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In the case that infinite times is prohibited by law, they'll settle for infinity minus one, though.

Here's an interesting part that sounds very similar to Zediva:

The record clearly demonstrates that showcasing a video cassette at Maxwell's is a significantly different transaction than leasing a tape for home use. Maxwell's never disposed of the tapes in its showcasing operations, nor did the tapes ever leave the store. At all times, Maxwell's maintained physical dominion and control over the tapes. Its employees actually played the cassettes on its machines. The charges or fees received for viewing the cassettes at Maxwell's facilities are analytically indistinguishable from admission fees paid by patrons to gain adimission to any public theater. Plainly, [**16] in their showcasing operation, the appellants do not sell, rent, or otherwise dispose of the video cassette. On the facts presented, Maxwell's "showcasing" operation is a public performance, which, as a matter of law, constitutes a copyright infringement.

Even though the tapes were technically being rented, the court decided they weren't being rented. Of course, Zediva does actually rent the DVDs for home use, but the judge just went along with a simple and quick ruling identical to the previous one. It's a logically contorted and stupid ruling, but I think he knows the MPAA will come on top anyway, so he might as well hand it to them.

Under U.S. copyright law, she's the creator and you are acting under her direction so your writing is her work, fixed in a tangible form.

NO.

Yes.

"[A] party can be considered an author when his or her expression of an idea is transposed by mechanical or rote transcription into tangible form under the authority of the party."

Andrien v. Southern Ocean County Chamber of Commerce, 927 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1991).
http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/545582

Lindsay v. R.M.S. Titanic, 97 Civ. 9248 (SDNY 1999).
http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/fulltext/lindsaytitanictext.htm

Relying on popular knowledge of copyright law is a nice way to make someone else rich.

I fail to see what this has to do with anything. You claimed that copyright gives authors exclusive rights to prepare derivative works, and that this precedent changes things.

I asserted that the right to preparing derivative works is not as absolutely exclusive with regards to software programs as you might think, and cite the Sect. 117(a)(1) exemption that's applied in this case.

You respond by saying that the GPL does not establish additional restrictions on recipients of GPL programs beyond what copyright requires. Okay - but that has nothing to do with my post.

Your claim that this precedent changes things is bogus. It may open your eyes to Sect. 117(a)(1), but the court didn't make that law; it was already on the books.

It appears that you were arguing that the GPL could be stronger, and not allow private modifications, if this precedent were not there, and that therefore this precedent weakens the potential strength of the GPL or something similar to the GPL. However, this precedent isn't what allows limited creation of derivative works provided "that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner" - the Copyright Act already allows that explicitly.

This precedent changes nothing fundamental, and only barely touches the boundary of what constitutes "an essential step in the utilization" of a program - the court looked to the case Aymes v. Bonelli (decided in 1992) to determine where the boundaries were, and this case fit within them.

There was nothing really noteworthy about this opinion, unless you count it noteworthy that pre-existing precedent was followed.

Just because a term isn't used in a given arena doesn't mean that the general concept doesn't exist. Besides the process of discovery is similar.

http://www.coolcopyright.com/cases/fulltext/nichol suniversaltext.htm

BTW that case doesn't make your case...nor it seems, strongly support it. It says essentially that even if the two are quite a bit different, a comparison of portions is necessary to rule out any infringement.

Fantasy owner Saul Zaentz agreed on the condition that Fogerty sign over all the rights to CCR's music to him.

Fogerty agreed, but the two already had a long history of conflict. After leaving the Fantasy label, Fogerty recorded his album Centerfield, which included the songs "The Old Man Down the Road" and "Zanz Can't Dance." Saul Zaentz immediately filed suit against Fogerty over these two songs. He claimed the first song was a copy of Fogerty's own previous hit "Run Through the Jungle" and filed a defamation suit based on the lyrics of the latter.

Fogerty settled the defamation claim by changing the lyrics and title to Vanz Kant Danz, but fought the first claim and eventually won. Zaentz eventually had to pay Fogerty's attorney's fees. However, considering that Zaentz owns the worldwide distribution rights to Tolkien's Lord of the Rings trilogy thereby earning him a percentage of the receipts from Peter Jackson's film versions, the case did not affect him much financially.

Lots more links on this sordid background here