WinXP Security Flaw
Many readers have submitted word of the newest security hole in Windows XP. joshjs, for instance, writes: "Don't know if this is common knowledge at this point or not, but apparently some security researchers discovered that Windows XP's universal plug and play features contain a huge security flaw: 'A Microsoft official acknowledged that the risk to consumers was unprecedented because the glitches allow hackers to seize control of all Windows XP operating system software without requiring a computer user to do anything except connect to the Internet. ... Microsoft made available on its Web site a free fix for both home and professional editions of Windows XP and forcefully urged consumers to install it immediately.' Read more at the Washington Post's story." No OS is perfectly secure, but I bet a lot of new XP owners won't be too happy about this. Update: 12/20 20:05 GMT by T : fcrick submits a link to the same AP story at Wired, and several readers have pointed out that a patch is available. Update: 12/20 21:31 GMT by T : And as banuaba writes: "This hole also affects versions of 98 with XP File sharing installed and all versions of ME."
Plug your XP box to the internet and pray for the hackers not to find it.
Pedro Côrte-Real.
It's not really Microsoft's fault, if this guy would've stayed quiet then WinXP would still be secure today.
The information from Microsoft regarding this can be found here, as well as a patch.
"Oh, you wanted a DOOR to hang that lock on.... Sure, I guess we could do that..."
"This is the first network-based, remote compromise that I'm aware of for Windows desktop systems," said Scott Culp, manager of Microsoft's security response center."
This speaks for itself
Burn Hollywood Burn
"What rock has he been smoking" is perhaps more appropriate.
cat
Now Windows XP offers strong security to home computer users through Internet Connection Firewall protection, which makes your information, computers, and family data safer from intruders as soon as you start using Windows XP.
I guess that helped a lot.
"I don't know half of you half as well as I should like, and I like less than half of you half as well as you deserve."
Well technically this is probably true. There have been compromises of IIS, MSSQL, and other Microsoft products but the OS itself hasn't been vunerable to such attacks until now.
Now granted, IIS comes with Windows so, is that really a seperate component? Also, by the same logic, Linux has never been exploited either has it? I mean, does Linux run any network daemons on it's own? No. So Linux, itself is bulletproof, it's just all those other things you put on top of it that can cause problems.
I just find it amusing how Microsoft keeps changing where they want to split their hairs when distinguishing between the OS and the applications. IE is part of the OS until it gets compromised and then suddenly it's a seperate application.
This sig has been temporarily disconnected or is no longer in service
What the article doesn't mention is that Windows 98 with XP sharing is also affected, and that any version of Windows ME is affected as well.
If you are running Windows 98 or ME, you should immediately go to Microsoft's website and download the patch for your system.
A more technical description can be found here.
Windows 2000 is not affected.
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"Over four hours without a remote hole in the default install!"
The Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) service allows computers to discover and use network-based devices. Windows ME and XP include native UPnP services; Windows 98 and 98SE do not include a native UPnP service, but one can be installed via the Internet Connection Sharing client that ships with Windows XP. This bulletin discusses two vulnerabilities affecting these UPnP implementations. Although the vulnerabilities are unrelated, both involve how UPnP-capable computers handle the discovery of new devices on the network.
The first vulnerability is a buffer overrun vulnerability. There is an unchecked buffer in one of the components that handle NOTIFY directives - messages that advertise the availability of UPnP-capable devices on the network. By sending a specially malformed NOTIFY directive, it would be possible for an attacker to cause code to run in the context of the UPnP service, which runs with System privileges on Windows XP. (On Windows 98 and Windows ME, all code executes as part of the operating system). This would enable the attacker to gain complete control over the system.
The second vulnerability results because the UPnP doesn't sufficiently limit the steps to which the UPnP service will go to obtain information on using a newly discovered device. Within the NOTIFY directive that a new UPnP device sends is information telling interested computers where to obtain its device description, which lists the services the device offers and instructions for using them. By design, the device description may reside on a third-party server rather than on the device itself. However, the UPnP implementations don't adequately regulate how it performs this operation, and this gives rise to two different denial of service scenarios.
In the first scenario, the attacker could send a NOTIFY directive to a UPnP-capable computer, specifying that the device description should be downloaded from a particular port on a particular server. If the server was configured to simply echo the download requests back to the UPnP service (e.g., by having the echo service running on the port that the computer was directed to), the computer could be made to enter an endless download cycle that could consume some or all of the system's availability. An attacker could craft and send this directive to a victim's machine directly, by using the machine's IP address. Or, he could send this same directive to a broadcast and multicast domain and attack all affected machines within earshot, consuming some or all of those systems' availability.
In the second scenario, an attacker could specify a third-party server as the host for the device description in the NOTIFY directive. If enough machines responded to the directive, it could have the effect of flooding the third-party server with bogus requests, in a distributed denial of service attack. As with the first scenario, an attacker could either send the directives to the victim directly, or to a broadcast or multicast domain.
Mmmmmmm
Oh the fun you could have with BackOrificeXP right now... User tries to get patch, Evil haX0r-d00d shoots out a pop-up and mp3: a little Strauss music and a MsgBox reading, "I don't think I can let you do that, Dave."
woof.
[1] As opposed to that Win95 "fix" they called Win98 that you had to pay for.
How do you forcefully urge people?
Along similar lines of "Writing Solid Code".
Wait for it, wait for it...
"Writing Secure Code"
This is for those who are sympathetic to the MS responsible reporting policies:
The flaw, discovered five weeks ago threatened to undermine widespread adoption of Microsoft's latest windows software...
The company sold 25 million copies of Windows XP in the two weeks after it hit stores Oct. 25...
The company released a free fix thursday.
So beyond consideration that MS delay releasing XP until this hole is fixed. The best thing to do is keep it secret (responsible reporting) until they get around to writing the patch sometime. In fact, the biggest threat here is that it will "undermine the adoption" of XP -- i.e. they might not sell as many copies if people know there is a huge hole in the OS. No mention of threat to users, etc.
For reference, look at the motorola exploit in the jargon file.
I wonder how many times this has to happen before people are convinced that making bugs available and publicly releasing exploit code is the only way that the big vendors will make security a top priority.
When in doubt, have a man come through a door with a gun in his hand.
Comments: First, don't mod me up as "informative"; I didn't write any of that. If you're considering modding me up as informative, consider unchecking "willing to moderate" or at least read the moderator guidelines. Second, does MS put out products with such glaring, horrible security flaws *on purpose*? As far as I know, the UPNP feature is brand new, so it shouldn't be based on any existing code base, yet MS programmers are *still* using unsafe commands (presumably) and not doing bounds checking. This is a buffer overflow vulnerability in a new product, for fuck's sake.
-Legion
For all you Linux-heads that haven't installed XP, the installer determines by asking you if you are connected directly to the Internet or if you are connected to a LAN --- if you're directly connected, YOUR CONNECTION IS AUTOMATICALLY FIREWALLED. Which means, that if MS did its math correctly, most people connecting to the Internet should already be protected, patch aside.
Now, what if you're on a LAN? You should already be behind a firewall. So theoretically the only people vulnerable are corporate users vulnerable from attacks INSIDE the company. That narrows it down, doesn't it?
Ooooh, it's a bug!! So what?!? I believe "security by obscurity" has proven to work this time. When did /. hear about this bug? Today. When was the patch released? Prolly before we heard about it. Nuff said.
But then, you know, Linux doesn't have bugs (eyeroll). Why is it that when Win* has bugs, it's headline news on /., but all the bugs in the 2.4 kernel go unnoticed? Oh yeah, heh, I forgot, this is Slashdot. Honestly, guys, grow up.
Like all the Linux boxen running pretty much any version of wu-ftpd and vulnerable versions of BIND (and there are A LOT) are safe. Hah. Why don't you look at the fact before you start posting flamebait......
"Linux" as a trademark is owned by Linus. Not the software.
The GNU affects you only if you wish to redistribute GNU copyrighted software. It is not an EULA, and no one is "licensed" to use or install GNU Software. Anyone can install/configure/run/modify it however they want.
When in doubt, have a man come through a door with a gun in his hand.
There have been a number of remote exploits in Win9x filesharing, first of all. I don't know of anything affecting an "out of the box" installation, but if you had a Win95 box that had any writeable shares, even password protected ones, even deeply nested in the filesystem ones, your computer could have been remotely compromised.
Secondly, does anyone remember a little thing called Outlook Express? Sure, most of the popular worms exploited the unpatchable "Stupid User" bug, but there have been at least two that left your computer remotely compromisable from just the Preview pane of the email (thanks to HTML buffer overflows) and one that would let your computer be compromised as email was downloaded (thanks to email header buffer overflows). Of course, the preview pane bugs were really Microsoft HTML component bugs, so could be triggered by Internet Explorer hitting a malicious page even if you didn't use Outlook.
And if there's one thing that Microsoft has taught us, it's that Internet Explorer is an essential part of the Windows(TM) Operating System eXPerience.
We ran into this several months ago when we were testing some server software that we wrote. We were using port 5000 as a default. As soon as XP came out, we tested the software on it and found that we could not bind a server to port 5000 at all because it was taken. So naturally, we wondered, what in XP is listening on port 5000?
Turns out that Microsoft picked the same port for its Plug and Play architecture, which listens on it for a connection coming (presumably) through the local TCP/IP stack. The protocol is XML (maybe SOAP, can't remember). You can receive and send configuration information by using that port (the schema is somewhere on microsoft.com) and it occurred to me even then that this looked like a potential security hole. But, I thought, this is too blatantly obvious and surely Microsoft is not so stupid as to allow access to the PnP internals from nonlocal IPs. Right? So we simply moved our software's default port setting to another port and forgot about it.
Predictions:
The scandal will flow off MS in a day or two, like water off a duck's back.
The downloadable security patch will be bundled with the latest updates to Microsoft's digital rights management crap.
Every script kiddie will have a tool within the week that scans IP ranges on port 5000 in search of the machines that have remained unpatched.
The guy who publicized the flaw will be tried in a secret military tribunal as a cyberterrorist.
>
>You don't think the Feds dropped the antitrust case for nothing, do you?
I may have misadjusted my tinfoil hat this morning, but it struck me that a PC configured to send out unicast malformed NOTIFY messages to exploit the previously-undisclosed UPnP hole on a specific target machine... well, it'd look to the UPnP service like piece of hardware. Hardware like a lantern, if you will, shining a light on the suspect's machine... *evil grin*
At risk of losing all my karma, but here goes.... if you enable XP's built in firewall on a network interface, you'll discover that you can no longer connect to the universal plug and play service on that interface. So yes, it helps a lot actually!
Lead developer, http://wisptools.net
The GPL is a EULA..
EULA = "End User License Agreement". They are a way of taking away user's first sale rights. The GPL does not try to foist any license agreement on end users. In fact it states
5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not signed it. However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or
distribute the Program or its derivative works.
So you are confusing a license to redistribute something (which is required for all copyrighted works) with a license to use a copyrighted work. Microsoft has the latter in the form of EULA. Linux doesn't. Microsoft has the former in the form of often secret agreements with OEMs. Linux has the former with the publicly available GPL. Apples and oranges.
When in doubt, have a man come through a door with a gun in his hand.
How are *users* supposed to know about this?
I mean, it's OK for you and me, we read techie web sites like slashdot, and I'm subscribed to bugtraq. But 99.9% of the public out there aren't.
So, somewhere informative should be yelling and screaming about a problem like this that affects pretty much everyone with WinME or XP.
So, I check MS's website.
Top article with the biggest link? No. That goes to 'Give the gift of Internet for Christmas', an advert for MSN.
Ah, there's a Windows section just beneath - surely it'll be there? Nope. "Music, movies and more".
Maybe it counts as 'News'? "Test Results In - Windows XP more reliable" (at least if its getting your computer rooted you're after).
Downloads perhaps? An item at least for a security fix - the Internet Explorer one discussed last week, but no mention of any XP patches. Not even if I click "More downloads".
Maybe if you click on the 'Windows' section? No mention. But that's for the Windows XP Home edition. Maybe the Pros think it's more useful? No. "Turn your computer into an entertainment center" - very professional.
Aha - finally found it; chose a link from the Windows XP Home page to the Windows XP home page (note capitalisation difference) and theres a small link there "Important! Security patch for Windows XP and Windows ME users" on a page that apparently has the main intention of allowing people to choose whether they want the home edition or the professional edition sites, neither of which has the link.
Oh, and as an aside, is it just me, but I'm using Internet Explorer 5 with default font size settings, on Win NT 4 with default font size settings, and some of the text on the security bulletin is only about 6 pixels tall and is utterly unreadable because of this?
The idea that full-disclosure means "immediate disclosure" is simply not true.
TWW
"Encyclopedia" is to "Wikipedia" what "Library" is to "Some people at a bus stop"
How do you know there hasn't already been one. After all, security through obscurity means not telling users how bad things really are.
TWW
"Encyclopedia" is to "Wikipedia" what "Library" is to "Some people at a bus stop"