opinion without taking some time to review the evidence at least as closely.

The last line of the linked article reads, "Expect a ruling on the RIAA's motion for sanctions soon."

Judge Trager did act on the plaintiff and defendant motions quickly. In December he referred the motions to Magistrate Judge Levy. You don't think that saying "my decision is . . . probably whatever this guy decides" counts as a decision?

For those who dared not taint their eyes with a quote from TFA, I will further clarify: NewYorkCountryLawyer was not accused of being vexatious.

The decision said that, "[a]ccording to plaintiffs . . . counsel 'intentionally provided false information, attempted to misdirect Plaintiffs as to relevant facts and events, and concealed critical information and evidence regarding the infringement at issue,' unreasonably and vexatiously multiplying this litigation and severely prejudicing plaintiffs' ability to learn the critical facts." The complaint sought monetary sanctions under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927, which only allows for sanctions if the accused attorney "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously ."

I suppose this is what happens when you appoint a half-dozen ex-RIAA attorneys to top spots in the Justice Department. President Obama assured us that rules were put into place to prevent this sort of activity, but apparently that doesn't matter. Not that I'm the least bit surprised by that. Frankly, I think the Justice Department should have better things to occupy their time than civil lawsuits. That kind of bias ought to be considered malfeasance in office, or something else worthy of immediate dismissal. 1.92 million dollars for copyright violations by an individual? Now that's Justice for you. Personally, I've never believed that the law should be used to make examples out of people, no matter how distasteful their crimes. That simply breeds more disrespect for the law, which is something the RIAA is apparently unable to understand. They will continue to reap the rewards of that lack of understanding, regardless of what ultimately happens to Jammie Thomas.

What really goes on at DOJ, I can't say, but I will point out the following:

1. If President Obama's rules are being applied, the six or more ex-RIAA attorneys were recused from dealing with this case, and had nothing to do with the brief.

2. The brief's arguments are not dissimilar to the arguments made by the Bush administration when they filed their brief on this issue (pdf) in 2007.

3. In the important Cartoon Networks v. CSC Holdings case, the Solicitor General filed a brief which directly contravened the positions the RIAA's lawyers had taken in that very case. (See Slashdot discussion.)

Law school?
We don't need no stinking law school!

Ray Beckerman probably has a multitude of reasons for choosing his nickname but it won't be for lack of a degree as you can see from his short biography he not only has a degree but cum laude acclamation as well. Also it indicates he did follow the path of Lincoln somewhat in that he worked his way through night school at a law firm, which might have a bit to do with his choosing that handle.

Oh and he has admitted in the past that he has gained a bit of an education here as he sought to learn more about computers and networking to improve his ability to defend his client via preventing the RIAA filling the court's ear with false and improper "facts" unchallenged. He has taught us many things as well.

It's on his website.
-St. John's University School of Law, J.D., cum laude, 1978
-Herbert H. Lehman College, B.A., 1968
-The Bronx High School of Science, 1964

It agrees with what mpoulton posted. Not a bad school, not an astoundingly big name either. If you graduate with honors, you probably know what you're doing.

having read the opinion and cited its reasoning extensively in a law review article I just authored

Here's a copy of the decision for those of you who might not have read it.

As to the reporting of it, most reporters usually report it that way. Lawyers (and law students) know that a denial of certiorari is not an affirmance, but merely a decision not to review the decision.

All of the above still does not bring the cost of one song to $80k.

Copyright statutory damages are not per infringement, but per work.

Let's turn this around and pretend that a recording studio was the defendant and she was the plaintiff. She creates (or purchases the copyright for) a new song, which she plays in the local coffee shops for free. An executive from a recording studio hears her song and falls in love with it. He asks if she's willing to sell it. He offers her $1M plus $0.03 per recording sold. She says "sorry, my song is not for sale at any price." A bit miffed, he copies the notes and lyrics from her music sheet while she is in the restroom, and takes it back to the studio with the intent of forming a boy band to bring the song to the world.

As luck would have it, she discovers his treachery and sues him for copyright infringement (for copying the notes and lyrics) before the song is released

What would the damages be in this case? She was giving performances of the song away for free, yet unwilling to sell the song, thus depriving the rest of the world access to another composition. Should the damages be $0? Can there be a reasonable royalty when one party would not have agreed to a sale and the music never produced sales?

It might be hard to make a case based on actual damages. But, she could sue for statutory damages instead (remember, they are calculated for each work, not for each infringement). In that case, $80,000, or even the $150,000 maximum for willful infringement, might not seem so bad.

In the real case, should the jury have considered that the labels were big bad corporations while Jammie was a sweet mother? Not according to the judge's instructions:

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 11
You should consider and decide this case as a dispute between persons of equal standing in the community, of equal worth, and holding the same or similar situations in life. A corporation is entitled to the same fair trial as a private individual. All persons, including corporations, and other organizations stand equal before the law, and are to be treated as equals.

Well, maybe by the financial yardstick, but on the karmic yardstick you are light years ahead.
I guess it all boils down to what is important to a person that determines which yardstick they use to measure worth/achievement in their lives, and what they want to accomplish.

It's all a matter of perspective, expectations, and goals.
I admire your balance between reality/practicality, and your ideals....Hat's Off to ya!

BTW, I do have a question for you.

From your website, linked in the summary:

"Legally, it is hornbook law that the Fourth Amendment, and thus the exclusionary rule, does not apply in civil cases."

[Plaintiffs' opposition to defendant's motion to suppress MediaSentry materials]

What is 'hornbook' law in this case, and how does this apply here?[I have never encountered this term before]
I will try wikipedia.org, and google.com, but I would appreciate your perspective within the boundaries of the 'possible'(legal/moral ethics, etc...).

Please stop saying "RIAA" unless you also name its constituent organizations. Calling them "RIAA" without naming them simply lets them off the hook: * EMI * Sony Music Entertainment * Universal Music Group * Warner Music Group

You are correct that it's those 4 corporations hiding behind the RIAA as a front. I use "RIAA" as shorthand. But knowing those 4 names doesn't really help because most of the records are sold under their affiliated labels. So the best way to know which are the real bad guys is to go to my Index of Litigation Documents and look at the plaintiffs' names. And the best way to avoid patronizing any RIAA label is to check them out on RIAA Radar.

A PayPal "Donate" button goes a long way..

Well the last time we mentioned my PayPal button, some contributions came rolling in. So if you insist it's here.

Thing is, what I like about the affiliate advertising idea is I'm not asking for a handout, and it's not costing you anything. You buy stuff on the internet anyway. So why not check and see if you can buy it through one of my links and help ol' NewYorkCountryLawyer out, without it costing you a dime?

These guys argued the other side forever, they *should* know how to tear that apart now.

If they knew how to tear it apart, and they did by my understanding of the brief, then they knew the original case was flawed. If the case was flawed, a reasonable person or persons would not attempt such a case in the first place with the intent on 'winning'. If they are not trying to win, then is it a fair and reasonable use of the courts for these ulterior motive shenanigans? Are there penalties for such behavior?

I guess I'm also wondering if this suddenoutbreakofcommonsense has implications in current or future litigation where the RIAA/MPAA or other content redistributors are the plaintiff.

Just curious why you feel it's necessary to link the PDF in via a frame with some other stuff in the "sidebar" I could care less about.

Here's a direct link to the PDF:

http://beckermanlegal.com/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/cartoonnetwork_csc_090500AmicusCuriaeBriefOfUS.pdf

He's a nice guy because so far he's done almost $130,000 worth of work on this case, for which he will never get paid for, as he mentions on page 3 this PDF file.

He also says this:

"In its previous Order the Court noted "that the Defendant has offered to continue
to make regular, monthly payments to Toder, which evinces a good faith effort, on her
part, to make good on her debt to him, and is also an indication that communications have
not, in fact, broken down between Toder, and his client, to such an extent as to warrant a
withdrawal." Order of August 31, 1997 (Dkt. No. 48). Please see Declaration of Brian
N. Toder filed concurrently (under seal) with the instant motion which demonstrate the
opposite.

So when he first tried to leave the case, it looks like the court said "No, she says she's gonna try to pay monthly sums, and you guys can work it out". Looks like she's not keeping her end of the bargain.

Since Ray did not answer you right away, I will answer you from a non-involved, non-expert, and non-lawyer point of view:

There has been a lot of back-and-forth in this case. RIAA (as I shall label the plaintiff's side) made claims, defendant (Tenenbaum) made counter-claims. Tenenbaum amended counter-claims. RIAA moved to have counter-claims dismissed. Tenenbaum filed "Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims". RIAA file a memorandum in response, to support claims for dismissal of those counterclaims.

And, as Kurt Vonnegut wrote: "So it goes."

If you want to read all the legalese, you can find it here: Beckerman Legal, Sony v. Tenenbaum

I am not about to make predictions: I am not a judge and I have known judges make some strange and seemingly unreasonable decisions. But I find the arguments presented by Tenenbaum (which I think Ray Beckerman may have had a hand in) to be well-argued and compelling, especially compared to the material and arguments brought to bear by the RIAA.

After all, as Nate Anderson wrote for Ars Technica: "... as long as the music labels continue filing their suits, stories about how the RIAA is a lying collection of lying liars (who lie) aren't going to die ..."

This makes way too much sense.

Nope. Letting the RIAA pick the "forensics expert" does absolutely nothing to ensure that a fair and impartial expert is chosen. I'd think all that would do is make it very easy for the RIAA to set up a forensics lab of their own that could potentially plant evidence on the mirror copy. Then what do you do? They could always claim that your copy, which is minus the planted evidence, was "tampered with". I see no good out of this, but if NewYorkCountyLawyer disagrees, I would welcome an opportunity to be educated out of my error here.

No, while I think the order otherwise "makes sense", I happen to agree with you 100% on your point that the RIAA should not be able to unilaterally pick the forensic examiner. I think that is a mistake on the judge's part. As I pointed out in TFA:

Unlike the protective order (pdf) in SONY BMG Music Entertainment v. Arellanes, this protective order permits the RIAA to unilaterally select whatever expert it chooses, rather than an independent, mutually agreeable, expert.

I think that is unfortunate. I'm hoping the judge comes to recognize that oversight.

This makes way too much sense.

Nope. Letting the RIAA pick the "forensics expert" does absolutely nothing to ensure that a fair and impartial expert is chosen. I'd think all that would do is make it very easy for the RIAA to set up a forensics lab of their own that could potentially plant evidence on the mirror copy. Then what do you do? They could always claim that your copy, which is minus the planted evidence, was "tampered with". I see no good out of this, but if NewYorkCountyLawyer disagrees, I would welcome an opportunity to be educated out of my error here.

No, while I think the order otherwise "makes sense", I happen to agree with you 100% on your point that the RIAA should not be able to unilaterally pick the forensic examiner. I think that is a mistake on the judge's part. As I pointed out in TFA:

Unlike the protective order (pdf) in SONY BMG Music Entertainment v. Arellanes, this protective order permits the RIAA to unilaterally select whatever expert it chooses, rather than an independent, mutually agreeable, expert.

I think that is unfortunate. I'm hoping the judge comes to recognize that oversight.

I must admit, at first glance, I was concerned since I only knew about recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com, but beckermanlegal.com is in TFS, so I would imagine it too is genuine Ray Beckerman.

Ray Beckerman (NYCL) has graciously hosted a fully illustrated PDF of the plaintiff's brief for class action certification (the documents in question) on his site. Now, I'm not a lawyer but that's got a whole lot of lengthy legalese that no human could understand.

Unlicensed investigator? It's a civil trial, "illegal evidence" applies only to criminal cases, and by government agents, not by civil parties.

Yes, but remember, the RIAA and MPAA keep calling it "stealing" which is not a civil offense. Meanwhile, if it actually was classified as "stealing" and "theft" then said investigatory practices wouldn't be allowed in the first place.

I totally agree about everything you say, this is one of my pet peeves too. However this is a civil lawsuit in this case, and they're calling it "copyright infringement" in the suit.

Whatever PR spin they put on the thing, or the bullshit they tried to pull in other cases (or even in this one, actually, just read their opposition to the quashing here: http://beckermanlegal.com/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/arista_does1-16_081014RIAAOppos.pdf ), this doesn't invalidate my point...

With all due respect, you live in an imaginary world of how things should be, while I unfortunately have to live in the world that is. For a description of reality, go here.

I've put a copy of the decision (PDF) online.

As it turns out that one was settled too.

If the "writ of mandamus or prohibition" ever gets decided on the merits, it will be denied. The RIAA tries to read Rule 83.3 (the rule that governs recordings and broadcasts of a case) in a way to which it is not susceptible. Specifically, ... 83.3(a) reads, "Except as specifically provided in these rules OR by order of the court ..." Rule 83.3(c) reads, "The court may permit ..." followed by a list of certain types of proceedings. The RIAA wants 83.3(c) to apply as a limitation to 83.3(a) "... by order of the court .." However, 83.3(c) is a rule, and as such it applies to 83.3(a) "specifically provided in these rules". For example, this rule permits a court to allow a recording of proceedings without the need to resort to an order. Sorry folks, I have read too many SCO v. The World Court filings. The RIAA thinks just like SCO. Oh yes, SCO is now in bankruptcy. Here is the Court filing: http://beckermanlegal.com/pdf/?file=/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/sony_tenenbaum_090117PetitionWritProhibitionMandamus.pdf

Actually reading the rule? What a radical concept. How come no one told the RIAA lawyers about that?

If the "writ of mandamus or prohibition" ever gets decided on the merits, it will be denied. The RIAA tries to read Rule 83.3 (the rule that governs recordings and broadcasts of a case) in a way to which it is not susceptible. Specifically, ...

83.3(a) reads, "Except as specifically provided in these rules OR by order of the court ..."

Rule 83.3(c) reads, "The court may permit ..." followed by a list of certain types of proceedings.

The RIAA wants 83.3(c) to apply as a limitation to 83.3(a) "... by order of the court .." However, 83.3(c) is a rule, and as such it applies to 83.3(a) "specifically provided in these rules". For example, this rule permits a court to allow a recording of proceedings without the need to resort to an order.

Sorry folks, I have read too many SCO v. The World Court filings. The RIAA thinks just like SCO. Oh yes, SCO is now in bankruptcy.

Here is the Court filing:
http://beckermanlegal.com/pdf/?file=/Lawyer_Copyright_Internet_Law/sony_tenenbaum_090117PetitionWritProhibitionMandamus.pdf