Slashdot Mirror
Interview With Microsoft's Chief of Security
Paul Coe Clark III writes: "I interviewed Howard Schmidt, Microsoft's head of security, questioning him about, among other things, cyberterrorism and Redmond's responsibility for insecure features in the wake of many virus attacks.
/. readers might find it interesting. They can find it here."
Well, the way you guys constantly dog out Microsoft around here it's no wonder it is insecure. A little TLC should get them back in order in no time.
>
> A: I think any time we find any security vulnerability, we're one of the best in the industry to notify people of the details of them and give them the details to get it fixed.
Conspicuously absent is any description of Microsoft's response when someone else finds the security vulnerability in their products.
Microsoft does focus a lot of effort towards securing their products. Unfortunately the effort is more reactive than proactive. It's a basic flaw in the capitalist model that allows the Marketing and Accounting people to determine release dates--instead of the Developers. The attitude can be paraphrased like this: "As long as the app fires up, it can be released. We'll let the customers be beta testers."
If they were in the car business insted of the O/S business, a lot of people would be dead or mangled.
"What is the sound of one belly slapping?"
Unfortunately for those who oppose full disclosure, the issue was discussed on Bugtraq, which finally led to the details of the vulnerability. This means that the Microsoft-supported way of disclosing bugs (Do issue an advisory but do not publish any details that could be used in creating exploits) apparently didn't work out. Ofcourse, there was a (small) delay, but eventually everybody knew about it before the patch was released.
My question regarding this issue is: how do you feel about this issue? Do you really think that not fully disclosing a vulnerability will prevent exploits to be made? One of the arguments for full disclosure is that sysadmins are able to reproduce the error so that they can test if their system is vulnerable, but with limited disclosure this will only be possible for a small (and probably malicious) public.
--
If code was hard to write, it should be hard to read
The article references this. Here are a couple of URLS on it:
0 24 01.html
s m_ militias/20011031_eff_usa_patriot_analysis.html
Full Bill:
http://www.politechbot.com/docs/usa.act.final.1
EFF Analysis:
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/Terrori
For this, as well as for many other reasons, it is essential that one operating system and one software company does not dominate the industry. The cost of dealing with cross-platform issues is the price we have to pay for a competitive market and a resilient infrastructure.
Suggestions that our salvation lies in uniformity, market dominance by one company, and bigness are more reminiscent of the central planning of the USSR than of what has made our society so successful. It's kind of funny to see that some of the most staunch conservatives and defenders of Microsoft-style laissez-faire economics seem to be falling into the same trap that the communists fell into.
Why does this interviewer have to keep comparing software attacks with the September 11th terrorist attacks? About the only thing they have in common is that they are both malicious. Beyond that, it has no place in an interview about Microsoft security. Very poor taste, IMO.
- Just an AC
Okay, wrong reply (Yes, I scanned the article and saw the words 'microsoft' 'security' 'ask' 'question' and 0 comments, started typing like a wildman to be the first to type an intelligent question ... and realised just a bit too late that it wasn't a call for questions).
:)
Please mod me down before to many people notice my dumbness
--
If code was hard to write, it should be hard to read
Anyone who knows that they're a market leader does have a responsability to see that their stuff isn't going to be the cause of the next great Internet collapse. MS is quickly becoming the leader in getting their bugs exploited, and with so much market penetration, we really could be facing quite a disaster when a better worm comes along.
Does anyone out there work for some other big company with lots of market share? What type of responsability do they assume for the security of their products?
Mac
Does the name Pavlov ring a bell?
A: If you look at the development process, and how long it takes to develop these things and get them out the door, this is not something that people started working on six months ago, and the developer community is saying this is a bad thing. This is stuff that has been in progress for years, which is why we've had to effectively retool the way we do things internally, to meet that new threat environment.
I don't know if the interviewer changed tapes in his recorder or what, but this is the single most important question he asked, and it was completely and totally unaddressed. This one question drives home the problem with Microsoft security, makes him aware that yes, we were all SCREAMING "Stop the madness" BEFORE it rolled out, and he waves his hands saying that hmm, we're meeting the new threat environment. What?
Is there any chance that anyone of importance will see or read this interview? That's the shame. I'd love it if the appropriate congresspeople and/or attorneys-general could see this nonsense made more public.
Not that I expect anyone in his position to actually answer all the questions asked, but it'd be nice if his lips moved in sync to his words, too.
John
John
Oops...that should be
~/windows/source$ find . -name "*.c*" -exec grep -l gets {} \; > ~/msholes
A: Security?
Q: ... yeah, security ...
A: Oh... that......... Our policy is to blame the people who find the holes in our software...
Q: What about the people who put the holes in the software in the first place?
A: Yes, of course. We're currently trying to purge the Al Quida factions from our programming team.
Microsoft has been getting better. Many of the current IIS exploits aren't in IIS at all, but in ISAPI extentions like Index Server (Code Red exploited this), and HTTP Printing in Win2K. Almost all of the exploits released last year and this year could've been blocked by simply following MS' security checklist.
Needless to say, sysadmins apparently don't read checklist, follow best practices, or pay attention to alerts. I have seen real movement from MS (on their site, in comments on NT BugTraq, and in other places) that they take this security stuff seriously now, and they are coming out with some good tools (they're even subcontracting them to get them faster and by security companies who have a better track record) to help automate patch downloading and installation, scanning of network resources for missing patches, remote deployment of patches (for those 500 web servers you have in your datacenter), and various checker tools which will basically verify the security checklists for you.
Apparently MS realizes they made a wrong decision in their approach to security (trusting the sysadmin's dilligence), and they are making strong strides to change this now, and in the future.
I know many of you dislike MS, but you must give them at least that.
Sounds more like the head of Marketing at Microsoft than the Head of Security. Most of his answers were the same marketing BS that come out of Micro$oft every time you ask anyone from there a question. I just wish Micro$oft would give straight answers instead of Marketing BS.
"Really, I'm not out to destroy Microsoft. That will just be a completely unintentional side effect." Linus Torvalds
Is there some sort of steganography going on in the typos of this interview?
"Consider yourself a member of a virtual corporation with Mr. Torvalds as your Chief Executive Officer." - Linux Advocac
Q: But that kind of begs the question, because it wasn't completely unthinkable, like someone flying a plane into a building. At the time when all these features were being rolled out, programmers online were screaming left and right that this was inevitably going to result in these massive incidents, and, sure enough, they did.
A: Well, yes. You're right about that. We were given the signal loud and clear, and completely ignored it. We here at Microsoft are terrible at making software. In fact, please don't ever again buy any of our products. We are very, very bad.
I mean, this guy is speaking on behalf of a multi-billion dollar software giant. He is not going to risk his job by embarrassing his whole company. That's why companies like MS (GM, American Airlines, Exxon) hire guys like this. For reference, consult any presidential press conference.
If you fall off a building, go real limp, because maybe you'll look like a dummy and people will be like hey, free dummy
(When asked about full disclosure, and publishing of exploits)
In some cases, it's tantamount to screaming "fire!" in a crowded movie theater.
Yeah, except there really IS a fire.
So when there is a fire in a movie theatre, he's suggesting the person who notice it just quietly go and tell the management (who will wait to see if it's really a big fire, and then assign some staff to attempt to put it out), instead of telling the people whose lives are in danger?
Yeah, GREAT analogy.
Howard Schmidt: I think the position has always been that you check the final product for vulnerabilities. Because there's a whole lot of open source out there that, day after day after day, there's more reports of vulnerabilities. I think it doesn't make any difference whether it is open source or closed source, it's a matter of identifying them once the product is released.
(bold added by me)
Shouldn't a company with Microsoft's resources be able to identify security holes before the product is released?
Maybe this "release-and-then-check-for-bugs" strategy explains why there are so many MS explots?
___
The way to see by faith is to shut the eye of reason. --Ben Franklin
In response to the question about MS making Good Times into reality (having scripting in email on by default), he said:
If I leave my keys in my car because it's convenient for me, and somebody steals my car, is that my fault? Ten or 15 years ago, the likelihood of that happening was very, very low. But the threat picture has changed dramatically in most places.
I don't know where he was living 15 years ago, but where I grew up (granted I didn't have a car then), there's no way you'd leave your keys in your car and act surprised when it was gone in the morning.
If your car gets stolen because you left the keys in it, its not entirely your fault because it's illegal to steal the car regardless. But it was still bloody stupid.
If it was my friend who left my keys in the car, I'd be pissed as hell. And if the manufacturer put a spare key on every car in the exact same place so it was easy to find and my car got stolen, I'd join the class-action lawsuit that would surely result.
It's one thing to say that MS has good security, and non-disclosure is the right way to go, etc etc. He has to. But to dismiss this question as though it wasn't their fault, without even a "Yeah, we shouldn't have done that", I think is demonstrative of the thinking that led to the problem in the first place.
The enemies of Democracy are
You're going to hit the 50 point karma cap with three off-topic posts in a row.
Splendid, man, splendid.
True reason MS won't release the source code for a security audit:
~$ df
/home 200M free
~$ cd windows/source
~/windows/source$ find . -name "*.c*" -exec grep -l gets {} \; > ~/
volume
umm, that would match fgets(3) as well, which is much safer.
-BlueLines
--BlueLines "The cost of living hasn't affected it's popularity." -anonymous
Did someone interview the Security Chief at Microsloft and seriously expect to get somthing besides a politician? The guy even works three blocks from the WhiteHouse.
"God fights on the side with the best artillery." - Napoleon, Marshal of France - speaking truth to power
But there is a fire. Its only irresponsible to shout "fire!" in a crowded movie theater if there isn't on, just like it would be irresponsible to post non-existent exploits to bugtraq.
Mr. Schmidt is suggesting:
Geez... They must have cut their spin budget recently.
Q: . . . things like . . . making e-mail attachments executable.
A: I think that picture has changed. Once again, we've been developing stuff based on ease-of-use for the customer . . . it goes back to a physical analogy. If I leave my keys in my car because it's convenient for me, and somebody steals my car, is that my fault?
No, it's not. But if the Foo Car Company set all their remote locks to open when you clap your hands thrice, for "when your hands are filled with grocery bags, to save you from searching your pockets for the key", and only allowed this to be disabled by opening the hood and clipping the red wire with the blue tracer, I'd say they would be responsible for my aunt's CDs disappearing.
Opening the hood and clipping a wire is farther than most people want to go when it comes to modifications. I'd even wager that it is more than many drivers are capable of. Searching around in the "control panel" is further than your average MS-Outlook user is likey to feel comfortable with. They are afraid of "breaking" things.
The car keys are in the user interface portion of the car, I guess my point is. It's "easy" to remove them, put them in your pocket, to provent unauthorized use. How "easy" is it to disable the trojan propigation in Outlook?
The previous has been a secret message to my comrades.
Classic Microsoft... standards bad, embrace and extend good... we do it for security reasons, not because we're trying to leverage our monopoly power into yet-another market. I can almost understand the "don't tell anyone about the exploit until we have a chance to fix it" stance, but this makes me sick to my stomache.
I would be in favor of government standards of security. And not just because it would force more open standards, but because it's a good idea. Yes, it will probably not be easy to implement, and it might force MS to ship a product or two late, but at least it will enforce some needed checks from a company who's concept of security is identifying problems after product release.
Those who fail to understand communication protocols, are doomed to repeat them over port 80.
"My server got rooted, and all I got was assurance from Howard Schmidt that we have a special obligation to improve security"
"What is the sound of one belly slapping?"
If we have vulnerable systems, it is likely that terrorists will use our own weaknesses against us. As is mentioned in the interview, the cost of bringing down our communication systems is fairly small.
Remember the Morris Worm? It brought the entire internet to its knees, and Robert Morris didn't mean to release it. What if a "virus" (more correctly, a worm or trojan) is created that destroys every MS-Windows installation? This means more than just Grandma Jane's computer-- I mean military, telecom, and hospital-controlling computer in the world.
The threat isn't that great. Although it wouldn't be expensive in the monetary sense, it would be hard to engineer. But as long as the threat *exists,* it must be considered a potential.
- Tony
Microsoft is to software what Budweiser is to beer.
I think it doesn't make any difference whether it is open source or closed source, it's a matter of identifying them once the product is released.
So...who cares if there are problems. We'll find them eventually - as soon as someone exploits them and we hear about it.
Precicely.
If you want bug-free code you need to start at the architecture/design process (avoiding bug-prone choices), then debug as you go. It's like growing a perfect crystal - you push the impurities out as it solidifies, so only the boundary needs attention. The longer you wait, the larger your search space for each bug, and the bigger the hive of ofspring each bug has produced as new code was added to buggy code.
Security issues are a special case of "bugs", with more than the typical amount of effort needed at precoding stages to avoid building unfixable problems into the basic architecture.
I wonder if they release their code like that for QA as well. It's a matter of identifying bugs once the product is released.
My impression is that Schmidt is completely unaware that software QA, or any other pre-release potential for (securyty) bug suppression, exists. At a minimum his statement implies that Security as a department doesn't participate in architecture, design, code reviews, or QA, and that its leader either feels no need to do so, or is deliberately directing attention away from an inability to affect those stages.
That the head of security for Microsoft could emit such an answer is appalling. But it also goes a long way toward explaining the security problems in Microsoft products.
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
I think security is recognized as the number-one priority across the company.
After the interview, Mr. Schmidt realized that the question was actually about Microsoft's software products, and not about locking the doors each night at MS HQ.
The guy even works three blocks from the WhiteHouse.
The software is developed in a suburb of Seattle Washington (state) and the company's security chief works in Washington (DC), nearly as far from the software department as you can get and still be in the continental US.
THAT explains the security problems in Microsoft products!
B-)
Bantam Dominique roosters crow a four-note song. Once you've heard it as "Happy BIRTHday" you can't NOT hear it that way
Leave their keys in their cars, I mean. Is it stupid? Maybe, but so long as they don't get stolen (hint: after twenty odd years of this, they haven't) then you can say that in their situation it works.
Really, this parallels the whole trust on the Internet thing. I don't leave mail relays open anymore, I don't run ftp or telnet services; hell, I don't even let my computer respond to ping or finger.
Microsoft should have fixed their default settings problem a couple years ago. I wouldn't blame them for having it like that, though. Most Linux distributions come somewhat secure out of the box now, but a year ago most didn't.
Even Slashdot wants to hide some things
> i've seen have finally swayed me back. Red Hat has
>a long way to go, and I'll be recommending to all
>my collegues not to try out this so called
>operating system.
Hmmm. "swayed me back"..."so called operating system"...
"recommending to all my collegues"...
Hooom, hum.
Heck, who needs 'Lord of the Rings'. I think we got real live trolls right here.
"We are Slashdot... you will be assimilated." Form your own opinions, people.
I think security is recognized as the number-one priority across the company. That goes not only to operational security and securing our assets, but also to product development. (emphasis mine)
Anyone else find his priorities in terms of security, shall I say, interesting?
-- B.
This sig does in fact not have the property it claims not to have.
'Nuff said...
I have no problem with your religion until you decide it's reason to deprive others of the truth.
In some cases, it's tantamount to screaming "fire!" in a crowded movie theater. Responsible reporting means if you find a vulnerability, you contact the person in the best position to fix it,
Bob, decided to be a responsible reporter, silently walk out of the movie theater when he found the toilet was on fire. He then dialed 911 across the street for somebody to fix the problem "Hi, are you sure you are the person in the best position to put the fire off? I wouldn't report until I get to this guy."
As of Dec. 20, 2001, the total number of published security bulletins is only 58 compared to 100 in 2000 and 60 in 1999. This year, there are 4 cumulative patches so the actual number of published security threats is around 54.
.NET server hopefully will do better than W2K servers.
The last 3 security vulnerabilities for XP relate to IE, Windows Media, and USB plug and play feature.
I should say that the products of Microsoft are just becoming mature right now. It is unfair for Linux and Unix since they I believe they have been ages before Microsoft introduced Windows. So it terms of maturity, Linux took years just as Microsoft is.
Like in service packs, the Windows 3.51 had around 13 (or more if I remember correctly.) Windows NT4.0 had 6 (the 7th was not released officially.) Windows 2000 now has 2 (and they are releasing SP3 Q1 2002.) There is WindowsXP although there is no SP around (I believe it may be in the alpha stages.) The number of service packs that is released actually decreases due to the maturity of their products. And most people even some *nix guys say that WindowsXP is actually more stable than ever.
It is also noteworthy to say that the base OS of Windows is getting more secure. It is just the apps integrated with the Internet that have most of the security threats like IE, Outlook, Office. For the servers in W2K, the services are the ones problematic and the user has the freedom to deactivate some and use an alternative. Like in Linux, the same thing applies where a server may use the services from different publishers.
I am not saying that Microsoft is good or anything but I say that comparing Windows (PRO/HOME) and Linux/Unix is like comparing apples and oranges. They are built for different purpose thus designed differently.
In the server arena, I think that it is only in Windows 2000 that they released their 1st server OS and not in Windows NT 4.0. Their Windows
Live your life each day as if it was your last.
Q: Capacity issues...
A: Right.
Howard failed to see the sarcasm in Paul's response - he's being totally irrelevent in answering Paul's question. Paul asked you security in telecom not freaking capacity issue!!!
Talking about we ain't got enough clueless people to run the security....
We've all been saying that Microsoft should improve their security, but all the time Microsoft has! Here, have a look at what he says:
I added the emphasis, but look at it! They are securing their assets. He lists security in product development is an afterthought.
So now you know why they are so anti-piracy: they are securing their products.
Microsoft's head of security
Isn't that like the taliban having a minister of women's rights?
Disconnect your television. Do your own research. Draw your own conclusions. They're probably lying. Don't be a sheep.
1) As Multics taught us, security with significant hardware support is significantly easier to do than without. A result of this is that we need to be asking Intel (etal) about help (like tagged memory blocks) in hardware. It really is time that we got away from just the stale VonNeuman ideas that Mr Cray graciously gave us in the 1960s and 1970s.
2) Once the hardware exists, then we can move to implement better O/Ses that are significantly more robust. Everyone will win, even MS.
-- Multics
For instance. Even with all the security patches Microsoft has provided with IIS, their FTP server is still insecure. How do I know this. Because some warez dudez managed to use my server, even though I had applied all the patches and set the FTP directory to be read only.
Now, if this ever happens to you, let me tell you, these guys play a dirty trick so you can't easily delete their directory. They name their folders with names that cannot be deleted the normal way, names like COM1 or DEL, names that are reserved somehow when you try to delete the files and folders.
The amusing thing about this is that the only way to get rid of these files is to install the posix utilities and use rm to get rid of them.
Now here's the kicker. If you use rm -r CO* to get rid of a directory called COM1 you might find out that this directory is really called "COM1\
Yes, I perform backups, so I proceeded to restore the files. But insidiously, SQL Server on the same machine refused to run, because it felt the installation had been corrupted. I basically had to figure out how to trick it into running again, because(another hideous design fault) you can't just uninstall SQL server and reinstall it and hope your data directory is OK. I had no way of doing an up to date backup of my data on this machine. So I had to trick it into believing it wasn't a corrupt installation, or I would have lost data.
Now, how many things can you count that would have never happened with an open source system. You certainly wouldn't have files with the latter part hidden. You can back up data directories to completely different servers by simply copying the directory. Its very easy to drop in other FTP servers without loss of functionality. And there is certainly nothing that will stop a program from running if all its files are there and the execute permission is set.
All, in all, I had a very frustrating experience that never would have happened with a Linux system. With Microsoft, its their way or the highway, and you can't change things or fix them when the design is bad. Rather than the user dictating what the software does, Microsoft dictates to you how their software will work. Because of that, closed source is less flexible and configureable, is less managable and nimble, and therefore cannot respond nearly as well to any number of problems, including security.
No, Thursday's out. How about never - is never good for you?
Gotta LOVE this exchange ...
...
Q: Some of the security problems with Microsoft products are things like buffer overflows. That happens in programming, and you fix it. But others seem like boneheaded decisions based on marketing. Things like enabling Windows Scripting Host by default on millions of consumer machines and making e-mail attachments executable. In these big virus attacks, doesn't Microsoft bear some responsibility for those choices?
A: I think that picture has changed. Once again, we've been developing stuff based on ease-of-use for the customer and what the customer requirements are. I think what happens now is that we've seen the threat picture change. I think it goes back to a physical analogy. If I leave my keys in my car because it's convenient for me, and somebody steals my car, is that my fault?
Okay, but what if the manufacturer ships the car with the keys attached to the steering column with a chain,because THAT way I don't have to worry about losing the keys? Now I have to find out (from someone other than the manufacturer, since the manufacturer's customer support staff is clueless) how to detach them. NOW is the manufacturer responsible, in any way, when my car is stolen?
utter rubbish
This is Microsoft for gods sake. Think real hard, look over the last 20 or thirty things some top level MS exec said in public. Find one interview, statement, debate, press release or anything that did not contain at least one lie. I dare you.
Every corporation has a culture. The culture MS has chosen to develop is one of lying, cheating and stealing.
War is necrophilia.
Number 1. Adding new product features
Number 2. Getting products on the shelves
Number 3. Security
The reason for this is that people can't tell whether a product is secure by looking at reviews or even trying it out (and they sure as hell can't tell by looking at a shrink wrapped box). So, there are very few dollars in it short-term.
Longer term, issues of reputation kick in - and Microsoft are finding that their poor reputation in this area is now biting them, especially as they move into net services.
Unfortunately, turning an entire corporate culture around on a dime is not possible. Even if it was, there's way too much legacy software around, requiring compatability. It will therefore be some time before their product security is all it should be.
"Well, put a stake in my heart and drag me into sunlight."
digital rights management operating system protects rights-managed data, such as downloaded content, from access by untrusted programs
To protect the rights-managed data resident in memory, the digital rights management operating system refuses to load an untrusted program into memory
If the untrusted program executes at the operating system level, such as a debugger, the digital rights management operating system renounces it's trusted identity (it lobotimizes itself)
To protect the rights-managed data on the page file, the digital rights management operating system prohibits raw access to the page file, or erases the data from the page file before allowing such access.
operating system also limits the functions the user can perform on the rights-managed data and the trusted application
provide a trusted clock used in place of the standard computer clock
It's good to see Microsoft finaly getting tough on security!
-
- - You can't take something off the Internet! That's like trying to take pee out of a swimming pool.
BIND
wu-ftpd
Open-SSH
TUX HTTPD
lpd
SYNcookies
Lion
Ramen
Torn
Adore
etc...
We get several attacks from compromised LINUX boxes every fucking day of the week!
gee, that Microsoft software sure does suck...
Some guy once said "Let him who is without sin cast the first stone."
Do you see what I'm getting at here?
"Information wants to be paid"
With software, testing starts at the requirements stage. When you have captured the requirements you then force the customer to review them. You don't just get them to sign off documents, because they will happily do that without reading them. You get them to sit through a presentation. The same applies after the functional specs and you cross check the functional specs against the requirments.
All this before you have written one line of code!!!
As regards exploits if you code defensively against exploits, you will produce better code. You should never trust data that hasn't come out of a checked process and only through a failure-free path.
I also agree that Writing Solid Code by Steve Maguire is a good book. It is a pity that Microsoft seems to regard the practices described in these books as a luxury!!!!
See my journal, I write things there
Nobody can access my computer then - pretty neat, eh?
Seriously, 2K is much better than NT was but I wonder whether Microsoft actually knows what computer security is? We were taught the initials C.I.A. That is Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability.
It doesn't matter how a product fits into these categories as long as the customer knows what it is being provided. If you are selling a system and application to a customer and telling them that they can bet their business on it, then it had better not go down every other day or let the whole world and their dog every time you connect to the Internet.
See my journal, I write things there
1. Marketing != PR
2. Marketing != advertising
3. Marketing != reactive
Marketing is about Product, Price, and Position. It proactive and its scientific, what Microsoft confuses with Marketing is like confusing Socialogy with sleazy used cars salesmanship.
What they need to do, like the vast majority of corperations is completely seperate Marketing from advertising, and accounting. Real Marketing is much closer to R & D and should have a closer relationship to product developement than any other department.
1. Product needs work I think the real market has slipped out from under them.
Security, Stability, Speed in that order is where the market seems to be heading. Less consern with feature creap and more attention to make basic functionality rock solid and easy to use.
2. Price, who can beat free? that's what the consumer pays; after all it comes on the machine, very few people write a seperate check. Businesses on the other hand are kicking and screeming over liciensing costs lately. I guess they are tired of subsidising the consumer grade product. I chuckle when some suit says "open software is worth the price you pay for it." when their company is running 2K oem M$ licienses.
3. M$ has position down pat; they're everywhere.
Apocalypse Cancelled, Sorry, No Ticket Refunds
But is the world a better place because of Outlook? The answer was "no" when we saw HTML in email, and it's still "no" because of HTML in email. Nothing's changed, it's gotten worse as they have continually moved to support MORE crap in the client.
(*OK, so they didn't actually market this last point.)
All he says is that they're working on "meeting a threat". A threat that exists solely because they chose to install unneeded, unwanted, and ultimately insecure extensions to email. They chose to do so with plenty of forewarning that adding any automatic processing to email would create a viral breeding ground where none existed before. And that they did so simply to offer a free email reader to cut market share from competing email manufacturers just adds antitrust icing to the cake.
Yeah, I'm screaming. I'm screaming because I'm still pissed off. 8 years of this crap and it's only gotten worse.
John
John
Uh, huh.
Make an vague, content-free, 'fanboy'-type comment about Microsoft, and you are a martyr.
Suuuuurrrrreee.
I'll probably be quoting that somewhere, if you don't mind.
You're right of course - all I was trying to say was that only testing the finished software product, and only then by usage testing, is a poor development methodology. I wasn't intending to imply manufacturing does do that either, just that in my mind a manufacturing process has a more concrete 'finished product' - I get the impression you might have some ties to that part of industry :)
It's interesting to read in Writing Solid Code that before the practices in the book were made standard across MS, they had products cancelled because of runaway buglists. The book was published a few years ago now, so all current products were theoretically built using those methods, yet there are still some pretty fundamental mistakes being unearthed - use of a good libc would expose a lot of the buffer overrun problems that IIS has had, for example.
"don't fall into the fallacy of believing that Perl can solve social problems. Maybe Perl 6 can, but that's a ways off"